Ben Udell wrote:
But first, on a general note, let me say that among the issues driving my
current display of confusion & error, is the question: if comprehension
is for quality & predicate, while denotation is for objects
(resistances/reactions), then what dimension is for representational and
logical relations themselves? Words like "not," "probably," "if," etc. do
not designate either qualities or objects, nor do they represent objects
as having this or that quality. What, then, do they connote? What do they
denote?>>
Dear Ben,
Here's my take on the questions you raise above. I would say that symbols
convey information and that they represent or stand for the meaning of
objects. Objects (which may be tangible or abstract) have both qualities
(forms) and locations (centers of gravity). The meaning of an object (its
consequence for other objects) depends upon both the objects qualities and
location.
One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center of
gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One
can not readily point to the quality or form an object because form is not a
matter of the object's location but of how the object is organized in space
and time. However one can illustrate the form or quality of an object by
providing a copy of another object that has similar properties. An object
that performs this function is called an icon. To adequately represent or
stand for an object's meaning we must refer to both its connotation and
location. Moreover, I think it is a mistake to restrict the notion of
objects to concrete tangible entities -- An object is anything that can be
represented. Abstract objects such as relations also have forms and
locations that can be connoted and denoted as discussed below.
It is my view (and I think Peirce's) that words or symbols such as "not",
"probably", "if" etc refer to and stand for abstract objects (relations)
that have that do indeed have specifiable forms and locations. "Not", for
example can, perhaps, be loosely defined as the abstract quality of lacking
membership in a particualar class. Many, perhaps all, objects can
participate in the abstact relational quality of "not" being a member of
some class. And these sorts of abstract relations can be illustrated and
pointed to. What makes "not" and all other abstractions difficult to
conceive and illustrate is that abstractions are not forms or qualities of
concrete objects themselves but are forms of the way in which concrete
objects relate to one another. Logical relationships are abstact
properties of the time/space continuum in which all concrete objects swim.
To illustrate them we need to point to actions (and their consequences) over
time and involving more than one concrete object. That's why math is not
for all of us -- me for example. A symbol that does not perform the iconic
and denotative function is like a gesture without movement -- sound and
fury signifying nothing. Again, myself a good example.
But most of all -- Thanks for all the interesting observations and
references. Much food for thought in what you've provided.
Cheers,
Jim Piat
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