Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 28 May 2013, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2013 9:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 01:53, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2013 2:18 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: do you indeed exclude the other animals from being selfconcious? or - having a logic on their own level? Or any other trait we assign (identify?) for humans - in our terms? A question about plants (rather: about being conscious): you may feel free to define 'being conscious' in human terms, or mammal (etc.) terms, but the response plants exude to information (circumstances, impact. etc.) shows reactivity we may appropriate to us humans. So do not deny consciousness from fellow DNA-bearing plants. How about the DNA-not-bearing other creatures? (crystals, stones, water, impact you may call energy, - whatever?) Anthropocentric? zoocentric? phitocentric? what-CENTRIC? I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property. You have to ask Consciousness of what? There's consciousness of surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical concentrations There's consciousness of internal states. Consciousness of sex. Consciousness of one's location. Consciousness of one's status in a tribe. I think human-like consciousness requires language of some kind. Hmm... I would have agreed some years ago. I would have even say that consciousness always involve consciousness of time. But I am no more sure on this. Some altered conscious state seems to be like being conscious of literally only one thing; being conscious, and nothing else, but such state are quasi not memorizable, and might quite exotic. Sometimes there is consciousness of something, but which is not related to anything temporal or spatial. My be in math some feeling like that can occur, when understanding a proof, for example. Many aspect of human consciousness requires languages, but humans have still a big part of the animal consciousness. You don't need language to feel the hotness of a fire. Then you are agreeing now. If you agree that consciousness can have different aspects and some aspects may be lacking in some species, then consciousness is not all-or-nothing. Why? Consciousness can take many shapes. I would say it is all-or-nothing, like a continuous function is either non-negative or negative, even if it can be close to zero. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 29 May 2013, at 00:10, John Mikes wrote: Evgenyi, you write very 'deep' and 'smart things. One bothers me: ..the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. first the anthropocentric sound (neurological?) and then the unidentified term of Ccness. In this same post (cf Russell and Brent) different contents are proposed, still with (some) awareness type side-effect in the shadow, while I keep propagating the final result of my 2 decade long struggle to generalize the term, used by EVERY author as THEIR theory required, into RESPONSE TO (first: information, then refined into) RELATIONS. From such wording all human, animal, plant, in fact all DNA-based- and not based Ccness variations can be derived. Neocortex etc. makes it easier. The thermostat has none of the kind, yet it exercises the PROCESS of CCnes quite well. We T H I N K in human terms with our human mind (indeed: language). The fact that we are ignorant in following other languages than human does not mean that those creatures have none. The 'crystal' decides (in its ways) whether to build further links, or terminate the growth, a 'mental object' (idea?) decides(!) whether to branch out into broader domains, or let it be as is. Bruno's restrictions (Loeb, comp, numbers) are regrettably suppressing his brillinat mind into limitations he does not want to transcend. Pity. John, I respectfully disagree with the term 'restriction'. Löb, numbers, ... are consequence of comp, and if you postulate non- comp, you become the one restricting consciousness to a smaller class of entities. Comp can be seen as a restriction with respect to panpsychism, OK. But saying that every entities are conscious makes consciousness into a trivial notion, and we loss the explanation of where the physical (quanta and qualia) comes from. Bruno Brent sometimes observes limits of a rather physicalistic way in his conclusions (pity, again) and Russell seems not to forget sometimes what he wrote in his books or taught to students. I freed up into agnosticism and accept critical denigration. It was not easy. I had to abandon 'that' conventional science of my 50+ years lectured on 3 continents and start my 'thinking' anew. I could not review and start again, if a nonagenarian is wrong, he should close shop and go fishing. John Mikes On Sun, May 26, 2013 at 7:29 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates. http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ...
