On 7/27/26 7:50 AM, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
Cornelia, Eric, Matt, here are 5 more fixes for hardening QEMU against invalid input. Nothing is strictly a security issues as defined in the policy. For example https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/security.html says assert / abort: If triggering the code path requires kernel privileges (or root account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in QEMU are a self inflicted denial of service. These will not be treated as security flaws, at most hardening bugs. And if anyone can provide invalid boot loader content it can provide anything to boot if secure boot is not available. We should fix those anyway, probably even for 11.1 Conny, I did not rebuild the s390-ccw, I assume you will do that? Christian Borntraeger (1): hw/char/sclpconsole-lm: avoid guest triggerable assert Joshua Daley (4): s390x/ipl: validate num_comp against iplb length before iterating pc-bios/s390-ccw: fix out-of-bounds read in iso_get_file_size() pc-bios/s390-ccw: bounds-check zipl menu entry index before array write pc-bios/s390-ccw: bound zipl menu strlen and replace VLA in zipl_print_entry hw/char/sclpconsole-lm.c | 3 ++- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 6 ++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 6 ++++-- pc-bios/s390-ccw/helper.h | 10 ++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/menu.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
These have been running on our systems the last few days. For the series: Reviewed-by: Eric Farman <[email protected]>
