Magnus Hagander <mag...@hagander.net> writes:
> On Mon, Dec 27, 2010 at 10:53, Magnus Hagander <mag...@hagander.net> wrote:
>> We could quite easily make a replication role *never* be able to
>> connect to a non-walsender backend. That would mean that if you set
>> your role to WITH REPLICATION, it can *only* be used for replication
>> and nothing else (well, you could still SET ROLE to it, but given that
>> it's not a superuser (anymore), that doesn't have any security
>> implications.
> Actually, having implemented that and tested it, I realize that's a
> pretty bad idea.
OK, so if we're not going to recommend that REPLICATION roles be
NOLOGIN, we're back to the original question: should the REPLICATION
bit give any other special privileges? I can see the point of allowing
such a user to issue pg_start_backup and pg_stop_backup.
regards, tom lane
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