JAS, list .You wrote:
> -if believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding, > then I am justified in believing in God; and believing in God gives me > intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding; hence, I am justified in > believing in God. I consider this pragmatically empty. Replace the terms: IF believing that witches cause illness gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding [ because I know who/what to blame], THEN, I am justified in believing in witches as causal of illness. Essentially this argument sets up, not a pragmaticist format of evidentiary requirements but an entirely individual subjective and emotional format. Its evidentiary ‘proof’ is circular - ie - it is confined; it rests within the individual’s private emotions. As Peirce said - to make individuals the locus of proof is ‘most pernicious [ can’t remember the site].. The point is - such an argumentative framework rejects scientific and thus objective reasoning. It is circular - and abduction is not circular but moves from multiple inductive empirical observations to form a possible hypothesis. That is the point of pragmaticism and objective idealism - that these arguments are grounded in existential observations and experiences. . Edwina > On Oct 25, 2024, at 6:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List: > > What we are discussing here is the metaphysical hypothesis that God as Ens > necessarium is real, not any religious beliefs about God. Other than offering > that clarification, I just have two comments about the logical claim in #2 > below. > > First, affirming the consequent is indeed a fallacy in deductive logic, where > the conclusion is necessary; but it is precisely the form of abductive > inference (CP 5.189, EP 2:231, 1903), where the conclusion is merely > plausible, which is the very reason why Peirce also calls the latter > retroduction--"reasoning from consequent to antecedent" (CP 6.469, EP 2:441, > 1908). Of course, his "Neglected Argument" is explicitly > abductive/retroductive, so there is no problem with formulating it > accordingly--believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral > grounding; and if God were real, then this would be a matter of course; > hence, there is reason to suspect that God is real--especially in light of > Peirce's statement, "If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you > will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction" > (CP 5.196, EP 2:234). > > Second, as an alternative, we can simply revise the argument to make it > deductively valid--if believing in God gives me intellectual satisfaction and > moral grounding, then I am justified in believing in God; and believing in > God gives me intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding; hence, I am > justified in believing in God. One can certainly reject the first premiss and > deem the argument unsound accordingly, but it is not at all fallacious. > Moreover, that would then call for a reason why the first premiss is > (allegedly) false. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 2:25 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary, list >> >> 1] Because Peirce wrote of ‘god’ isn’t the point I was trying to make - >> which was/is the importance of pragmaticism when validating our concepts of >> the world. >> >> 2] the pragmatic benefits of a belief in god can be compared to any >> societal set of rules-about-how-to-live. And can hardly be understood as a >> result only in a belief in god. >> And therefore, can’t be used as a validation of such a belief…ie.. that >> would be the fallacy of affirming the consequent. >> IF I am justified in believing in god, THEN, I will have intellectual >> satisfaction, moral grounding.. >> I have intellectual satisfaction and moral grounding >> Therefore - my belief in god is justified >> The above is a fallacy. [affirming the consequent] >> >> 3] Ah- now, I would definitely disagree with your outline of the >> ur-continuity and an omniscient and omnipotent being. I prefer Peirce’s >> Nothing-Chaos…an indeterminate ‘pure energy' >> >> 4] I don’t think that a general is equivalent to existence [ ie, thirdness >> is not reducible to secondness]. >> >> 5] Yes - my understanding is that Mind, as a process of rational >> organization of matter is operative in all realms - the physicochemical, the >> biological and the conceptual. >> >> I was not talking about this rational process in my comment - but only about >> the human use of symbolic forms - where we assign arbitrary meaning to a >> form, ie..the ’sound’ of the word ‘cat’ refers to that animal. As such, we >> humans can assign meanings to terms that have no existential reality. ..and >> are thus, not subject to the logical and material existential limits imposed >> by pragmaticism and objective idealism. >> >> So- the human species can, arbitrarily, declare that X behaviour is good >> and Y behaviour is bad, when no such predicates can, in the objective world, >> be applied to such behaviour. We find this in all societal ideologies - >> from the political to the religious. >> >> And that is why I suggest that religious beliefs about the reality of god >> are outside of argumentation since thy are beliefs without objective >> reality. - outside of pragmaticism and objective idealism. >> >> Edwina >>> On Oct 25, 2024, at 2:58 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Edwina, List, >>> >>> ET: I am not going to deal with the