List: What we are discussing here is the *metaphysical *hypothesis that God as *Ens necessarium* is real, not any *religious *beliefs about God. Other than offering that clarification, I just have two comments about the logical claim in #2 below.
First, affirming the consequent is indeed a fallacy in *deductive *logic, where the conclusion is *necessary*; but it is precisely the form of *abductive *inference (CP 5.189, EP 2:231, 1903), where the conclusion is merely *plausible*, which is the very reason why Peirce also calls the latter *retroduction*--"reasoning from consequent to antecedent" (CP 6.469, EP 2:441, 1908). Of course, his "Neglected Argument" is explicitly abductive/retroductive, so there is no problem with formulating it accordingly--believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding; and if God were real, then this would be a matter of course; hence, there is reason to suspect that God is real--especially in light of Peirce's statement, "If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction" (CP 5.196, EP 2:234). Second, as an alternative, we can simply revise the argument to make it deductively valid--if believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding, then I am justified in believing in God; and believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding; hence, I am justified in believing in God. One can certainly *reject *the first premiss and deem the argument *unsound *accordingly, but it is not at all *fallacious*. Moreover, that would then call for a reason *why *the first premiss is (allegedly) false. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 2:25 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, list > > 1] Because Peirce wrote of ‘god’ isn’t the point I was trying to make - > which was/is the importance of pragmaticism when validating our concepts of > the world. > > 2] the pragmatic benefits of a belief in god can be compared to any > societal set of rules-about-how-to-live. And can hardly be understood as a > result only in a belief in god. > And therefore, can’t be used as a validation of such a belief…ie.. that > would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent. > IF I am justified in believing in god, THEN, I will have intellectual > satisfaction, moral grounding.. > I have intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding > Therefore - my belief in god is justified > The above is a fallacy. [affirming the consequent] > > 3] Ah- now, I would definitely disagree with your outline of the > ur-continuity and an omniscient and omnipotent being. I prefer Peirce’s > Nothing-Chaos…an indeterminate ‘pure energy' > > 4] I don’t think that a general is equivalent to existence [ ie, thirdness > is not reducible to secondness]. > > 5] Yes - my understanding is that Mind, as a process of rational > organization of matter is operative in all realms - the physicochemical, > the biological and the conceptual. > > I was not talking about this rational process in my comment - but only > about the human use of symbolic forms - where we assign arbitrary meaning > to a form, ie..the ’sound’ of the word ‘cat’ refers to that animal. As > such, we humans can assign meanings to terms that have no existential > reality. ..and are thus, not subject to the logical and material > existential limits imposed by pragmaticism and objective idealism. > > So- the human species can, arbitrarily, declare that X behaviour is good > and Y behaviour is bad, when no such predicates can, in the objective > world, be applied to such behaviour. We find this in all societal > ideologies - from the political to the religious. > > And that is why I suggest that religious beliefs about the reality of god > are outside of argumentation since thy are beliefs without objective > reality. - outside of pragmaticism and objective idealism. > > Edwina > > On Oct 25, 2024, at 2:58 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > ET: I am not going to deal with the concept of god - since I consider it > a belief that one either accepts or rejects, and thus, outside the realm of > scientific or even logical examination. [the logic tends to be circular] - > but some of your phrases made me think of Peirce’s foundational argument > for pragmaticism: > GR: And yet Peirce wrote not infrequently of God (so capitalized) and not > only in A Neglected Argument. And, of course, Peirce, an extraordinary > logician and scientist, believed in God and thought that a scientific > metaphysics could prove his hypothesis of the reality of God. (I no longer > write 'Him' for God, for I consider that a word more suitable for theology > than for religious metaphysics). > > ET (quoting Peirce): “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have > practical bearings, you conceive the objects of your conception to have. > Then, your conc > eption of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object > [5.438]. > GR: In the N.A. and elsewhere Peirce discusses the potential *pragmatic > *benefits > to humanity of a belief in God should it be proved, linking such belief to > practical outcomes, intellectual satisfaction, moral grounding, and more. > > "If God Really be.. . in view of the generally conceded truth that > religion, were it but proved, [it] would be a good outweighing all others. > . ." (in the N.A.) CSP > > > ET: To me, this means that, as Peirce pointed out with his support of > objective idealism rather than idealism [ 6.24], that reality requires at > some time, a movement into discrete existentially or ‘really being'. That > is, the universe does not operate within only the generalities of Thirdness > [ or even the qualities of Firstness] but requires Secondness. > GR: As I have argued here, perhaps somewhat differently than JAS and, > possibly differently from Peirce, the Blackboard analogy in the last of the > 1898 Cambridge Lectures suggests to me that 'before' the putative 'Big > Bang' that an ur-continuity allowed for a omnipotent and omniscient being, > viz., God, to 'scribe' all three Universal categories upon that > proto-cosmic 'blackboard'' these, then, in Gottes Zeit these burst forth > into the trichotomic semiotic cosmic being which is our Universe. As has > been repeatedly argued here by me and others, that 'nothing' preceding the > putative (for me, alleged) Big Bang is *not* the empty "nothing of > negation" (as Peirce phrases it), but rather is an open and indeterminate > state of primordial generative possibility: everything in general; > nothing in particular: 'ideas' for a universe yet to be. On the > primordial blackboard is 'scribed' those characters or 'ideas' (Peirce > says, 'Platonic ideas') which out of an infinite number of characters will > together form the building blocks of this, our, Universe. (Btw, to refer to > 'Platonic ideas' is not to suggest that Peirce was a Platonist but merely > to suggest, as Peirce does, out of an infinite number of these universal > forms, only some will serve in the structuring of *this *cosmos. In the > proto-cosmos they are real, but not existent). > > ET: I understand the term of ‘reality’ as a reference to the general > mode of organization - and thus, conclude that this ‘general’, though real > in the sense that it is not