[agi] Legg and Hutter on resource efficiency was Re: Yawn.
On 14/01/2008, Pei Wang [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Jan 13, 2008 7:40 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And, as I indicated, my particular beef was with Shane Legg's paper, which I found singularly content-free. Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter have a recent publication on this topic, http://www.springerlink.com/content/jm81548387248180/ which is much richer in content. I think this can also be found here http://arxiv.org/abs/0712.3329 For those of us without springerlink accounts. While we do not consider efficiency to be a part of the definition of intelligence, this is not to say that considering the efficiency of agents is unimportant. Indeed, a key goal of artificial intelligence is to find algorithms which have the greatest efficiency of intelligence, that is, which achieve the most intelligence per unit of computational resources consumed. Why not consider resource efficiciency a thing to be adapted? Over which problems can be solved. An example. consider 2 android robots with finite energy supplies tasked with a long foot race. One shuts down all processing non-essential to its current task of running (sound familiar to what humans do? I certainly think better walking), so it uses less energy. The other one attempts to find programs that precisly predict its input given its output, churning through billions of possibilities and consuming vast amounts of energy. The one that shuts down its processing finishes the race and gets reward, the other one runs its battery down by processing too much and has to be rescued, getting no reward. As they have defined it only outputting can make the system more or less likely to achieve a goal. Which is a narrow view. Will Pearson - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85547641-0ef2b3
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
Richard, I don't think Shane and Marcus's overview of definitions-of-intelligence is poor quality. I think it is just doing something different than what you think it should be doing. The overview is exactly that: A review of what researchers have said about the definition of intelligence. This is useful as a view into the cultural mind-space of the research community regarding the intelligence concept. As for their formal definition of intelligence, I think it is worthwhile as a precise formulation of one perspective on the multidimensional concept of intelligence. I don't agree with them that they have somehow captured the essence of the concept of intelligence in their formal definition though; I think they have just captured one aspect... -- Ben G On 1/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Pei Wang wrote: On Jan 13, 2008 7:40 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And, as I indicated, my particular beef was with Shane Legg's paper, which I found singularly content-free. Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter have a recent publication on this topic, http://www.springerlink.com/content/jm81548387248180/ which is much richer in content. Unfortunately, this paper is not so much richer in content as containing a larger number of words and formulae. It adds nothing to the previous (poor quality) paper, falls into exactly the same pitfalls as before, and repeats the trick of pulling an arbitrary mathematical definition out of the hat without saying why this definition should correspond with the natural or commonsense definition. Any fool can mathematize a definition of a commonsense idea without actually saying anything new. Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85626959-5ab00c
[agi] Re: [singularity] The establishment line on AGI
Also, this would involve creating a close-knit community through conferences, journals, common terminologies/ontologies, email lists, articles, books, fellowships, collaborations, correspondence, research institutes, doctoral programs, and other such devices. (Popularization is not on the list of community-builders, although it may have its own value.) Ben has been involved in many efforts in these directions -- I wonder if he was thinking of Kuhn. Indeed, working toward the formation of such a community is one of the motivations underlying the AGI-08 conference. And also underlying the OpenCog AGI project I'm initiating together with the SIAI, see opencog.org My prior efforts in this direction, such as -- AGI email list -- 2006 AGI workshop -- two AGI edited volumes have been successful but smaller-scale. My feeling is that the time is ripe for the self-organization of a really viable AGI research community. In connection with AGI-08, we have put up a wiki page intended to gather proposals and suggestions regarding the formation of a more robust AGI community http://www.agi-08.org/proposals.php If any of y'all have relevant ideas, feel free to post them there. I don't actually have a lot of time for community-building activities, as my main focus is on Novamente LLC (and Novamente's work on AGI plus its narrow-AI consulting work that pays my bills). But, I try to make time for community-building, because I think it's very important and will benefit all of us working in the field. I did read Kuhn back