On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> wrote:
> Cornelia, Eric, Matt, > > here are 5 more fixes for hardening QEMU against invalid input. Nothing > is strictly a security issues as defined in the policy. For example > https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/security.html says assert / > abort: If triggering the code path requires kernel privileges (or root > account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in QEMU are a self > inflicted denial of service. These will not be treated as security > flaws, at most hardening bugs. > And if anyone can provide invalid boot loader content it can provide > anything to boot if secure boot is not available. > We should fix those anyway, probably even for 11.1 Fixing: yes. For 11.1: how easy are they to trigger? For the bios fixes, I assume you need a broken/crafted disk image; I assume that for the other two, you need some buggy/misbehaving guest. Did you actually manage to trigger this via some kind of test case? > > Conny, I did not rebuild the s390-ccw, I assume you will do that? Yes, the bios rebuild will be done by whoever ends up applying the patches. > > Christian Borntraeger (1): > hw/char/sclpconsole-lm: avoid guest triggerable assert > > Joshua Daley (4): > s390x/ipl: validate num_comp against iplb length before iterating > pc-bios/s390-ccw: fix out-of-bounds read in iso_get_file_size() > pc-bios/s390-ccw: bounds-check zipl menu entry index before array > write > pc-bios/s390-ccw: bound zipl menu strlen and replace VLA in > zipl_print_entry > > hw/char/sclpconsole-lm.c | 3 ++- > hw/s390x/ipl.h | 6 ++++++ > pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 6 ++++-- > pc-bios/s390-ccw/helper.h | 10 ++++++++++ > pc-bios/s390-ccw/menu.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- > pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 2 +- > 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
