Maybe better, I do not know. I do not know right place to recommend this, I hope it is not too out of place here.

Opportunistic TLS is a concept I do not like. DANE fixes the issues for system admins willing to implement DNSSEC and add a TLSA record but it seems many are not, so MTA-STS was invented.

MTA-STS has the same flaw as opportunistic TLS. It uses an insecure channel to determine if it should use a secure channel.

If Mallory can eavesdrop and MITM the message from Alice to Bob, then Mallory can likely alter the DNS responses and thwart MTA-STS either by saying the needed DNS record for MTA-STS does not exist, and possibly doing the same for the A/AAAA records for the specified subdomain used for MTA-STS if the server checks them anyway.

A better solution is to bring back Port 465 and SMTPS.

When Alice connects to Bob on Port 465, the certificate MUST validate in one of two ways:

A) DNSSEC validated TLSA record
B) Trusted CA with Certificate Transparency and OCSP stapled

If a DNSSEC validated TLSA record exists, then either it validates or the connection drops and bounces as undeliverable.

If no DNSSEC secured TLSA record exists, then B is used. Failure to validate likewise results in message undeliverable.

Port 25 is only used if Port 465 is not listening *and* no TLSA record exists for Port 465.

For servers that do not use DNSSEC, they can optionally send a response on first successful to Port 465 telling the client to never connect via Port 25 similar to how HSTS works, so that if a future attack blocks Port 465, Port 25 would not be tried until X days had passed.

This solution takes opportunistic completely out of the equation for servers that use DANE and for servers that don't use DANE, allows them to send a command upon first successful connection that takes future opportunistic out of the equation.

The *only* think MTA-STS does for non DNSSEC users that this doesn't do, MTA-STS does provide a somewhat secured list of MX hosts, but only if the A/AAAA record response is not modified by the attacker.

If this has merit, who do I submit it to?

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