Edwina, List: As I already pointed out, any of these categorial assignments ultimately depend on how one defines the terms, in what context, and for what purpose.
ET: But, as its information is always general, then, the distinction between past and future is irrelevant, and time becomes adaptive or progressive. According to Peirce, the distinction between past and future is quite important--"the mode of the Past is that of Actuality [2ns]," while "the Future ... is either Necessary [3ns] or Possible [1ns]" (CP 5.459, EP 2:357-358, 1905). Of course, I discuss this at some length in my recent paper, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" ( https://rdcu.be/b9xVm). ET: I also have a problem with defining 1st as a 'form'. Since it has no existentiality 'in itself', then I don't see how it can have a form, which to me, at least, involves a 'cell wall' so to speak, a specific image. According to Peirce, 1ns corresponds to Form as "quality, suchness" where 2ns corresponds to Matter as "that which exists" and 3ns corresponds to Entelechy as "that which brings things together" (NEM 4:292-300, 1904; cf. EP 2:303-304, 1904). ET: And of course, I reject the notion that 1ns involves ideas since an idea involves Mind. According to Peirce, 1ns corresponds to Ideas as "anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented" where 2ns corresponds to "the Brute Actuality of things and facts" and 3ns corresponds to "everything which is essentially a Sign" (CP 6.453&455, EP 2:434-435, 1908; cf. EP 2:478-479, 1908). He also associates 1ns with consciousness and 3ns with thought as different aspects of mind. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 8:11 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Mike, list > > A few further comments on your chapter - which I liked very much - and > your table. > > I was about to comment on 'my' terms for time [present, perfect, > progressive] vs your terms [present, past, future] but see that you've > already done that in your notes. My terms come rom the exceptional analysis > of time by Koichiro Matsuno. The point is, that 3ns is not simply > functioning in 'the future' but, as laden with habits, is also bringing > with it information from the past. But, as its information is always > general, then, the distinction between past and future is irrelevant, and > time becomes adaptive or progressive. > > My quibble about the spatial definition of 3ns as a 'triangle' is that I > reject the whole image - such a very common image - of the Peircean triad > [O-R-I] as a triangle. Such a form nullifies the actual nature of the triad > as one where the Interpretant is not a mimetic copy of the Object but is an > action of growth of information. > > I also have a problem with defining 1st as a 'form'. Since it has no > existentiality 'in itself', then I don't see how it can have a form, which > to me, at least, involves a 'cell wall' so to speak, a specific image. And > of course, I reject the notion that 1ns involves ideas since an idea > involves Mind. I prefer to consider Ideas as an abductive property and > define abduction as functioning within the categorical mode of 3-2... > Thirdness operating within physical connections; that is, Mind connectinn > to multiple local informational data - and - coming up thereby, with a > hypothesis to explain/organize this data. > > All in all - a great chapter. Thanks for letting us read it. > > Edwina >
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