Hi Jon, List,
Happy Pi Day!
Before addressing your question, Jon, I would ask you to spend a couple
of minutes thinking about where you would place your own studies and
analysis of existential graphs (EGs) within Peirce's Classification (use
the 1903 'perennial' one). . . .
OK. So, the first thing I would say is that the study of knowledge
representation (KR), in my view, subsumes the study of EGs. So the first
answer is to place KR as the parent of where you placed EG. An EG is a
specialized notation and rules for expressing logical relationships in a
symbolic language, which is (should be) one character of any formal KR
system.
Second, as for my own placement, my book [1, Part II] places the study
of KR under speculative grammar, as I explain in Chapter 7. The book
itself is called a '/practionary/' (in Kelly Parker's coinage [2, p
182], which he kindly allowed me to borrow), which is "all the practical
effects a thing could have in experience, and thus furnish the reader
with a better conception of the object.” Parker coined this term to
capture Peirce's discomfort (1902, NEM 4.30) with his "imperfect"
earlier expression of the pragmatic maxim “Consider what effects, which
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our
conceptions to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object” (1878, CP 5.402). Parker saw the
usefulness of laying out all of the practical effects a thing may have
(a 'practionary'), but that a “third-grade of clearness of apprehension"
also required personal "hands-on" experience. A practionary is thus an
approach under methodeutic. It is not surprising that the study of KR is
closely aligned to formal semiotic (or what Peirce also called
'categorics').
I can see a bit of your logic in suggesting KR to be placed under the
'Science of Review' but I think that applicable more to the assembly or
collection of extant KR systems or KR artifacts (if at all) than to the
study of them as a science. (Thus, KBpedia as a KR instantiation could
be placed there.) Beverly Kent [3, p 81] notes Peirce disdained this
approach as the "exudation" or "fossilized remains" of science as a
"systematized or organized body of knowledge". My understanding of
Peirce's classification of the sciences, obviously much informed by
Kent, is that principles and methods are the heart of the matter, not a
static organization or systematization. Still, as Peirce developed and
Kent then documents, he undertook at least 20 different classifications
over the period of 1866 to 1903 with many more minor ones. There are
many perspectives to be brought to bear on the questions of classification.
Lastly, I appreciate your contextual expressions of the categories under
Peirce's classification, but I do not view your expressions as uniformly
applicable across the branches as do you. In formal semiotic itself,
there are at least three universal category interpretations each under
speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic [1, Table 6-2]. There is
something universal about the categories, but that resides in their
'final cause' as well as specific instantiations in different contexts.
BTW, I have been slowly releasing the chapters [4] of my book in free
preprint versions, to be completed in the next month or so. Much more on
all of these topics is discussed there. I will complete that release
over the next few weeks, but I am happy to enable list members to obtain
them now either for the full book [1] or by individual chapters [4]. If
the specific chapter link is not yet active, simply substitute the
relevant number in the URL to get it now.
Best, Mike
[1] Bergman, Michael K. 2018. /A Knowledge Representation Practionary:
Guidelines Based on Charles Sanders Peirce/. Cham: Springer
International Publishing. See author's version at
https://www.mkbergman.com/pubs/akrp/a-kr-practionary.pdf (page numbers
for this version)
[2] Parker, Kelly A. 1998. /The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought/.
Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
[3] Kent, Beverley E. 1987. /Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the
Classification of the Sciences/. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
[4] https://www.mkbergman.com/a-knowledge-representation-practionary/
On 3/13/2021 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
A quick follow-up note--it seems obvious in retrospect, but it
occurred to me today that knowledge representation presumably falls
under what Peirce in his classification of the sciences calls "Science
of Review," which comes between "Science of Discovery" (mathematics,
philosophy, special sciences) and "Practical Science."
CSP: By "science of review" is meant the business of those who
occupy themselves with arranging the results of discovery,
beginning with digests, and going on to endeavor to form a
philosophy of science. Such is the nature of Humboldt's /Cosmos/,
of Comte's /Philosophie positive/, and of Spencer's /Synthetic
Philosophy/. The classification of the sciences belongs to this
department. (CP 1.182, EP 2:258-259, 1903)
CSP: Let science of review include all handbooks and digests, all
such works as those [of] Comte, Whewell, and Spencer, all
classifications and all histories of science, etc. (EP 2:458, 1911)
Do you agree? If so, then it only makes sense that the most salient
manifestations of 1ns/2ns/3ns would be different in that discipline
(monads/particulars/generals) than in phenomenology, where they are
found in their purest form (quality/reaction/mediation)--just as they
are different in normative science (feeling/action/thought), logic as
semeiotic (possibles/existents/necessitants), and metaphysics
(characters/things/habits).
Thanks again,
Jon
On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 8:31 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Mike, List:
MB: I'm in agreement with most of your points, but differ in two.
I am not sure that we really disagree even on those two.
MB: First, I chose monads, particulars and generals for KKO in
context to knowledge representation and the correspondence
with instances/classes in current KR languages.
This seems like mostly a difference in emphasis. As I have
admitted to you before, I do not know much about the discipline of
knowledge representation, so I will take your word for it that the
terminology of monads/particulars/generals is more appropriate for
your purposes within that context than quality/reaction/mediation.
MB: We know about the general modern discussion of information
and energy, and quite a few researchers have related this to
Peirce, entropy, and the 2nd law of thermodynamics
(Hermann-Pillith, Annila, Salthe, me).
I am not familiar with any of that literature either, so I will
refrain from further comment until you are able "to put forward a
coherent narrative."
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 9:48 PM Mike Bergman <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi Jon, List:
I'm in agreement with most of your points, but differ in two.
First, I chose monads, particulars and generals for KKO in
context to knowledge representation and the correspondence
with instances/classes in current KR languages. I'm not sure I
have a firm sense that Peirce himself had a firm sense of
which characterization he preferred. Your preferred canonical
version is 'quality, reaction, and mediation', not a bad
choice that I agree he propones, but he strongly proposed a
few variants and again that raises the contextual issue. I
simply can not see how one can fully understand the universal
categories without understanding their commonalities and
essences across instances of use. This is basic hierarchy and
categorization 101.
Second, Peirce is explicit about the depth and breadth of
information (1867, CP 2.407-8) or what he also called the area
(CP 2.419), a view he maintained for more than 35 years (1903,
EP 2:305), as you picked up in his later defense. This was a
major contributor to the discussion of intension and extension
in my hierarchy paper. We know about the general modern
discussion of information and energy, and quite a few
researchers have related this to Peirce, entropy, and the 2nd
law of thermodynamics (Hermann-Pillith, Annila, Salthe, me).
The relation to energy therefore deserves close inspection,
and our basic E = mcc does employ an area, only now one of
light. Since speed of light (c) is also a time concept, this
is perhaps evidence that time prescinds space. There is a
major theme underlying this that I will discuss with the list
when I am ready to put forward a coherent narrative.
Thanks, Mike
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com <http://cognonto.com>
http://mkbergman.com <http://mkbergman.com>
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman>
__________________________________________
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__________________________________________
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