Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote: W.Schudy: Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically (approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters have the most black and white, polarized view of the world. If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot of honesty concerning other candidates. *2. So for example, if 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 then Nader would win. This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the assertion RV "gives power to the candidate whose supporters have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized Nader supporters. How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their favourite (Gore) the winner? Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 05:03 PM 8/10/2007, Juho wrote: >In the light of this example it doesn't matter how the "sincere" >votes are derived or where they come from. Any method and logic is >ok. It could be based on terms "sincere" and "utilities", or not. The >only criterion is technical by nature, i.e. that the voter uses the >values in some other way than using mostly min and max values. In other words, even if your vote of max for one and min for another, and no intermediate values for anyone (maybe they are also max or min, or you left them blank) is an accurate reflection of your preferences, i.e., it is sincere, then your vote is "strategic." > > So how is this a "bad result"? >In the example the idea of Range electing the candidate that has best >utility from the society point of view failed. In the example the >votes were 50% - 50% but Range could ignore also a clear majority >opinion. Wait a minute, the is the very crux of the matter! Range does not "ignore" a majority opinion, but it *can* pass over it, *if* the majoriy expresses a weak opinion. That is, strong preferences are given greater weight in Range than weak preferences. This is *necessary* if any method is to elect the candidate with the "best utility." It is the very foundation of how Range operates. If you want to cast strong votes, you cast them. Weak votes, you cast them. If you cast a weak vote, big surprise, somebody else casting a strong vote *in that pairwise election* has, in it, more power. Once again, Juho has not stated what the "bad result" is. When he says that the votes were 50-50, he means what? The example has been lost. I've been asking for an example of a bad result, and Juho keeps repeating himself. So, of course, I'm repeating myself too. I ask for an example, and he says he gave one. But it was not, at least not to me, a "bad example, and he has not explained why. I think this is the example we were talking about. It was not described in detail. > One could e.g. translate utility values 1 >A=90, B=80 and 1 B=90, A=70 to actual votes 1 A=100, B=0 and 1 B=90, >A=70. So this is two voters. Thus it is 50-50 as far as first preference is concerned. (And we can imagine that this is two whole sets of voters voting identically.) Fine. If I'm correct, Juho is asserting that, if the votes are translated as stated, the outcome is "bad." Yet what method is going to do better than Range in this example? First of all, Juho has ignored all that was written about utilities. There is only one way that I can think of to make utilities interpersonally commensurable, and that is to fix the scales in some way, to something common. What I did was to fix them at "absolute best possible outcome" and "absolute worst outcome possible." We could equivalently state this as "as satisfied as possible" and "as dissatisfied as possible." If voters vote sincere utilities, and the method has sufficient resolution, we know that true social utility (or at least "satisfaction" is maximized. But this is not at all how we expect people will vote. Rather, they will treat a Range election as they have been treating elections for centuries, as a *choice* between a set of realistic alternatives. They will *usually* ignore possible write-ins except in quite unusual conditions. With ranked methods, starting with Plurality, you make a *choice.* You vote that choice simply, maximum strength, one full vote. Approval starts to allow you some more flexibility, but there is still the fact that by making one choice strong, you are making another maximally weak. Pure ranked methods allow you to make maximally strong choices among an entire set of candidates, but this leads to some contradictions and other problems, plus "maximally strong choice" is not an accurate picture of real preferences, and so ranked methods can make some spectacularly poor choices (though usually they don't). Now, if the voters described vote their supposed "sincere" utilities -- which were completely undefined by Juho -- Then we have a total of 180:150, A wins. Any ranked method, though, will give us a tie, because the two voters have reversed preferences. The problem with what was stated by Juho is that voters make a choice from a set. And if there are only two candidates in the set, there is no basis for voting less than one full vote. If you actually care. If you don't care about the outcome, then ignoring your vote (i.e., treating it as you stated it, weak) is *not* a bad outcome, it should certainly be fine with you, and it was the preference of the other voter, so where's the beef? Juho stated utilities of: A B 1 90 80 2 70 90 And then said that this could be translated to A B 1 100 0 2 70 90 Wbich it certainly could. If we assume that the utilities are "sincere" -- passing over for the moment the problem of what that actually means -- then what we see here is
