-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-06-30 18:20, Andrew wrote: > Andrew: >> J.M. Porup: >>> On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 02:30:34PM -0700, flux wrote: >>>> My thoughts were more along the lines of mitigative travel >>>> protection crossing borders and such. Like, you can boot to >>>> decryption but if the device is seized, no valid decryption >>>> can actually be performed. But as you say, depending on your >>>> situation that could be disadvantageous. I additionally just >>>> enjoy the idea of separating keys from locks regardless of >>>> the encrypted state of those keys. >>> >>> FWIW, I support this feature request as well. Search the >>> archives for previous discussion early 2015 (Caspar Bowden >>> indicated his support for the feature, before he passed.) >>> >>> Overreliance on a boot nuke feature would, as pointed out, be >>> unwise. But as a journalist, I can easily imagine a scenario >>> where I am crossing a border, am asked/ordered to decrypt my >>> laptop, and I prefer to nuke the hard drive rather than >>> comply. >>> >>> Sure, border officials might image the disk first, but how >>> many laptop users have such a feature? >>> >>> I think of it like TLS. Arguing that X.509 certificate >>> infrastructure is broken and not (very) trustworthy doesn't >>> mean we should insist Qubes return to a non-HTTPS website. >>> It's a layer of protection, one of many. >>> >>> So I support this feature request, while noting the priority >>> is low. >>> >>> jmp >>> >> >> [bullshit] >> >> Andrew >> > > Actually, I think I get it now. Tell me if I'm wrong. > > You want this to be a readily-accessible feature of Qubes. It's > not that you want to prepare to cross borders: you cross borders > in the course of your work. It's not even that you cross borders: > you're generally mobile, and you're a potential target. It makes > sense to have the ability to provide a quick failsafe if and when > the need strikes. > > Still, I think the better solution is to implement > plausibly-deniable per-VM encryption/hiding, as suggested when > this topic came up back in 2015. Search for the qubes-users thread > "Re: [qubes-users] feature request: luksAddNuke". > > Caspar actually supported this idea: > >> I would really like to see this implemented >> >> -- Caspar Bowden Qubes Policy Adviser" > > Does this, or do these, already have a tracking ticket? > > Andrew >
Hi Andrew, Not sure if you received my message (immediately prior to your last one in this thread). We've had a ticket open for the nuke option for quite a while now: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/921 As for the per-VM encryption option, see here: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1293#issuecomment- 229028321 - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXdgB0AAoJENtN07w5UDAwT20QANCGKu4rL3BcSkcfn42+5+Ml XHY6GAVRrQ8+RWu3GDdfu0hbCrzKkDXWZFSECM1v5CQm30hOFq1agaY8ANjmwvOP gQ2x24VmtXXqLDIKnnf85h5MPYJgsYYMTESr2hq3h5l/RCgfphJsbhrZblv9YfJs bwG5diwcwCcXFmF25QmgxfHWNmrFH/dVs8d++I9jDg/T0jCHBhzqO9g9SXtNRa2x E6mfKWuzU58xEE0ZoRUu6+PC8fPOyt9L0vUkM+VgZsyYcsLOCzd3qkNNuF02ViaM VsfqzALWhWgbmV3vxy5Lt+YchcO/XGcN010i9DADQEiXBh5GcJtNAazKIX4vCkhp AIfhPGjyDYaGETj351/nAf/vUJRivPR+TJ8cvWKciJSHOjY/UImzF48SnLT3MJYl zEj6qFsjvbmo7kjOsxDZkKcimvNjYjA9OqLEiOh/P8TDtZPqZeJOegeg97MftDml 0tOQXYk6e4CZKW09WJn3h2BMK/hbhFjZXTHXw8CLcdHfOc8cfF2RRbnSylrGJFun WKFVZ7EavlkcapDYLdq2TLiT8g7SmLH9gpe4kYNOaGftQ5lAApGYlsS78EayL9et Wq5c6rd52f0yGwLBu7D6TeRrwXkRjrlJc9bB7Yc3WQdMqa0TqieVoV2qPg8gjhU8 iHpwhjjU633zI6M0k8Lg =xYUA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/dacf71ca-4352-107c-5886-7a318683ec29%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
