On tor, 2010-12-23 at 17:29 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > Josh Berkus <j...@agliodbs.com> writes: > > On 12/23/10 2:21 PM, Tom Lane wrote: > >> Well, that's one laudable goal here, but "secure by default" is another > >> one that ought to be taken into consideration. > > > I don't see how *not* granting the superuser replication permissions > > makes things more secure. The superuser can grant replication > > permissions to itself, so why is suspending them by default beneficial? > > I'm not following your logic here. > > Well, the reverse of that is just as true: if we ship it without > replication permissions on the postgres user, people can change that if > they'd rather not create a separate role for replication. But I think > we should encourage people to NOT do it that way. Setting it up that > way by default hardly encourages use of a more secure arrangement.
I think this argument is a bit inconsistent in the extreme. You might as well argue that a superuser shouldn't have any permissions by default, to discourage users from using it. They can always grant permissions back to it. I don't see why this particular one is so different. If we go down this road, we'll end up with a mess of permissions that a superuser has and doesn't have. -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
