Hi Jon, List:
I'm in agreement with most of your points, but differ in two. First, I
chose monads, particulars and generals for KKO in context to knowledge
representation and the correspondence with instances/classes in current
KR languages. I'm not sure I have a firm sense that Peirce himself had a
firm sense of which characterization he preferred. Your preferred
canonical version is 'quality, reaction, and mediation', not a bad
choice that I agree he propones, but he strongly proposed a few variants
and again that raises the contextual issue. I simply can not see how one
can fully understand the universal categories without understanding
their commonalities and essences across instances of use. This is basic
hierarchy and categorization 101.
Second, Peirce is explicit about the depth and breadth of information
(1867, CP 2.407-8) or what he also called the area (CP 2.419), a view he
maintained for more than 35 years (1903, EP 2:305), as you picked up in
his later defense. This was a major contributor to the discussion of
intension and extension in my hierarchy paper. We know about the general
modern discussion of information and energy, and quite a few researchers
have related this to Peirce, entropy, and the 2nd law of thermodynamics
(Hermann-Pillith, Annila, Salthe, me). The relation to energy therefore
deserves close inspection, and our basic E = mcc does employ an area,
only now one of light. Since speed of light (c) is also a time concept,
this is perhaps evidence that time prescinds space. There is a major
theme underlying this that I will discuss with the list when I am ready
to put forward a coherent narrative.
Thanks, Mike
On 3/9/2021 6:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:
MB: It seems to me that except for possibly First, Second and
Third, that all Peircean uses of the universal categories are
contextual.
I believe that we are generally on the same page here, although I also
agree with Terry Rankin "that the essential categorical dynamic (1ns,
2ns, 3ns) is context-independent." Peirce quite intentionally gives
these relatively generic names to his universal categories because
they are "entirely new words without any false associations whatever"
(CP 4.3, 1898). They obviously have a mathematical tinge and
correspond directly to monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations
accordingly, but he also states that "the purest conceptions of them"
are phenomenological--namely, "quality, reaction, and mediation" (CP
1.530, 1903; cf. CP 4.3, 1898). That is why I consider these to be the
most fundamental terminological alternatives to 1ns/2ns/3ns, rather
than your choice of monad/particular/general. Where context comes into
play is when we assign any three /other /terms to the members of a
trichotomy.
MB: I am intrigued with Peirce's concept of information as the
area of breadth x depth, and have an instinct this may relate to
space and light.
I am not seeing the relation that you suspect, but maybe this is just
a failure of imagination on my part. For Peirce, breadth and depth are
/logical /terms that respectively pertain to the object (subject) and
interpretant (predicate/signification) of a sign (proposition).
CSP: The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the
totality of the characters it signifies, are indifferently each
called its logical /depth/. This is the oldest and most convenient
term. Synonyms are the /comprehension /of the Port-Royalists, the
/content /(/Inhalt/) of the Germans, the /force /of De Morgan, the
/connotation /of J. S. Mill. (The last is objectionable.) The
totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of
the real objects of a sign, is called the logical /breadth/. This
is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms are the
/extension /of the Port-Royalists (ill-called /extent /by some
modern French logicians), the /sphere/ (/Umfang/) of translators
from the German, the /scope /of De Morgan, the /denotation /of J.
S. Mill.
Besides the logical depth and breadth, I have proposed (in 1867)
the terms /information /and /area /to denote the total of fact
(true or false) that in a given state of knowledge a sign
embodies. (EP 2:305, 1904)
Given the context of this passage in "New Elements," I suggest that
depth roughly corresponds to Form as 1ns, breadth to Matter as 2ns,
and information to Entelechy as 3ns. Peirce elaborates further on
breadth and depth in "The Fourth Curiosity" (R 200, 1908), but I will
refrain from quoting another lengthy excerpt, especially since he does
not say anything about information in that later manuscript.
MB: For example, I still find characterizing the 'instantaneous
present' as 1ns as one of the more challenging ones.
As I discuss in my "Temporal Synechism" paper, for Peirce the present
is not truly /instantaneous/. From a mathematical standpoint, it has
/infinitesimal /duration (CP 6.110-111, EP 1:315, 1892); and from a
phenomenological standpoint, it is /indefinite/ such that "moment
melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to
be entirely separate and yet not be the same" (CP 7.656, 1903). At the
present, we /perceive /(1ns) prolonged states of things, like a
sustained tone; we /experience /(2ns) gradual states of things, like
the change from one note to another; and we /cognize /(3ns) relational
states of things, like a musical performance (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129,
1878)
In other words, time as a whole is continuous (3ns), with indefinite
lapses (1ns) as its real parts, while discrete instants (2ns) with
measurable intervals between them are actualized only upon being
deliberately marked off for a particular purpose. My other recently
published paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A 'Thicker' Theory"
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.1.04
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.1.04>), makes
the case for this aspect of Peirce's mature conception of a true
continuum.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 12:18 PM Mike Bergman <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi Edwina, Auke, List,
I am having a hard time understanding the reluctance to embrace
'context' for Peirce's universal categories. It seems to me that
except for possibly First, Second and Third, that all Peircean
uses of the universal categories are contextual. Indeed, it is the
triadic relations of a sign that even allows for the formal
treatment of 'context'.
A simple perusal of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)>
shows the many areas he applied the categories. (Or the 60 or so
examples I have published in Table 6-2
<https://www.mkbergman.com/publications/akrp/chapter-6.pdf>.) One
of the main points I have been arguing has been the importance --
at least to me -- for studying these uses across contexts in order
to better grok the richness and character Peirce had in mind when
referencing Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. This is in
keeping with Peirce's guidance for natural classification as “only
an enumeration of tests by which the class may be recognized in
any one of its members.” (CP 1.223, 1902)
As to the 'force' of the universal categories, I guess I tend to
try to apply some form of 'indeterminant reductionism' to work my
way back to the most basic (root or fundamental or first)
expression of the universal categories, close to what might be the
first sign to emerge at the moment of the Big Bang. In that
regard, candidates like energy, spin, direction (propagation
vector), light, or maybe waves appear to be close to the first
concepts. I feel this kind of analysis is essential to test the
'realness' of the universal categories in relation to modern
science and whether a triadic foundation is both sufficient and
necessary to represent all of reality. I am intrigued with
Peirce's concept of information as the area of breadth x depth,
and have an instinct this may relate to space and light.
Continuity and its relation to time and space also intrigue me.
Whatever it is, I think the components of the proto-sign should be
before matter in E = mcc (also consistent with today's standard
cosmology <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_cosmology>). The
pool of candidates for these possible components should be quite
limited. As to what actual three components might represent that
first sign and in accord with which category is something I have
been contemplating for a few years now. It is probably my most
active area of current Peirce research.
At any rate, this assembling of concepts for 1ns, 2ns and 3ns
across instances of the use of the universal categories, including
trying to understand and use prescissive distinctions, have
seemingly been helping me understand the universal categories
better. Or, perhaps, I am just deluding myself. For example, I
still find characterizing the 'instantaneous present' as 1ns as
one of the more challenging ones.
Pointers or criticisms are heartily welcomed!
Best, Mike
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
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