Jim, Ben, list
Jim wrote:
An object is anything that can be represented. Abstract objects such
as relations also have forms and locations that can be connoted and
denoted as discussed below.
It is my view (and I think Peirce's) that words or symbols such as
"not", "probably", "if" etc refer to and stand for abstract objects
(relations) that have that do indeed have specifiable forms and
locations. "Not", for example can, perhaps, be loosely defined as
the abstract quality of lacking membership in a particualar class.
Many, perhaps all, objects can participate in the abstact relational
quality of "not" being a member of some class. And these sorts of
abstract relations can be illustrated and pointed to. What makes
"not" and all other abstractions difficult to conceive and illustrate
is that abstractions are not forms or qualities of concrete objects
themselves but are forms of the way in which concrete objects relate
to one another. Logical relationships are abstact properties of the
time/space continuum in which all concrete objects swim. To illustrate
them we need to point to actions (and their consequences) over time
and involving more than one concrete object.
I would tend to agree with this analysis, Jim. I'm trying to remember if
you tried to make it when Jon Awbrey was arguing for "pure symbols" a
while back. This would seem to address that issue rather neatly.
Gary
Jim Piat wrote:
Ben Udell wrote:
But first, on a general note, let me say that among the issues
driving my current display of confusion & error, is the question:
if comprehension is for quality & predicate, while denotation is for
objects (resistances/reactions), then what dimension is for
representational and logical relations themselves? Words like "not,"
"probably," "if," etc. do not designate either qualities or objects,
nor do they represent objects as having this or that quality. What,
then, do they connote? What do they denote?>>
Dear Ben,
Here's my take on the questions you raise above. I would say that
symbols convey information and that they represent or stand for the
meaning of objects. Objects (which may be tangible or abstract) have
both qualities (forms) and locations (centers of gravity). The
meaning of an object (its consequence for other objects) depends upon
both the objects qualities and location.
One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center
of gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an
index. One can not readily point to the quality or form an object
because form is not a matter of the object's location but of how the
object is organized in space and time. However one can illustrate the
form or quality of an object by providing a copy of another object
that has similar properties. An object that performs this function is
called an icon. To adequately represent or stand for an object's
meaning we must refer to both its connotation and location.
Moreover, I think it is a mistake to restrict the notion of objects to
concrete tangible entities -- An object is anything that can be
represented. Abstract objects such as relations also have forms and
locations that can be connoted and denoted as discussed below.
It is my view (and I think Peirce's) that words or symbols such as
"not", "probably", "if" etc refer to and stand for abstract objects
(relations) that have that do indeed have specifiable forms and
locations. "Not", for example can, perhaps, be loosely defined as
the abstract quality of lacking membership in a particualar class.
Many, perhaps all, objects can participate in the abstact relational
quality of "not" being a member of some class. And these sorts of
abstract relations can be illustrated and pointed to. What makes
"not" and all other abstractions difficult to conceive and illustrate
is that abstractions are not forms or qualities of concrete objects
themselves but are forms of the way in which concrete objects relate
to one another. Logical relationships are abstact properties of the
time/space continuum in which all concrete objects swim. To illustrate
them we need to point to actions (and their consequences) over time
and involving more than one concrete object. That's why math is not
for all of us -- me for example. A symbol that does not perform the
iconic and denotative function is like a gesture without movement --
sound and fury signifying nothing. Again, myself a good example.
But most of all -- Thanks for all the interesting observations and
references. Much food for thought in what you've provided.
Cheers,
Jim Piat
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