Tom,
I understand the points in your brief and think it well done.
My question relates narrowly to any problems there are for Christians.  I
can see many more problems for other faiths, including in particular your
examples.

I suppose the eavesdropping on the priest/penitent case
is Christian, and it burdens the exercise -- but is there not a
sanction under the 9th circuit (use of the tape against the penitent)?

Let's consider zoning perhaps.  Is a denial of a variance a sanction? or a
denial of a benefit?  Or is it just a regulatory action which does not meet
the 9th circuit test under any likely interpretation?  Denial of a permit to
build a church could substantially affect religious exercise of the
religious community.  Is this not a cognizable claim at all under RLUIPA
under any possible reading of the 9th circuit test?

Are there any others?

Steve

On Sat, Jun 13, 2009 at 6:05 PM, Berg, Thomas C. <tcb...@stthomas.edu>wrote:

> I don't see what child abuse cases have to do with this, other than that
> Marci likes to bring them up in order to try to discredit free exercise of
> religion in general.
>
> The Ninth Circuit's standard is that "a 'substantial burden' [under RFRA]
> is imposed only when individuals are (1) forced to choose between following
> the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit ... or (2)
> coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by threat of civil or
> criminal sanctions."  Our amicus brief,
> http://www.narf.org/sct/navajonationvusfs/amicus_of_religious_liberty_law_scholars.pdf,
> lists cases that might be dismissed at the threshold under that language.
>  They involve varying faiths; we weren't just concerned about Christians.
>  There are the cases of Hmong or some Jewish families' objections to loved
> ones' autopsies, which were prime examples given to Congress of why RFRA was
> needed, but which don't involve the imposition of civil or criminal
> sanctions on anyone or deny anyone a benefit.  There are also prisoner
> cases, from multiple faiths, where the prisoners are not sanctioned but
> simply have their religious materials taken away f!
>  rom them or are refused a worship space or a religiously required diet.
>  (The same restrictive "substantial burden" test could well spread to RLUIPA
> or to state RFRAs.)  The government also confiscated religious materials
> (the sacramental tea) in Gonzales v. O Centro; that part of the case
> involved neither denial of a benefit nor  coercion to act contrary to
> religious belief.  The Ninth Circuit's test could also mean that government
> eavesdropping on religious conversations, meetings, or houses of worship
> creates no burden (entirely apart from whether a strong government interest
> justifies the burden).  The en banc decision essentially disapproved the
> circuit's Mocklaitis decision that had held RFRA was triggered by the
> government's surreptitious recording of a confessional between a prisoner
> and his priest.  Those are some of the examples that occurred to those of us
> who joined the brief.
>
> As I said in my earlier post, there are ways to read the Ninth Circuit's
> language narrowly to avoid these results.  I expect that will happen in some
> of the situations.  But lawyers and judges ought not to have to parse or
> manipulate the phrasing in order to cover these cases, which involve
> substantial real-world inhibitions of religious practice and several of
> which are core applications of the statute.  (All this in addition, of
> course, to the effects on Native American practices in the federal-lands
> case themselves.)
>
> Tom
>
> -----------------------------------------
> Thomas C. Berg
> St. Ives Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academc Affairs
> University of St. Thomas School of Law
> MSL 400, 1000 LaSalle Avenue
> Minneapolis, MN   55403-2015
> Phone: (651) 962-4918
> Fax: (651) 962-4996
> E-mail: tcb...@stthomas.edu
> SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author='261564
> Weblog: http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

-- 
Prof. Steven Jamar
Howard University School of Law
Associate Director, Institute of Intellectual Property and Social Justice
(IIPSJ) Inc.
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