concept of god - since I consider it a >>> belief that one either accepts or rejects, and thus, outside the realm of >>> scientific or even logical examination. [the logic tends to be circular] - >>> but some of your phrases made me think of Peirce’s foundational argument >>> for pragmaticism: >>> GR: And yet Peirce wrote not infrequently of God (so capitalized) and not >>> only in A Neglected Argument. And, of course, Peirce, an extraordinary >>> logician and scientist, believed in God and thought that a scientific >>> metaphysics could prove his hypothesis of the reality of God. (I no longer >>> write 'Him' for God, for I consider that a word more suitable for theology >>> than for religious metaphysics). >>> >>> ET (quoting Peirce): “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have >>> practical bearings, you conceive the objects of your conception to have. >>> Then, your conc >>> eption of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object >>> [5.438]. >>> GR: In the N.A. and elsewhere Peirce discusses the potential pragmatic >>> benefits to humanity of a belief in God should it be proved, linking such >>> belief to practical outcomes, intellectual satisfaction, moral grounding, >>> and more. >>> "If God Really be.. . in view of the generally conceded truth that >>> religion, were it but proved, [it] would be a good outweighing all others. >>> . ." (in the N.A.) CSP >>> >>> ET: To me, this means that, as Peirce pointed out with his support of >>> objective idealism rather than idealism [ 6.24], that reality requires at >>> some time, a movement into discrete existentially or ‘really being'. That >>> is, the universe does not operate within only the generalities of Thirdness >>> [ or even the qualities of Firstness] but requires Secondness. >>> GR: As I have argued here, perhaps somewhat differently than JAS and, >>> possibly differently from Peirce, the Blackboard analogy in the last of the >>> 1898 Cambridge Lectures suggests to me that 'before' the putative 'Big >>> Bang' that an ur-continuity allowed for a omnipotent and omniscient being, >>> viz., God, to 'scribe' all three Universal categories upon that >>> proto-cosmic 'blackboard'' these, then, in Gottes Zeit these burst forth >>> into the trichotomic semiotic cosmic being which is our Universe. As has >>> been repeatedly argued here by me and others, that 'nothing' preceding the >>> putative (for me, alleged) Big Bang is not the empty "nothing of negation" >>> (as Peirce phrases it), but rather is an open and indeterminate state of >>> primordial generative possibility: everything in general; nothing in >>> particular: 'ideas' for a universe yet to be. On the primordial blackboard >>> is 'scribed' those characters or 'ideas' (Peirce says, 'Platonic ideas') >>> which out of an infinite number of characters will together form the >>> building blocks of this, our, Universe. (Btw, to refer to 'Platonic ideas' >>> is not to suggest that Peirce was a Platonist but merely to suggest, as >>> Peirce does, out of an infinite number of these universal forms, only some >>> will serve in the structuring of this cosmos. In the proto-cosmos they are >>> real, but not existent). >>> >>> ET: I understand the term of ‘reality’ as a reference to the general mode >>> of organization - and thus, conclude that this ‘general’, though real in >>> the sense that it is not a subjective or intellectual [ human] concept >>> cannot be ‘real’ unless articulated within actualities. >>> GR: In my understanding, Peirce means by reality not "the general mode of >>> organization" (that would tend to reduce reality to existence). Rather: >>> "The real is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would >>> finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me >>> and you." >>> >>> But you are surely right in suggesting that for most practical purposes >>> this asymptotic agreement in the long run on any given Truth of Reality >>> requires an existential world. But precedes the creation of the world -- >>> the universe -- is unique. By saying "God is really creator of all three >>> universes," Peirce expresses his metaphysical view that in which God is the >>> origin of everything, 1ns, possibility, 2ns, actuality, and 3ns, law, and >>> is necessary for there to be cosmic coherence and unity. >>> >>> ET: That is - hypotheses remain abstract concepts - and thus, in the human >>> species which alone uses symbolic concepts, >>> GR: But you yourself have argued that Peirce held a rather expansive view >>> of Mind, seeing it as present not only in human symbolic thought, but also >>> in natural processes and patterns. Mind can be found wherever there's a >>> tendency to form habits or to act in ways that produce regularity. And it >>> is this viewpoint which I consider to be the basis of objective idealism. >>> You have occasionally offered Peirce's examples of bees building hives and >>> and crystals growing in structured forms. So, in short, Mind is present in >>> any process where habits or regularities develop (including evolutionary >>> development which involves the change in habits and so involves 1ns along >>> with 2ns and 3ns). In a semiotic universe pervaded by a trichotomy of sign >>> relations, nature can even exhibit forms of representation: bees can >>> 'interpret” the environment to build hives or to find food, and crystals >>> can 'interpret” chemical conditions to grow in structured ways, some >>> proving essential to life processes. >>> >>> But again, the