On 28 May 2013, at 19:27, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, In my model which you have already said is not comp, all the computational histories happen in a mindspace and only one of them become physical. Yes, that is what makes it into a non-comp theory, a bit like Bohm's hidden variable theory. In that case, the notion like particles, universes, in fact the whole physical, seem to be build-in unexplainable. Bruno Richard On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 May 2013, at 20:44, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, With MWI are some universes less probable than others. Only relatively to some state, some computational histories are less probable. It is open if there is a more stringer notion of probable universe. Actually it is an open question is the notion of physical multiverse make sense. There are only coherence conditions on (sharable) dreams. Keep in mind that I am only translating a problem in math. Then it is almost obvious it is more a platonist theology than an Aristotelian theology. No one knows which one is correct. I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be statistical. I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be. I think I understand the frequency argument. But that does not make sense either. ? Feel free to explain why. I think it is simpler to forget the notion of physical universe, and to concentrate on the computational histories as seen by a machine/number. Obviously, neoneo-platonism is very young, and an infinity of problems are awaiting us there. Bruno Richard On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote: On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote: Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is immaterial. If the universe isinfinitely large or infinitely varied, we each reappear an infinite number of times. There are a countably infinite number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a finite number of possible programs shorter than some length. Any consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists somewhere else in the infinitely varied/ infinitely large universe, and if the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate you perfectly without having to extract a record of you. Just running Bruno's UDA for a long enough time ressurects everyone, we are all contained in that short program. To which, one is tempted to respond: So what? If there is all this simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take place (the real ones, if there are any) are anything like this one. Because the FPI makes this one a statistical sum on all possible one. What do you mean by a statiscal sum? FPI must still pick out some kind of unity; not just an average. Why? How so? If not, then I don't know what FPI means. I thought it referred to one's experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience. I experience being Brent Meeker. I don't experience being Bruno Marchal. FPI = First Person Indeterminacy. When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your level of substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the infinitley many computations which go through your state. That's how the FPI makes this one resulting from a statistical sum. You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds, where possible can be anything from familiar enough I can understand it to nomologically possible to not containing contradictions. Possible means livable from a first person point of view in such a way that you would not see the difference above the substitution level. So all simulations must look just like this?? Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I would say. How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the case that everything happens here. Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities. Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on eternal statistics on atemporal number relations. Everything physical happens is really the p - BDp explained by the LUMs' theology, and it is more like shit happens, to be short. (I explain the math on the FOAR list if you are interested). Bruno Brent Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see the same average on all computations, which, due to
Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 29 May 2013, at 06:59, Kim Jones wrote: On 29/05/2013, at 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You don't need language to feel the hotness of a fire. Bruno You don't need language to feel the effect of music. Good point. Language is the greatest barrier to communication that still exists - Edward de Bono Language is like computer. At first it looks like it simplifies life, but then it makes you in front of new difficulties. It is like the whole of life, always getting more complex, from universal layer on universal layers. Bruno Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au Mobile: 0450 963 719 Landline: 02 9389 4239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 29 May 2013, at 08:33, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2013 11:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2013 9:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 01:53, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2013 2:18 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: do you indeed exclude the other animals from being selfconcious? or - having a logic on their own level? Or any other trait we assign (identify?) for humans - in our terms? A question about plants (rather: about being conscious): you may feel free to define 'being conscious' in human terms, or mammal (etc.) terms, but the response plants exude to information (circumstances, impact. etc.) shows reactivity we may appropriate to us humans. So do not deny consciousness from fellow DNA-bearing plants. How about the DNA-not-bearing other creatures? (crystals, stones, water, impact you may call energy, - whatever?) Anthropocentric? zoocentric? phitocentric? what-CENTRIC? I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property. You have to ask Consciousness of what? There's consciousness of surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical concentrations There's consciousness of internal states. Consciousness of sex. Consciousness of one's location. Consciousness of one's status in a tribe. I think human-like consciousness requires language of some kind. Hmm... I would have agreed some years ago. I would have even say that consciousness always involve consciousness of time. But I am no more sure on this. Some altered conscious state seems to be like being conscious of literally only one thing; being conscious, and nothing else, but such state are quasi not memorizable, and might quite exotic. Sometimes there is consciousness of something, but which is not related to anything temporal or spatial. My be in math some feeling like that can occur, when understanding a proof, for example. Many aspect of human consciousness requires languages, but humans have still a big part of the animal consciousness. You don't need language to feel the hotness of a fire. Then you are agreeing now. If you agree that consciousness can have different aspects and some aspects may be lacking in some species, then consciousness is not all-or-nothing. Why? Consciousness can take many shapes. I would say it is all-or-nothing, like a continuous function is either non-negative or negative, even if it can be close to zero. I don't see the analogy. I don't think consciousness can be negative, or even that it can be measured by one dimension. All-or- nothing would be a function that is either 1 or 0. The point is more