in college, and was impressed with his insight, along with (even more so) that of Imre Lakatos, with his theory of scientific research programmes. In Lakatos's terms, what needs to be done is to build a community that can turn AGI into an overall progressive research program. I discuss these philosophy of science ideas a bit in the Hidden Pattern, and earlier in an essay http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/PhilosophyOfScience_v2.htm Further back, I remember when I was 5 years old, reading a draft of a book my dad was writing (a textbook of Marxist sociology), and encountering the word paradigm and not knowing what it meant. As I recall, I asked him and he tried to explain and I did not understand the explanation very well ;-p ... and truth be told, I still find it a fuzzy term, preferring Lakatos's characterization of research programmes. However, Kuhn had more insight than Lakatos into the sociological dynamics surrounding scientific research programmes... -- Ben G - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85618740-3a68d2
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
Pei Wang wrote: On Jan 13, 2008 7:40 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And, as I indicated, my particular beef was with Shane Legg's paper, which I found singularly content-free. Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter have a recent publication on this topic, http://www.springerlink.com/content/jm81548387248180/ which is much richer in content. Unfortunately, this paper is not so much richer in content as containing a larger number of words and formulae. It adds nothing to the previous (poor quality) paper, falls into exactly the same pitfalls as before, and repeats the trick of pulling an arbitrary mathematical definition out of the hat without saying why this definition should correspond with the natural or commonsense definition. Any fool can mathematize a definition of a commonsense idea without actually saying anything new. Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85625387-40ef44
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
Benjamin Goertzel wrote: Richard, I don't think Shane and Marcus's overview of definitions-of-intelligence is poor quality. I'll explain why I said poor quality. In my experience of marking student essays, there is a stereotype of the night before deadline essay, which goes like this. If the topic is X, the student grabs a bunch of definitions that other people have given of X, and they start the essay by saying Well, we don't really know what X is in all it's [sic] glory, but So-and-so has said [definition 1]. In contrast, So-and-so-other has disagreed and said that [definition 2] .. and on and on through a long and miserable list of quotations. Then, realizing that something more is needed, the essay writer winds up with a commentary that comes out of nowhere and arbitrarily declares that some point of view or some formula is probably the best. In reading Legg and Hutter's first essay in the AGIRI-06 workshop, and now their more recent expansion of that paper, I see no difference between what they did and the stereotypic night-before-deadlne essay. That is why I comdemned it with the phrase poor quality. As for your other (very diplomatic) comment, phlogiston was also a nice example of a precise formulation of one perspective on the multidimensional concept of combustion. Multidimensional concepts are sometimes not what they are cracked up to be. Your job is to be diplomatic. Mine is to call a spade a spade. ;-) Richard Loosemore I think it is just doing something different than what you think it should be doing. The overview is exactly that: A review of what researchers have said about the definition of intelligence. This is useful as a view into the cultural mind-space of the research community regarding the intelligence concept. As for their formal definition of intelligence, I think it is worthwhile as a precise formulation of one perspective on the multidimensional concept of intelligence. I don't agree with them that they have somehow captured the essence of the concept of intelligence in their formal definition though; I think they have just captured one aspect... -- Ben G On 1/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Pei Wang wrote: On Jan 13, 2008 7:40 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And, as I indicated, my particular beef was with Shane Legg's paper, which I found singularly content-free. Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter have a recent publication on this topic, http://www.springerlink.com/content/jm81548387248180/ which is much richer in content. Unfortunately, this paper is not so much richer in content as containing a larger number of words and formulae. It adds nothing to the previous (poor quality) paper, falls into exactly the same pitfalls as before, and repeats the trick of pulling an arbitrary mathematical definition out of the hat without saying why this definition should correspond with the natural or commonsense definition. Any fool can mathematize a definition of a commonsense idea without actually saying anything new. Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85635979-4e972e
[agi] Comments on Pei Wang's What Do You Mean by “AI”?
