What Bruno Latours writes about acquiring a nose (that is, acquiring the finely nuanced capacity to discriminate smells) seems to me, at least, relevant to the question of what might serve as a model for the work of phaneroscopy (the word makes it clear that the emphasis falls first and foremost on observation, not description, a form of *logos*). So, too, does CSP's own training as a wine connoisseur. Of course, the painter's ability, first, to discern the play of hues in what careless observers identify as the pure whiteness of snow and, then, to capture this play in pigments on canvas provides yet another model of discerning what stares us in the face (no small accomplishment!).
Is the question one regarding replicable experiments or rather is it a question of shared observations? Does not CSP assume that the object of inquiry is in principle available to an indefinite number of observers? It certainly may be the case that some observers never acquire a minimal degree of the observational competency (a kid in my biology could never see anything when he looked through a microscope, no matter how hard he tried!). But it must be the case that the object of inquiry is, *in principle*, available to any and all observers The community of inquirers must encompass a community of observers and, in turn, the latter presupposes that your observations might serve as a corrective and aid to mine. I come to realize the extent to which what I claim to observe is a distortion or even a fabrication when other observers appear to be unable to see what I see (more generally, to observe what I observe). To what extent are some expositors of CSP still held captive by an image (that of a beetle in a box only the individual can observe)? The allusion is of course to the later LW. The object of any scientific investigation, incl that of phaneroscopy, is in principle an intersubjectively observable phanneron. My remark about the categories being tints or tones on conceptions needs to be tied to my repeated insistence on the* heuristic function of the Peircean categories* (they were crafted and refined by CSP to guide and goad inquiry, finely attuning us to intimations of intelligibility frequently overlooked). The phenomenological derivation of the categories at once exemplifies and serves the systematic articulation of their heuristic function. The very identification of the categories implicitly points to their immanent operation in any heuristic undertaking, while their formal and recursive elaboration is guided at every turn by phenomenological observations. Not certain any of this helps. Hope it does. All best wishes to each of my co-inquirers, V Vincent Colapietro The Center for the Humanities Swan Hall, 175G 60 Upper College Road University of Rhode Island (URI) Kingston, RI 02881 Liberal Arts Research Professor Emeritus Philosophy & African American Studies Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 2:04 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello, > > > If the goal is to get a clearer idea of how to engage in the practice of > phenomenology, it might help to consider a paradigmatic case. Peirce's > remarks in "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic" (Nov. 1882) about > Kepler's *De Motu Stellae Martis* seem to offer such a case. Here are > some reasons why. > > > As the title indicates, Peirce wants to explain how one should study > logic. For the sake of developing a theory of critical logic, we need to > construct hypotheses that properly explain each of the main forms of > inference: abduction, deduction and induction. In doing so, we want to > develop the science of logic in such a manner that we > progress from descriptive, to classificatory to nomological theories. > > > The practice of phenomenology, I believe, should help us with the > following sorts of tasks at the initial stages of our logical inquiries: > > 1) to carefully analyze the phenomena that call out for explanation, > > 2) to detect possible sources of observational error, > > 3) to correct for observational errors, > > 4) to draw attention to the various relations of order present in the > phenomenon, > > 5) to guide us in making comparisons of the phenomena. > > > If all goes well, carrying out these tasks will enable us to > develop hypotheses with a better understanding of the forms of measurement > that can be applied to the phenomena being observed. What is more, it will > enable us to formulate mathematical models of the hypothetical relations > between the phenomena posited in our conjectures. Peirce's aim, he tells > us, is to make philosophical logic more rigorous as a science. Doing so > requires that we be able to make more exact deductions of what we predict > would follow as consequences from various possible tests. Mathematical > models are essential for making more exact deductions. > > > Consider the challenges Peirce faces in developing better explanations of > inductive inference. Prior accounts of induction, ranging from those > offered by Aristotle, Hume, Kant and Mill, all fail in various