that it is 0, or 0. If you can be conscious of red and green, then I'd say you are more conscious than someone who is red/green colorblind (albeit by a tiny amount). That is about consciousness' content. Not on being or not conscious. In order to have beliefs about arithmetic requires that you be conscious of numbers and have a language in which to express axioms and propositions. I doubt that simpler animals have this and so have different consciousness than humans. Most plausibly. But this again is about the content, and the character of consciousness, not the existence or not on some consciousness. I don't venture to say less consciousness because I think of it as multi-dimensional and an animal may have some other aspect of consciousness that we lack. Sure. Bats have plausibly some richer qualia associated to sound than humans. But what we discuss is that consciousness is either present or not. Then it can take many different shapes, and even intensity, up to the altered state of consciousness. Cotard syndrom is also interesting. People having it believe that they are dead, and some argue that they are not conscious, but in fact what happen is that they lack the ability to put any meaning on their consciousness. It shows that consciousness seems independent of the ability to interpret the consciousness content. Many pathological states of consciousness exist, but none makes me feel like if consciousness was not something (rich and variated) or nothing. You refer to the content of consciousness, not consciousness itself. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about. Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula using some notation for this, So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still can't find a damn thing about Bp p. When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but at least I try. You're not even trying. Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to speak more clearly than I think. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
Brent: after lots of back-and-forth you wrote: *...I don't see the analogy. I don't think consciousness can be negative, or even that it can be measured by one dimension. All-or-nothing would be a function that is either 1 or 0. If you can be conscious of red and green, then I'd say you are more conscious than someone who is red/green colorblind (albeit by a tiny amount). In order to have beliefs about arithmetic requires that you be conscious of numbers and have a language in which to express axioms and propositions. I doubt that simpler animals have this and so have different consciousness than humans. I don't venture to say less consciousness because I think of it as multi-dimensional and an animal may have some other aspect of consciousness that we lack. Brent * Please consider my definition for that monster of a word (I deny to use): * consciousness * NOT IDENTICAL to the noun referring to being conscious (aware!) of but a * PROCESS* of responding to relations. Human, animal, stone,idea, anything. The Totality (Everything) that exists. Including Bruno's favorites (Loebianism, universal anything, numbers, etc.) and much more. The infinite complexity we have no access to, only to a small segment. I cannot imagine a 'negative' of a process that either goes on, or not. (Maybe the reverse can be called so, but that would be the 'triggering of a response' - different from the response, not a negative of it.) The *'response'* is richer than we could 'restrict' (again!) into dimensions of our views. We may 'see' only some dimensions in the way how *WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF * it. Colorblind, or not. And your fragment: *...animals have this and so have different consciousness...* refers to a THING, the noumenon of being conscious of. John M On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:33 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/28/2013 11:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2013 9:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 01:53, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2013 2:18 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: do you indeed exclude the other animals from being selfconcious? or - having a logic on their own level? Or any other trait we assign (identify?) for humans - in our terms? A question about plants (rather: about being conscious): you may feel free to define 'being conscious' in human terms, or mammal (etc.) terms, but the response plants exude to information (circumstances, impact. etc.) shows reactivity we may appropriate to us humans. So do not deny consciousness from fellow DNA-bearing plants. How about the DNA-not-bearing other creatures? (crystals, stones, water, impact you may call energy, - whatever?) Anthropocentric? zoocentric? phitocentric? what-CENTRIC? I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property. You have to ask Consciousness of what? There's consciousness of surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical concentrations There's consciousness of internal states. Consciousness of sex. Consciousness of one's location. Consciousness of one's status in a tribe. I think human-like consciousness requires language of some kind. Hmm... I would have agreed some years ago. I would have even say that consciousness always involve consciousness of time. But I am no more sure on this. Some altered conscious state seems to be like being conscious of literally only one thing; being conscious, and nothing else, but such state are quasi not memorizable, and might quite exotic. Sometimes there is consciousness of something, but which is not related to anything temporal or spatial. My be in math some feeling like that can occur, when understanding a proof, for example. Many aspect of human consciousness requires languages, but humans have still a big part of the animal consciousness. You don't need language to feel the hotness of a fire. Then you are agreeing now. If you agree that consciousness can have different aspects and some aspects may be lacking in some species, then consciousness is not all-or-nothing. Why? Consciousness can take many shapes. I would say it is all-or-nothing, like a continuous function is either non-negative or negative, even if it can be close to zero. I don't see the analogy. I don't think consciousness can be negative, or even that it can be measured by one dimension. All-or-nothing would be a function that is either 1 or 0. If you can be conscious of red and green, then I'd say you are more conscious than someone who is red/green colorblind (albeit by a tiny amount). In order to have beliefs about arithmetic requires that you be conscious of numbers and have a language in which to express axioms and propositions. I doubt that simpler animals have this and so have different consciousness than humans. I don't venture to say less consciousness because I think of it as multi-dimensional and an animal may have some other aspect of consciousness
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22 2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about. Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula using some notation for this, So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still can't find a damn thing about Bp p. When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but at least I try. You're not even trying. Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to speak more clearly than I think. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 29 May 2013, at 17:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22
2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all?