Pei, I have a few thoughts about your paper. Your classification scheme for different types of intelligence definition seems to require that the concepts of percepts, actions and states be objectively measurable or identifiable in some way. I see this as a problem, because the concept of a percept (say) may well be so intimately connected with what intelligent systems do that we could never say what counts as a percept without making reference to an intelligent system. For example, would it count if an intelligent human perceived an example of a very abstract concept like (e.g.) hegemony? Would [hegemony] be a percept, or would you only allow primitive percepts that are directly picked up by an intelligence, like oriented line segments? More precisely, I think that percepts like [hegemony] are indeed bona fide percepts, but they are very unlikely to be defined without making reference to the systems that developed the concept. So [hegemony] does not have a closed-form definition and the best we can do is to say that among a large population of human intelligences, there is a point in concept-space that is given the word-label hegemony but if you were to look inside each individual mind you would find that the same name is actually a unique cluster of connections to other concepts (each of which, in turn, has its own subtle differences among all the different individuals). The same story can be told about actions, and internal states. But if there is only a loose correspondence (across individuals) between terms labelled with the same name, then how can we even begin to think that the act of comparing states, percepts and actions between computers and humas (as you do in your paper) would be a good way to dissect the different meanings of intelligence? The only way out of this problem would be to define some normative central tendency of the Ps, Ss and As across the population of actual intelligent agents (i.e. human minds, at this time in history) and then move on from there. But of course, that would be tantamount to declaring that intelligence is basically defined by what human minds do. My point here is not to ask questions about how percepts map onto one another (across individuals), but to say that the very question of which things count as percepts cannot be answered without looking at the chunks that have actually been formed by human beings. To put this in stark relief: suppose we came across an alien intelligence that did not use oriented line segments at a very low level of its visual system, but instead used pairs of blobs, separated by different distances across the retina. Eveything it perceived above this level would then be various abstractions of that basic visual building block. This alien mind would be carving nature along different joints - parsing it very differently - and it might well be that it simply never constructs high level concepts that map onto our own concepts, so the two sets of percepts (ours and theirs) are just not comparable. They might never perceive an example of hegemony, and we might never be able to perceive an instance of one of their concepts either. How would we then - even in principle - start talking about whether the same percepts give rise to the same iternal states in the two systems? The percepts would depend too much on the actual structure of the two different minds. The 'percepts would not be objective things. I see no way out of this, because I cannot see any way that the abstract notion of *objective* percepts, states and actions can be justified. The validity of any proposed objective scheme can be challenged, and so long as it can be challenged, the notion of percepts, states and actions cannot be used as a starting point for a discussion of what intelligence actually is. What do you think? Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85650209-afcd20
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
Your job is to be diplomatic. Mine is to call a spade a spade. ;-) Richard Loosemore I would rephrase it like this: Your job is to make me look diplomatic ;-p - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85657842-0be0ab
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
Benjamin Goertzel wrote: Your job is to be diplomatic. Mine is to call a spade a spade. ;-) Richard Loosemore I would rephrase it like this: Your job is to make me look diplomatic ;-p I agree: I am undiplomatic and unreasonable. The reasonable man adapts himself to the world. The unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself Dear me, two quotes from Man and Superman in one week. ;-) Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85663214-cf41b9
Re: [agi] Comments on Pei Wang 's What Do You Mean by “AI”?
