Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ 3826 Judgement
On Mon, 6 Apr 2020 at 02:04, Rebecca via agora-discussion < agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: > I think by whatever dictionary meaning of the word any you use, universal > or existential, I can at least convince you all that the sentence is so > ambiguous as to be unsolvable with pure English. Although I could have used > other factors in resolving the case, I opted to use "common sense" (an > enumerated factor), that being I resolved the case on my first initial > reading of the sentence at issue. I have made arguments that the side of > "any" being "one" has the better of it textually, but as a backup I think I > am entitled to resolve the case using common sense. I am happy to slightly > edit these explanatory paragraphs and append them to the judgement if you > would like. If you believe that the statement is sufficiently ambiguous as to require a fallback to R2125 principles, this should be a full part of the judgment. I stand by my request for a motion to reconsider.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ 3826 Judgement
I think by whatever dictionary meaning of the word any you use, universal or existential, I can at least convince you all that the sentence is so ambiguous as to be unsolvable with pure English. Although I could have used other factors in resolving the case, I opted to use "common sense" (an enumerated factor), that being I resolved the case on my first initial reading of the sentence at issue. I have made arguments that the side of "any" being "one" has the better of it textually, but as a backup I think I am entitled to resolve the case using common sense. I am happy to slightly edit these explanatory paragraphs and append them to the judgement if you would like. On Mon, Apr 6, 2020 at 4:01 PM Rebecca wrote: > ""A worker CAN dispose of a shipment if a recipient cannot eat any apple > within" > > I think this sentence means the same thing as my example sentence. If "a > recipient can eat any apple within the shipment", they can eat every single > apple because any is universal here, the apple is arbitrarily selected. The > reason it is universal is because, as my judgement notes, any is almost > always universal in positive sentences like this one. If a recipient > CANNOT eat just a single apple, it is untrue that they CAN eat "any" apple. > > This logic was not the logic of my judgement but it would sustain it. > > But I think in this case "the Auctioneer of that Auction cannot transfer > any item included in a lot in that Auction" is a phrase that is different > to "a recipient cannot eat any apple within the shipment" because in this > context we are _really_ talking about the item itself being nontransferable > by law, although the auctioneer is the actor in this sentence as > grammatically written. Whereas in your example we seem to be talking a lot > more about whether any theoretical recipient could actually eat it, which > makes your sentence a very different sentence from "if the apple cannot be > eaten". In this case, I don't think "the auctioneer cannot transfer" is > different to "any lot can be transferred". > > On Mon, Apr 6, 2020 at 2:52 PM Alexis Hunt via agora-business < > agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote: > >> On Sun, 5 Apr 2020 at 23:46, Aris Merchant via agora-discussion < >> agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: >> >> > I'm not actually convinced by the region example; I initially read that >> the >> > other way, and on rereading think it's ambiguous. Still, the apple >> example >> > seems sound, and I find that a good enough as an analogue. Good >> judgement! >> > >> > -Aris >> > >> >> I'm not sure I agree. In my view, there is a clear distinguishing factor. >> In the apple example, the "cannot" appears after the "any", while in the >> rule at issue, it appears before. This is a critical distinction. The >> corresponding apple phrase would be "A worker CAN dispose of a shipment if >> a recipient cannot eat any apple within". If I may make appeals to the >> principles of first-order logic, (using words instead of symbols, for the >> sake of those not used to logic notation), suppose we let P(x) mean "x >> can >> be eaten" and Q mean "the shipment can be disposed of" (with x ranging >> over >> all apples in the shipment). >> >> Then the judge's example is clearly equivalent to "If there exists an x >> such that P(x) is false, then Q". This is logically equivalent to "If, for >> all x, P(x) is true, then Q". But by contrast, if we have the statement >> "If >> there does not exist an x such that P(x) is true, then Q", the logical >> equivalent is "If, for all x, P(x) is false, then Q." >> >> Breaking down the English of "if a recipient cannot eat any apple within", >> "eat any apple within" is a relative clause that is negated by "cannot". >> In >> my opinion, this most strongly resembles "If there does not exist an x >> such >> that P(x) is true". To interpret it otherwise requires either changing the >> way that "cannot" binds or interpreting "any" as a universal (for all) >> quantifier, rather than existential (there exists) quantifier. I contend >> that this is not the most straightforward way to convert the English into >> the language of logic, and once we have done so, the conclusion of TRUE on >> the CFJ must follow. >> >> I intend, with 2 support, to file a motion to reconsider CFJ 3826; the >> above needs to be addressed, at minimum. >> > > > -- > From R. Lee > -- >From R. Lee
