On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote:
> Am 27.07.26 um 14:14 schrieb Cornelia Huck: >> On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Cornelia, Eric, Matt, >>> >>> here are 5 more fixes for hardening QEMU against invalid input. Nothing >>> is strictly a security issues as defined in the policy. For example >>> https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/security.html says assert / >>> abort: If triggering the code path requires kernel privileges (or root >>> account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in QEMU are a self >>> inflicted denial of service. These will not be treated as security >>> flaws, at most hardening bugs. >>> And if anyone can provide invalid boot loader content it can provide >>> anything to boot if secure boot is not available. >>> We should fix those anyway, probably even for 11.1 >> >> Fixing: yes. For 11.1: how easy are they to trigger? For the bios fixes, >> I assume you need a broken/crafted disk image; I assume that for the >> other two, you need some buggy/misbehaving guest. Did you actually >> manage to trigger this via some kind of test case? > > Easy to trigger, but only with modified guests or modified zipls. Normal > guests will not trigger those. Ok, so I think these would be suitable for the next release, but maybe with a cc:stable.