case of the Reality of God is unique and extraordinary. >>> Peirce writing that "God is really creator of all three universes" is not >>> only attributing the creation of all three universal categories to God but >>> commencing his argumentation (in the N.A.) with the necessary reality of a >>> Ens Necessarium as a testable hypothesis which he outlines in that article >>> (and its Additmaents) and so confronts your assertion that "these concepts >>> if left as such without any movement into scientific empiricism, remain >>> confined to their rhetorical ideology" E.T. >>> >>> Of course it is possible to find Peirce's argumentation in the N.A. >>> unpersuasive and some scholars have. Still, the N.A. is meant to initiate a >>> unique investigation into the Reality of God and its argumentation seems to >>> me solid enough, Yet, as you know, I have found other work by Peirce >>> conducive to a view of the cosmos as panentheism and so concluded my >>> lengthy post of 9/18 outlining that viewpoint thusly: >>> >>> In a word, a panentheistic vision, particularly with its emphasis on the >>> cosmos as an integral sign (universe) which is in turn an evolving >>> complexus of signs, offers an argument for both theists and atheists to >>> find common ground. It allows for a view of reality that is suffused with >>> meaning, structured by logic, and compatible with scientific inquiry, while >>> also retaining space for religious awe and wonder. This approach can serve >>> as a bridge, fostering dialogue and understanding across traditionally >>> opposing worldviews. >>> >>> -ET: [Certain beliefs] can, of course, become dangerous, as they did in the >>> medieval Christian era of which claims, heresy, inquisitions. >>> GR: Well, Peirce -- and we critical thinking postmoderns -- are far past >>> that (although there are plenty people in the world who aren't and who, for >>> example, have turned even the ethical principles of Christianity -- such as >>> brother-/sisterly love, inclusion, compassion, mercy, forgiveness, >>> humility, justice etc. -- on their heads. On the other hand, I have >>> witnessed in recent years an overgeneralization of the worstof religion -- >>> and not only as it currently appears in some forms of Christianity, but >>> also in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism. Meanwhile, dictators, tyrants, and >>> would-be autocrats get 'off the hook' relatively speaking. I personally >>> know many good Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus. But, as a book by >>> Kathleen Nott put it many years ago, the problem is that "The Good Want >>> Power," where 'want' here means 'lack'.Meanwhile, there are indeed many >>> deluded religionists. >>> >>> ET; My point is that Peirce’s work is founded on pragmaticism and objective >>> idealism and thus - I don’t see how outlines describing purely idealist >>> concepts fit in with this work. >>> GR: I have tried to address your point as well as I could in my comments >>> above. I doubt that I will have convinced you of many -- if any -- of my >>> points. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 9:59 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> Gary R, List >>>> >>>> I am not going to deal with the concept of god - since I consider it a >>>> belief that one either accepts or rejects, and thus, outside the realm of >>>> scientific or even logical examination. [the logic tends to be circular] - >>>> but some of your phrases made me think of Peirce’s foundational argument >>>> for pragmaticism: >>>> >>>> “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, >>>> you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your >>>> conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object >>>> [5.438]. >>>> >>>> To me, this means that, as Peirce pointed out with his support of >>>> objective idealism rather than idealism [ 6.24], that reality requires at >>>> some time, a movement into discrete existentially or ‘really being'. That >>>> is, the universe does not operate within only the generalities of >>>> Thirdness [ or even the qualities of Firstness] but requires Secondness. >>>> >>>> I understand the term of ‘reality’ as a reference to the general mode of >>>> organization - and thus, conclude that this ‘general’, though real in the >>>> sense that it is not a subjective or intellectual [ human] concept cannot >>>> be ‘real’ unless articulated within actualities. >>>> >>>> That is - hypotheses remain abstract concepts - and thus, in the human >>>> species which alone uses symbolic concepts, these concepts if left as >>>> such without any movement into scientific empiricism, remain confined to >>>> their rhetorical ideology. One can maintain them as such [ ie, the >>>> belief/hypothesis of the reality of bad luck numbers] . Or one can move >>>> them into the empirical realm of testing [ the acknowledgment that >>>> bacteria exist and cause illness]. >>>> >>>> Or- if left as hypotheses/beliefs - They can, of course, become dangerous, >>>> as they did in the medieval Christian era of which claims, heresy, >>>> inquisitions. >>>> >>>> My point is that Peirce’s work is founded on pragmaticism and objective >>>> idealism and thus - I don’t see how outlines describing purely idealist >>>> concepts fit in with this work. >>>> >>>> Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to > repair / update all the links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of > the message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