And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's
ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about.
Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula
using some notation for this,
So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to
myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp
p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't
matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still can't find
a damn thing about Bp p.
Bp = I believe in p, or 'my opinion is that it is the case that p',
or, in the context of ideally correct (and simple machine):
Beweisbar('p').
p, when produced by some system, means, in all books on logic, that p
is true (from the system pov).
So Bp p is a ay to model true opinion, in some system.
When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I
say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but at
least I try. You're not even trying.
I have explained this more than one times on this list, to different
people, because once you get it you can't forget.
You have come perhaps too much recently, but you can always ask
question. You should not focus on the formula, but on what it
represents. It is also explained in sane04, and basically, in all my
papers on this subject. Probably with different notations.
Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to
speak more clearly than I think.
Bp is for I believe p, produced by some machinery (machine, formal
system, ...).
In particular, it is an expression in some modal logic. 'Belief' obeys
usually the axioms:
1. B(p-q) - B(p - Bq)
2. Bp - BBp
Bp p means (I believe in p) and p. P alone, in the assertative
mode of some entity means it is the case that p. (independently of
the veracity of p).
For knowledge, we use the axiom:
3. Bp - p
As Gödel saw in 1933, beweisbar, or provability, does not obey to that
third axiom, and so provability cannot model knowledgeability. Indeed
no consistent machine can prove B('0=1') - 0=1, which is equivalent
with ~B('0=1'), which is self-consistency.
But it is trivial that the new connector Kp, defined by Bp p,
verifies the axiom 3. So we get a way to associate a knower to a
machine. But it cannot be defined in arithmetic, as you would need to
define a predicate like B('p') true('p'), which cannot exist by a
theorem of Tarski saying that true is not definable. We can only
simulate it by the modal trick of Theaetetus, for each arithmetical
formula. For example,
I know that 1+1=2 can be emulated by B('1+1=2') 1+1=2. But you
cannot find a general arithmetical predicate for knowledge, and this
makes such kind of knowledge confirming many studies by philosophers
and theologian, in the computer science setting.
Here belief is always a form of rational belief, which is basically
the meaning of the axiom 1 above.
Is is clearer? Ask anything.
I have already given such explanation here, and I will at some point
later explain this again on FOAR. No need to be angry or something,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 5/29/2013 12:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2013, at 08:33, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2013 11:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote: On 5/28/2013 9:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2013, at 01:53, meekerdb wrote: On 5/27/2013 2:18 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: do you indeed exclude the other animals from being selfconcious? or - having a logic on their own level? Or any other trait we assign (identify?) for humans - in our terms? A question about plants (rather: about being conscious): you may feel free to define 'being conscious' in human terms, or mammal (etc.) terms, but the response plants exude to information (circumstances, impact. etc.) shows reactivity we may appropriate to us humans. So do not deny consciousness from fellow DNA-bearing plants. How about the DNA-not-bearing other creatures? (crystals, stones, water, impact you may call energy, - whatever?) Anthropocentric? zoocentric? phitocentric? what-CENTRIC? I don't think consciousness is an all-or-nothing property. You have to ask Consciousness of what? There's consciousness of surroundings: sound, photons, temperature, chemical concentrations There's consciousness of internal states. Consciousness of sex. Consciousness of one's location. Consciousness of one's status in a tribe. I think human-like consciousness requires language of some kind. Hmm... I would have agreed some years ago. I would have even say that consciousness always involve consciousness of time. But I am no more sure on this. Some altered conscious state seems to be like being conscious of literally only one thing; being conscious, and nothing else, but such state are quasi not memorizable, and might quite exotic. Sometimes there is consciousness of something, but which is not related to anything temporal or spatial. My be in math some feeling like that can occur, when understanding a proof, for example. Many aspect of human consciousness requires languages, but humans have still a big part of the animal consciousness. You don't need language to feel the hotness of a fire. Then you are agreeing now. If you agree that consciousness can have different aspects and some aspects may be lacking in some species, then consciousness is not all-or-nothing. Why? Consciousness can take many shapes. I would say it is all-or-nothing, like a continuous function is either non-negative or negative, even if it can be close to zero. I don't see the analogy. I don't think consciousness can be negative, or even that it can be measured by one dimension. All-or-nothing would be a function that is either 1 or 0. The point is more that it is 0, or 0. If you can be conscious of red and green, then I'd say you are more conscious than someone