Patrick wrote:
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually
"exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic
process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a "Fallacy of
Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms.
Jean-Marc responded:
Not at all.
Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of Misplaced
Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in that context.
Peirce was not a nominalist.
Dear Patrick, Jean-Marc, Folks--
I have a bit of trouble keeping track of the similarities and differences
among the notions of true, real and existent as Peirce uses them.
I am especially unclear about the the application of the term real to his
category of Firstness. Are firsts real but non existent? Seems to me
the notion of real qualities (as opposed to illusory ones) only has meaning
in the context of qualities coupled with secondness as they are embodied in
objects.
In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love for
someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent and true are
related.
Best wishes
Jim Piat
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