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ 3826 Judgement
""A worker CAN dispose of a shipment if a recipient cannot eat any apple within" I think this sentence means the same thing as my example sentence. If "a recipient can eat any apple within the shipment", they can eat every single apple because any is universal here, the apple is arbitrarily selected. The reason it is universal is because, as my judgement notes, any is almost always universal in positive sentences like this one. If a recipient CANNOT eat just a single apple, it is untrue that they CAN eat "any" apple. This logic was not the logic of my judgement but it would sustain it. But I think in this case "the Auctioneer of that Auction cannot transfer any item included in a lot in that Auction" is a phrase that is different to "a recipient cannot eat any apple within the shipment" because in this context we are _really_ talking about the item itself being nontransferable by law, although the auctioneer is the actor in this sentence as grammatically written. Whereas in your example we seem to be talking a lot more about whether any theoretical recipient could actually eat it, which makes your sentence a very different sentence from "if the apple cannot be eaten". In this case, I don't think "the auctioneer cannot transfer" is different to "any lot can be transferred". On Mon, Apr 6, 2020 at 2:52 PM Alexis Hunt via agora-business < agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote: > On Sun, 5 Apr 2020 at 23:46, Aris Merchant via agora-discussion < > agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: > > > I'm not actually convinced by the region example; I initially read that > the > > other way, and on rereading think it's ambiguous. Still, the apple > example > > seems sound, and I find that a good enough as an analogue. Good > judgement! > > > > -Aris > > > > I'm not sure I agree. In my view, there is a clear distinguishing factor. > In the apple example, the "cannot" appears after the "any", while in the > rule at issue, it appears before. This is a critical distinction. The > corresponding apple phrase would be "A worker CAN dispose of a shipment if > a recipient cannot eat any apple within". If I may make appeals to the > principles of first-order logic, (using words instead of symbols, for the > sake of those not used to logic notation), suppose we let P(x) mean "x can > be eaten" and Q mean "the shipment can be disposed of" (with x ranging over > all apples in the shipment). > > Then the judge's example is clearly equivalent to "If there exists an x > such that P(x) is false, then Q". This is logically equivalent to "If, for > all x, P(x) is true, then Q". But by contrast, if we have the statement "If > there does not exist an x such that P(x) is true, then Q", the logical > equivalent is "If, for all x, P(x) is false, then Q." > > Breaking down the English of "if a recipient cannot eat any apple within", > "eat any apple within" is a relative clause that is negated by "cannot". In > my opinion, this most strongly resembles "If there does not exist an x such > that P(x) is true". To interpret it otherwise requires either changing the > way that "cannot" binds or interpreting "any" as a universal (for all) > quantifier, rather than existential (there exists) quantifier. I contend > that this is not the most straightforward way to convert the English into > the language of logic, and once we have done so, the conclusion of TRUE on > the CFJ must follow. > > I intend, with 2 support, to file a motion to reconsider CFJ 3826; the > above needs to be addressed, at minimum. > -- >From R. Lee
DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ 3826 Judgement
I just realized I top-posted. I apologize. -Aris On Sun, Apr 5, 2020 at 8:46 PM Aris Merchant < thoughtsoflifeandligh...@gmail.com> wrote: > I'm not actually convinced by the region example; I initially read that > the other way, and on rereading think it's ambiguous. Still, the apple > example seems sound, and I find that a good enough as an analogue. Good > judgement! > > -Aris > > On Sun, Apr 5, 2020 at 5:56 PM Rebecca via agora-business < > agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote: > >> A zombie auction can be terminated "if the Auction has not ended and the >> Auctioneer of that Auction cannot transfer any item included in a lot in >> that Auction" (as says rule 2552). In this case, one lot could not be >> transferred. The question is whether the auction can end if one lot cannot >> be transferred, or only if all of them cannot be transferred. >> >> The word "any" can mean each. In most legal contexts it does mean each(see >> SAS Institute v Iancu). But that only tends to be the case when it is used >> with "a singular noun in affirmative contexts" (this is quoting SAS >> Institute). In other contexts, any means "one or more selected items in a >> group". The sentence at issue here involves a negative context, and in >> such >> context, a legal dictate tends to apply when one or more of the items does >> not satisfy a condition, rather than when all of them do not. Let me >> provide an example sentence. "The supplier can embargo a