ways to > properly describe, classify and explain the grounds of the validity of > induction. Peirce seeks to improve upon their competing theories. > > > The data for an improved theory are examples of inductive reasoning. > Relying on our *logica utens*, we need to mark a distinction between > cases that are held to be instances of good inductive reasoning as compared > to cases of bad inductive reasoning. As an example of a particularly good > series of scientific inferences, Peirce suggests that Kepler's *De Motu > Stellae Martis* is perhaps "the greatest piece of inductive reasoning > ever produced." [CP 7.73] In fact, a major advantage of taking this work as > important phenomena for our theory of induction is that "it is possible to > follow Kepler's whole course of reasoning from beginning to end, and to > show the application of all the maxims of induction already laid down." > > > If our aim is to develop better hypotheses about how to classify > the different forms of abductive, deductive and inductive inference used in > Kepler's course of reasoning, then we need to engage in a phenomenological > analysis of our observations. In doing so, we should be able to analyze the > phenomena we are observing: the patterns of inference present on the pages > of Kepler's work. Carrying that through would be no small task, but it > would give us plenty of practice in the sort of phenomenological analysis > that Peirce thinks is instructive for the sake of building a better > philosophical theory of logic. > > > If anyone is interested in putting Peirce's phenomenological theory into > practice using Kepler's work as a case study, let me know. I'd be happy to > join you. > > > > Yours, > > > Jeff > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] < > [email protected]> on behalf of Gary Richmond < > [email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, March 25, 2021 9:12 PM > *To:* Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; Jon Alan Schmidt; De Tienne, Andre > *Cc:* VINCENT M Colapietro > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, Iconoscopy, and Peircean Category > Theory > > Gary f, Jon, Andre, List, > > Gary f wrote: > > ". . . the core practice [of phanerscopic observation] isn’t really > *observable*, not even by introspection. That makes it difficult to > design replicable experiments! Lately I’m thinking that “training” in the > practice would have to be something like guided meditation, with the guide > acting as a mentor." > > > Guided phaneroscopic practice may be an approach worth exploring. But who > shall be "the guide acting as a mentor"? Certainly Peirce didn't have one, > and neither did you (I think) nor I. At the moment I wouldn't know how to > begin to 'guide' someone in the core practice, but it's definitely > something worth considering, and so I intend to. At one point in my life I > was leading groups in guided meditation, but at the moment I don't see how > that skill might transfer to guiding phaneroscopic practice. But it's > definitely worth thinking about as, for one thing, I could definitely use a > collaborator or two to help develop this project! > > As for 'replicable experiments', I agree that such experiments would be > extremely difficult to devise. Perhaps two or more people could choose some > phenomenal 'field' to jointly observe, jot down what they prescind from > their observations, and share notes. Still, I tend to think of > phenomenology more as a solo activity in which the *iconoscopic* and > *trikonic* 'results' could, perhaps, serve as the basis for other's > observations. I say this because it was my experience that once I had in > mind some of Peirce's categorial 'characters' I could, for example, observe > and prescind the phaneral character of specific qualities, > actions-reactions, and thoughts. In any event, that was all I had to guide > me at the time. > > Gf: "[T]he actual practice is more like an art than a science." I would > tend to strongly agree. This echoes Andre's comment in the letter I posted > to the List: > > > AdT: "Usually such [elusive, phaneal] things are captured by poets, > without their knowing they are good at phaneroscopy." > > > I certainly have found something like this to be so, and it may be that > the poets (in several arts) may be some of our best guides towards > developing phaneral competency, if you will, suggesting in their work what > might be possible to observe in the phaneron as well as the kind of > language which might best capture such phaneral 'things'. > > Recently, the Franciscan mystic, writer, and teacher, Fr. Richard Rohr, > quoted Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel as writing: > > Rabbi Herschel: " The prophet is a poet. His experience is one known to > the poets. . . .What makes the difference between the prophet [or poet] > and the ordinary person is the possession of a heightened and unified > awareness of certain aspects of life. Like a poet, [the prophet] is endowed > with sensibility, enthusiasm, and tenderness." > > > I recall Peirce writing