Richard, Thanks for the detailed comments! If you spend some time in my semantic theory, you will see that I never believe any concept can get any kind of objective meaning or true definition. All meanings depend on an observer, with its observation ability and limitation. The so called objective meaning is just commonly agreed meaning in a community of observers, which is not as subjective as one observer's own idea. Therefore, I agree with your analysis that percepts, actions and states cannot be objectively measurable or identifiable concepts --- actually no concept can be. However, it doesn't mean that everything goes and we cannot make any meaningful analysis to any situation. Especially, it doesn't mean intelligence as a concept cannot have a stable working definition, as the goal of a research project, since our current understanding on the topic is clearly limited. In my paper, I do assume we can meaningfully use words like percepts, actions, and states according to our intuitive understanding of them --- we have to start from somewhere. To me, these concepts, though have no objective meaning, are still much less complicated than the concept of intelligence, and different understanding about them won't have too big a impact to the conclusion of the paper. By the way, the word percepts, borrowed from RussellNorvig, doesn't mean perception, which is much more subjective. I uses a conceptual framework consists of percepts, actions, and states, not because I think these concepts are objective, but because they can help us to show the difference among various understandings of intelligence. Even for the concept of intelligence, I'm not trying to find its true meaning, but to show where different understandings will lead the research. Of course, all of these opinions are based on my biased experience, and restricted by my insufficient resources in processing them, so therefore is neither objective nor fully formalized. However, I don't believe those properties are the most important ones for defining intelligence at the current time. Pei On Jan 14, 2008 11:20 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Pei, I have a few thoughts about your paper. Your classification scheme for different types of intelligence definition seems to require that the concepts of percepts, actions and states be objectively measurable or identifiable in some way. I see this as a problem, because the concept of a percept (say) may well be so intimately connected with what intelligent systems do that we could never say what counts as a percept without making reference to an intelligent system. For example, would it count if an intelligent human perceived an example of a very abstract concept like (e.g.) hegemony? Would [hegemony] be a percept, or would you only allow primitive percepts that are directly picked up by an intelligence, like oriented line segments? More precisely, I think that percepts like [hegemony] are indeed bona fide percepts, but they are very unlikely to be defined without making reference to the systems that developed the concept. So [hegemony] does not have a closed-form definition and the best we can do is to say that among a large population of human intelligences, there is a point in concept-space that is given the word-label hegemony but if you were to look inside each individual mind you would find that the same name is actually a unique cluster of connections to other concepts (each of which, in turn, has its own subtle differences among all the different individuals). The same story can be told about actions, and internal states. But if there is only a loose correspondence (across individuals) between terms labelled with the same name, then how can we even begin to think that the act of comparing states, percepts and actions between computers and humas (as you do in your paper) would be a good way to dissect the different meanings of intelligence? The only way out of this problem would be to define some normative central tendency of the Ps, Ss and As across the population of actual intelligent agents (i.e. human minds, at this time in history) and then move on from there. But of course, that would be tantamount to declaring that intelligence is basically defined by what human minds do. My point here is not to ask questions about how percepts map onto one another (across individuals), but to say that the very question of which things count as percepts cannot be answered without looking at the chunks that have actually been formed by human beings. To put this in stark relief: suppose we came across an alien intelligence that did not use oriented line segments at a very low level of its visual system, but instead used pairs of blobs, separated by different distances across the retina. Eveything it perceived above this level would then be various abstractions of that basic visual building block. This alien mind would be carving
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