certain region if >> we cannot receive safety assurances from any country included in the >> region". That sentence is basically a mirror of rule 2552, and it's clear >> to all that one country failing to provide assurances is enough for the >> whole region to be subject to embargo. >> >> Alexis offers a sentence similar to "I can't understand any of your >> questions". In this case, any clearly means each, all questions are >> incomprehensible to the speaker. That example sentence, though, is much >> further away from the rule itself than mine, and mine disproves the rule >> offered that "any" after a negated verb always means "each". Instead, I >> think, it is purely contextual. But take this sentence "if any item can't >> be transferred, the auction can be cancelled". That's just a simplified >> and >> switched up version of the actual rule at issue, but I don't think anyone >> can read that at first scan and think that _every_ item must be unable to >> be transferred >> >> I have said before in CFJs that we resolve textual arguments not like >> robots, but with the reading of reasonable English speakers in mind. I am >> not pointed to any grammatical canon which clearly resolves this case. >> Indeed, looking at grammatical explanations of the word "any" available to >> me, two different meanings seemed to be distinguishable often only by >> context. My first reading of the rule 2552 is that one inability to >> transfer nixes the whole auction. Take this sentence "A worker CAN dispose >> of a shipment of apples if any apple within it cannot be eaten". In that >> case, just like this one, one rotten apple spoils the bunch, consistent >> with, although not strictly required by, rules of grammar. >> >> On the basis of natural grammar, my first reading as a reasonable speaker, >> and the context of one wrong thing being involved in a lot of multiple, >> inextricable things (just like my regions or apples examples), I judge CFJ >> 3826 FALSE >> >> -- >> From R. Lee >> >
DIS: Re: BUS: CFJ 3826 Judgement
I'm not actually convinced by the region example; I initially read that the other way, and on rereading think it's ambiguous. Still, the apple example seems sound, and I find that a good enough as an analogue. Good judgement! -Aris On Sun, Apr 5, 2020 at 5:56 PM Rebecca via agora-business < agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote: > A zombie auction can be terminated "if the Auction has not ended and the > Auctioneer of that Auction cannot transfer any item included in a lot in > that Auction" (as says rule 2552). In this case, one lot could not be > transferred. The question is whether the auction can end if one lot cannot > be transferred, or only if all of them cannot be transferred. > > The word "any" can mean each. In most legal contexts it does mean each(see > SAS Institute v Iancu). But that only tends to be the case when it is used > with "a singular noun in affirmative contexts" (this is quoting SAS > Institute). In other contexts, any means "one or more selected items in a > group". The sentence at issue here involves a negative context, and in such > context, a legal dictate tends to apply when one or more of the items does > not satisfy a condition, rather than when all of them do not. Let me > provide an example sentence. "The supplier can embargo a certain region if > we cannot receive safety assurances from any country included in the > region". That sentence is basically a mirror of rule 2552, and it's clear > to all that one country failing to provide assurances is enough for the > whole region to be subject to embargo. > > Alexis offers a sentence similar to "I can't understand any of your > questions". In this case, any clearly means each, all questions are > incomprehensible to the speaker. That example sentence, though, is much > further away from the rule itself than mine, and mine disproves the rule > offered that "any" after a negated verb always means "each". Instead, I > think, it is purely contextual. But take this sentence "if any item can't > be transferred, the auction can be cancelled". That's just a simplified and > switched up version of the actual rule at issue, but I don't think anyone > can read that at first scan and think that _every_ item must be unable to > be transferred > > I have said before in CFJs that we resolve textual arguments not like > robots, but with the reading of reasonable English speakers in mind. I am > not pointed to any grammatical canon which clearly resolves this case. > Indeed, looking at grammatical explanations of the word "any" available to > me, two different meanings seemed to be distinguishable often only by > context. My first reading of the rule 2552 is that one inability to > transfer nixes the whole auction. Take this sentence "A worker CAN dispose > of a shipment of apples if any apple within it cannot be eaten". In that > case, just like this one, one rotten apple spoils the bunch, consistent > with, although not strictly required by, rules of grammar. > > On the basis of natural grammar, my first reading as a reasonable speaker, > and the context of one wrong thing being involved in a lot of multiple, > inextricable things (just like my regions or apples examples), I judge CFJ > 3826 FALSE > > -- > From R. Lee >
Re: DIS: [Proto] Down with the Auction Rules
On Sun, 5 Apr 2020 at 16:40, Kerim Aydin via agora-discussion < agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: > >>> the valid options are the zombies a) that were eligible for auction at > >>> its initiation and b) whose master switch has not changed in the > >> meanwhile. > >> > >> Right now the Registar has discretion and is not required to auction all > >> eligible zombies - this removes that discretion. > >> > > > > E does not; the parenthetical in the first paragraph of R1885 eliminates > > discretion. > > As the author of that parenthetical in question, and a Registrar who used > it to split up big auctions a few times, I disagree - I think it means > that any subset of eligible zombies CAN be auctioned by the registrar. > (I'd rather not quibble about the current wording - I see both readings > and definitely acknowledge the ambiguity - but it would be great to > empower the Registrar to meter the zombie economy if e can't already). > I'd prefer not to make the proposal more complex by accommodating this, but I will do so if the current Registrar wants. -Alexis
Re: DIS: [Proto] Down with the Auction Rules
On Sun, 5 Apr 2020 at 17:09, Alexis Hunt wrote: > 3. Definitions of specific types of decisions are meted out to lower-level > rules or even subsidiary bodies of law, e.g. election procedure no longer > needs to be tied in to high-powered rules. > Oh this made me think of self-ratification and how we should fix that. Letting decisions always self-ratify that they had a specific outcome would a power that's safe to pass onto subsidiary law, but only if it's a legal fiction and doesn't alter any preconditions). Do we have a preferred fix? I recall that someone (Falsifian?) submitted a proto that I think I liked more than mine but I 'd have to go back to see if that's true.
Re: DIS: [Proto] Down with the Auction Rules
On Sun, 5 Apr 2020 at 16:56, Kerim Aydin via agora-discussion < agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: > > On 4/5/2020 1:45 PM, Jason Cobb via agora-discussion wrote: > > On 4/5/20 4:38 PM, Kerim Aydin via agora-discussion wrote: > > Amend Rule 683 (Voting on Agoran Decisions) by appending "The above > > notwithstanding, an entity CANNOT withdraw a non-PRESENT vote on an > auction > > decision except to change eir vote to one with an equal or higher > bid." > I think withdrawing from the auction entirely should be allowed, since > zombies can withdraw themselves during the auction (but if they > withdraw > entirely they shouldn't be allowed to re-enter). > > >>> Good idea. How about using PRESENT for that: you can always change to > >>> PRESENT, but not away from it? > >> Sounds like a good way to do it! > >> > >> > > > > It feels weird to me to say that a person CANNOT change eir vote to any > > valid vote on an Agoran decision. > > > > I should add that I'm a little undecided on this one overall - on one hand > it's clever to use existing Decision machinery, but OTOH by the time you > put in verbiage to shoehorn an auction into a voting procedure, you might > as well write a single rule defining a simplified auction procedure > without the baggage. > My broader vision was something like this: 1. A rule defines an agoran decision and various parameters of decisions, like voting method, quorum, etc. 2. Another rule provides default parameters. 3. Definitions of specific types of decisions are meted out to lower-level rules or even subsidiary bodies of law, e.g. election procedure no longer needs to be tied in to high-powered rules. The alternative I'd like to consider in the context of the broader reform project is having a clear system for using modified definitions in a lower-powered rule or subsidiary body of law. E.g. that a regulation could define a switch except change some properties, and this would still hold, because it's interpreted as defining something that is "a switch but differences" rather than actually making a switch and losing the ability to define differences due to power. That would be a similar way to the same effect, but unlike the above one it isn't immediately clear how to make it all work out cleanly since we'd need to think carefully about where a rule really intends to say "there is no other way of doing it". -Alexis
Re: DIS: [Proto] Down with the Auction Rules
On 4/5/2020 1:45 PM, Jason Cobb via agora-discussion wrote: > On 4/5/20 4:38 PM, Kerim Aydin via agora-discussion wrote: > Amend Rule 683 (Voting on Agoran Decisions) by appending "The above > notwithstanding, an entity CANNOT withdraw a non-PRESENT vote on an auction > decision except to change eir vote to one with an equal or higher bid." I think withdrawing from the auction entirely should be allowed, since zombies can withdraw themselves during the auction (but if they withdraw entirely they shouldn't be allowed to re-enter). >>> Good idea. How about using PRESENT for that: you can always change to >>> PRESENT, but not away from it? >> Sounds like a good way to do it! >> >> > > It feels weird to me to say that a person CANNOT change eir vote to any > valid vote on an Agoran decision. > I should add that I'm a little undecided on this one overall - on one hand it's clever to use existing Decision machinery, but OTOH by the time you put in verbiage to shoehorn an auction into a voting procedure, you might as well write a single rule defining a simplified auction procedure without the baggage.
