List: Like I said, one can certainly reject the first premiss of my deductive alternative and deem it unsound accordingly. My point in bringing it up was more formal than material--as demonstrated below, *any* justificatory rationale can be substituted for both the antecedent of the conditional proposition and the second premiss, with the argumentation remaining logically valid (not fallacious).
Moreover, *every *deductive argumentation is ultimately "circular" in the sense that because it represents *necessary *inferences, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already implied by the premisses. This is only problematic when the conclusion is covertly *assumed *by one of those premisses, such that it may be fairly described as having been "smuggled into" them. In any case, like I also said, what Peirce associates directly with pragmatism is abduction/retroduction--*ampliative *reasoning, "the only logical operation which introduces any new idea" (CP 5.171, EP 2:216, 1903). According to him, the transcendent reality of God as *Ens necessarium* is a highly plausible metaphysical hypothesis (not a religious belief) to explain the co-reality of the three universes (and corresponding categories) that together encompass any and all observable phenomena. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 5:54 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, list > > You wrote: > > -if believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral > grounding, then I am justified in believing in God; and believing in God > gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding; hence, I am > justified in believing in God. > > I consider this pragmatically empty. Replace the terms: > > IF believing that witches cause illness gives me intellectual satisfaction > and moral grounding [ because I know who/what to blame], THEN, I > am justified in believing in witches as causal of illness. > > Essentially this argument sets up, not a pragmaticist format of > evidentiary requirements but an entirely individual subjective and > emotional format. Its evidentiary ‘proof’ is circular - ie - it is > confined; it rests within the individual’s private emotions. As Peirce said > - to make individuals the locus of proof is ‘most pernicious [ > can’t remember the site].. > > The point is - such an argumentative framework rejects scientific and thus > objective reasoning. It is circular - and abduction is not circular but > moves from multiple inductive empirical observations to form a possible > hypothesis. That is the point of pragmaticism and objective idealism - > that these arguments are grounded in existential observations and > experiences. . > > Edwina >
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