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 10, 2007, at 6:08 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > At 04:09 PM 8/9/2007, Juho wrote: >> I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their >> personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't >> like the word "utility" then we can just talk about putting >> candidates on the value axis without putting any special emphasis on >> the min and max values. > So what do I come up with as so-called "sincere" non-normalized > Range Votes? Range 100, 50.25% for Gore. Bush is below 50% by five > times as much as Gore is above it, so Bush is 48.75%. Rounding off > for Range 100, it is Gore 50%, Bush 49%. My sincere votes. > > If this is not what "sincere" vote means, please explain what is! In the light of this example it doesn't matter how the "sincere" votes are derived or where they come from. Any method and logic is ok. It could be based on terms "sincere" and "utilities", or not. The only criterion is technical by nature, i.e. that the voter uses the values in some other way than using mostly min and max values. > So how is this a "bad result"? In the example the idea of Range electing the candidate that has best utility from the society point of view failed. In the example the votes were 50% - 50% but Range could ignore also a clear majority opinion. Juho ___ Now you can scan emails quickly with a reading pane. Get the new Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 04:09 PM 8/9/2007, Juho wrote: >In this discussion I'm quite sensitive to different wordings that are >used when describing Range. > >[...] > >I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their >personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't >like the word "utility" then we can just talk about putting >candidates on the value axis without putting any special emphasis on >the min and max values. "Roughly." What is a "personal candidate utility value"? What Juho did was to simply use a different set of words, without describing the *meaning*, i.e., how the voter is to arrive at this set of values. How do I put the candidate values "on the value axis"? What determines what I call the "magnification"? Suppose that I try to estimate candidate values by the following procedure: I consider the payment that I would want to personally receive in order to allow the election of a candidate, or pay in order to guarantee that election. This would establish what are reasonably called "absolute utilities." It doesn't matter if I'm rich or poor, we would only need to consider that if we are trying to make my utilities commensurable with those of others. Now, I have absolute utilities. They measure and compare the value of the candidates to me. If I wouldn't pay a nickel to elect so-and-so over his opponent, I must not have much of a preference. Unless I don't have a dime to my name. In which case I'd simply measure the utilities in terms of how many minutes I'd spend for the cause, or any other measure. Now, I am faced with a specific election, Range 100. Do I consider who is actually *in* the election when I vote? From what Juho has written, I'd have to assume that to be "sincere," I would not. So; none of the present candidates are anywhere as near as good as the Messiah, and none of them are anywhere as bad as the Antichrist. For the Messiah, I'd spend everything I have and might even borrow, for the Antichrist you couldn't offer me enough. Let's see, maybe I could scrape together a couple of hundred thousand dollars, pulling out all the stops. So we have at one end, the Messiah, $200,000. At the other, negative infinity! (Yes, this is correct. I wouldn't do it for the world.) For the election of Al Gore, in 2000, I'd have paid easily $1000, if I knew it would have been effective. Possibly more. (The rules have to be that nobody will help me) (I would now pay more.) To accept the election of Bush, $5000 might have been enough. (It would be a *lot* more expensive now that we know the man better.) Let's see. If we use an absolute scale, linear, everything ends up at negative infinity. However, there is another procedure. I could decide to fix the midpoint at 50%. Then I scale positive utilities in the range of 50% to 100%, and I proceed down an equal amount. This, then, truncates at -$200,000. Anything that low or lower is zero. So what do I come up with as so-called "sincere" non-normalized Range Votes? Range 100, 50.25% for Gore. Bush is below 50% by five times as much as Gore is above it, so Bush is 48.75%. Rounding off for Range 100, it is Gore 50%, Bush 49%. My sincere votes. If this is not what "sincere" vote means, please explain what is! *Everybody will normalize, at least to some degree!* And many will "truncate," which means that they place the ends of the Range Voting scale on their absolute scale *within* the candidate set such that more than one candidate is at an end point. And there is nothing "insincere" about this. If I give a candidate more than zero, I am contributing something to the possible election of that candidate. It is easily possible that I would not care to do that for more than one candidate. Or am I *forced* to make a choice, to assign a higher utility to Adolf Hitler than to Genghis Khan -- or the reverse? Let me repeat this: there is no clear definition of a "sincere" vote in Range. Indeed, the whole concept is suspect. If the Republican supporters of R2 in the example given by Juho previously did not have a strong preference for R2 over R1, why did they vote max strength for R2 over R1? Juho, following others, will give the reason as "they wanted their favorite to win." But *how much* did they want their favorite to win. If this is the most important thing to them, they voted sincerely! Their vote, as an action, abstained from the election between D and R1. It is as if they were saying, "R2 or I don't care." And if that is how they feel, who are we to called it "strategic"? What Juho and others do is to posit a weak preference that is expressed as a strong one, but ignored is the *motivation.* I have *never* seen a critic of Range present the reason why they might do this, it is passed off as "they wanted to win." Okay, they wanted to win, that is, they wanted R2 to win. How badly? One full vote. So that is what they cast. What's the problem? They expressed what they wanted, and
