On 2021 Jul 29, 10:01, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On 29 Jul 2021, at 8:17 am, raf <post...@raf.org> wrote:
> > 
> > The Rhenus email did say:
> > 
> >  "...must be sent with the TLS 1.2 protocol or higher.
> >  Any mail received without fulfilling this condition
> >  will be rejected by our server."
> > 
> > That second sentence sounds to me like a definite
> > statement that an SMTP connection that doesn't initiate
> > STARTTLS will not be able to send email. At least, I
> > can't see how else to interpret those words.
> 
> The simplest thing they could do is just disable TLS 1.0.
> This would also comply with some brain in neutral audit.
> 
> My money is on brain in neutral, as opposed to a carefully
> considered risk assessment in which they've concluded that
> they only receive legitimate email from TLS-1.2-capable
> senders.

Well, there is also the third option, the kamikaze approach: we're
disabling TLS 1.0, and while we are at it we will also disable this
"backdoor" we just found of "plain text" connections to our world-facing
SMTP servers... Risk assessments?, what are those? This is security!

-- 
Josh Good

Reply via email to