Re: [EM] An ABE solution
I agree it's silly to create complicated rules for a two-slot ballot. But,
though Forest didn't quite say so, I also think that FBC and (voted ballot)
Condorcet are not incompatible for a 3-slot ballot.
Jameson
2011/11/22 Chris Benham
> Forest,
>
> "When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is simply
> Approval, which does satisfy the
> FBC."
>
> When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots be used
> "for simplicity".
> I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated algorithm
> on 2-slot ballots
> that is equivalent to Approval ??
>
> "Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and suppose that
> optimal strategy requires the
> voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to Approval,
> which does satisfy the FBC."
>
> The FBC doesn't stipulate that all the voters use "optimal strategy", so
> that isn't relavent.
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
>
> http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* "fsimm...@pcc.edu"
> *To:* C.Benham
> *Cc:* em ; MIKE OSSIPOFF <
> nkk...@hotmail.com>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 22 November 2011 11:11 AM
> *Subject:* Re: An ABE solution
>
>
>
> From: "C.Benham"
>
> >
> > Forest Simmons, responding to questions from Mike Ossipff, wrote
> > (19 Nov
> > 2011):
> >
> > > > 4. How does it do by FBC? And by the criteria that bother some
> > > > people here about MMPO (Kevin's MMPO bad-example) and MDDTR
> > > (Mono-Add-Plump)?
> > >
> > > I think it satisfies the FBC.
> >
> > Forest's definition of the method being asked about:
> >
> > > Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are
> > Range
> > > Style, say three slot for simplicity.
> > >
> > > When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie
> > relations are
> > > determined among the candidates.
> > >
> > > The covering relations are also determined. Candidate X covers
> > > candidate Y if X
> > > beats Y as well as every candidate that Y beats. In other
> > words row X
> > > of the
> > > win/loss/tie matrix dominates row Y.
> > >
> > > Then starting with the candidates with the lowest Range
> > scores, they are
> > > disqualified one by one until one of the remaining candidates
> > X covers
> > > any other
> > > candidates that might remain. Elect X.
> >
> >
> > Forest,
> >
> > Doesn't this method meet the Condorcet criterion? Compliance
> > with
> > Condorcet is incompatible with FBC, so
> > why do you think it satisfies FBC?
>
> When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is simply Approval,
> which does satisfy the
> FBC. Does Approval satisfy the Condorcet Criterion? I would say no, but
> it does satisfy the "votes only
> Condorcet Criterion." which means that the Approval winner X pairwise
> beats every other candidate Y
> according to the ballots, i.e. X is rated above Y on more ballots than Y
> is rated above X.
>
> Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and suppose that
> optimal strategy requires the
> voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to Approval,
> which does satisfy the FBC.
>
>
> >
> >
> > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-
> > electorama.com/2005-June/016410.html
> >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > This is an attempt to demonstrate that Condorcet and FBC are
> > incompatible.> I modified Woodall's proof that Condorcet and
> > LNHarm are incompatible.
> > > (Douglas R. Woodall, "Monotonicity of single-seat preferential
> > > election rules",
> > > Discrete Applied Mathematics 77 (1997), pages 86 and 87.)
> > >
> > > I've suggested before that in order to satisfy FBC, it must be
> > the case
> > > that increasing the votes for A over B in the pairwise matrix
> > can never
> > > increase the probability that the winner comes from {a,b};
> > that is, it
> > > must
> > > not move the win from some other candidate C to A. This is
> > necessary
> > > because
> > > if sometimes it were possible to move the win from C to A by
> > increasing> v[a,b], the voter with the preference order B>A>C
> > would have incentive to
> > > reverse B and A in his ranking (and equal ranking would be
> > inadequate).>
> > > I won't presently try to argue that this requirement can't be
> > avoided
> > > somehow.
> > > I'm sure it can't be avoided when the method's result is
> > determined solely
> > > from the pairwise matrix.
>
> Note that in our method the Cardinal Ratings order (i.e. Range Order) is
> needed in addition to the
> pairwise matrix; the covering information comes from the pairwise matrix,
> but candidates are dropped
> from the bottom of the range order.
>
> In the two slot case can the approval order be determined from the
> pairwise matrix? If so, then this is a
> counterexample to the last quoted sentence above in the attempted proof of
> the incompatibility of the CC
> and the FBC.
>
> Forest
>
>
>
>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
Election-Methods mai
Re: [EM] PR election results
I tried to vote by registering and then returning on a later day to vote and was unable to find any link to the vote page without going through the register page, which I had already done. Thus, I did not vote. -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." "Renewable energy is homeland security." Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR election results
I didn't vote because I thought that the options, format, and interface were all lame. I'd be happy to vote if the poll were run on modernballots.com with a better set of options and a clear use-case (not just "best PR system" but "best PR system for a electing over 100 representatives for a population of over 10 million" or whatever). Jameson 2011/11/22 Kathy Dopp > I tried to vote by registering and then returning on a later day to > vote and was unable to find any link to the vote page without going > through the register page, which I had already done. Thus, I did not > vote. > > -- > > Kathy Dopp > http://electionmathematics.org > Town of Colonie, NY 12304 > "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the > discussion with true facts." > "Renewable energy is homeland security." > > Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections > http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 > > View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: > http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] ] An ABE solution
"I also think that FBC and (voted ballot) Condorcet are not incompatible for a
3-slot ballot."
Jameson,
Thanks for sharing this (based-on-who-knows-what) thought. Your problem with
Kevin Venzke's
June 2005 3-candidate demonstration that FBC and Condorcet are incompatible
(pasted below)
iswhat?
Chris Benham
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-June/016410.html
Hello,
This is an attempt to demonstrate that Condorcet and FBC are incompatible.
I modified Woodall's proof that Condorcet and LNHarm are incompatible.
(Douglas R. Woodall, "Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules",
Discrete Applied Mathematics 77 (1997), pages 86 and 87.)
I've suggested before that in order to satisfy FBC, it must be the case
that increasing the votes for A over B in the pairwise matrix can never
increase the probability that the winner comes from {a,b}; that is, it must
not move the win from some other candidate C to A. This is necessary because
if sometimes it were possible to move the win from C to A by increasing
v[a,b], the voter with the preference order B>A>C would have incentive to
reverse B and A in his ranking (and equal ranking would be inadequate).
I won't presently try to argue that this requirement can't be avoided somehow.
I'm sure it can't be avoided when the method's result is determined solely
from the pairwise matrix.
