Helmut, Gary R., List: I largely agree with Gary's remarks below. To clarify, what I am *primarily *up to in this thread is seeking confirmation or correction of how I am interpreting Peirce's 1866 statements about Anselm's ontological argument. I have already quoted his description of what he views as the strongest point in its favor, but I will now add that it comes immediately after his summary of what he views as the strongest point *against *it.
CSP: The definition of God, then, is not peculiar in implying the existence of its object. Every definition does so. Anything would exist if it did exist. And what a thing would be if it did exist is all that a definition can assert. The argument, therefore, rests upon a confusion between *would be* and *is*, between *being thought* and *being*. In defence of the argument, it may be said that the distinction of *being thought* and *really being* does not exist in the case of deity. (W 1:447, 1866) Again, this is the difference between a nominal definition and a real definition--merely stipulating what something *would be* if it were real vs. also establishing that it *actually is* real. "God" is unique as "*the *definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908), the One being whose existence/reality directly follows from its essence/possibility. Nevertheless, the possibility of such a being must then be *demonstrated* to convert the nominal definition of God into a real definition. Following Leibniz's example, Peirce seems to hold that treating the *reality *of God as a highly plausible hypothesis to explain "the co-reality of the three universes" as "all the phenomena there are" successfully achieves this. In fact, here is what he says next, which I omitted at the ellipsis in my initial quotation. CSP: What is meant by truth? What do we mean for instance when we say that it is *true *that there is a statue of Daniel Webster in front of the State-house? We mean that if we were to go there we might see it and feel it. That is what we mean and yet to say that we should see it and feel it, that is should have such sensations, is not to say that it is there so much as to say that evidence of its being there would be afforded. We mean then by saying that a fact is true, that an indefinitely great amount of evidence upon the point, not *ex parte* [from only one party], would be overwhelmingly in favor of the fact, not against it. If, therefore, a hypothesis is required--an indefinitely large number of facts or as many as you please being taken into account--that constitutes the truth of the hypothesis. (W 1:447-448) On the other hand, as Gary already noted, Peirce explicitly rejects the *existence *of God in accordance with his peculiar metaphysical conception of that mode of being. CSP: The anti-generality of reaction is of great consequence in logic. We have seen that existence consists in reaction against the body of the universe. That existence is no general character is a point of great importance, insisted on by Kant and by Scotus. It furnishes the answer to the [ontological] argument that God must exist because God is, by definition, a perfect being, and existence is an attribute of perfection. Anything that exists is a logical individual, which no general description can distinguish and no general law can explain, but which stands without a reason and defies the universe to annul it. Thus individuality consists in reaction. (NEM 4:349, 1899-1900) Existence is not a predicate, and God does not exist because *Ens necessarium* is not a logical individual that "stands without a reason." Instead, "God" is "*the *definable proper name"--unlike all other proper names, a general description *can *distinguish its only possible object, whose rational explanation is the necessity of its own nature. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 2:53 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, Jon, List, > > HR: ". . .there is the "distinction of being thought and really being" > GR: Peirce claims that this is not the case for God. CSP: ". . . it may > be said that the distinction of *being thought* and *really being* does > not exist in the case of deity. . ." For after all 'God' is 'o*ur* God' > even if one conceives of God cosmically as both Jon and I do. > > And it is fairly easy to imagine a far distant point in humankind's > history where there was *no* thought of God (no abduction: 'there is > God') despite God's timeless Reality. > > And the definition of God as "Ens Necessarium" is, after, a hypothetical > one, and Peirce's God in 'A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God' is a > hypothetical God. You can imagine in that essay that Peirce imagines that a > future scientific metaphysics might make some headway towards proving his > hypothesis. That certainly seems to be what Jon is up to. > > HR: ". . . the truth exists before, or without being "constituted". . ." > GR: *Reality* is such as it is no matter what anyone, or any group (even > of scientists), or any community or society thinks it is. But the Truth of > Reality is discovered along the way (as it is paradigmatically discovered > in science), but in the long run or, rather, asymptotically approached. > > HR: "[is there simply an] announcement of achieved knowledge? > GR: All knowledge is fallible. But there are some things which seem fairly > scientifically secured, for example, that water is H2O. But that 'certain > truth' could possibly be overturned in some future rigorous investigation. > Peirce once suggested that even 1 + 1 = 2 might not necessarily hold up in > future far reaching investigation. > > HR: I mean, God existed before organisms capable of "thought" existed, or > not? > GR: Despite the necessity of the use of the word 'is' even when discussing > God, Peirce made it clear that to say that God 'exists' is fetishistic. God > is not an existential 'thing' like other 'things' in the universe. God, > however *is* 'Real. Now what is meant by saying 'God is Real' is another, > far reaching discussion. > > What I personally think that Peirce is getting at is that a 'real > definition' of God -- Peirce's definition being, 'Ens Necessarium' -- is > required to get the investigation going. > > I might add that while Jon and I disagree on certain significant points > relating to religious metaphysics, we are both attempting to approach the > topic scientifically. So was Peirce, of course. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 1:51 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary, Jon, List, >> >> I find this very confusing. I think, there is the "distinction of being >> thought and really being", and that the truth exists before, or without >> being "constituted", whatever "constituted" means, does it mean generated, >> like a constitution is, or is it just an announcement of achieved >> knowledge? I think the latter. Otherwise we have platonism, >> anthropocentrism, nominalism, whatever. I mean, God existed before >> organisms capable of "thought" existed, or not? >> >> Besr regards, Helmut >> >
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