It depends on the state actually. But generally the "confession" must be for spiritual/salvation purposes
Marci A. Hamilton Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School Yeshiva University @Marci_Hamilton On Dec 5, 2013, at 12:32 PM, Paul Horwitz <phorw...@hotmail.com> wrote: > Is that accurate? It may vary, but I thought the privilege could be claimed > for any confidential communication made to a clergy member in his/her > professional capacity as a spiritual advisor. The person seeking that counsel > need not necessarily be a co-communicant. I don't think this is just > hair-splitting. It's not analogous to a statement that men as well as women > can seek medical care for pregnancy. > > On Dec 4, 2013, at 10:56 PM, "Levinson, Sanford V" <slevin...@law.utexas.edu> > wrote: > >> Free speech doctrine, for better or worse, presumably protects (almost) >> everyone. What is distinctive about the “clergy-penitent privilege” is that >> it protects only a particular subset of people, i.e., those who claim some >> religious identity, as against secularists who have the same desire to >> unburden themselves to sympathetic listeners but can’t assume that it is >> protected in the same way. Aren’t we back to the conundra involving >> “conscientious objection” and the Seeger and Welch cases. There the Court >> could adopt Paul Tillich and say that secularists, too, have “ultimate >> concerns” equivalent to religious commitments. Can one imagine a similar >> move with regard to clergy privileges? I support such cases as Rosenberger >> (assuming, at least, one version of the facts in that case, which may or may >> not be entirely correct) and Widmar v. Vincent on “equality” grounds, i.e., >> those who are religious should not be selected out for worse treatment than >> those who are secular. If I can use a facility for meetings of my >> philosophy club, then I think that others should be free to use the facility >> for meetings of the “Good News Club.” But it is telling that we’re talking >> about a “privilege” that is denied to each and every secular person (unless >> they can afford a shrink, though even there the privilege is significantly >> more constrained than is the case with a priest), and “equality” arguments >> go by the boards. >> >> sandy >> >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein >> Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2013 11:35 PM >> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >> Subject: RE: The clergy-penitent privilege and burdens on third parties >> >> Much of free speech law involves protecting speech that burdens third >> parties; for example, the victims of hate speech suffer emotional distress >> as do the mourners at funerals tormented by the Westboro Church, and speech >> that does not quite violate Brandenburg can incite violence. Further, the >> cost to the public in protecting speech can be extraordinarily high. cities >> incurred tens of thousands of dollars in police and other costs while trying >> to maintain order during Operation Rescue protests. Criminal procedure >> rights can make it more difficult to apprehend and punish people who commit >> crimes. Property rights can make it more difficult to protect the >> environment. Rights have always been expensive politcal goods. >> >> It is true that the Establishment Clause imposes some constitutional >> constraints on the costs government may incur or impose on third parties in >> protecting religious liberty. Arguing that free exercise rights or statutory >> religious liberty rights should only be protected in situations in which >> doing so imposes virtually no costs on either the public or third parties, >> however, would treat religious liberty differently than almost all other >> rights and dramatically undermine their utility for people attempting to >> exercise such rights. >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >> [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Christopher Lund >> [l...@wayne.edu] >> Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2013 5:53 PM >> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' >> Subject: RE: The clergy-penitent privilege and burdens on third parties >> >> I think Marc’s point is solid and underappreciated. Following up on it, >> does anyone know of any literature that tries to think about “burdens on >> third parties” across constitutional rights? We accept such burdens as a >> matter of course with defamation law, as Marc notes. Yet we also accept >> them in other contexts. Guns would be one obvious example. But also think >> of, for example, busing during the Civil Rights Era. White suburban >> families had to accept busing of their kids to distant and sometimes >> difficult schools, because desegregation was that important. Or think about >> abortion: I think the Court was right to hold spousal consent and >> notification laws unconstitutional, but there are real issues of third-party >> harms there too. >> >> Best, Chris >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as >> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are >> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or >> wrongly) forward the messages to others. > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others.
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