Suppose a method satisfies this property, and also Condorcet. Consider this
scenario:
a=b 3
a=c 3
b=c 3
a>c 2
b>a 2
c>b 2
There is an A>C>B>A cycle, and the scenario is "symmetrical," as based on
the submitted rankings, the candidates can't be differentiated. This means
that an anonymous and neutral method has to elect each candidate with 33.33%
probability.
Now suppose the a=b voters change their vote to a>b (thereby increasing v[a,b]).
This would turn A into the Condorcet winner, who would have to win with 100%
probability due to Condorcet.
But the probability that the winner comes from {a,b} has increased from 66.67%
to 100%, so the first property is violated.
Thus the first property and Condorcet are incompatible, and I contend that FBC
requires the first property.
Thoughts?
Kevin Venzke
From: Jameson Quinn
To: Chris Benham
Cc: "fsimm...@pcc.edu" ; MIKE OSSIPOFF ;
em
Sent: Tuesday, 22 November 2011 8:30 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] An ABE solution
I agree it's silly to create complicated rules for a two-slot ballot. But,
though Forest didn't quite say so, I also think that FBC and (voted ballot)
Condorcet are not incompatible for a 3-slot ballot.
Jameson
2011/11/22 Chris Benham
Forest,
>
>"When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is simply Approval,
>which does satisfy the
>FBC."
>
>When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots be used "for
>simplicity".
>I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated algorithm on
>2-slot ballots
>that is equivalent to Approval ??
>
>"Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and suppose that
>optimal strategy requires the
>voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to Approval, which
>does satisfy the FBC."
>
>The FBC doesn't stipulate that all the voters use "optimal strategy", so that
>isn't relavent.
>
>
>http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
>
>http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
>
>Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] ] An ABE solution
That proof assumes that the method works from the pairwise matrix only, so it is not bulletproof. (Note that the actual ballot change discussed in the proof is not an FBC violation; it is only relevant at all because it is pairwise-matrix-equivalent to an FBC violation.) Still, of course it gives me pause. I had thought the two were compatible because of a vague memory that I'd proven that to myself in the past; but against a clear indication to the contrary, I'll have to do better. I'll play around and see what I can do. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
http://politeaparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/free-and-fair-elections-and-their.html They're trying to end the use of IRV in SF. Obviously, they're concerned about non-monotonicity or that the Condorcet candidate is not guaranteed... I think that if IRV3/AV3 were used instead, it would be easier to explain the vote-counting method to folks. > I think it'd be easier if a two stage approach were used. Like before, let > folks rank up to three candidates. > > Then, in the first stage, count up the number of times each candidate gets > ranked by voter(if voters ranked the same candidate more than once, it > would only count once). Publish these results on election night. Make the > three candidates who get ranked most often be the finalists. > > Then, for the second stage, use an instant runoff vote. First, tally the > number of times the three finalists are the favorite of voters. If one is > preferred by a majority of voters then (s)he is the winner. Otherwise, > eliminate the candidate who is preferred by the fewest voters and transfer > her/his votes as much as possible to the other two candidates. Then, after > tallying the votes for the two finalists, the one with the most votes wins. > > Does that sound simple enuf, D.Eris? It could be done in two days time, > most of the time... > dlw The real issue that prevents electoral reform in the US is marketing, not electoral analytics. Electoral analytics, as illustrated by this board, are very good at exposing attempts to pass bad election reforms for the wrong reasons. But I don't think it works in creating a working consensus on which electoral reforms to push for among activists. This is illustrated by how your own "consensus" statement recommends 4 alternatives to FPTP and waves its hands over IRV. It also says nothing about the pragmatic use of PR to make "more local" elections become competitive, to handicap the cut-throat rivalry between the two major parties and to make them both more attentive to the issues of minority groups. So how about it? Can we try to rewrite the consensus statement to include an endorsement of IRV3/AV3 and to make it more marketable to #OWS and other folks? dlw Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
Hi Chris,
>>De : C.Benham
>>À : em
>>Cc : MIKE OSSIPOFF ; Kevin Venzke
>>Envoyé le : Dimanche 20 Novembre 2011 23h43
>>Objet : [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
>>
>>
>
>Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the
>"Approval
>Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by
>
>49: C (sincere)
>27: A>B (sincere)
>24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A).
>
>He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal Criterion
>(FBC) and
>also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for their
>"defection"
>from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets both
>the Plurality
>and Minimal Defense criteria).
>
>I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special
>"Tied-at-the-Top"
>pairwise rule.
>
>http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top
>
>*Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom signifying
>least preferred,
>Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle.
>
>According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X beats
>candidate Y
>if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y *plus the
>number of
>ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number of
>ballots on
>which Y is given a higher rating than X.
>
>(And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates X and
>Y that some
>ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other).
>
>If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten by Y
>and is
>not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y is
>disqualified.
>
>Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest number of
>ballots.*
>
>I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I will
>withdraw my
>support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria.
The beatpath-like logic regarding candidate Z looks bad. The only things I
accomplished with the tied-at-the-top
rule are a minmax variant and a C//A variant. No known FBC method at all uses
any kind of beatpath tracing. So
it would be revolutionary if a method of this complexity satisfied FBC.
I'm having problems easily thinking through how the method works. But this is
the question to ask: By lowing your
favorite out of the top position, can you evict some other lower-ranked
candidate from the top tier? If you can, that is
surely going to be handy in some situation.
This non-reciprocal TTP beating concept is really odd to me. The TTP votes for
X and Y with respect to the other
are exactly the same count. If Y can't beat X even with the TTP votes, then X
certainly doesn't need to have those
TTP votes to beat Y. It's a simple X>Y pairwise win.
Kevin
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Mutual Majority Top (MMT)
Mutual Majority Top (MMT): For any set of candidates whom the same majority of voters vote over everyone else, the winner must come from that set of candidates. >From such a set, or, lacking one, from the entire candidate set, the winner is the most top-rated candidate. [end of MMT definition] MMT differs from MDDTR because the B voters in the ABE are forced to admit that A is better than C, so that the method avoids a Plurality Criterion violation if it elects A. MMT loses the Mono-Add-Plump compliance of TTPDTR, but thereby gains some simplicity. It would be better to meet Mono-Add-Plump, if TTPDTR is accepted in spite of its greater complexity. For the best methods, not as simple to define, it would be necessary to have time to talk to people, and speak first about the desired properties, and then about what it takes to achieve them. I don't know if I'll get any other chances to get to a computer during today and tomorrow. MMT meets 3P, but fails 1CM, as it must, since it doens't recognize one-sided coalitions. It trades TTPDTR's Mono-Add-Plump compliance for greater simplicity. It probably meets FBC. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 11/22/2011 9:38 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> So how about it? Can we try to rewrite the consensus statement to
> include an endorsement of IRV3/AV3 and to make it more marketable to
> #OWS and other folks?
IRV, and variations of it, are based on the mistaken belief that the
candidate with the _fewest_ first-choice votes is the least popular.
Yes, that's better than plurality voting, which is based on the mistaken
belief that the candidate with the _most_ first-choice votes is the most
popular.
But just getting better results than plurality isn't persuasive
("marketable"). After all, plurality (FPTP) is such a low threshold,
that it can almost be tripped over and end up with something better.
Note that the "declaration" leaves open the issue about the balance
between IRV's advantages and disadvantages.
You can sign the statement and say in your signature that you support
"IRV3/AV3, which is an improvement on IRV". This is compatible with the
section about IRV that says some signers support it, and some don't.
Richard Fobes
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
David L Wetzell wrote: http://politeaparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/free-and-fair-elections-and-their.html They're trying to end the use of IRV in SF. Obviously, they're concerned about non-monotonicity or that the Condorcet candidate is not guaranteed... I'm still writing my reply to the long mail, trying to shorten it. But while I'm doing that, I can reply to this, if briefly. If the IRV-opponents are concerned about non-monotonicity or the lack of Condorcet, neither the page nor the KQED page it links to mentions this. I also hope that you're not implying that non-monotonicity or lack-of-Condorcet objections are somehow disingenuous and that IRV-opponents are all incumbents trying to protect their little domains. While I don't find it that important, I can see how some could object to the relative opacity of IRV. Plurality has its score (how many top votes each candidate got), Range has mean score, and Minmax has the magnitude of the worst defeat (where lesser is better). What does IRV have? It has the round in which the candidate was eliminated, but that doesn't, by itself, say anything about whether it was a squeaker or the candidate was a sure loser. (In a sense, this ties in with the sensitivity to initial conditions of IRV. You might say "B lost in the second round, and the guy that was next to last in the second round only survived by a single vote, so that was close". But perhaps B would have led someone else (D instead of E) to win, had he survived -- or perhaps defeating C instead of being defeated by C would only have made B lose soundly in a later round?) I think that if IRV3/AV3 were used instead, it would be easier to explain the vote-counting method to folks. I think it'd be easier if a two stage approach were used. Like before, let folks rank up to three candidates. Then, in the first stage, count up the number of times each candidate gets ranked by voter(if voters ranked the same candidate more than once, it would only count once). Publish these results on election night. Make the three candidates who get ranked most often be the finalists. Then, for the second stage, use an instant runoff vote. First, tally the number of times the three finalists are the favorite of voters. If one is preferred by a majority of voters then (s)he is the winner. Otherwise, eliminate the candidate who is preferred by the fewest voters and transfer her/his votes as much as possible to the other two candidates. Then, after tallying the votes for the two finalists, the one with the most votes wins. Does that sound simple enuf, D.Eris? It could be done in two days time, most of the time... dlw The real issue that prevents electoral reform in the US is marketing, not electoral analytics. Electoral analytics, as illustrated by this board, are very good at exposing attempts to pass bad election reforms for the wrong reasons. But I don't think it works in creating a working consensus on which electoral reforms to push for among activists. This is illustrated by how your own "consensus" statement recommends 4 alternatives to FPTP and waves its hands over IRV. It also says nothing about the pragmatic use of PR to make "more local" elections become competitive, to handicap the cut-throat rivalry between the two major parties and to make them both more attentive to the issues of minority groups. It says nothing about the use of PR in a local setting to handicap rivalry between the two major parties because we don't know that it will do so enough to matter. More generally, it doesn't mention PR as it can't cover too wide an area - there was an earlier objection that the declaration was already too long. (I do like PR, but I can see that logic.) So how about it? Can we try to rewrite the consensus statement to include an endorsement of IRV3/AV3 and to make it more marketable to #OWS and other folks? If you think the statement is too dilute as it is, then wouldn't adding another method make it less forceful still? You could, as Richard points out, sign the statement and then say you support IRV3/AV3 as an improvement upon IRV. If you want to see Plurality gone, and think the main proposed alternatives would work, why not? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
Jameson said: The point of those criteria was not to have any merit, it was to show why preference-applying criteria are silly. [endquote] Yes, and I told _why_ your criteria were silly. They weren't silly because they mentioned preferences. They were silly because you wrote silly criteria, something that can be done with any kind of criteria. I carefully explained what was silly about them. It wasn't that they mentioned preferences. Jameson continues: Let's forget about those criteria [endquote] Suit yourself, Jameson. , because apparently the fact that they are bad criteria is distracting from the issue here. [endquote] Jameson pronounces them "bad criteria" :-) So make that claim, Jameson needs to be specific about what he thinks is wrong with those criteria, and why. Jameson continues: Here are three statements of the Condorcet criterion: 1. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, more voters prefer X to Y than vice versa, and no voter insincerely voted Y over X, then X must win. [endquote] Nonsense. Your premise allows everyone preferring X to someone else to not vote that preference. Jameson continues: 2. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, there are more ballots that could prefer X to Y (that is, either they explicitly show that preference or they were unable to express a preference for X over Y without losing some other preference information) than those which definitely prefer Y over X, then X must win. [endquote] A meaningless, gibberish attempt at my preference Condorcet's Criterion. Jameson's #1 and #2 are preference-mentioning criteria, but are garbage. Jameson has merely shown, again, that it's possible to write garbage preference-mentioning criteria. --something that he already established in other recent posts. Jameson never tells what he means when he says that a ballot prefers one candidate to another. Condorcet's Criterion: If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone votes sincerely, then x should win. [end of CC definition] A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a preference or fail to vote a preference that the method in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the preferences that s/he actually voted. [end of sincere voting definition] I've recently defined voting one candidate over another, in a posting with that expression in its subject-line. Jameson continues: 3. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, more ballots prefer X to Y than vice versa, then X must win. [endquote] Jameson hasn't said what it means for a ballot to "prefer" one candidate to another. Jameson continues: Plurality passes criterion 3. [endquote] It might if the criterion wording meant something. Jameson continues: Any non-full-ranking method, including Condorcet methods like Schulze, fails criterion 1. Obviously, we should be using criteria which are like 2. [endquote] As nearly as it's possible to guess what he means, that's Jameson's sloppy attempt at the preference CC that I defined. Jameson says: Often, we speak of preferences when specifying the criteria, as a shorthand for the longer-winded precision as in criteria 2 above. ??? :-) Precision? Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
My replies below resulted from mistakenly believing that Jameson was referring to preference criteria in general, when, actually, he was referring to his one or two preference criteria that he'd proposed in a recently previous posting: J: Let's forget about those criteria [endquote] M: Suit yourself, Jameson. J: , because apparently the fact that they are bad criteria is distracting from the issue here. [endquote] M: Jameson pronounces them "bad criteria" :-) M: So make that claim, Jameson needs to be specific about what he thinks is wrong with those criteria, and why. Yes, certainly Jameson's one or two criteria in the previous post were "bad", because they weren't defined. He didn't say what he meant by "votes for A". The best guess for what that means is "marks A on a Plurality-style ballot". 1. That would mean that Jameson's criterion only applies to a limited subset of methods. 2. There could be a count rule that says that the candidate with the fewest Plurality-style marks wins. 3. But Jameson didn't specify that, or any other meaning for "votes for A". Additionally, a reasonable guess about what that term means, all methods would fail the criterion, making the criterion not useful. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
> > > Condorcet's Criterion: > > If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and > everyone votes sincerely, > then x should win. > > My point is that this is equivalent to: If the ballots are such that it could be the case that, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone votes sincerely, then x should win. By "equivalent" I mean that it is passed and failed by exactly the same methods. But my statement is still better in that it prevents pedants from refusing to face cases where the criterion-required behavior may not actually be a good idea. This of course means that no limited-slot method can ever pass the Condorcet criterion except in a ballots-only sense. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
-- Forwarded message --
From: Richard Fobes
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 11:53:06 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 11/22/2011 9:38 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: So how about it? Can we try
to rewrite the consensus statement to
> include an endorsement of IRV3/AV3 and to make it more marketable to
> #OWS and other folks?
RF:IRV, and variations of it, are based on the mistaken belief that the
candidate with the _fewest_ first-choice votes is the least popular.
dlw:Or, it's easy to market. Doesn't rely on folks putting a lot of
time/energy to rank all of the candidates and presumes people put most of
their energy into their top rankings relative to their lower-rankings.
RF:But just getting better results than plurality isn't persuasive
("marketable"). After all, plurality (FPTP) is such a low threshold, that
it can almost be tripped over and end up with something better.
dlw: There's plenty of real world evidence that IRV is quite marketable to
the US public. What isn't persuasive are analysis based on
pseudo-experiments with Bayesian Regret analysis or rational choice theory.
RF:Note that the "declaration" leaves open the issue about the balance
between IRV's advantages and disadvantages.
You can sign the statement and say in your signature that you support
"IRV3/AV3, which is an improvement on IRV". This is compatible with the
section about IRV that says some signers support it, and some don't.
dlw: All analysis shows that the perceived problems with IRV are seriously
attenuated with only 3 candidates. This is why it's a shame not to add
IRV3/AV3 to the list of endorsed methods, since it always uses IRV with
only 3 candidates and addresses other concerns like precinct
summarizability.
Now to Kristofer Munsterhjelm:
KM:If the IRV-opponents are concerned about non-monotonicity or the lack of
Condorcet, neither the page nor the KQED page it links to mentions this. I
also hope that you're not implying that non-monotonicity or
lack-of-Condorcet objections are somehow disingenuous and that
IRV-opponents are all incumbents trying to protect their little domains.
dlw: No, but I think all those who oppose IRV on more
egalitarian/idealistic grounds, like yourself and most people I've
interacted with on this list-serve, need to be aware of the real-politik of
electoral reform and how others can use their arguments to hold back
electoral reform.
KM: While I don't find it that important, I can see how some could object
to the relative opacity of IRV. Plurality has its score (how many top votes
each candidate got), Range has mean score, and Minmax has the magnitude of
the worst defeat (where lesser is better). What does IRV have? It has the
round in which the candidate was eliminated, but that doesn't, by itself,
say anything about whether it was a squeaker or the candidate was a sure
loser.
(In a sense, this ties in with the sensitivity to initial conditions of
IRV. You might say "B lost in the second round, and the guy that was next
to last in the second round only survived by a single vote, so that was
close". But perhaps B would have led someone else (D instead of E) to win,
had he survived -- or perhaps defeating C instead of being defeated by C
would only have made B lose soundly in a later round?)
dlw: I agree that it's hard to summarize all the steps of pure IRV into a
helpful metric. It'd be a lot easier with IRV3/AV3 to first summarize the
totals for all candidates and then to sort the total votes into ten
possible (complete or partial) rankings of three candidates. The latter
could be summarized in a relatively small table and editorialized
relatively easily.
KM:It says nothing about the use of PR in a local setting to handicap
rivalry between the two major parties because we don't know that it will do
so enough to matter. More generally, it doesn't mention PR as it can't
cover too wide an area - there was an earlier objection that the
declaration was already too long.
(I do like PR, but I can see that logic.)
dlw: We know that it affected outcomes in IL from 1870-1980. There's a
literature in political science on the import of state legislatures for the
US political system.
