> > Beyond all that is the problem of data retention. It's likely that a > secure system will encourage key expiration, if for no other reason > than to keep moving away from once-secure techniques that become > insecure due to increased computing power, clever algorithm > developments, or whatever. If that's true, what do you do will all the > messages that arrived encrypted with your old key?
I think that the answer to the data retention problem is a "Maxwell's Daemon encryption bot". No-one in the process cares which keys are being used, only that the materials are being kept encrypted and secure. So the notion that materials can remain static and safely encrypted is really not feasible in the long run. So either we only can expect encrypted communications to have a half-life, and that after some term they are deleted, or there needs to be some agent/bot that re-encrypts them. If we are changing keys and we are changing encryptions mechanisms on a regular basis, then it would make sense to go through all your materials on a regular basis and re-encrypt them. This would likely be a huge burden on a person. But it would be reasonable to have a bot that managed the keys, the encryption and the encryption grooming (re-encryption) for all of the materials you want to keep encrypted. And this then works us back to the models of trust that need to be re-thought in order to make large scale adoption of secure communications meaningful. -- John Sechrest . Need to schedule a meeting : http://sechrest.youcanbookme.com . . . . sechr...@gmail.com . @sechrest <http://www.twitter.com/sechrest> . http://www.oomaat.com . _______________________________________________ PLUG mailing list PLUG@pdxlinux.org http://lists.pdxlinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug