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 9, 2007, at 20:14 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > I've been over and over this point, there is little in this post > that is new. I'd suggest reading it carefully. In this discussion I'm quite sensitive to different wordings that are used when describing Range. > And if you wish to continue asserting that Range can "cause a mess" > when voters vote a mixture of "sincere" voting and Approval-style > voting, please define "sincere" in a manner that we could agree > upon, define what a sincere Range vote is, and how, and *how much* > the voters are harmed by voting sincerely, and what effect this has > on society as a whole. I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't like the word "utility" then we can just talk about putting candidates on the value axis without putting any special emphasis on the min and max values. The voters could be harmed considerably in some cases. There have been several examples. One could e.g. translate utility values 1 A=90, B=80 and 1 B=90, A=70 to actual votes 1 A=100, B=0 and 1 B=90, A=70. The effect on the society could be e.g. bad election results (e.g. worse candidate A elected due to strategic voting) or Range becoming Approval in practice. I think we have covered all this before. Let's try to avoid repeating the cycle. > "Insincere" refers to reversing a preference; That's one option. In natural language I'd include also other cases. (sincere votes) >> You seem to be recommending the voters to primarily do so, > > I do recommend not reversing preferences. As to the expression of > so-called sincere ratings -- what is that? Defined above. (I didn't refer to reversals specifically.) > -- I suggest normalization, for starters, in nearly all > circumstances. In some, what I call the "first normalization" would > remain proper, not the second. > > (The first normalization: the voter considers *all* possible > candidates, not just those on the ballot. The voter assigns 100% to > the best of these and 0% to the worst. This is pretty much what > Warren does with his simulations, to generate "sincere" and "not > normalized" utilities. But by assuming that all voters have the > same internal scale, there is a normalization. Other utilities are > proportional. An assumption is made that they are linear, though > various distributions of utilities are used.) > > (The second normalization: the voter considers all candidates on > the ballot, including a write-in, if any. The voter assigns 100% to > the favorite and 0% to the worst. Another variation of this would > not include any write-ins. Again, other utilities would be presumed > to fall in the middle somewhere, but that is actually a separate > issue.) > > (And how are so-called sincere internal utilities translated to > Range Votes, when they are not at the extremes? There is no fixed > standard. Approval-style voting could be, in ordinary usage of the > term, "sincere." That is, the voter is saying, "I'll be about as > happy with either of these, and about as unhappy with either of > those." This does *not* necessarily mean that the voter has no > measurable preference, if only given the choice of two. It does > mean that the voter is more likely, perhaps, to stay home in a > runoff, but that is not guaranteed.) It seems you recommend not to normalize the estimated frontrunners to min and max. >> With this I think we are back in the >> original claim that Range may create a mess if some voters vote >> sincerely (and maybe are guided to do so) and some strategically. > > No such mess has been alleged specifically. Rather, Juho and others > continue to claim that a mess is created, but not *specific* > scenario that deserves the name is mentioned. There have been examples. See e.g. the example I gave above. > Suppose we have a pizza election. Two friends are choosing a pizza, > using Range Voting. They express, with their votes, not only what > they prefer, but how strongly. Certainly, the person who votes > Approval style is more likely to get what he wants -- indeed it is > guaranteed -- than the one who votes "sincerely." This is quite > like two friends having a discussion about it. One says, I like > Artichoke, but Mushroom is okay with me. The other says, wow! I > *love* Mushroom and I *hate* Artichoke. > > Which pizza do they choose? Routinely, in ordinary human > interaction, we give precedence to strongly expressed preferences. > Do we question the sincerity of these preferences? We may, if > voting over time shows a pattern. But who is to say, even then. A > person's preferences may change. If a person always expresses > strong preference, we may think them histrionic, but usually we > will treat their preference as strong; however, in some cases, we > may also start to treat our own as strong, if we nev
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
I've been over and over this point, there is little in this post that is new. I'd suggest reading it carefully. And if you wish to continue asserting that Range can "cause a mess" when voters vote a mixture of "sincere" voting and Approval-style voting, please define "sincere" in a manner that we could agree upon, define what a sincere Range vote is, and how, and *how much* the voters are harmed by voting sincerely, and what effect this has on society as a whole. Otherwise, the assertion is just blowing smoke and confusion.At 12:03 AM 8/9/2007, Juho wrote: >>It happens, however, that you can think about Range that way if you >>want. It can be used to maximize social utility, and it does a >>pretty good job even if most voters vote the extremes. > >Maximizing social utility refers to giving sincere utilities in the >ballots. No. Not necessarily. If you don't give some kind of "sincere" utility on the ballot, *your* utility won't be maximized! However, the word "sincere" isn't precisely defined with Range. Lots of writers have assumed that there is some "sincere utility" that would automatically translate to a specific Range vote. Of course, Warren Smith, in designing his simulators, had to face the fact that there is no such thing. We can easily define "insincere" with Range, and the definition covers ranked methods exactly, except for ranked methods which allow equal ranking. When equal ranking is allowed, ranked methods start to resemble Range in that small way "Insincere" refers to reversing a preference; that is, you prefer A over B but your ballot shows that you prefer B over A. Plurality, with no overvoting, for starters, requires "insincere voting" if you prefer a third party candidate who has no chance of winning, and want to influence the outcome of the real election. Range methods never provide an incentive to reverse preference. Now, when I propose Range+PW, there comes to be a ranked aspect to the election, so it is possible that one could discover some such incentive, but the strategic considerations, it seems to me, become so twisted and unlikely that I doubt anyone would do it. Condorcet methods do provide some motive for insincere voting, but even there it is controversial how much people would actually do it. With Range+PW, I haven't examined the characteristics of the hybrid method in detail, but it seems to me quite a stretch that a solid strategic motive for reversal would be found. In Range+PW, the goal is to get your favorite in the runoff, or, failing