Ben, list, You say "if the connotation is, as Peirce says elsewhere, the meaning or significance which gets formed into the interpretant," Where does Peirce say that, Ben? That sounds like a mistaken paraphrase. Also, I don't know what is meant by speaking of meaning "in the sense of acceptation". Again, it doesn't sound like a Peiircean notion. I associate the idea of acceptance with that of belief, i.e. to accept x is to be persuaded to x/ And I am also puzzled by the notion that we are to make a distinction between evocation and connotation. Why would you suggest that? Maybe context is missing for all this. Or maybe I am just wrong about what he wouldn't say.
Joe. . ----- Original Message ----- From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2006 12:59 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Joe, list, I had a thought about an topic from February 2006. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Joseph Ransdell" To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, February 10, 2006 9:32 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? >>[Ben] Yet attributions, ascriptions, copulations, distributions, etc., >>etc., of predicates to subjects, or of accidents to substances, or of >>qualities to reactions, all have a certain similarity and parallelism. >>Then when we associate connotation in one way with firstness, quality, & >>iconicity and, in another way, with thirdness, >>meaning/implication/entailment, we get confused. Or at least I get >>confused. >[Joe] That is exactly the confusion that I was trying to express, Ben. .... I've come to think that the mistake here is to associate connotation generally with firstness, quality, & iconicity on account possibly mainly of the prominence of the case of a descriptive predicate term, the case which has been the focus of the "connotation x denotation = information" discussions. If the connotation is, as Peirce says elsewhere, the meaning or significance which gets formed into the interpretant, then we should recognize -- as equally valid modes of connotation along with the connoting of a quality -- symbolic designation of an object, and the symbolizing of a representational relation. In a way, the real "odd man out" is _denotation._ Not that the conception of denotation isn't valid. sign ------------ icon ------ resembling, portraying |> interpretant - |> symbol - |> evoking, connoting object ---------- index ----- pointing at, pointing to The main difference between Peirce's account of connotation & the "everyday" logical account, is that he at least sometimes equates connotation with significance, significance presumably including implication, while the everyday account, I think, tends to equate connotation with meaning in the sense of _acceptation_ (and perhaps with a meaning arising in an "obvious" way through a compounding of acceptations). For what it's worth, it also seems to me that, if an evocation/connotation distinction is to be made, it might be better made between that which is evoked information and that which is evoked (soever informatively) as subject matter or as a given. Under this account, icons and indices would generally not _connote_, though they easily _evoke_. Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 4/28/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 4/28/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
