In a message dated 8/27/02 12:19:39 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
<< 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that
many people are only willing to get worked up over a small
# of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and
the dedicated might add their favorites like g
For an occupant, the incentive to build on one's own land would be the same
as always. Since there would be no restriction on the right of the actual
occupier of a piece of land to charge a price before quitting it, it would
be possible to recoup the value of improvements. The only differenc
>From: Fred Foldvary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > As for "defense," a decentralized, stateless society would present few
> > concentrated targets of value to foreign predators; it would have no
> > central government to surrender;
>
>Tell that to the American Indians.
OK, adding the proviso that the
> So what are you getting at? Since there is a series of elections, each
> with a different median voter, the MVT doesn't actually predict that the
> median general voter gets his way? Or what?
> Prof. Bryan Caplan
I think that applications of MVT are ver
--- Dan Lewis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
"At dinner last night [T]hey get contracts
commensurate to this level."
I agree with you almost entirely. While a guaranteed
record contract for the winning 'Idol' surely has some
value, for example, it's probably not as much of a
boost as getting to
Good points. Thanks.
-jsh
--- Fred Foldvary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> --- john hull <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > ... you seem to be suggesting that
> > policy makers are benefiting the present at the
> > expense of the future, yet couldn't one could
> accuse
> > you of wanting to benefit th
In a message dated 8/26/02 6:33:51 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
<< There are several levels of puzzlement.
Puzzle #1: The median voter disapproves of existing policy.
Puzzle #2: The median voter, primary voters, and party activists ALL
disapprove of existing policy.
I don't think there are ma
On Mon, 26 Aug 2002, Fred Foldvary wrote:
> Since the relevant comparitive system is majority voting, there is a disjoint
> in yes-no voting as well.
Agree with you so far
> The disjoint is even greater, since with demand
> revelation, each person pays the average cost, whereas with voting, th
On Mon, 26 Aug 2002, Fred Foldvary wrote:
> First of all, the demand-revealing method does not require that the
> identities of the persons stating a value be public. Each voter can be given
> a password, and he enters a stated value on a web site. The administrator of
> the system knows his id
> No, the point is that might *really* get a $10 benefit from SAYING you
> get a $1 M benefit. If your probability of decisiveness is under
> 1-in-100,000, it would pay to do so. But the social cost of this
> behavior could drastically exceed the private benefit.
> Prof.
--- Eric Crampton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The important point is that there's a disjoint between the willingness to
> pay and the actual payment:
Since the relevant comparitive system is majority voting, there is a disjoint
in yes-no voting as well. The disjoint is even greater, since with
--- Eric Crampton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If expressive voting theory holds, and if expressive benefits
> are increasing in the amount of money "voted" under the Tideman-Tullock
> procedure, then the demand revelation process should induce worse outcomes
> than the current system. Specifical
fabio guillermo rojas wrote:
>
> > Any decent treatment of the MV states that it is the median *actual*
> > voter who matters, not the median *potential* voter. It's the Median
> > VOTER theorem, not the Median CITIZEN theorem, or the Median SENTIENT
> > BEING theorem.
>
> I still think this is
On Mon, 26 Aug 2002, Fred Foldvary wrote:
> If the average cost, say for mosquito abatement, would be $5, and that person
> states he would pay up to $10 for it, then he is knowingly contributing to
> the total stated value, and if the total value exceeds the cost, is willing
> to pay the $10, re
Fred Foldvary wrote:
>
> > Thus, suppose I get a $10 direct expressive benefit from voting for tons
> > of useless health care spending, and the probability of decisiveness is
> > 1-in-a-million. I don't see how any demand revelation mechanism is
> > going to help.
> > Pr
--- Kevin Carson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> As for "defense," a decentralized, stateless society would present few
> concentrated targets of value to foreign predators; it would have no
> central government to surrender;
Tell that to the American Indians.
> and local citizens' militias, feder
> Any decent treatment of the MV states that it is the median *actual*
> voter who matters, not the median *potential* voter. It's the Median
> VOTER theorem, not the Median CITIZEN theorem, or the Median SENTIENT
> BEING theorem.
I still think this is true but still misleading. Consider how Am
Actually, I'm in the process of writing up a short article for Public
Choice on this topic (as Bryan may recall).
If expressive voting theory holds, and if expressive benefits
are increasing in the amount of money "voted" under the Tideman-Tullock
procedure, then the demand revelation process s
> Thus, suppose I get a $10 direct expressive benefit from voting for tons
> of useless health care spending, and the probability of decisiveness is
> 1-in-a-million. I don't see how any demand revelation mechanism is
> going to help.
> Prof. Bryan Caplan
Kevin Carson wrote:
> I think the
> absentee ownership of land seriously exacerbates economic rent in urban
> areas. If the tenants (not only apartment dwellers, but small business
> people) of slumlords, real estate speculators, etc., ceased to pay rent, and
> if vacant lots could be homesteade
In a post a while back, I maintained that restrictions on inter-racial
adoption seemed like a pretty clear violation of the Median Voter
theorem. I found some data at:
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3143/RacialBiracialToplines.pdf
Question 36 reveals that 79%+ respondents of ALL races say that
In a message dated 8/26/02 11:34:01 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
<< 2: I seem to recall that heavy flooding in the Mississippi / Missouri
area led to a reversal of the "let's build a protective dike and thus
move the problem down stream"-policy. Large areas (including whole
villages) were
At dinner last night, I posed a similar to question to a few of my
friends. I noted that MTV once held a contest to be the next MTV veejay,
and that the winner got his (or her?) requisite however-long stint -- but
the runner up actually got a full-time veejay job out of the deal. Would
this
oops. Make that more dikes rather than fewer.
>From: Grey Thomas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
>User-fees are an excellent idea, but I don't think
>incompatible with a Lib-Georgist land value tax:
>Who supports the judiciary? Who supports the
>Dept. of War? er, Defense? -- property owners,
>who need/use local police and international police,
>as
Another fascinating study from the Kaiser Family Foundation:
http://www.kff.org/content/archive/1383/gender.pdf
I especially like the contrast between answers to question 3 and 4.
Most people think changing gender roles are worse for most people, but
most people think these changes have benefit
Fred Foldvary wrote:
>
> --- Bryan D Caplan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > The outcome of democracy depends on the
> > overall rationality of public opinion, but whatever outcome you get can
> > be equally enjoyed by the rational and irrational alike.
>
> Does this not depend on the structure an
fabio guillermo rojas wrote:
>
> Let me elaborate some more. I think the MVT encourages us to think
> that democracy works by taking a random sample of voters and making
> policy the average response. If that were the case, democracy would
> clearly give us what the median voter wants.
>
> Howev
>From: Fred Foldvary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>In which case you yourself are 80% Georgist, because if taxes there be not,
>then landowners will bear the major cost of infrastructure now paid for by
>the taxation of labor and capital. That will deflate their land value, now
>puffed up by the capital
fabio guillermo rojas wrote:
>
> > "screwed-up institution." The outcome of democracy depends on the
> > overall rationality of public opinion, but whatever outcome you get can
> > be equally enjoyed by the rational and irrational alike.
>
> My question isn't about the quality of policy, but th
Two points
1: It is my belief that in a free market for river management (no
government meddling) common law practises would evolve, stipulating how
to resolve cases where activities upstream causes havoc downstream
(whether this take the form of pollution, flooding or whatever)
2: I seem to
--- john hull <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ... you seem to be suggesting that
> policy makers are benefiting the present at the
> expense of the future, yet couldn't one could accuse
> you of wanting to benefit the future at the expense of
> the present?
One could accuse me thusly, but the accusa
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