Good point, Gary. Still another way of thinking about it might be to
suppose that the emphasis is supposed to fall on "thing" rather than
"sign":
"no sign is a real THING" rather than "no sign is a REAL thing"; but that
doesn't sound very plausible to me. I like your solution better.
Joe Ransdell
Dear Joe, Gary Folks--
While we're raising questions about the distinctions among such notions as
the real, the existent and the true (their relationships to the categories
etc) -- I'd like to throw in a related question: Does existence as a mode
of being ever occur outside of representation or thirdness (as a mode of
being). Or is existence (and objects conceived of as merely existing -- ie
something less than signs) something that always swims in the contiuum of
representation. My personal understanding is that Peirce views objects as
something which we abstract from triadic or representational experience.
IOWs in the act of perceiving an object we are engaged in representation.
However, I do not take this interpretation of Peirce to mean that Peirce is
arguing that objects do not exist outside of our representation of them
because clearly he is not saying this. The fact that objects exist (and are
thus real in his definitional sense of the real as that which exist apart
from what we imagine) does not mean that we have access or experience of
objects apart from the triadic or representational mode of being
of which they are inextricably embedded. Nor I might add does it mean that
objects as we experience them representationally are necessarily other than
what they are -- in contrast to the view that we experience objects through
some distorting lens. What we experience is always a part of the truth --
our error is not that what we perceive is distorted but that we mistake the
small part of the truth that we perceive (from our limited POV) as being the
whole truth!
This view raises the question (I guess I'm trying to suggest an answer to my
own questions -- so my larger question is how does this solution seem to
yall) what then is the distinction between objects such as trees and
objects such as the word tree which are replicas of signs (or representamen
of representations -- is that the correct usage of these terms btw). My
answer is that both are abstractions. All are signs. So called objects are
merely signs that we have not interpreted as signs. So called objects are
signs in the universal mind of god or the universe -- but it is only when
we use these objects as signs for other objects that we think of them as
signs. IOWs what we have here is a confusion of level and meta level -- a
sort of category mistake. All is a sign -- all things are signs and all of
reality is merely a matter of signs interpreting signs. Indeed the modes of
being called qualtiy reaction and interpretation can each be conceptually
abstracted from the all inclusive reality of a universe of signs which is
itself a sign -- but all experience (in the fullest sense of the word) is a
matter of representation. At least I take this to be the overall thrust
of Peirce's comments though I must admit that in some context and on some
occassions his comments do seem to suggest that we can experience or know
objects or reactions without representation.
But as to the specific quote above -- I'm inclined to go with the reading
you suggest above, Joe. Gary's reading (while a good way of illustrating
the question or problem) changes the logic of Peirces statement. Yours, for
me, clarifies Peirces remark in what strikes me as a most plausible way.
Signs are not mere things -- however real. In fact, as I've argued above,
what we call things are actually abstracted from signs. Things are mere
replicas of signs as Gary has pointed out.
-- on a related note: Wittgenstein points out (according to PMS Hacker)
that when we say such things as "I have a pain" supposing we are describing
an internal object such as the sensation of pain we are instead actually
expressing the pain itself. The expression is less an indicative symbol of
pain as an exclamatory index of pain. I mention this because I think it
may have some bearing on the issue of the so called internal vs external
nature of experience. IOWs some seemingly symbolic sentences are actually
merely indexes -- dressed up in the traditional form of symbolic sentences.
This misunterpretation of how we are using language when speaking of such
things as feeling and thoughts (as I understand Wittgenstein) accounts for
much of the confusion we have about private language intuition and the like.
I think Peirce may be saying saying something similar.
And finally, (trying to squeeze a lot into this quick weekend note) -- I
found a passage of Leo Strauss on interpretation vs explanation (and how to
read texts in general) that I think is interesting both in terms of our
reading of this text as well as giving some insight into Strauss. He comes
off to me as not so sinister as I'd feared -- and in fact rather straight
forward. This "secret/privledged reading stuff is merely a common sense
admonition to be mindful of the context in which a writer is or was
expressing his views. Minorities are of necessity generally more aware of
this than those whose consciousness is limited by being of the majority
opinion. As Peirce has said all development is a matter of eliminating
options. On that which everyone agrees -- interpretation, development and
consciousness stops. Which is the danger of mistakenly supposing agreement
determines truth rather than truth being one factor that tends to promote
agreement over the long haul. Perhaps truth is the only factor that
promotes lasting agreement, but the trouble here is that lasting is a very
long time so mere agreement by itself (without consideration of the time
element) turns out to be a very poor measure of truth. Actually I think
our individual perceptions (even including illusions and delusions) are
excellent and indeed the only measure of personal truth -- but we must be
ever vigilent not to mistake our narrow individual truths (limited across
time and space) as the whole truth. But anyway I will try to post a short
Strauss passage later. Just musing as usual. I'm greatly enjoying this New
Elements and related discussion.
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
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