that, your favorite from among the top few candidates. I should note that Range and Approval, without special rules, are "Plurality" methods. Approval makes it more likely that a winner will have a "majority," but certainly does not guarantee it, and "strategic" considerations make an Approval majority less clear if there exists more than one candidate with it. Some consider that Approval can elect a winner who would lose a pairwise election with another candidate to be a feature of Approval. It is, to a degree. My opinion is that whenever a majority surrenders its preference, it should do so knowingly. It's generally impossible to fully consider this in a single-stage election. (It's possible, if the voters specifically consent to it, with the same ballot. It gets murky if, instead, they pass a law to apply to future elections. It's a *different* majority in that case!) > You seem to be recommending the voters to primarily do so, I do recommend not reversing preferences. As to the expression of so-called sincere ratings -- what is that? -- I suggest normalization, for starters, in nearly all circumstances. In some, what I call the "first normalization" would remain proper, not the second. (The first normalization: the voter considers *all* possible candidates, not just those on the ballot. The voter assigns 100% to the best of these and 0% to the worst. This is pretty much what Warren does with his simulations, to generate "sincere" and "not normalized" utilities. But by assuming that all voters have the same internal scale, there is a normalization. Other utilities are proportional. An assumption is made that they are linear, though various distributions of utilities are used.) (The second normalization: the voter considers all candidates on the ballot, including a write-in, if any. The voter assigns 100% to the favorite and 0% to the worst. Another variation of this would not include any write-ins. Again, other utilities would be presumed to fall in the middle somewhere, but that is actually a separate issue.) (And how are so-called sincere internal utilities translated to Range Votes, when they are not at the extremes? There is no fixed standard. Approval-style voting could be, in ordinary usage of the term, "sincere." That is, the voter is saying, "I'll be about as happy with either of these, and about as unhappy with either of those." This does *not* nece
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 9, 2007, at 6:41 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: In any case, simple Range N is exactly like having N votes to cast, in an Approval election, and the one with the most votes wins. There is nothing in this about "utilities" or "ratings." It happens, however, that you can think about Range that way if you want. It can be used to maximize social utility, and it does a pretty good job even if most voters vote the extremes. Maximizing social utility refers to giving sincere utilities in the ballots. You seem to be recommending the voters to primarily do so, and in addition to that accept the Approval style voting as a secondary less good option. With this I think we are back in the original claim that Range may create a mess if some voters vote sincerely (and maybe are guided to do so) and some strategically. Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 06:13 PM 8/8/2007, Juho wrote: I'm just saying that the voters should know what they are doing in >order not to lose their vote (partly). Maybe the official >descriptions of the method are not that important since probably we >can trust the media to do their job and explain the methods to the >voters. First of all, what their vote is doing, in Range, is quite simple. Range is just like Approval, only difference is that you have more than one vote to cast. So the problem reduces to what is happening in Approval. And the principle is already established and used in public elections. I've mentioned it many times: with conflicting initiatives. Again, there is a difference: with initiatives, if none get a majority Yes vote, none pass. But in some places no candidate can get a majority Yes vote and still someone is elected. It is actually a flaw, a situation where basic democratic principles are not observed, in the name of efficiency. What would we think about a budget process where various budgets were presented to the legislators, and they could vote for which one they wanted, and the one with the most votes wins. Even if most legislators would vote against it. In any case, simple Range N is exactly like having N votes to cast, in an Approval election, and the one with the most votes wins. There is nothing in this about "utilities" or "ratings." It happens, however, that you can think about Range that way if you want. It can be used to maximize social utility, and it does a pretty good job even if most voters vote the extremes. But this should *not* be part of the official explanation on the ballot. That explanation should be very simple and should not presume to tell people what their vote "means," except for the *real* meaning: what will be done with the vote. What if the instructions on a present Plurality ballot were to say, "Vote for your favorite"? It would be offensive, a suggestion that some voters disregard political reality, thus wasting their vote. It would actually be an instruction with partisan effect, harming some candidates more than others. Yes, media and others will explain what the implications are of Range. And some of this will be propaganda to be disregarded! What should be officially said about it is the minimum. What I've suggested, about how the winner will be determined, is more than current practice but I think it would be appropriate. >The media could give also the examples. They could say e.g. that: If >one wants to use the full strength of one's vote one should normally >use the min and max points. If you believe the winner will be either >A or B and you prefer A don't vote A=100, B=90 but vote A=100, B=0 >instead. Or if it is Range+PW, you *might* vote A=100, B=1. Depends on how you feel about the other candidates. If there is another candidate C, who you would really like to keep out, you might want to express preference in the pairwise election between B and C, and you can't do that with zero. 1/100 of a vote expresses preference but gives very little support to B. I've suggested a Plus marker, which at the top end would be used to indicate preference, but