I heavily agree with you, Richard. But perhaps the Hutter exercise has some value - simply by way of making us question the validity of any mathematical approach to intelligence. Well, there IS some value, (although BTW, at a glance they don't seem to recognize that IQ is not even a direct measure of intelligence). Intelligence of any kind does involve computational powers. One person may be a faster or more complex thinker than another. You can measure that. But what precise mathematical figures can we put on the relative intelligence of : *the Gettysburg address *the I have a dream speech *Obama's we can speech *the Ipod *the Creative Zen *the Archos *Novamente *LIDA * (does Richard's have a name? ANGLOFILE? ) *Ben's lovemaking *Franklin's lovemaking *Richard's lovemaking *Ben's posts *Richard's posts *Pei's posts *Macbeth *Scarface *The Roaring Twenties etc etc ad infinitum. Like all the psychologists they rely on, they have an EXTREMELY limited idea of intelligence, and how it is applied, (and that's being generous). Richard, In my experience of marking student essays, there is a stereotype of the night before deadline essay, which goes like this. If the topic is X, the student grabs a bunch of definitions that other people have given of X, and they start the essay by saying Well, we don't really know what X is in all it's [sic] glory, but So-and-so has said [definition 1]. In contrast, So-and-so-other has disagreed and said that [definition 2] .. and on and on through a long and miserable list of quotations. Then, realizing that something more is needed, the essay writer winds up with a commentary that comes out of nowhere and arbitrarily declares that some point of view or some formula is probably the best. In reading Legg and Hutter's first essay in the AGIRI-06 workshop, and now their more recent expansion of that paper, I see no difference between what they did and the stereotypic night-before-deadlne essay. That is why I comdemned it with the phrase poor quality. As for your other (very diplomatic) comment, phlogiston was also a nice example of a precise formulation of one perspective on the multidimensional concept of combustion. Multidimensional concepts are sometimes not what they are cracked up to be. Your job is to be diplomatic. Mine is to call a spade a spade. ;-) Richard Loosemore I think it is just doing something different than what you think it should be doing. The overview is exactly that: A review of what researchers have said about the definition of intelligence. This is useful as a view into the cultural mind-space of the research community regarding the intelligence concept. As for their formal definition of intelligence, I think it is worthwhile as a precise formulation of one perspective on the multidimensional concept of intelligence. I don't agree with them that they have somehow captured the essence of the concept of intelligence in their formal definition though; I think they have just captured one aspect... -- Ben G On 1/14/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Pei Wang wrote: On Jan 13, 2008 7:40 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And, as I indicated, my particular beef was with Shane Legg's paper, which I found singularly content-free. Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter have a recent publication on this topic, http://www.springerlink.com/content/jm81548387248180/ which is much richer in content. Unfortunately, this paper is not so much richer in content as containing a larger number of words and formulae. It adds nothing to the previous (poor quality) paper, falls into exactly the same pitfalls as before, and repeats the trick of pulling an arbitrary mathematical definition out of the hat without saying why this definition should correspond with the natural or commonsense definition. Any fool can mathematize a definition of a commonsense idea without actually saying anything new. Richard Loosemore - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.516 / Virus Database: 269.19.2/1221 - Release Date: 1/12/2008 2:04 PM - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85666781-a1e2a3
Re: Yawn. More definitions of intelligence? [WAS Re: [agi] Ben's Definition of Intelligence]
On Jan 14, 2008 10:10 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Any fool can mathematize a definition of a commonsense idea without actually saying anything new. Ouch. Careful. :) That may be true, but it takes $10M worth of computer hardware to disprove. disclaimer: that was humor - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85679890-97e868
Re: [agi] Comments on Pei Wang 's What Do You Mean by “AI”?
Will, The situation you mentioned is possible, but I'd assume, given the similar functions from percepts to states, there must also be similar functions from states to actions, that is, AC = GC(SC), AH = GH(SH), GC ≈ GH Consequently, it becomes a special case of my Principle-AI, with a compound function: AC = GC(FC(PC)), AH = GH(FH(PH)), GC(FC()) ≈ GH(FH()) Pei 2008/1/14 William Pearson [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Something I noticed while trying to fit my definition of AI into the categories given. There is another way that definitions can be principled. This similarity would not be on the function of percepts to action. Instead it would require a similarity on the function of percepts to internal state as well. That is they should be able to adapt in a similar fashion. SC = FC(PC), SH = FH(PH), FC ≈ FH I'm not strictly speaking working on intelligence at the moment, rather how to build adaptive programmable computer architectures (which I think is a necessary first step to intelligence), so it might take me a while to get around to fully working out my definition of intelligence. It would contain principles like the one I mention above though. Will Pearson - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?; - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85815783-9a4a33
Re: [agi] Comments on Pei Wang 's What Do You Mean by “AI”?