something to the effect that religion at its most > authentic is like poetry, but poetry completed (something like that). Be > that as it may, it has certainly been my experience that certain poetry and > prophetic literature which I have been responsive to has a tendency to > inspire me to engage in phaneral observation. It feels something like a > challenge the poet or prophet puts before me -- I, who am anything but > either of these! -- to observe the phaneron 'as it is', simply, > respectfully. > > Jon, thanks for reiterating and, so, emphasizing Gary's point that the > categories are "irreducible elements all of which are present (in varying > proportions) in *every* phenomenon in the universe of discourse." That > this is so makes not only phenomenology a difficult science to work in, let > alone develop, but every Peircean science which employs the categories is, > or at least ought to be, similarly challenged. > > I might add to another comment by Gary f: > > Gf: "[The categories] are ordered not serially but subsumptively, so we > have to *prescind* the Secondness of a phenomenon from its Thirdness, and > its Firstness from its Secondness." > > > While I certainly don't disagree with that comment whatsoever as it > relates to categorial 'subsumption' (as you noted, Peirce uses the term > 'involution') as such, *that* involutional order is but one of six > possible 'orderings', what I call paths (or 'vectors') through the three > categories as I've argued this in my "Outline of *trikonic*" paper (and > in sections of other papers) as well as numerous times on Peirce-L. > I have been gratified to see you, Jon, employ the vectors in at least one > of your papers. > > I diagram the categorial vectors as follows in the * trikonic* paper: > > [image: image.png] > > Shortly after that paper was published I realized that by 'analysis' I > meant what Peirce analyzes in his paper, "The Logic of Mathematics; An > Attempt to Develop My Categories from Within," namely, 'involution'. As > he uses both terms ('analysis' and 'involution') in describing that path, > 3ns-2ns-1ns (in that paper it is contrasted with its inverse, Hegelian > dialectic, what I call the *vector of order*, namely 1ns-2ns-3ns), I > thought that to avoid confusion that it was prudent to rename that > analytical path the *vector of involution* to distinguish it from other > forms of analysis (although, in a sense, it refers to these as well). It is > the only vector name which I have changed since the paper was published. > [Incidentally, before 'Outline of *trikonic*' was published I had been > calling what is now termed the *vector of process *in the diagram above*,* the > *vector of evolution*, but I came to believe that *process* is the more > inclusive term). > > JAS: . . . that since all other sciences of discovery in Peirce's > classification depend on phenomenology/phaneroscopy for their own > principles, [the principles discovered in phenomenology] should be > recognized and treated as fundamental principles of *every *science > (except pure mathematics). . . > > > I agree that it is most certainly the case that Peirce made clear that > principles discovered in the sciences earlier in the classification ought > to provide principles to those following--Peirce is quite clear on that. > But you continued. > > JAS: [Involution] needs to be maintained whenever we discuss or apply the > three categories. > > Now while involution is something of the understructure of the categories' > triadicity (again, as Gary f put it, the categories are " > <https://www.academia.edu/2435636/Non_linear_Process_in_Peirce_the_end_second_the_middle_third_>irreducible > elements all of which are present. . . in *every* phenomenon"), yet, it > seems to me that in many cases of tricategorial analysis that one (or > even more) of the other vectors needs to be considered as well, and this is > especially the case in categorial vector analysis. > <https://www.academia.edu/2435636/Non_linear_Process_in_Peirce_the_end_second_the_middle_third_> > For example, each of the three forms of inference, abduction, deduction, > and induction, follow a different vector (abduction--*vector of > representation*; deduction--*vector of involution*; induction--*vector of > determination*). Yet when these types of inference are considered > together in the design of what Peirce calls "a complete inquiry," they > follow a fourth path, the *vector of process*, 1ns - 3ns -2ns, so that > *abduction* (1ns; the forming of a hypothesis) is following in such an > inquiry by *deduction* (3ns, analyzing the hypothesis as to what might be > testable in it) followed by *induction* (2ns, the actual experimental > testing of what should be confirmed should the abduction be true). I should > add that, as we've discussed here in the past, in John Sowa's view (with > which I concur) the experiment the cycle of research does not stop with the > experimental results and their interpretations. This process vector is > the subject of a paper by Jamin Pelkey, "Non-linear Process in Peirce: 'the > end