> I think that's actually a good thing to forbid. I think I agree Andres, there are already comments in the appendShellString function to this effect - they say that CR/LF chars in a file name are mostly used for malicious hacking attempts anyways - I know I've hardly ever needed a newline in a file name.
Did you see anything else in my code that you have recommendations about? I made sure to free the PQExpBufferStr vars that I allocated. Best, Ryan On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Andres Freund <and...@anarazel.de> wrote: > On 2016-08-18 09:14:44 +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 12:21 AM, Ryan Murphy <ryanfmur...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > I have created a better patch (attached) that correctly escapes the > shell > > > arguments using PQExpBufferStr and the appendShellString function, as > per > > > Michael and Andres' suggestions. > > > > > > Further suggestions welcome of course. > > > > As far as I know, it is perfectly possible to have LF/CR in a path > > name (that's bad practice btw...), and your patch would make initdb > > fail in such cases. Do we want to authorize that? > > I think that's actually a good thing to forbid. >
