Am 27.07.26 um 17:06 schrieb Cornelia Huck:
On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote:
Am 27.07.26 um 14:14 schrieb Cornelia Huck:
On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote:
Cornelia, Eric, Matt,
here are 5 more fixes for hardening QEMU against invalid input. Nothing
is strictly a security issues as defined in the policy. For example
https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/security.html says assert /
abort: If triggering the code path requires kernel privileges (or root
account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in QEMU are a self
inflicted denial of service. These will not be treated as security
flaws, at most hardening bugs.
And if anyone can provide invalid boot loader content it can provide
anything to boot if secure boot is not available.
We should fix those anyway, probably even for 11.1
Fixing: yes. For 11.1: how easy are they to trigger? For the bios fixes,
I assume you need a broken/crafted disk image; I assume that for the
other two, you need some buggy/misbehaving guest. Did you actually
manage to trigger this via some kind of test case?
Easy to trigger, but only with modified guests or modified zipls. Normal
guests will not trigger those.
Ok, so I think these would be suitable for the next release, but maybe
with a cc:stable.
Ok with me.