second, the middle third'." However, Pelkey seems unaware -- or at > least doesn't touch upon -- the other vectors, even the *vector of > involution*, nor does he acknowledge how the *vector of order*, which he > seems to disparage, has its proper logical function. But he does note that, > while there is "well worked out" among Peirce scholars a general > understanding of the irreducibility of triadic relations, a thorough > review of the literature reveals that an understanding of "triadic > interdependence" lags far behind. > > JP: The necessity of triadic relations, and their irreducibility, are now > well worked out; but our understanding of triadic interdependence > (relations between relatives), by contrast, may still be in its infancy. > > I have no idea how this situation might improve, but it is my sincere hope > that others will take up in earnest the study of tricategorial "relations > between relatives," and first within phenomenology. > Best, > > Gary > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 1:36 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary F., Andre, List: >> >> I am generally not a fan of "me too" posts and try to avoid sending them >> myself, but in this case I believe that the following statements bear >> repeating and cannot be emphasized enough. >> >> GF: [T]he Peircean categories are not a set of three separate bins into >> which we sort things or parts of processes. They are irreducible elements >> all of which are present (in varying proportions) in *every* phenomenon >> in the universe of discourse. And they are ordered not serially but >> subsumptively, so we have to *prescind* the Secondness of a phenomenon >> from its Thirdness, and its Firstness from its Secondness. >> >> >> I will even go so far as to suggest that since these are fundamental >> principles of phenomenology/phaneroscopy, and since all other sciences of >> discovery in Peirce's classification depend on phenomenology/phaneroscopy >> for their own principles, they should be recognized and treated as >> fundamental principles of *every *science (except pure mathematics). >> Peirce's preferred term for "subsumption" was "involution" and Robert >> Marty's is "presupposition," but whatever word we use for it, that notion >> needs to be maintained whenever we discuss or apply the three categories. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 9:32 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Gary, thanks for posting Andre’s impromptu letter on “phaneroscopic >>> analysis” to the list (and to Andre for giving permission to do that). It >>> offers some good explanations both of what this practice is (and isn’t), >>> *and* of why it’s so hard to describe. We can give some suggestions as >>> to what to do, as I did in *Turning Signs* (sometimes without calling >>> it “phaneroscopy” — in Chapter 2 >>> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm#trans> for instance), but the core >>> practice itself isn’t really *observable*, not even by introspection. >>> That makes it difficult to design replicable experiments! Lately I’m >>> thinking that “training” in the practice would have to be something like >>> guided meditation, with the guide acting as a mentor. Then it could be >>> usefully correlated with observables such as brain activity (as in >>> Francisco Varela’s “neurophenomenology”). >>> >>> For those of us who learn mostly by reading and writing, I think >>> description or explanation of the actual practice is more like an art than >>> a science. One has to give a peculiar twist to ordinary language now and >>> then (as Andre did a few times in his piece.) My own favorite artist in >>> this respect is Dogen Zenji, whom I quote in my book for that purpose. Once >>> Peircean category theory has emerged from the practice of phaneroscopy and >>> iconoscopy, then the logic of science takes over and we can apply them to >>> classification of signs or whatever. But that logic can go astray if we >>> forget that the Peircean categories are not a set of three separate bins >>> into which we sort things or parts of processes. They are irreducible >>> elements all of which are present (in varying proportions) in *every* >>> phenomenon in the universe of discourse. And they are ordered not serially >>> but subsumptively, so we have to *prescind* the Secondness of a >>> phenomenon from its Thirdness, and its Firstness from its Secondness. >>> >>> I don’t suppose I’m saying anything original here, so I might as well >>> stop. I don’t have much to say about the applications of Peircean category >>> theory anyway, so I’ll leave that to you (Gary and Andre) and others who >>> have taken it much further than I have. >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> } (Stoop) if you are abcedminded, to this claybook, what curios of signs >>> (please stoop), in this allaphbed! [*Finnegans Wake* 18] { >>> >>> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> [email protected] with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >
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