Re: DIS: [Proto] Down with the Auction Rules
On 4/5/20 4:38 PM, Kerim Aydin via agora-discussion wrote: Amend Rule 683 (Voting on Agoran Decisions) by appending "The above notwithstanding, an entity CANNOT withdraw a non-PRESENT vote on an >>> auction decision except to change eir vote to one with an equal or higher bid." >>> I think withdrawing from the auction entirely should be allowed, since >>> zombies can withdraw themselves during the auction (but if they withdraw >>> entirely they shouldn't be allowed to re-enter). >>> >> Good idea. How about using PRESENT for that: you can always change to >> PRESENT, but not away from it? > Sounds like a good way to do it! > > It feels weird to me to say that a person CANNOT change eir vote to any valid vote on an Agoran decision. -- Jason Cobb
Re: DIS: [Proto] Down with the Auction Rules
On 4/4/2020 10:45 PM, Alexis Hunt via agora-discussion wrote: > On Sun, 5 Apr 2020 at 00:28, Kerim Aydin wrote: > >> >> On 4/4/2020 8:55 PM, Alexis Hunt via agora-discussion wrote: >>> A zombie auction is an Agoran decision to award ownership of zombies to >>> players. A zombie is eligible for auction if its master switch is set to >>> Agora and has a resale value greater than 0. >> >> Since zombies can vote on decisions I think R683 might overrule R2542's >> list of prohibitions and allow zombies to bid? (and possibly allow zombie >> masters to bid?) Sorry if I'm missing an obvious block to that somewhere. >> > > Masters still can't act on behalf of zombies to bid. > You probably want to add that "bid" = "cast a ballot" - it's not a big intuitive leap to assume that, but it's not a straightforward common definition. >>> the valid options are the zombies a) that were eligible for auction at >>> its initiation and b) whose master switch has not changed in the >> meanwhile. >> >> Right now the Registar has discretion and is not required to auction all >> eligible zombies - this removes that discretion. >> > > E does not; the parenthetical in the first paragraph of R1885 eliminates > discretion. As the author of that parenthetical in question, and a Registrar who used it to split up big auctions a few times, I disagree - I think it means that any subset of eligible zombies CAN be auctioned by the registrar. (I'd rather not quibble about the current wording - I see both readings and definitely acknowledge the ambiguity - but it would be great to empower the Registrar to meter the zombie economy if e can't already). >>> Amend Rule 683 (Voting on Agoran Decisions) by appending "The above >>> notwithstanding, an entity CANNOT withdraw a non-PRESENT vote on an >> auction >>> decision except to change eir vote to one with an equal or higher bid." >> >> I think withdrawing from the auction entirely should be allowed, since >> zombies can withdraw themselves during the auction (but if they withdraw >> entirely they shouldn't be allowed to re-enter). >> > > Good idea. How about using PRESENT for that: you can always change to > PRESENT, but not away from it? Sounds like a good way to do it!
DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [Arbitor] CFJ 7 assigned to Jason
On 3/26/2020 7:48 AM, Jason Cobb via agora-business wrote: > On 3/19/20 7:19 PM, Kerim Aydin via agora-official wrote: >> I recuse the judge of CFJ 7 from CFJ 7 (note: this may do nothing). >> >> I assign CFJ 7 to Jason. >> >> CFJ 7 = >> >> Because of Rule 111, Rule 112 takes precedence over Rule 219. >> Therefore, Rule 219 has no legal force. >> >> == > > > > I assign the following judgement in CFJ 7: [...] > Rule 219 is not a change to the gamestate (although it only exists > because of one; more on that later), so it is not prohibited by Rule > 112. Therefore, Rule 112 does not conflict with Rule 219, so Rule 111 > does not cause Rule 219 to have no legal force. The statement of this > CFJ is FALSE. Jason (#7 on 26 Mar): 9729.682153 days between Called by Wes and Judged FALSE by Jason
