Re: [dmarc-ietf] Time to work on failure reporting

2022-08-12 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Thu 11/Aug/2022 21:06:31 +0200 John R Levine wrote:

On Thu, 11 Aug 2022, Alessandro Vesely wrote:


I added an example, see
https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting/blob/main/draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting-04.txt#L528 


I just picked a report I received and anonymized it.  How is it?


The Source-Port field is non-standard so I'd take it out.



Defined by RFC 6692.


I'd also remove at least the ARC and References headers from the message inside 
example since they make it a lot longer and don't help explain the format.



Done.



I'd change text/rfc822-headers to message/rfc822 and add ther a message body
or something like [ Message body was here ]


Why?  I chose a body-less example as it looks more privacy-friendly.

Perhaps I could change Auth-Failure: to bodyhash and add a 
DKIM-Canonicalized-Body.  That would prove one can provide that data using 
while still sending only rfc822-headers.


BTW: The strings that Auth-Failure: can take seem to still be the ones defined 
by RFC 6591.  The file I started from had "dmarc".  There is no IANA registry. 
 Should we define one?



The goal here is to make it clear that this has to be multipart/report and what 
goes into the message/feedback-report.  I hope anyone reading this already 
knows what a 5322 message looks like and how to leave out the body.


I need to figure out whether the example is XML  or  but 
we can worry about that later.



I thought it is the source of the email message.  Its artistic content lacks 
somewhat...  :-)



For another point, should I redact the addresses?  How?  Possibilities:

* Only s///

* Replace all what looks like a local-part with something like 
rZ8cqXWGiKHzhz1MsFRGTysHia4=, according to RFC 6590, including Received:'s for 
clauses and Message-Id.  This has to be noted in the text.


* Other?


Best
Ale
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Girl Scout troops vs MLM problems (#70)

2022-08-12 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Fri 12/Aug/2022 08:46:45 +0200 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

On Thu, Aug 11, 2022 at 3:16 AM Alessandro Vesely  wrote:

That's the /complicated/ de-munging strategy.  The much simpler approach I 
described upthread would work 100% of cases for lists that add the Author: 
field.  It is a little less secure, as you need to trust the mailing list 
signature.


If you trust the mailing list signature, doesn't that also mean you trust 
the list to behave "well"?  If that's true, then why do you need Author?



I trust the list to not allow attacks featuring spoofed Author:.  (Spoofed 
From: are possible but infrequent.)  It is safer if Author: is set by the 
author's MSA.


I need Author: to replace munged From:.


Best
Ale
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Girl Scout troops vs MLM problems (#70)

2022-08-12 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Thu 11/Aug/2022 19:47:17 +0200 John R Levine wrote:

On Thu, 11 Aug 2022, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
It only works if all or most lists add Author (none do today, and it would 
take a long time to get this rolled out if they started), and no other 
software co-opts and mutates it for whatever reason.  Those are big enough 
conditions that I'm a bit worried about writing a standards-track document 
that depends on it.


When Dave proposed the Author header, part of the idea was that DMARC could use 
it rather than From.



IIRC that was the Sender: field.


Best
Ale
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Girl Scout troops vs MLM problems (#70)

2022-08-12 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Thu 11/Aug/2022 18:26:38 +0200 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
A domain owner can know, for instance, that it only sends transactional 
messages that have no purpose to ever go to a mailing list.  Such an operator 
can safely set "p=reject" because the risk of the collateral damage about which 
we're concerned here is close to zero.  That is equivalent to the domain owner 
knowing not only that there's dual authentication, but also that authentication 
is highly likely to survive to delivery.  When users are introduced into such a 
system, that logic goes out the window.  DMARC is arguably not appropriate for 
those use cases, and Barry is urging that we say so.



To have to use different domains for transactional messages vs. personal usage 
which might include mailing lists is an artifact of authentication as well. 
Recall, for example, Brett McDowell, who participated in the ietf-dkim list 
sporting an address with a domain part of paypal.com.  In 2010 his company 
created the domain paypal-inc.com in order to separate mail flows.


Creating look-alike domains is not the most natural thing to do, and has the 
potential to confuse recipients, as spammers quickly learned.


OTOH, stopping at p=none is not much effective.  It can be interesting only for 
email geeks.  Saying that DMARC is for highly abused domains only, albeit near 
to the original aim, sounds like saying, after the invention of locks, that you 
can keep your home door unlocked because you're not a bank.  Since locks exist, 
I want to lock my door too.



Best
Ale
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Time to work on failure reporting

2022-08-12 Thread John R Levine

The Source-Port field is non-standard so I'd take it out.


Defined by RFC 6692.


So it is.  ARF is such a mess.

I'd change text/rfc822-headers to message/rfc822 and add ther a message 
body or something like [ Message body was here ]


Why?  I chose a body-less example as it looks more privacy-friendly.


I'd rather it be more general, to show where all of the plausible parts 
go.


I need to figure out whether the example is XML  or  
but we can worry about that later.


I thought it is the source of the email message.  Its artistic content lacks 
somewhat...  :-)



For another point, should I redact the addresses?  How?  Possibilities:


Just change them to something like x...@yyy.zzz.  It's an example.  They 
don't matter.


By the way, it looks like you edited this into the XML rather than the 
markdown source.  It would be nice to have the markdown available for 
future edits.


Regards,
John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Girl Scout troops vs MLM problems (#70)

2022-08-12 Thread John R Levine

On Fri, 12 Aug 2022, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
When Dave proposed the Author header, part of the idea was that DMARC could 
use it rather than From.


IIRC that was the Sender: field.


No, DMARC decided not to use Sender back when DMARC was new.  Dave 
suggested using Author to work around the From hacking.  I still think 
this is completely out of scope and not worth any more argument.


Regards,
John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Girl Scout troops vs MLM problems (#70)

2022-08-12 Thread Dotzero
On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 12:28 PM John R Levine  wrote:

> On Fri, 12 Aug 2022, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> >> When Dave proposed the Author header, part of the idea was that DMARC
> could
> >> use it rather than From.
> >
> > IIRC that was the Sender: field.
>
> No, DMARC decided not to use Sender back when DMARC was new.  Dave
> suggested using Author to work around the From hacking.  I still think
> this is completely out of scope and not worth any more argument.
>
> Regards,
> John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
> Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly
>

+1

Michael Hammer
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Girl Scout troops vs MLM problems (#70)

2022-08-12 Thread John Levine
It appears that Alessandro Vesely   said:
>> If you trust the mailing list signature, doesn't that also mean you trust 
>> the list to behave "well"?  If that's true, then why do you need Author?
>
>I trust the list to not allow attacks featuring spoofed Author:.  (Spoofed 
>From: are possible but infrequent.)  It is safer if Author: is set by the 
>author's MSA.

Hi, bot spammer here.  My MSA is really good at putting other people's addresses
anywhere I tell it to.  You want a fake From and fake Author?  No problem.

To reiterate a point I think I've made three times now, the reason we
have ARC rather than something simpler is exactly because spoofed mail
leaks through lists and causes filtering problems. Since Author would
be a copy of some version of From, it's hard to imagine how spoofed
Author would be less of an issue.

Perhaps since we have seen no support at all for this Author hack or other
>From demunging, we could stop now and work on DMARC.

R's,
John

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[dmarc-ietf] Can we put the psd tag in the IANA registry now?

2022-08-12 Thread John Levine
Since we seem close to agreement on the tree walk text, and and it
uses the psd tag, can we ask IANA to add psd=u/n/y to the registry, please?

R's,
John


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