Peter Eisentraut wrote: > KaiGai Kohei wrote: > > I don't agree. What is the reason why? It has been unclear for me. > > > > The PGACE security framework is designed to allow users to choose > > an enhanced security mechanism from some of provided options. > > (Currently, we have sepgsql and rowacl.) > > It is quite natural that one is disabled when the other is enabled. > > As a general rule, mutually exclusive features as compile-time option > should be avoided at all costs. Since most people use binary packages, > forcing the packager to make such a choice will always make a lot of > people unhappy, or alternatively cause one of the features to bitrot. > > As a secondary rule, mutually exclusive features should be avoided at > all, without a compelling reason. I don't see such a reason here.
I think there is a reason to have SE-Linux be compile-time because there is no way to know at run time if the OS has the SE-Linux libraries, right? I assume this is similar to how we do LDAP. But your larger point is that SQL-row-level security should always be available, which I just posted about. -- Bruce Momjian <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + If your life is a hard drive, Christ can be your backup. + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
