Gary, Jon, List,
I find this very confusing. I think, there is the "distinction of being thought and really being", and that the truth exists before, or without being "constituted", whatever "constituted" means, does it mean generated, like a constitution is, or is it just an announcement of achieved knowledge? I think the latter. Otherwise we have platonism, anthropocentrism, nominalism, whatever. I mean, God existed before organisms capable of "thought" existed, or not?
Besr regards, Helmut
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 24. Oktober 2024 um 18:36 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>
An: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Peirce-L" <[email protected]>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Peirce and Anselm
Von: "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>
An: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Peirce-L" <[email protected]>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Peirce and Anselm
Jon, List,
You quoted Peirce, then asked 4 questions:
CSP: In defence of the argument, it may be said that the distinction of being thought and really being does not exist in the case of deity. ... That an ideal of a God is required to bring our general conceptions to unity is admitted on all hands. And that ideal God would not be such unless it were regarded as having existence and therefore it constitutes a hypothesis of a real God and as this hypothesis is required in every state of Cognition, its truth is constituted thereby.
These statements prompt several questions in my mind.
1. What exactly does Peirce mean by "bring our general conceptions to unity"?2. In what sense is "an ideal of a God" required for this, such that "a hypothesis of a real God ... is required in every state of Cognition"?3. Was this really uncontroversial in the mid-19th century, i.e., "admitted on all hands"?4. Even if so, is it still uncontroversial today? (I suspect not.)
I'm away from my downtown apartment and, so, my desk and library, and I will be for about a week. Consequently I can't read the 6th Lowell lecture just now. So, my question and comments may turn out to be off base (or obvious).
My question is: Does it in any way change the direction of our thinking if we make this one editorial change in the Peirce quotation above?
CSP: In defence of the argument, it may be said that the distinction of being thought and really being does not exist in the case of deity. ... That an ideal of a God is required to bring our general conceptions [of God] to unity is admitted on all hands. And that ideal God would not be such unless it were regarded as having existence and therefore it constitutes a hypothesis of a real God and as this hypothesis is required in every state of Cognition, its truth is constituted thereby.
Then the four questions might be reflected on in that light: that Peirce is not talking about "our conceptions" generally, but specifically of our conceptions of God. So:
[Those who today believe in God might even in our age hold something like Perice's view. That is, before one can consider God's possible attributes or properties (traditionally, omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence) that a hypothetical ideal God (such as is argued for in the N.A.) is needed. For Peirce God must be thought of, first, as Ens Necessarium, and that is God's real being (the thought and the reality are one). Everything that we might subsequently postulate about God's being would then be unified in that idea. As you wrote regarding the two kinds of definitions: "in a nominal definition, the copula only means would be, while in a real definition, it also means actually is." So, for Peirce the real definition of God is: Ens Necessarium.1. What exactly does Peirce mean by "bring our general conceptions [of God] to unity"? [See below.]2. In what sense is "an ideal of a God" required for this, such tha "a hypothesis of a real God ... is required in every state of Cognition" [of God]? [See below.]3. Was this really uncontroversial in the mid-19th century, i.e., "admitted on all hands"? [Perhaps what everyone ("all hands") might have agreed upon was that an ideal of God (such as Ens Necessarium?) is required before other general conceptions (attributes/properties) of God might then be brought to unity?4. Even if so, is it still uncontroversial today? (I suspect not.)
Now, again, I don't have that Lowell lecture at hand, nor can one access the PDF in your earlier post you linked to in the Peirce Archives, so I'm not certain of the context of your short quotation. Yet it seems to me that for Peirce the ideal of God as Ens Necessarium is logically the unifying idea that represents the reality that is God.
Or perhaps I'm just redundantly stating the obvious. (I've been assuming that your take on the quotation was more general than mine.)
Best,
Gary R
On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 10:21 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Suteerth, List:Thanks for your response. FYI, my middle name is Alan (not Allen), and List protocol is that we "reply all" to any post to which we are responding, or (my personal preference) simply reply and then change the "To:" line to [email protected]. Either way, the "Subject:" line is then unchanged in everyone's e-mail inboxes, and the posts are properly threaded in the online archive (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/).I am inclined to agree that "reducing our concepts to unity" likely means "explaining diverse things using one idea." As for the definition of "God," we have discussed in various recent threads--perhaps before you joined the List--that Peirce's was ultimately Ens necessarium (CP 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908), "that which would Really be in any possible state of things whatever" (R 339:[295r], 1908).Taken together, his much earlier texts that I quoted in my previous post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-10/msg00046.html) seem to imply that "a hypothesis of a real God" corresponds to "the conception of being" as "that which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the manifold to unity," especially in conjunction with this passage that he wrote in between.CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. Accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is One; and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake of an identical being. (CP 1.487, c. 1896)In summary, Peirce appears to be saying that it is impossible to unify the observed variety of the universe--i.e., "bring our general conceptions to unity"--without the ideal conception and explanatory hypothesis of a real God as Ens necessarium, the One root of all being, "the Principle of all Phenomena" and "the author and creator of all that could ever be observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or Logoi" (R 339:[295r]). If that is right, then it answers my first two questions, but I remain interested in seeing what others have to say about all four of them.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran ChristianOn Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 1:29 PM suteerth vajpeyi <[email protected]> wrote:I am certainly not that well read in religious literature but I can still put forward a conjecture.What is meant by reducing our general conceptions to unity ?By reducing our concepts to unity, peirce may mean explaining diverse things using one idea. So we explain the multitude of the qualities, relations and representations of dogs, cats, humans, apes, elephants, giraffes etc. by bringing them all under one concept- the concept of a mammal. How in the world is the idea of a god required for this? For that we must try to define god. God is the ultimate ideal of all degrees of truth, goodness and admirable-ness in the universe. That is why we worship god. Ideals are required for all types of unification of ideas. For that we must show that ideals are required for all the three peircean categories of thought. Thirdness or thought requires a basic reference to truth. Secondness or action requires a basic reference to the good and feeling requires reference to admirableness. In other words, if thought, action and feeling are to be able to fulfil their functions they must conform to ideals. Finally goodness, truth and admirableness in an infinite degree all united in one god/deity help to guide all the things we are capable of doing that is thinking, acting and feeling.I really have no clue about the non-controversial nature of this doctrine so I cannot answer your third and fourth questions.P.S. this is not decisive content. I can only hope that it helps to churn thought in you and others with the result that better ideas are put forward.
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