Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and real things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness doesn´t interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary).
Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are different kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, depending for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or something that not necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but reluctantly suspect, that it is not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If A then B"? or "No A without B", in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, depends on whether A exists or not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What for is God necessary? For the world, which exists, then God too exists. Or for logic, which doesn´t exist, but is real, then God too is at least real, but does not necessarily exist. Or do EGs, as they are "existential graphs", and nonmodal logic in general too, only count for existing things, but not for merely real things? I would find that funny, because it would mean, that you cannot substitute "A" with what you like, e.g.: "A = reality of A". I find it quite commonsentic and obvious, that it would be allowed to say: "The possibility of A exists", or the necessity. But in logic it is forbidden??
Best regards, Helmut
Jerry -
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My view is that one can come to different conclusions using modal logic.
1] For example, the Anselm-Hartshorne argument for god is:
’There’s a necessary being is logically possible [ with logically possible as the predicate or description of the necessary being] ]
Therefore, there’s a necessary being’. [because it’s possible is a description of its nature].
But - we could also easily conclude: therefore, ’there’s no necessary being is also logically possible’.
Or - ’There’s a necessary being is logically necessary
2] …but- this doesn’t make this necessary being to be ‘god’. It could be a …
Because one asserts
3] ‘ God is a necessary being’ - one can conclude that therefore, God is actual. '
But the problem with this is that a logical argument, whether possible or necessary, doesn’t prove that something is actual or existential . That is - the question has to be on whether the ’necessary’ also implies’ the actual’. [ Anselm’s ontological says that the two are merged; others disagree - ie they reject that ’the existence of an idea moves into the actual existence of a ’thing’.
Necessity and possibility arguments are complex!
Edwina
On Oct 27, 2024, at 6:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Jerry, List:I explained the quoted statement in the remainder of the same paragraph.JAS: In logic, possibility and necessity are not predicates any more than existence/actuality. Instead, they are modalities, which is why axioms must be added to classical logic to incorporate them, one of which is called T--if a proposition is necessarily true, then it is actually true. In the Gamma part of Existential Graphs, anything within a solid cut within a broken cut is asserted to be possibly true, while anything within a broken cut within a solid cut is asserted to be necessarily true. However, when Peirce ultimately abandoned cuts altogether in favor of shading, he needed a new notation for such graphs--"I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals" (R 500:3, 1911). Unfortunately, he never spelled out what he had in mind, but my newly published paper describes a plausible candidate (https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00026).Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran ChristianOn Sun, Oct 27, 2024 at 2:17 PM Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> wrote:List, Jon:On Oct 26, 2024, at 7:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:In logic, possibility and necessity are not predicates any more than existence/actuality.???Why?What forms of logic are you referring to?Which grammar of which logic informs your assertion?How is it plausible that this assertion is meaningful?[This statement directly contradicts chemical, biochemical and biological equilibrium processes as was well described by A. N. Whitehead.]CheersJerry
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