Mike, List: MB: It seems to me that except for possibly First, Second and Third, that all Peircean uses of the universal categories are contextual.
I believe that we are generally on the same page here, although I also agree with Terry Rankin "that the essential categorical dynamic (1ns, 2ns, 3ns) is context-independent." Peirce quite intentionally gives these relatively generic names to his universal categories because they are "entirely new words without any false associations whatever" (CP 4.3, 1898). They obviously have a mathematical tinge and correspond directly to monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations accordingly, but he also states that "the purest conceptions of them" are phenomenological--namely, "quality, reaction, and mediation" (CP 1.530, 1903; cf. CP 4.3, 1898). That is why I consider these to be the most fundamental terminological alternatives to 1ns/2ns/3ns, rather than your choice of monad/particular/general. Where context comes into play is when we assign any three *other *terms to the members of a trichotomy. MB: I am intrigued with Peirce's concept of information as the area of breadth x depth, and have an instinct this may relate to space and light. I am not seeing the relation that you suspect, but maybe this is just a failure of imagination on my part. For Peirce, breadth and depth are *logical *terms that respectively pertain to the object (subject) and interpretant (predicate/signification) of a sign (proposition). CSP: The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*. This is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms are the *comprehension *of the Port-Royalists, the *content *(*Inhalt*) of the Germans, the *force *of De Morgan, the *connotation *of J. S. Mill. (The last is objectionable.) The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of the real objects of a sign, is called the logical *breadth*. This is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms are the *extension *of the Port-Royalists (ill-called *extent *by some modern French logicians), the *sphere* (*Umfang*) of translators from the German, the *scope *of De Morgan, the *denotation *of J. S. Mill. Besides the logical depth and breadth, I have proposed (in 1867) the terms *information *and *area *to denote the total of fact (true or false) that in a given state of knowledge a sign embodies. (EP 2:305, 1904) Given the context of this passage in "New Elements," I suggest that depth roughly corresponds to Form as 1ns, breadth to Matter as 2ns, and information to Entelechy as 3ns. Peirce elaborates further on breadth and depth in "The Fourth Curiosity" (R 200, 1908), but I will refrain from quoting another lengthy excerpt, especially since he does not say anything about information in that later manuscript. MB: For example, I still find characterizing the 'instantaneous present' as 1ns as one of the more challenging ones. As I discuss in my "Temporal Synechism" paper, for Peirce the present is not truly *instantaneous*. From a mathematical standpoint, it has *infinitesimal *duration (CP 6.110-111, EP 1:315, 1892); and from a phenomenological standpoint, it is *indefinite* such that "moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same" (CP 7.656, 1903). At the present, we *perceive *(1ns) prolonged states of things, like a sustained tone; we *experience *(2ns) gradual states of things, like the change from one note to another; and we *cognize *(3ns) relational states of things, like a musical performance (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878) In other words, time as a whole is continuous (3ns), with indefinite lapses (1ns) as its real parts, while discrete instants (2ns) with measurable intervals between them are actualized only upon being deliberately marked off for a particular purpose. My other recently published paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A 'Thicker' Theory" ( https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.1.04), makes the case for this aspect of Peirce's mature conception of a true continuum. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 12:18 PM Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Edwina, Auke, List, > > I am having a hard time understanding the reluctance to embrace 'context' > for Peirce's universal categories. It seems to me that except for possibly > First, Second and Third, that all Peircean uses of the universal categories > are contextual. Indeed, it is the triadic relations of a sign that even > allows for the formal treatment of 'context'. > > A simple perusal of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)> > shows the many areas he applied the categories. (Or the 60 or so examples I > have published in Table 6-2 > <https://www.mkbergman.com/publications/akrp/chapter-6.pdf>.) One of the > main points I have been arguing has been the importance -- at least to me > -- for studying these uses across contexts in order to better grok the > richness and character Peirce had in mind when referencing Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness. This is in keeping with Peirce's guidance for > natural classification as “only an enumeration of tests by which the class > may be recognized in any one of its members.” (CP 1.223, 1902) > > As to the 'force' of the universal categories, I guess I tend to try to > apply some form of 'indeterminant reductionism' to work my way back to the > most basic (root or fundamental or first) expression of the universal > categories, close to what might be the first sign to emerge at the moment > of the Big Bang. In that regard, candidates like energy, spin, direction > (propagation vector), light, or maybe waves appear to be close to the first > concepts. I feel this kind of analysis is essential to test the 'realness' > of the universal categories in relation to modern science and whether a > triadic foundation is both sufficient and necessary to represent all of > reality. I am intrigued with Peirce's concept of information as the area of > breadth x depth, and have an instinct this may relate to space and light. > Continuity and its relation to time and space also intrigue me. Whatever it > is, I think the components of the proto-sign should be before matter in E = > mcc (also consistent with today's standard cosmology > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_cosmology>). The pool of > candidates for these possible components should be quite limited. As to > what actual three components might represent that first sign and in accord > with which category is something I have been contemplating for a few years > now. It is probably my most active area of current Peirce research. > > At any rate, this assembling of concepts for 1ns, 2ns and 3ns across > instances of the use of the universal categories, including trying to > understand and use prescissive distinctions, have seemingly been helping me > understand the universal categories better. Or, perhaps, I am just deluding > myself. For example, I still find characterizing the 'instantaneous > present' as 1ns as one of the more challenging ones. > > Pointers or criticisms are heartily welcomed! > > Best, Mike >
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