You should realise, I don't actually care if the 2nd laptop is hacked. I'm only trying to protect WHO I am, and not WHAT I'm doing.
So I don't care about DMA attacks on the 2nd laptop. I only aim to protect the Tor hotspot thing that is set up in the Qubes system. And for this, I think the solution is to use a safe WiFi/Ethernet device, if these things even exist. Of course, this means that I don't even really need Qubes at all, which you pointed out in an earlier post. I originally thought I needed Qubes for this system.... but in fact, VT-D simply doesn't do what I originally thought it did. I originally thought VT-D isolated the networking devices themselves. But in fact, VT-D simply allows networking devices to be inside the Net VM. The Net VM still relies on Xen to separate itself from the rest of the Qubes system. Hence, it all comes back to Xen. Maybe Qubes 4.0 and SLAT will make Xen secure. But for now, I think using 2 laptops is more secure, so long as we can be sure there are no bugs in the networking drivers. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/8b38d7e7-090b-4935-a9ab-4766ef475134%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