who is red/green colorblind (albeit by a tiny amount). That is about consciousness' content. Not on being or not conscious. In order to have beliefs about arithmetic requires that you be conscious of numbers and have a language in which to express axioms and propositions. I doubt that simpler animals have this and so have different consciousness than humans. Most plausibly. But this again is about the content, and the character of consciousness, not the existence or not on some consciousness. You seem to regard consciousness as a kind of magic vessel which exists even when it is empty. I think John Mikes is right when he says it is a process. When a process isn't doing anything it doesn't exist. I don't venture to say less consciousness because I think of it as multi-dimensional and an animal may have some other aspect of consciousness that we lack. Sure. Bats have plausibly some richer qualia associated to sound than humans. But what we discuss is that consciousness is either present or not. Then it can take many different shapes, and even intensity, up to the altered state of consciousness. Cotard syndrom is also interesting. People having it believe that they are dead, and some argue that they are not conscious, but in fact what happen is that they lack the ability to put any meaning on their consciousness. Put meaning on consciousness? That makes no sense to me. They are obviously conscious of some things. If they were unconscious they couldn't respond. It shows that consciousness seems independent of the ability to interpret the consciousness content. Many pathological states of consciousness exist, but none makes me feel like if consciousness was not something (rich and variated) or nothing. You refer to the content of consciousness, not consciousness itself. But you seem to contend that there can be consciousness without content - which I find absurd. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to
Dennet on Free will!
This is fun! http://youtu.be/EJsD-3jtXz0?t=24m16s It exist! -- Onward! Stephen I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post and all of my posts will contain. ;-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 5/29/2013 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 18:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 17:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22
2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And
if
even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to
expect
your readers to know what you're talking about.
Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula using
some
notation for this,
So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to myself
obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp p means.
Well,
that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't matter because I just
Googled
true opinion and I still can't find a damn thing about Bp p.
Bp = I believe in p, or 'my opinion is that it is the case that p', or, in the context
of ideally correct (and simple machine): Beweisbar('p').
p, when produced by some system, means, in all books on logic, that p is true (from
the system pov).
So Bp p is a ay to model true opinion, in some system.
When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I say, I
may not
always be successful in making myself clear but at least I try. You're not
even
trying.
I have explained this more than one times on this list, to different people, because
once you get it you can't forget.
You have come perhaps too much recently, but you can always ask question. You should
not focus on the formula, but on what it represents. It is also explained in sane04,
and basically, in all my papers on this subject. Probably with different notations.
Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to speak more
clearly than I think.
Bp is for I believe p, produced by some machinery (machine, formal system,
...).
In particular, it is an expression in some modal logic. 'Belief' obeys usually
the axioms:
1. B(p-q) - B(p - Bq)
2. Bp - BBp
Bp p means (I believe in p) and p. P alone, in the assertative mode of some entity
means it is the case that p. (independently of the veracity of p).
For knowledge, we use the axiom:
3. Bp - p
As Gödel saw in 1933, beweisbar, or provability, does not obey to that third axiom, and
so provability cannot model knowledgeability. Indeed no consistent machine can prove
B('0=1') - 0=1, which is equivalent with ~B('0=1'), which is self-consistency.
I'm not sure I understand this. Are you saying we cannot take (Bp-p) for all p as an
axiom because it would entail Bf -f and then ~f-~Bf, and since ~f is true by definition
it would entail that the machine is consistent?
Brent
But it is trivial that the new connector Kp, defined by Bp p, verifies the axiom 3.
So we get a way to associate a knower to a machine. But it cannot be defined in
arithmetic, as you would need to define a predicate like B('p') true('p'), which
cannot exist by a theorem of Tarski saying that true is not definable. We can only
simulate it by the modal trick of Theaetetus, for each arithmetical formula. For example,
I know that 1+1=2 can be emulated by B('1+1=2') 1+1=2. But you cannot find a
general arithmetical predicate for knowledge, and this makes such kind of knowledge
confirming many studies by philosophers and theologian, in the computer science setting.
Here belief is always a form of rational belief, which is basically the meaning of the
axiom 1 above.
Is is clearer? Ask anything.
I have already given such explanation here, and I will at some point later explain this
again on FOAR. No need to be angry or something,
Bruno
Oops!
Of course I was talking to J. Clark, not Quentin.
Sorry,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/
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