On Aug 6, 2007, at 1:28 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote:
On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot
of honesty concerning other candidates.
*2. So for example, if
49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and
49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and
2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0
then Nader would win.
This structure is a realistic possibility that totally
contradicts the
assertion RV
"gives power to the candidate whose supporters
have the most black and white, polarized view of the world."
In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized
Nader supporters.
How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters
giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their
favourite (Gore) the winner?
That Range gives Nader an opportunity doesn't guarantee Nader a
win? Should it?
In this case, we have an *average* vote from the Bush and Gore
supporters, both, of 53%. The Nader supporters voted quite strongly
for Nader -- 20% for Gore is quite a weak vote, given how strongly
both the Repubs and Dems supported Nader. Already.
Note that the scenario described quite probably already has "10"
Gore voters doing that. Probably quite a bit more than ten! I think
Juho missed that the Nader votes were averages.
Most election methods would give this election to Gore, period.
Gore is the Condorcet winner. But Nader is arguably the best
winner. In a situation like this, I'd trigger a runoff between Gore
and Bush.
This constant argument that Range gives too much power to extreme
voters is truly bizarre.
Bush and Gore have the same number of first preference votes and the
voters are planning to give (maybe strategically) max and min votes
to these candidates. Nader supporters however seem to prefer Gore to
Bush, which makes the Gore position stronger.
With the given numbers (that are maybe from a poll) this will be a
very close race and therefore anything can happen at the election
day. But if we assume that the given numbers will hold the Gore
supporters have a strategic option to give Nader 0 points and win.
Isn't this giving more power to Gore supporters if they are more
extreme?
I don't know if it is exactly true that "Range gives too much power
to extreme voters" (since less extreme voters can also exaggerate if
they consider that to be the normal recommended way to vote) but it
often seems to encourage voters to give extreme/exaggerated/Approval
like votes.
(Condorcet btw seems to be closer to electing Nader.)
Juho
Rather, what has actually happened here is that the system gives
Nader a chance. If enough voters vote against him, ranking him
equal last, which is what was proposed, he's going to lose with
either Range or a Condorcet method. However, if I had my 'druthers,
with the winner, Gore, only getting 49% of the first place votes, a
runoff might be a great idea. Who would win? You sure can't tell
from the data for sure.... Unless we assume those are sincere and
accurate expressions of relative utility, in which case Nader has a
chance.
Note that the Reps seem to prefer Nader, greatly, to Gore. So I'd
predict Nader would win.
Juho
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