And both electoral practice and theory suggests that the use of PR is
extremely important for how a political system works and so it's damn
tragic to spend so much ink on varieties of single-winner/stage elections
and not to mention PR at all! Your logic is built on the wrong
presupposition. The telos of electoral analytics is not to work out the
"best" single-winner/stage election rule so that we can make more progress
faster. We are engaging in exercises of learning by doing that often focus
on marketing the need for electoral pluralism/experimentation to the
general public. Electoral analysis can help these efforts, but they aren't
per se the engine of inquiry. Cuz
[EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
Jameson: I'd said: Condorcet's Criterion: If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone votes sincerely, then x should win. You replied: My point is that this is equivalent to: If the ballots are such that it could be the case that, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x , and everyone votes sincerely, then x should win. By "equivalent" I mean that it is passed and failed by exactly the same methods. [endquote] Are you sure? Say, in Plurality, x gets more votes than anyone else. S/he wins as a result. With those ballots, it could be that for every y not x, no fewer people preferred x to y than y to x and everyone voted sincerely. Maybe people who voted for x didn't have any preferences other than for x over everyone else. Therefore, their voting was sincere. The ballots are consistent with that. So, what you said is not equivalent to the criterion that you quoted above. You continued: But my statement is still better in that it prevents pedants from refusing to face cases where the criterion-required behavior may not actually be a good idea. [endquote] Sincere voting might not be a good idea for someone who could benefit from offensive order-reversal in a Condorcet-Criterion-complying method. But that has no effect on the meaning or validity of the criterion. You haven't said how a pedant could genuinely find fault with CC as I defined it above. Sure, CC's value is lessened by its assumption that everyone votes sincerely. That's a reason why I prefer SFC to CC. You continued: This of course means that no limited-slot method can ever pass the Condorcet criterion except in a ballots-only sense. [endquote] Of course. And the ballots-only CC is passed by Plurality. But, from what you've said, you do recognize preference-mentioning criteria, and their universal applicability, and the limited meaningful applicability of votes-only criteria. So there's no significant disagreement. Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
2011/11/22 MIKE OSSIPOFF > > Jameson: > > I'd said: > > Condorcet's Criterion: > > > > If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and > everyone votes sincerely, > > then x should win. > > You replied: > > My point is that this is equivalent to: > If > the ballots are such that it could be the case that, for every y not x, > no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x > > , and everyone votes > sincerely, then x should win. > > > > By "equivalent" I mean that it is passed and failed > by exactly the same methods. > > [endquote] > > Are you sure? Say, in Plurality, x gets more votes than anyone else. S/he > wins as a result. > > With those ballots, it could be that for every y not x, no fewer people > preferred x to y than y to > x and everyone voted sincerely. Maybe people who voted for x didn't have > any preferences other than for x over > everyone else. Therefore, their voting was sincere. The ballots are > consistent with that. > > So, what you said is not equivalent to the criterion that you quoted above. > Are you seriously claiming that a method passes a criterion because it passes in one case? Even in that one case, the same criterion probably requires that Y, Z, and W also win, so the method does not pass it. (Yes, criteria can require contradictory things for some ballot types without themselves being contradictory. It just means no method with those ballot types will ever pass, as I said in my prior message). > > You continued: > > But my statement is still better in that it > prevents pedants from refusing to face cases where the > criterion-required behavior may not actually be a good idea. > > [endquote] > > Sincere voting might not be a good idea for someone who could benefit from > offensive order-reversal in a > Condorcet-Criterion-complying method. But that has no effect on the > meaning or validity of the criterion. You haven't said > how a pedant could genuinely find fault with CC as I defined it above. > Let's just stop, OK? We're not getting through to each other, and we're the only people on the thread. I still know that you're a smart person who just happens to be wrong, but the more you treat me like a stupid person, the more tempted I am to believe you are one. So, the end. Nobody else cares. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
> > > dlw: All analysis shows that the perceived problems with IRV are seriously > attenuated with only 3 candidates. > The primary anti-IRV example people use is Burlington, with only 3 major candidates. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would have worked themselves out. In the US, three-way close races are not common and can be mitigated in other ways, such as are already at work with FPTP. dlw On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 3:52 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> dlw: All analysis shows that the perceived problems with IRV are >> seriously attenuated with only 3 candidates. >> > > The primary anti-IRV example people use is Burlington, with only 3 major > candidates. > > Jameson > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria
> Are you sure? Say, in Plurality, x gets more votes than anyone else. S/he > wins as a result. > > With those ballots, it could be that for every y not x, no fewer people > preferred x to y than y to > x and everyone voted sincerely. Maybe people who voted for x didn't have > any preferences other than for x over > everyone else. Therefore, their voting was sincere. The ballots are > consistent with that. > > So, what you said is not equivalent to the criterion that you quoted above. > Are you seriously claiming that a method passes a criterion because it passes in one case? [endquote] Ok, aside from the question of whether your added wording changes the criterion's meaning, the added wording is unnecessary. It serves no purpose. You didn't say how your pedant could find fault with my CC. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% cutoff(what's > in place now) or FPTP. Yes. > If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would have > worked themselves out. > How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. And even if it were, it will take several elections before the time that the spoiler isn't the first-round winner so that people can realize they're a spoiler. > In the US, three-way close races are not common and can be mitigated in > other ways, such as are already at work with FPTP. > I don't want to "mitigate" (that is, try to avoid) them, I want to handle them correctly. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] An ABE solution
You are right that although the method is defined for any number of slots, I suggested three slots as most practical. So my example of two slots was only to disprove the statement the assertion that the method cannot be FBC compliant, since it is obviously compliant in that case. Furthermore something must be wrong with the quoted proof (of the incompatibility of the FBC and the CC) because the winner of the two slot case can be found entirely on the basis of the pairwise matrix. The other escape hatch is to say that two slots are not enough to satisfy anything but the voted ballots version of the Condorcet Criterion. But this applies equally well to the three slot case. Either way the cited "therorem" is not good enough to rule out compliance with the FBC by this new method. Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC as well. It is an open question. I did not assert that it does. But I did say that "IF" it is strategically equivalent to Approval (as Range is, for example) then for "practical purposes" it satisfies the FBC. Perhaps not the letter of the law, but the spirit of the law. Indeed, in a non-stratetgical environment nobody worries about the FBC, i.e. only strategic voters will betray their favorite. If optimal strategy is approval strategy, and approval strategy requires you to top rate your favorite, then why would you do otherwise? Forest - Original Message - From: Chris Benham > Forest, > > "When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is > simply Approval, which does satisfy the > FBC." > > When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots > be used "for simplicity". > I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated > algorithm on 2-slot ballots > that is equivalent to Approval ?? > > "Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and > suppose that optimal strategy requires the > voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to > Approval, which does satisfy the FBC." > > The FBC doesn't stipulate that all the voters use "optimal > strategy", so that isn't relavent. > > http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC > > http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc > > Chris Benham > > > > > > > > From: "fsimm...@pcc.edu" > To: C.Benham > Cc: em ; MIKE OSSIPOFF > > Sent: Tuesday, 22 November 2011 11:11 AM > Subject: Re: An ABE solution > > > > From: "C.Benham" > > > > > Forest Simmons, responding to questions from Mike Ossipff, > wrote > > (19 Nov > > 2011): > > > > > > 4. How does it do by FBC? And by the criteria that bother some > > > > people here about MMPO (Kevin's MMPO bad-example) and > MDDTR > > > (Mono-Add-Plump)? > > > > > > I think it satisfies the FBC. > > > > Forest's definition of the method being asked about: > > > > > Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots > are > > Range > > > Style, say three slot for simplicity. > > > > > > When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie > > relations are > > > determined among the candidates. > > > > > > The covering relations are also determined. Candidate X > covers > > > candidate Y if X > > > beats Y as well as every candidate that Y beats. In other > > words row X > > > of the > > > win/loss/tie matrix dominates row Y. > > > > > > Then starting with the candidates with the lowest Range > > scores, they are > > > disqualified one by one until one of the remaining > candidates > > X covers > > > any other > > > candidates that might remain. Elect X. > > > > > > Forest, > > > > Doesn't this method meet the Condorcet criterion? Compliance > > with > > Condorcet is incompatible with FBC, so > > why do you think it satisfies FBC? > > When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is simply > Approval, which does satisfy the > FBC. Does Approval satisfy the Condorcet Criterion? I would > say no, but it does satisfy the "votes only > Condorcet Criterion." which means that the Approval winner X > pairwise beats every other candidate Y > according to the ballots, i.e. X is rated above Y on more > ballots than Y is rated above X. > > Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and > suppose that optimal strategy requires the > voters to avoid the middle slot. Then the method reduces to > Approval, which does satisfy the FBC. > > > > > > > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods- > > electorama.com/2005-June/016410.html > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > This is an attempt to demonstrate that Condorcet and FBC are > > incompatible.> I modified Woodall's proof that Condorcet and > > LNHarm are incompatible. > > > (Douglas R. Woodall, "Monotonicity of single-seat > preferential > > > election rules", > > > Discrete Applied Mathematics 77 (1997), pages 86 and 87.) > > > > > > I've suggested before that in order to satisfy FBC, it must > be > > the
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > >> Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% >> cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. > > > Yes. > > >> If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would have >> worked themselves out. >> > > How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between > progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. > The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto center. > > And even if it were, it will take several elections before the time that > the spoiler isn't the first-round winner so that people can realize they're > a spoiler. > I do not follow. > > > >> In the US, three-way close races are not common and can be mitigated in >> other ways, such as are already at work with FPTP. >> > > I don't want to "mitigate" (that is, try to avoid) them, I want to handle > them correctly. > And there is no *correctly *in the ongoing experiment called democracy. But when we get caught in notions that there are such, we tend not to experiment as much. dlw > > Jameson > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > > > On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> >> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell >> >>> Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% >>> cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. >> >> >> Yes. >> >> >>> If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would have >>> worked themselves out. >>> >> >> How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between >> progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. >> > > The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto > center. > So you're happy with the Democrat/Republican choice? > > >> And even if it were, it will take several elections before the time that >> the spoiler isn't the first-round winner so that people can realize they're >> a spoiler. >> > > I do not follow. >> > The first-round winner in Burlington was the spoiler. Good luck trying to convince his followers to vote for the Democrat next election to avoid another spoiled result. "We should have won last time, and you want us to vote for you losers?" > >> >> >>> In the US, three-way close races are not common and can be mitigated in >>> other ways, such as are already at work with FPTP. >>> >> >> I don't want to "mitigate" (that is, try to avoid) them, I want to handle >> them correctly. >> > > And there is no *correctly *in the ongoing experiment called democracy. > But when we get caught in notions that there are such, we tend not to > experiment as much. > You're talking about adding more epicycles to handle a "problem", I'm the saying that there's no real problem. I don't see that either of those positions is more experimentation-ready than the other. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:41 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > >> >> >> On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Jameson Quinn >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell >>> Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. >>> >>> >>> Yes. >>> >>> If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would have worked themselves out. >>> >>> How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between >>> progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. >>> >> >> The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto >> center. >> > > So you're happy with the Democrat/Republican choice? > No, I believe it's alright to have two major parties so long as the duopoly is contested and both major parties must regularly reposition themselves around the de facto center, as created by all of us with a good faith participation in democracy. > > >> >> >>> And even if it were, it will take several elections before the time that >>> the spoiler isn't the first-round winner so that people can realize they're >>> a spoiler. >>> >> >> I do not follow. >>> >> > The first-round winner in Burlington was the spoiler. Good luck trying to > convince his followers to vote for the Democrat next election to avoid > another spoiled result. "We should have won last time, and you want us to > vote for you losers?" > dlw: They weren't the winner in the first round. They just weren't the loser. And they cannot summon a majority of support among Democrats as their 2nd favorite, apparently. > > >> >>> >>> In the US, three-way close races are not common and can be mitigated in other ways, such as are already at work with FPTP. >>> >>> I don't want to "mitigate" (that is, try to avoid) them, I want to >>> handle them correctly. >>> >> >> And there is no *correctly *in the ongoing experiment called democracy. >> But when we get caught in notions that there are such, we tend not to >> experiment as much. >> > > You're talking about adding more epicycles to handle a "problem", I'm the > saying that there's no real problem. I don't see that either of those > positions is more experimentation-ready than the other. > dlw: I'm saying the "problem" was/is already being dealt with informally and so the impetus to fix it formally, via an even "better" alternative to FPTP is not that strong. dlw > > Jameson > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)
Chris, here's a monotone version that for all practical purposes would be the same as your TTPD,TR method:Initialize variable X as the candidate with top (or equal top) rating on the greatest number of ballots. Then while any candidate Y covers X (in the TTP sense), replace X with the one (among those that TTP-cover X) that is rated top (or equal top) on the greatest number of ballots . Elect the last value of X.Forest- Original Message -From: Date: Monday, November 21, 2011 5:48 pmSubject: TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com,> Chris,> > your new method includes the statement ...> > > If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn > > TTP beaten > > by Y and is> > not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat > Y, > > then Y > > is disqualified.> > In other words, there is no short TTP beatpath from Y to X, > where "short" means fewer than three steps.> > We could use this condition as the definition for "X covers Y in > the TTP sense," or more briefly "X TTP-> covers Y."> > So your method elects the TTP-uncovered candidate rated top on > the greatest number of ballots.> > If this method fails mono-raise (like most uncovered methods do) > we can use one of our covering method > ideas to fix it.> > For example ..> > Let variable X be the candidate with the highest range score. > Then while X is TTP-covered, replace X > with the highest range score candidate that TTP-covers it. > Elect the last value of X.> > Forest> > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > > > On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:41 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> >> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Jameson Quinn >>> wrote: >>> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% > cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. Yes. > If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would > have worked themselves out. > How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. >>> >>> The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto >>> center. >>> >> >> So you're happy with the Democrat/Republican choice? >> > > No, I believe it's alright to have two major parties so long as the > duopoly is contested > How would a post-Kiss Burlington duopoly be contested? > and both major parties must regularly reposition themselves around the de > facto center, > That only works for issues that make it onto the agenda; and it works as well for D/R on a national scale as it would for D/P on a Burlington scale. (Yes, D/P would be a better local fit for Burlington than D/R; but not better than D/R is nationally.) To my view, this is unacceptably bad. > as created by all of us with a good faith participation in democracy. > Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 5:01 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > >> >> >> On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:41 PM, Jameson Quinn >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell >>> On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Jameson Quinn >>> > wrote: > > > 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > >> Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% >> cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. > > > Yes. > > >> If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would >> have worked themselves out. >> > > How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between > progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. > The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto center. >>> >>> So you're happy with the Democrat/Republican choice? >>> >> >> No, I believe it's alright to have two major parties so long as the >> duopoly is contested >> > > How would a post-Kiss Burlington duopoly be contested? > dlw: IDK and I don't need to know. The ways new parties can be created or old parties readjusted are too many. > > >> and both major parties must regularly reposition themselves around the de >> facto center, >> > > That only works for issues that make it onto the agenda; and it works as > well for D/R on a national scale as it would for D/P on a Burlington scale. > (Yes, D/P would be a better local fit for Burlington than D/R; but not > better than D/R is nationally.) > dlw: More such issues wd make it onto the agenda more often if P's cd be among the top 2 in "more local" elections at the nationwide level. > > To my view, this is unacceptably bad. > dlw: You're failing to take into account how much of the dysfunctional behavior of the Ds and Rs is due to their mutual conflicting desire to get permanent majorities over the other. If you take this possibility away, you change their incentives to make cooperating more useful. Both major parties can be reincarnated from their current states. Once, we start balancing our use of single-winner and multi-winner elections, things'll start changing more often and we won't get stuck in a rut like the US has been for 40 so years due to cultural wars wedge issues(easier to reframe effectively when third party outsiders are given more voice) and the increased agressiveness of $peech (which is easy when there are so few competitive elections and third parties are not given a constructive role by the use of FPTP for almost all elections) and low voter turnout (also known to be increased by PR, it's not known whether alts to IRV will have a comparable effect). dlw Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
What kind of evidence would convince you to change your mind about IRV? How about on IRV3/AV3 resolving most of IRV's problems? (I believe that using 3-slot+unapproved ballots and implicit approval to run approval/runoff, which I guess in your notation is IRV3/AV2, would, but don't agree that IRV3/AV3 would). Obviously, if your belief in IRV being good enough weren't falsifiable, it would be just faith. I'm sure that's not the case. Jameson 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > > > On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 5:01 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> >> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:41 PM, Jameson Quinn >>> wrote: >>> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell > > > On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:27 PM, Jameson Quinn < > jameson.qu...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> 2011/11/22 David L Wetzell >> >>> Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% >>> cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. >> >> >> Yes. >> >> >>> If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would >>> have worked themselves out. >>> >> >> How? By people returning to lesser-evil voting, but possibly between >> progressives and democrats? That's not a solution in my book. >> > > The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto > center. > So you're happy with the Democrat/Republican choice? >>> >>> No, I believe it's alright to have two major parties so long as the >>> duopoly is contested >>> >> >> How would a post-Kiss Burlington duopoly be contested? >> > > dlw: IDK and I don't need to know. The ways new parties can be created or > old parties readjusted are too many. > >> >> >>> and both major parties must regularly reposition themselves around the >>> de facto center, >>> >> >> That only works for issues that make it onto the agenda; and it works as >> well for D/R on a national scale as it would for D/P on a Burlington scale. >> (Yes, D/P would be a better local fit for Burlington than D/R; but not >> better than D/R is nationally.) >> > > dlw: More such issues wd make it onto the agenda more often if P's cd be > among the top 2 in "more local" elections at the nationwide level. > >> >> To my view, this is unacceptably bad. >> > > dlw: You're failing to take into account how much of the dysfunctional > behavior of the Ds and Rs is due to their mutual conflicting desire to get > permanent majorities over the other. If you take this possibility away, > you change their incentives to make cooperating more useful. > > Both major parties can be reincarnated from their current states. > Once, we start balancing our use of single-winner and multi-winner > elections, things'll start changing more often and we won't get stuck in a > rut like the US has been for 40 so years due to cultural wars wedge > issues(easier to reframe effectively when third party outsiders are given > more voice) and the increased agressiveness of $peech (which is easy when > there are so few competitive elections and third parties are not given a > constructive role by the use of FPTP for almost all elections) and low > voter turnout (also known to be increased by PR, it's not known whether > alts to IRV will have a comparable effect). > > dlw > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 11/22/2011 1:03 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: dlw: All analysis shows that the perceived problems with IRV are seriously attenuated with only 3 candidates. This is why it's a shame not to add IRV3/AV3 to the list of endorsed methods, since it always uses IRV with only 3 candidates and addresses other concerns like precinct summarizability. If IRV3/AV is a round of Approval counting followed by a round of IRV among the top three choices, then the declaration already covers that situation. Note that the section about rounds of voting (which Peter Zbornik wisely requested restoring) allows for this combination. In this case, you are mainly saying that IRV works well when there are only three choices, and that's something you can state in your signature. Note that all methods produce fewer surprise results when there are fewer choices. Going from the two-choice limit of plurality voting to the three-choice limit of IRV doesn't seem like the big improvement we want to support. According to some IRV proponents, the more IRV is used, the more choices it fosters. Yet you are saying that too many choices leads to its weakness of only handling three choice fairly. That combination of benefits doesn't seem like a good strategy for promoting IRV. If my understanding of IRV3/AV is mistaken, please give me the "elevator pitch" explanation -- I haven't had time to follow lots of details on all the discussions here. Such an explanation would also be needed if the method is marketable. Another thought: Simplicity is an important advantage of IRV, and I wonder if that is lost when methods are combined. I'm not yet seeing anything that the declaration doesn't already say that needs to be said. You may regard this perspective as biased, but as you have also said, public criticism of election methods tends to be quite rigorous, perhaps even more rigorous than the criticisms here. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > What kind of evidence would convince you to change your mind about IRV? > How about on IRV3/AV3 resolving most of IRV's problems? (I believe that > using 3-slot+unapproved ballots and implicit approval to run > approval/runoff, which I guess in your notation is IRV3/AV2, would, but > don't agree that IRV3/AV3 would). dlw: 1. IRV is effectively the leading contender to replace FPTP in the US. (We agree on this, even if we don't like it, right?) 2. If you're going to attack IRV then you got to have an alternative (singular) to replace it with. 4 potential replacements do not cut it. In the US's current system, there can only be one alternative to FPTP at a time. If we push for multiple alternatives then the defenders of the status quo will divide and defeat us. 3. Let X be the quality of an election rule. Let p be its chances of implementation over fptp in the US's current system. Then Xirv doesn't need to be > Xother. Xirv*p(irv) needs to be greater than Xother*p(other) for IRV to deserve its place as the key alternative to FPTP. 4. This is why I pick away at how the args in favor of other election rules get watered down or annihilated when you make the homo politicus / rational choice assumptions more "realistic" or you reduce the number of effective candidates, or you consider how perceived biases/errors get averaged out over time and space, or you focus on the import of marketing and how IRV has the advantage in that area of critical importance to the probability of successful replacement of FPTP. 5. It's not a religious commitment to IRV on my part. My ideological/religious commitment is to subvert the rivalry between the two major parties and to increase the chances of vulnerable minorities being swing voters by pushing for a much better mix of single-winner and multi-winner election rules. I also support IRV(or IRV3/AV3 (I don't understand your IRV3/AV2 remark)) to replace FPTP in single-winner elections. I want others to turn away from or tone down their debating of rival single-winner alternatives, whose probability of success in the near future is effectively much lower than IRV, to focus more on what I believe is the most needful electoral reform in the USA today. dlw Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S.