a subjective or intellectual [ human] concept > cannot be ‘real’ unless articulated within actualities. > GR: In my understanding, Peirce means by reality not "the general mode of > organization" (that would tend to reduce reality to existence). Rather: > "The real is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would > finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me > and you." > > But you are surely right in suggesting that for most practical purposes > this asymptotic agreement in the long run on any given Truth of Reality > requires an existential world. But precedes the creation of the world -- > the universe -- is unique. By saying "God is really creator of all three > universes," Peirce expresses his metaphysical view that in which God is the > origin of everything, 1ns, possibility, 2ns, actuality, and 3ns, law, and > is necessary for there to be cosmic coherence and unity. > > ET: That is - hypotheses remain abstract concepts - and thus, in the > human species which alone uses symbolic concepts, > GR: But you yourself have argued that Peirce held a rather expansive view > of Mind, seeing it as present not only in human symbolic thought, but > also in natural processes and patterns. Mind can be found wherever there's a > tendency to form habits or to act in ways that produce regularity. And it is > this viewpoint which I consider to be the basis of *objective idealism*. > You have occasionally offered Peirce's examples of bees building hives and and > crystals growing in structured forms. So, in short, Mind is present in > any process where habits or regularities develop (including evolutionary > development which involves the change in habits and so involves 1ns along > with 2ns and 3ns). In a semiotic universe pervaded by a trichotomy of sign > relations, nature can even exhibit forms of representation: bees can ' > interpret” the environment to build hives or to find food, and crystals > can 'interpret” chemical conditions to grow in structured ways, some > proving essential to life processes. > > But again, the case of the Reality of God is unique and extraordinary. > Peirce writing that "God is really creator of all three universes" is not > only attributing the creation of all three universal categories to God but > commencing his argumentation (in the N.A.) with the necessary reality of a > Ens Necessarium as a testable hypothesis which he outlines in that article > (and its Additmaents) and so confronts your assertion that "these > concepts if left as such without any movement into scientific empiricism, > remain confined to their rhetorical ideology" E.T. > > Of course it is possible to find Peirce's argumentation in the N.A. > unpersuasive and some scholars have. Still, the N.A. is meant to initiate a > unique investigation into the Reality of God and its argumentation seems to > me solid enough, Yet, as you know, I have found other work by Peirce > conducive to a view of the cosmos as panentheism and so concluded my > lengthy post of 9/18 outlining that viewpoint thusly: > > In a word, a panentheistic vision, particularly with its emphasis on the > cosmos as an *integral sign* (*uni*verse) which is in turn an *evolving > complexus > of signs*, offers an argument for both theists and atheists to find > common ground. It allows for a view of reality that is suffused with > meaning, structured by logic, and compatible with scientific inquiry, while > also retaining space for religious awe and wonder. This approach can serve > as a bridge, fostering dialogue and understanding across traditionally > opposing worldviews. > > > -ET: [Certain beliefs] can, of course, become dangerous, as they did in > the medieval Christian era of which claims, heresy, inquisitions. > GR: Well, Peirce -- and we critical thinking postmoderns -- are far past > that (although there are plenty people in the world who aren't and who, for > example, have turned even the ethical principles of Christianity -- such as > brother-/sisterly love, inclusion, compassion, mercy, forgiveness, > humility, justice etc. -- on their heads. On the other hand, I have > witnessed in recent years an overgeneralization of the *worst* of > religion -- and not only as it currently appears in some forms of > Christianity, but also in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism. Meanwhile, dictators, > tyrants, and would-be autocrats get 'off the hook' relatively speaking. I > personally know many good Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus. But, as a > book by Kathleen Nott put it many years ago, the problem is that "The > Good Want Power," where 'want' here means 'lack'. Meanwhile, there are > indeed many deluded religionists. > > ET; My point is that Peirce’s work is founded on pragmaticism and > objective idealism and thus - I don’t see how outlines describing purely > idealist concepts fit in with this work. > GR: I have tried to address your point as well as I could in my comments > above. I doubt that I will have convinced you of many -- if any -- of my > points. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 9:59 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R, List >> >> I am not going to deal with the concept of god - since I consider it a >> belief that one either accepts or rejects, and thus, outside the realm of >> scientific or even logical examination. [the logic tends to be circular] - >> but some of your phrases made me think of Peirce’s foundational argument >> for pragmaticism: >> >> “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, >> you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception >> of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object [5.438]. >> >> To me, this means that, as Peirce pointed out with his support of >> objective idealism rather than idealism [ 6.24], that reality requires at >> some time, a movement into discrete existentially or ‘really being'. That >> is, the universe does not operate within only the generalities of Thirdness >> [ or even the qualities of Firstness] but requires Secondness. >> >> I understand the term of ‘reality’ as a reference to the general mode of >> organization - and thus, conclude that this ‘general’, though real in the >> sense that it is not a subjective or intellectual [ human] concept cannot >> be ‘real’ unless articulated within actualities. >> >> That is - hypotheses remain abstract concepts - and thus, in the human >> species which alone uses symbolic concepts, these concepts if left as such >> without any movement into scientific empiricism, remain confined to their >> rhetorical ideology. One can maintain them as such [ ie, the >> belief/hypothesis of the reality of bad luck numbers] . Or one can move >> them into the empirical realm of testing [ the acknowledgment that bacteria >> exist and cause illness]. >> >> Or- if left as hypotheses/beliefs - They can, of course, >> become dangerous, as they did in the medieval Christian era of which >> claims, heresy, inquisitions. >> >> My point is that Peirce’s work is founded on pragmaticism and objective >> idealism and thus - I don’t see how outlines describing purely idealist >> concepts fit in with this work. >> >> Edwina >> >
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