it could be used at the bottom as well. 0 and 0+ would be counted the same for the Range total, but to determine if there is any pairwise winner over the Range winner, the Plus would establish preference for the one so marked, without even giving the person 1/100 of a vote With a Plus marker, the Range method could be much lower resolution without harm It's questionable that humans have stable preferences with an accuracy of 1% 10% is quite possibly closer to what we do. >If this kind of discussion is repeated often enough voters will learn >and then use the method in a way that they find most appropriate for >them. Nobody will be "cheated" to cast weak votes. If they do so, >they will do that for some reason. Right. In any case, we start out with Approval, most likely, in public elections, it is such a simple change. It then becomes a little bit easier to explain Range, which is simply Approval with more votes per voter per candidate. Approval is one vote per voter per candidate >(Also the people that make decisions on what voting methods to use >should get all this information.) They will, I assume. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 8, 2007, at 20:52 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > The description should inform the voter how the voter's marks will > be used. One of the descriptions that has been suggested (by me?) > is precisely that "You have 10 votes, and you may cast as many of > them as you like for a given candidate, without any restriction on > how many you cast for another candidate. The winner will be the > candidate with the most votes. For each candidate, mark the > position on the ballot corresponding to the number of votes you > wish to cast for that candidate." Maybe some example votes would clarify to the voters what the typical voting patterns are. This description may still lead to different interpretations by them. Like what? I'm just saying that the voters should know what they are doing in order not to lose their vote (partly). Maybe the official descriptions of the method are not that important since probably we can trust the media to do their job and explain the methods to the voters. The media could give also the examples. They could say e.g. that: If one wants to use the full strength of one's vote one should normally use the min and max points. If you believe the winner will be either A or B and you prefer A don't vote A=100, B=90 but vote A=100, B=0 instead. If this kind of discussion is repeated often enough voters will learn and then use the method in a way that they find most appropriate for them. Nobody will be "cheated" to cast weak votes. If they do so, they will do that for some reason. (Also the people that make decisions on what voting methods to use should get all this information.) Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 12:11 AM 8/8/2007, Juho wrote: > > But that is what Range is! > > > > Does the method change based on how we describe it? > >In some sense yes. In practice the situation is much more complex but >in theory one could say that: 1) Strategic voters will study the >method in detail and they will find the most efficient strategic way >to vote irrespective of how the method is described. 2) Sincere >voters will vote in the way they were told to vote. Look, this is an assumption that "sincere" is equivalent to "clueless." Absolutely, voters should not, on the ballot, be "told how to vote," except where there are rules that will cause their ballot to be invalidated if they violate them. For example, "Vote for one" on a plurality ballot must be there! However, "Vote for one" is actually inadequate. Some voters, I'm pretty sure, will think that the votes will be counted. And voters know that even though it says "Vote for One," nothing will happen to them, lightning will not strike, if they don't vote for any at all -- and there are many blank ballots in real elections -- or they vote for more than one -- which can be a quick way for a voter to nullify a vote on a paper ballot, some of these are, I'm sure, deliberate. What was being presumed here was that the ballot had defective and biased instructions on it. Why make that assumption? Most voters, for example, are quite accustomed to voting "Strategically." They vote for one of the major party candidates, even if it means holding their nose. Are these not "sincere" voters? However, if "sincere" voters do vote the min and max for frontrunners, they lose nothing, and if they vote a little less than max, say, for a frontrunner when they prefer someone else, they lose very little. As I've written, if the range resolution is sufficient, the loss of voting power by a lowered vote for a frontrunner is miniscule. What Range does, like Approval, is to make the vote for any candidate independent of the vote for any other. You are casting multiple votes. So if it is important to you that a candidate get votes, most likely you will give the maximum you can give, or *maybe* just a tad less, if you want to preserve preference order. As long as you don't go *below* your actual rating for the candidate, you are quite safe as far as expected outcome is concerned. In a highly contentious environment, you will tend to give the max or max - 1. And I'm sure that if we have Range in an election, it will be broadly discussed. People, most of them, will know how to vote for maximum effect. >In Range this means that if you present Range as a method that elects >the candidate with best utility sum after the voters have marked >their personal utilities in the ballots, then sincere voters have >been advised in a way that makes them vote differently than what the >strategists will do. The determination of the winner in Range has *nothing* to do with "utility." Personal utility is a *strategy* for how to vote. It happens to be one that will tend to maximize overall social utility, so it has a value entirely apart from the voter's personal goals. However, the choice of whether or not to seek to maximize personally desirable effect or overall SU, and whether or not to trust other voters to do likewise, is completely up to the voter. And it is quite debatable which is really best for the voter. What does seem to be clear is that harm from voting "sincerely," i.e., accurately according to personal utilities, is small. The ballot instructions would not mention "utility." They probably would not mention "rating." They would mention "votes." What other people will say about the method is up to those other people. Some candidates will be saying, "Vote max for me, min for everyone else." They could easily lose my vote by giving me that advice! Except under some circumstances Range as a method optimizes overall expected voter satisfaction, if voters express their expected satisfaction on the ballots. If they don't, it doesn't. However, it tends to optimize overall satisfaction for the voters who express it, as long as they normalize, i.e, vote max for their favorite and min for the least liked, and it gets even better with somewhat more sophisticated voting strategies. Voting Approval style is *fine*. There is nothing wrong with it, and that Range allegedly may encourage many voters to vote that way is not an argument against it. > If you present range as a method where the votes >are expected to promote the candidates with either min or max values, >or with intermediate values if they don't want to use their full >voting power for some reason, then strategic and sincere votes are >closer to each others (some additional but more complex strategic >options that sincere voters might not use may still remain). It doesn't need to be that complicated. In Range 10, you may cast from 0 to 10 votes for each candidate. The winner is the one with
Re: [Election-Methods] response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
>In other words: yes, correlation between degree of >strategizing and political stance makes Bayesian regret >bigger. But we don't have reason to be afraid of big >correlations of that kind. Still thinking that, I feel like addig something: If I don't vote and at the end a bad candidate wins, I will kick myself for having not voted. And I will find little comfort in the fact that if all voter groups abstain in the same proportion, the result is the same as if they all voted. If in a Plurality I vote for Calero and he gets almost nothing and Bush wins instead of Gore, I will kick myself for having wasted my vote on an almost chanceless candidate. If in a Range(1,2,3,...,100) I give 100 to Calero, 10 to Gore and nothing to Bush, and Bush wins instead of Gore, I will still kick myself for having wasted nine-tenth of my vote on an almost chanceless candidate. Peter Barath Megújult a Jobline.hu! 2600 állásból most még egyszerűbben válogathatsz és önéletrajzodat akár 1 perc alatt is feltöltheted. http://ad.adverticum.net/b/cl,1,6022,191642,246289/click.prm Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 8, 2007, at 3:42 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > At 05:44 PM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote: >> On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: >> > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is >> > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range >> > gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does >> > Approval, to blocks of same. It is an imaginary objection to Range, >> > accusing it of fomenting what other methods *require*. >> >> Approval doesn't give the voters any other alternative but to use the >> min and max values. If one wants to describe Range in a way that >> avoids the problems of giving strategic/exaggerating voters more >> power then it is best to describe it like you did, as an Approval >> like election with option to use also less powerful values than the >> (generally used) min and max values are. > > But that is what Range is! > > Does the method change based on how we describe it? In some sense yes. In practice the situation is much more complex but in theory one could say that: 1) Strategic voters will study the method in detail and they will find the most efficient strategic way to vote irrespective of how the method is described. 2) Sincere voters will vote in the way they were told to vote. In Range this means that if you present Range as a method that elects the candidate with best utility sum after the voters have marked their personal utilities in the ballots, then sincere voters have been advised in a way that makes them vote differently than what the strategists will do. If you present range as a method where the votes are expected to promote the candidates with either min or max values, or with intermediate values if they don't want to use their full voting power for some reason, then strategic and sincere votes are closer to each others (some additional but more complex strategic options that sincere voters might not use may still remain). (A third quite common way to describe Range is to use normalised values.) > Absolutely, someone could describe Range, on a ballot, in a way > that would encourage voters to waste their vote. Consider it an > intelligence test. If you see through this defective advice, your > vote will count for more! Yes. This is something I would not like to happen. It is better to try to give all voters the same power, irrespective if they are less strategic or less analytical. > But I would never support such a description being on a ballot. Yes, it is too late to try to educate voters using the ballot. They should know beforehand. > The description should inform the voter how the voter's marks will > be used. One of the descriptions that has been suggested (by me?) > is precisely that "You have 10 votes, and you may cast as many of > them as you like for a given candidate, without any restriction on > how many you cast for another candidate. The winner will be the > candidate with the most votes. For each candidate, mark the > position on the ballot corresponding to the number of votes you > wish to cast for that candidate." Maybe some example votes would clarify to the voters what the typical voting patterns are. This description may still lead to different interpretations by them. > That's Range 10. (This naming policy btw has the problem that nowadays I don't know what method people are talking about when they say "Range 2". You could mean the ability to give from zero to two votes or the ability to give two different kind of values.) Juho > ___ The all-new Yahoo! Mail goes wherever you go - free your email address from your Internet provider. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 05:44 PM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote: >On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is > > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range > > gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does > > Approval, to blocks of same. It is an imaginary objection to Range, > > accusing it of fomenting what other methods *require*. > >Approval doesn't give the voters any other alternative but to use the >min and max values. If one wants to describe Range in a way that >avoids the problems of giving strategic/exaggerating voters more >power then it is best to describe it like you did, as an Approval >like election with option to use also less powerful values than the >(generally used) min and max values are. But that is what Range is! Does the method change based on how we describe it? Absolutely, someone could describe Range, on a ballot, in a way that would encourage voters to waste their vote. Consider it an intelligence test. If you see through this defective advice, your vote will count for more! But I would never support such a description being on a ballot. The description should inform the voter how the voter's marks will be used. One of the descriptions that has been suggested (by me?) is precisely that "You have 10 votes, and you may cast as many of them as you like for a given candidate, without any restriction on how many you cast for another candidate. The winner will be the candidate with the most votes. For each candidate, mark the position on the ballot corresponding to the number of votes you wish to cast for that candidate." That's Range 10. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
>*2. So for example, if >49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and >49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and >2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 >then Nader would win. > >This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts >the assertion RV >"gives power to the candidate whose supporters >have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." >In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized >Nader supporters. Well, in this example Nader supporters were more "polarized" than either Bush or Gore ones. Anyway, picked up examples don't refute hypotheses about tendencies. >*3. If we also add, say, Badnarik with scores not of 53 like for >Nader, but rather, say, 20, then Badnarik would not win, >but still would get a total range-voting >score in the same ballpark as Bush, Gore, and Nader, thus permitting >him to claim he has a lot of popular support, and thus allowing his >party to try to get money and support for future elections. I wouln't vote that way. If concerned with these smaller scores, I would ask the question: will Badnarik get more or less points than I think he deserves? If think: more, I would give him 0 points to lesser; if think: less, I would give him full points to enhance. >Note, it was an "immediate" bad effect that (above) >Approval caused Nader to lose >when Range vould have caused him to win. Not necessarily. A lot of 53 percenters would approve him. >In our study of the 2004 US election, we were not able >to find any evidence that >Bush voters were either more or less "polarized" and >"strategically exaggerating" >than Gore voters. (Perhaps they were, but if so the >effect was too small for our >statistics to see.) In other words: yes, correlation between degree of strategizing and political stance makes Bayesian regret bigger. But we don't have reason to be afraid of big correlations of that kind. Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range > gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does > Approval, to blocks of same. It is an imaginary objection to Range, > accusing it of fomenting what other methods *require*. Approval doesn't give the voters any other alternative but to use the min and max values. If one wants to describe Range in a way that avoids the problems of giving strategic/exaggerating voters more power then it is best to describe it like you did, as an Approval like election with option to use also less powerful values than the (generally used) min and max values are. Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 02:01 AM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote: [I wrote:] >>Most election methods would give this election to Gore, period. >>Gore is the Condorcet winner. But Nader is arguably the best >>winner. In a situation like this, I'd trigger a runoff between Gore >>and Bush. That was a typo. I meant Gore and Nader, of course. >>This constant argument that Range gives too much power to extreme >>voters is truly bizarre. > >Bush and Gore have the same number of first preference votes and the >voters are planning to give (maybe strategically) max and min votes >to these candidates. Nader supporters however seem to prefer Gore to >Bush, which makes the Gore position stronger. As it should. Terming the giving of max and min votes to the favorite/worst among the frontrunners "strategic" is misleading. We use the term "normalized" for this because it doesn't have the implications of "strategic," which with other methods refers, generally, to reversing preferences. It is *never* strategically advantageous in Range to reverse preferences. Now, Range+PW, I'll call it, is a hybrid method, so theoretically, in the Condorcet side, there could be strategic motivation. However, that would be giving up the Range side. While certainly I have not done an exhaustive analysis, I seriously doubt that reversal motivation exists in the combination method. Hmm maybe a little. A vote of 99 and a vote of 100 are almost the same in Range, trivial difference. *If* there were certain conditions, it's conceivable that one would reverse these but it doesn't seem very plausible to me. >With the given numbers (that are maybe from a poll) No, these were intended to be election results, I think. > this will be a >very close race and therefore anything can happen at the election >day. But if we assume that the given numbers will hold the Gore >supporters have a strategic option to give Nader 0 points and win. >Isn't this giving more power to Gore supporters if they are more >extreme? But they vastly outnumber the Nader supporters. "Giving them a strategic advantage" is a strange terminology for using a method that *allows* them to rate Nader highly enough that, together with the Republicans, they could allow Nader to win. Nader only has a chance if the Gore supporters actually think he is good, enough of them. Note, again, I don't think Juho has picked up on this, the Gore votes may be all over the spectrum, with some almost favoring Nader and some rating him zero. Who in the world is to say that any of these votes is insincere? Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does Approval, to blocks of same. It is an imaginary objection to Range, accusing it of fomenting what other methods *require*. And Range+PW really does provide the best of both worlds, and the retention of pairwise significance should encourage some degree of discrimination in the votes. I.e., pure exaggeration, voting Approval style, is giving up the power of the pairwise comparison. So those Gore supporters, most of them, would not rate Nader at zero. They would rate him, perhaps at 1 or more, thus showing preference, but very little Range power. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