On 11/19/11 4:24 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: Hallo, Mike Ossipoff wrote (19 Nov 2011): > Beatpath isn't a choice for a proposal in the U.S. Markus, you and your beatpath just have to step aside because MIKE OSSIPOFF is clearly the most knowledgeable expert here. The Schulze method is analyzed here: http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf The Schulze method satisfies anonymity, neutrality, homogeneity, resolvability, Pareto, reversal symmetry, mono-raise, mono-add-plump, Condorcet, Smith, Schwartz, independence of clones, and independence of Smith-dominated alternatives. It satisfies Woodall's CDTT criterion, Woodall's plurality criterion, Ossipoff's SFC, and Ossipoff's SDSC. The Schulze method has been published several times in scientific journals and in scientific books. The Schulze method is currently used by more than 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in total. in all seriousness, Markus, everything you said above is true, and i am fully convinced that the Schulze method *is* the best method from a POV of best inhibiting or resisting voting strategies that make use of throwing a clean Condorcet race into a cycle. but this statement: Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed, the Schulze method is that method that has the best chances of getting adopted. i disagree with, at least as far as getting adopted for governmental elections. it is much harder to explain than either minmax or ranked-pairs. and, if my understanding is correct, Schulze, ranked-pairs, and minimax all pick the same winner in the case where there are 3 candidates in the Smith set, is that not so? so, as unlikely as a Condorcet cycle is (and that's the big sale to make to voters and legislators about adopting Condorcet, especially after they rejected IRV as being "too complicated"), it's even more unlikely that, if a cycle ever happens, that more than 3 candidates will be in the cycle. i don't think it will *ever* happen in a governmental election that a larger Smith set occurs and Schulze will be needed to select the correct winner when ranked-pairs fails to do so. "The Perfect is the enemy of the Good" and it's so much more important to get a Condorcet method adopted than to "go for broke" and get the best Condorcet method adopted since there will be effectively no difference in the outcomes. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 11/22/11 4:57 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: Aye, and that still looks better than a two-stage with a 40% cutoff(what's in place now) or FPTP. If they had stuck with IRV in Burlington, the perceived flaws would have worked themselves out. In the US, three-way close races are not common and can be mitigated in other ways, such as are already at work with FPTP. the problem with both IRV or one of the "other ways" to mitigate a 3-way race (such as a delayed runoff), is that, in the Burlington 2009 example, both methods send the wrong pair of candidates to the final runoff. and it's because of opacity below the current or promoted 1st-choice vote. at least with IRV, the information is collected to know one's 2nd or 3rd choices, but the method ignores that information as long as one's 1st choice remains. On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 3:52 PM, Jameson Quinn mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com>> wrote: The primary anti-IRV example people use is Burlington, with only 3 major candidates. there was a 4th candidate (Independent Dan Smith) who was no slouch and got a lot of votes, but someone had to come in 4th. the real reason IRV failed in Burlington in 2009, is that it did not elect the Condorcet winner when there was a clear CW. the GOP will not admit to the real reason that IRV failed because their candidate was the FPTP winner. my question to them was that if IRV only works well when it also elects the FPTP winner, then why bother with it? of course, the purpose of IRV was that sometimes the plurality winner was not the most democratically chosen winner, which is why we adopted IRV in the first place. we *had* to expect that eventually the IRV winner would be different, that was the point. the anti-IRV Democrats (and they are the reason that IRV was repealed in 2010) also missed the point. what they returned us to is even worse and serves the political interests of the Dems even less *unless* (and this will be decided in less than a month) the Progs decide not to field a candidate for mayor this year. but if the Progs put forth a candidate and we end up with Mayor Forty-one Percent (the GOP), the Progs will blame the anti-IRV Dems and the Dems will blame the Progs (for running a candidate and splitting the vote). the GOP have the 11th Commandment, while we liberals have a circular firing-squad. dlw: All analysis shows that the perceived problems with IRV are seriously attenuated with only 3 candidates. why 3? the issue with SF is that the number of ranking levels is only 3 (so that the ballot is totally opaque to voter preference below the 3rd level), but their ballot access laws are so lax that they get something like 20 candidates. and 20 ranking levels takes up too much real estate on the ballot. but if the 3 candidates that you like best are not among the contenders (and how should you know that in advance?), you might feel a bit disenfranchised when you find out that, due to ranking depth (or the lack thereof) you were unable to place a vote regarding the candidates that really *were* in contention. in SF, this "disenfranchisement" argument has some truth to it, but when it was co-opted by the anti-IRV Burlingtonians, it was totally bogus. and what they returned us to is essentially the same as IRV with only one level (your 1st preference) of ranking. in Burlington, we had 5 declared candidates in 2009 and 5 levels to rank them. On 11/22/11 12:38 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: http://politeaparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/free-and-fair-elections-and-their.html They're trying to end the use of IRV in SF. Obviously, they're concerned about non-monotonicity or that the Condorcet candidate is not guaranteed... and my argument with this (that while it doesn't *guarantee* electing the Condorcet winner, IRV will often do that because all the CW need to do is make it to the final round and then the CW will win the IRV election) is the same as it's been when Rob Richie made that case to me: It's the same as the use of the "Electoral College" (a term not found in the U.S. Constitution) in electing the U.S. president. Most of the time the E.C. will elect the popular vote winner and then we say "gee, the E.C. did a pretty good job." But when the electoral and popular vote disagree, it *never* makes the election look more legitimate. We *never* say "gee, I'm sure glad we have that Electoral College to save us from the popular will of the electorate" unless we do so for political convenience (like the Bush supporters in 2000). So then, why bother to have the E.C.? If we know what the popular vote is, and if the E.C. only does a good job when it elects the candidate with the popular majority, then why not just elect the candidate with the popular majority. Apply the same reasoning to IRV vs. Condorcet. If IRV does such a good job when it elects the CW and does a questionable job otherwise, why not just elec