Something I noticed while trying to fit my definition of AI into the categories given. There is another way that definitions can be principled. This similarity would not be on the function of percepts to action. Instead it would require a similarity on the function of percepts to internal state as well. That is they should be able to adapt in a similar fashion. SC = FC(PC), SH = FH(PH), FC ≈ FH I'm not strictly speaking working on intelligence at the moment, rather how to build adaptive programmable computer architectures (which I think is a necessary first step to intelligence), so it might take me a while to get around to fully working out my definition of intelligence. It would contain principles like the one I mention above though. Will Pearson - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85825259-71606f
Re: [agi] Comments on Pei Wang 's What Do You Mean by “AI”?
On 14/01/2008, Pei Wang [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Will, The situation you mentioned is possible, but I'd assume, given the similar functions from percepts to states, there must also be similar functions from states to actions, that is, AC = GC(SC), AH = GH(SH), GC ≈ GH Pei, Sorry I should have thought more. I would define the similarity of the functions that it is possible to be interested in as. St = F(S(t-1),P) That is the current state is important to what change is made to the state. For example a man coming across the percept Oui, bien sieur, would change his state in a different way depending upon whether he was already fluent in french or not. This doesn't really change the rest of your argument, but I feel it is important. Consequently, it becomes a special case of my Principle-AI, with a compound function: AC = GC(FC(PC)), AH = GH(FH(PH)), GC(FC()) ≈ GH(FH()) Pei To be pedantic (feel free to ignore the following if you like): That would depend on whether the ≈ relation is exactly. If you assume it has the same meaning when used above there are possible meanings for it where the relation (FC ≈ FH GC ≈GH) does not imply (GC(FC()) ≈ GH(FH())). Consider the meaning of ≈ x and y are similar because they can be transformed to a reference programs of a reference language of the same length + or - 20 bytes. This would mean the representation for GC(FC()) would be within + or - 40 bytes of GH(FH()). Which wouldn't be the same relation. A bit contrived I know, but as we are working on the theoretical side of things, this is the best example I could think of at short notice. Until I get a better feeling of my own definition, I can't really say much more that is really useful. Will - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85847138-e90417
Re: [agi] Comments on Pei Wang 's What Do You Mean by “AI”?
2008/1/14 William Pearson [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I would define the similarity of the functions that it is possible to be interested in as. St = F(S(t-1),P) That is the current state is important to what change is made to the state. For example a man coming across the percept Oui, bien sieur, would change his state in a different way depending upon whether he was already fluent in french or not. This doesn't really change the rest of your argument, but I feel it is important. That is correct for all deterministic systems, like Turing Machine. However, I really don't like to describe the internal situations of a system (or the external situation of its environment) using state. Though it is the common practice, this notion implies that the description is complete and precise, which is often impossible. In this paper, you can see that I only mentioned state in the first category (Structure-AI), and leave it out for the other categories, even though for those we still can discuss their states, as you suggested. Consequently, it becomes a special case of my Principle-AI, with a compound function: AC = GC(FC(PC)), AH = GH(FH(PH)), GC(FC()) ≈ GH(FH()) That would depend on whether the ≈ relation is exactly. If you assume it has the same meaning when used above there are possible meanings for it where the relation (FC ≈ FH GC ≈GH) does not imply (GC(FC()) ≈ GH(FH())). Of course. What I gave is a very rough relation. Consider the meaning of ≈ x and y are similar because they can be transformed to a reference programs of a reference language of the same length + or - 20 bytes. This would mean the representation for GC(FC()) would be within + or - 40 bytes of GH(FH()). Which wouldn't be the same relation. No, that is not the kind of situation I'm talking about. At the current stage, I'm not really trying to propose a quantitative measurement for intelligence or the similarity between systems. Instead, I'm looking for qualitative difference among working definitions of intelligence. I just have to assume that it is meaningful to talk about the similarity between systems in several aspects, and that will be enough for the conclusion of the paper. Pei - This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=85850863-74d8d0