On Aug 6, 2007, at 1:28 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote: On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote: If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot of honesty concerning other candidates. *2. So for example, if 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 then Nader would win. This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the assertion RV "gives power to the candidate whose supporters have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized Nader supporters. How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their favourite (Gore) the winner? That Range gives Nader an opportunity doesn't guarantee Nader a win? Should it? In this case, we have an *average* vote from the Bush and Gore supporters, both, of 53%. The Nader supporters voted quite strongly for Nader -- 20% for Gore is quite a weak vote, given how strongly both the Repubs and Dems supported Nader. Already. Note that the scenario described quite probably already has "10" Gore voters doing that. Probably quite a bit more than ten! I think Juho missed that the Nader votes were averages. Most election methods would give this election to Gore, period. Gore is the Condorcet winner. But Nader is arguably the best winner. In a situation like this, I'd trigger a runoff between Gore and Bush. This constant argument that Range gives too much power to extreme voters is truly bizarre. Bush and Gore have the same number of first preference votes and the voters are planning to give (maybe strategically) max and min votes to these candidates. Nader supporters however seem to prefer Gore to Bush, which makes the Gore position stronger. With the given numbers (that are maybe from a poll) this will be a very close race and therefore anything can happen at the election day. But if we assume that the given numbers will hold the Gore supporters have a strategic option to give Nader 0 points and win. Isn't this giving more power to Gore supporters if they are more extreme? I don't know if it is exactly true that "Range gives too much power to extreme voters" (since less extreme voters can also exaggerate if they consider that to be the normal recommended way to vote) but it often seems to encourage voters to give extreme/exaggerated/Approval like votes. (Condorcet btw seems to be closer to electing Nader.) Juho Rather, what has actually happened here is that the system gives Nader a chance. If enough voters vote against him, ranking him equal last, which is what was proposed, he's going to lose with either Range or a Condorcet method. However, if I had my 'druthers, with the winner, Gore, only getting 49% of the first place votes, a runoff might be a great idea. Who would win? You sure can't tell from the data for sure Unless we assume those are sincere and accurate expressions of relative utility, in which case Nader has a chance. Note that the Reps seem to prefer Nader, greatly, to Gore. So I'd predict Nader would win. Juho ___ Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" The Wall Street Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote: >On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote: >>If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner >>candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages >>of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot >>of honesty concerning other candidates. >> >> >>*2. So for example, if >>49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and >>49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and >>2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0 >>then Nader would win. >> >>This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the >>assertion RV >>"gives power to the candidate whose supporters >>have the most black and white, polarized view of the world." >>In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized >>Nader supporters. > >How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters >giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their >favourite (Gore) the winner? That Range gives Nader an opportunity doesn't guarantee Nader a win? Should it? In this case, we have an *average* vote from the Bush and Gore supporters, both, of 53%. The Nader supporters voted quite strongly for Nader -- 20% for Gore is quite a weak vote, given how strongly both the Repubs and Dems supported Nader. Already. Note that the scenario described quite probably already has "10" Gore voters doing that. Probably quite a bit more than ten! I think Juho missed that the Nader votes were averages. Most election methods would give this election to Gore, period. Gore is the Condorcet winner. But Nader is arguably the best winner. In a situation like this, I'd trigger a runoff between Gore and Bush. This constant argument that Range gives too much power to extreme voters is truly bizarre. Rather, what has actually happened here is that the system gives Nader a chance. If enough voters vote against him, ranking him equal last, which is what was proposed, he's going to lose with either Range or a Condorcet method. However, if I had my 'druthers, with the winner, Gore, only getting 49% of the first place votes, a runoff might be a great idea. Who would win? You sure can't tell from the data for sure Unless we assume those are sincere and accurate expressions of relative utility, in which case Nader has a chance. Note that the Reps seem to prefer Nader, greatly, to Gore. So I'd predict Nader would win. >Juho > > > > >___ >Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is >radically easier to use" The Wall Street >Journal http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html > > > >Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
