I haven’t been able to find any particularly good guidance about this on the 
Internet so I figured I’d ask those in the trenches for their opinions 
regarding where they land on this. I know it’s not a Postfix specific matter 
and if anyone thinks I should be posing this question elsewhere, please let me 
know where.


One of the fundamental tenets of security is not to give out any information to 
an adversary you don’t have to, but in the real world, there are operational 
considerations that need to be balanced against extreme security paranoia. So 
how does that balance work with message headers? In your average message header 
there are system names and IPs (both often internal) all along the path of 
delivery which would, on one hand, seem to be a needless leak of information 
useful to a hacker but, on the other hand, absolutely critical to 
troubleshooting mail delivery problems for any individual message.


So is there a line or philosophy one follows looking at this? I know inside 
Postfix there are a number of things you can do to adjust the system names at 
each hop (and, presumably, suppress the IP but I don’t know how, personally) 
but I would think each one would add burden to troubleshooting. However, how 
much burden that is compared to how much security benefit is gained from 
shielding that information is something I also don’t know.


So, assuming most of this list is operational folks with that particular bias, 
does anyone want to share their thoughts on the balance they have achieved on 
this that doesn't spin their auditors into a tizzy?


Thanks,


Scott

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