date:20120312

On 3/12/2012 9:29 PM, John Clark wrote:

> Indeed, but this makes my point. The 1-view at this stage is unique. We
might fuse
them, and nothing would have happened.

I'm glad you agree, but then what are we arguing about?

> note that if the reconstitution boxes are different from inside, in W and
in M, then

Then symmetry is broken, the 2 see different things, and are no longer identical and
become different people, I've already said that many times before.

I think you've both lost the thread of the argument. As I see it Bruno's argument is just
that the uncertainty of QM can be modeled by hypothesizing that each possible outcome is
experienced by the potential observer, who becomes a different actual observer for each
outcome. This is consistent with John Clark's position that a person's name is an
adjective and so the hypothetical observers are different but have equal claim to the
adjective. This is all just another explication of Everett's relative state.

Then Bruno further supposes that consciousness is just a certain kind of computation
(which John Clark agrees with - it's one that exhibits intelligence). So if all possible
computations are made they will include the conscious experiences of an observer of a
quantum event. The uncertainity of the experienced event is accounted for by noting that
the same computation up to a given point may have different continuations. These will
realize the different conscious experiences of the observer who was, before the
observation, an undifferentiated consciousness.

Brent

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Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

2012-03-12 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> The guy can believe he is split, because he knows the protocol and trust
> the machinery and the people handling it. At no point he can know, by
> personal experience, that he is split.
>

He can't feel the split in my symmetrical room thought experiment but he
can see it, he can see his copy as if in a mirror moving and talking just
as he does, and if you exchanged their positions he still couldn't tell
that anything had happened

> The fact that the 1-view are not duplicated, from their own 1-view pov,
> can be justified by the fact that the read-cut-reconstitution are not part
> of the experience.
>

The read-cut-reconstitution is not in the originals memory nor in the
identical copies memory, that is to say neither feels it so  they remain
identical.

> those events does not impact on the brain processing [...] It is
> literally trivial.
>

I could not have said it better myself, so why did you bring it up?

> you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view on the 1-view with the 3-view on the
> 1-view on the 1-view.
>

That my friend is one hell of a confusing mouthful, and it's confusing
because you do not understand it. Previously in the same Email you make a
point in emphasizing what I already knew, that neither the copy nor the
original can feel the split and so remain identical, but then in the very
same post you say the consciousness of the original and the consciousness
of the copy are different, they feel differently because something in the
original can not be copied, the 1 view of the 2 view of the something or
another view can not be duplicated for some unknown reason. Make up your
mind, can they feel the split or can they not? If they can't then they
remain identical and if they can then tell me how they do it.

> You really avoid putting yourself in the place of one of those
> reconstituted person. But you have to be able to do that for any of them.
>

OK I'll do that. You the original Bruno Marchal remember walking into the
duplicating chamber and then suddenly somebody who looks moves and speaks
exactly like you do suddenly appeared right in front of you. And you the
copy of Bruno Marchal remembers walking into the duplicating chamber and
then suddenly somebody who looks moves and speaks exactly like you do
suddenly appeared right in front of you. From any point of view from ANY
perspective including their own perspective there is no difference between
them, even the original and the copy themselves can't tell who is who, we
know this because if we exchange their position neither of them notice that
anything has happened.

> With any 3p view, there are no indeterminacy
>

That is totally untrue. Whenever you, Bruno Marchal, opens a door I don't
know for certain what you or I will see, and that is a fact even in a world
without duplicating chambers.

> The indeterminacy appears when they "open the door" of the reconstitution
> boxes
>

Yes, but you didn't need to say "reconstitution boxes", it's true of any
door.

> I don't assume QM.
>

You don't assume the existence of matter either, it seems to me if you
don't make some very basic assumptions you are never going to get anywhere
and your physics will fizz away into pure untestable abstraction that is no
better or worse than a infinite number of other competing theories. If you
can figure out how everything works starting from nothing but matter and
quantum mechanics don't you think that would be a pretty good days work?

> The point is that when opening the door (in the initial thought
> experiment), they break the symmetry and have each a personal different
> experiences,
>

If the symmetry breaks then they diverge because then they are no longer
identical.

> which they were unable to predict before opening the door.
>

Yep, you never know what you will see when you open a door.

> >  If the 1-views have been duplicated, then their are identical
>>
>
> > But then there is only one 1-view, as you said yourself.
>

Yes. Adjectives do not follow the same rules of arithmetic that nouns do,
if I see 2 red cars in a room "red" has not become plural "cars" has, there
is still only one red even if there are 2 cars. And if I destroy one of
those cars red still exists in that room although now there is only one
car. I don't know how many people are on this list but let's say 100, the
list automation sent a copy of your post to 100 different people, but there
is only one post, you did not write 100 posts.

> the 3-duplication has not entailed a duplication of the 1-views.
>

Then tell me exactly what it is about this mystical thing you call "the
3-view on the 1-view on the 1-view" that renders it incapable of being
duplicated.

>>  Explain to me how the 1-view perspective of anybody has changed from
>> any perspective you care to name, any at all.
>>
>
> > Without the vertical symmetry. If my face is not symmetrical, I might
> not recognize myself
>

I did specify symmetry in my thought experiment

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)


On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A 
"magical act", if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some 
conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that 
Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the 
statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. 


Because otherwise things would be screwed up?

Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to 
get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just "shared" 1p 
as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both 
conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? 
That's an open question. 


You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be 
regular.


No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? 


The obvious way is that all non-self-contradictory events are equally likely. But that's 
hypothesized, not defined.  I'm not sure why you are asking how it's defined.  The usual 
definition is an assignment of a number in [0,1] to every member of a Borel set such that 
they satisfies Kolmogorov's axioms.


If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard to get you to 
consider multiple observers and consider the question as to how exactly do they 
interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen so far considers a single observer and 
abstractions about other people. The most I am getting is the word "plurality". Is this 
difficult? Really?


It's difficult because people are trying to explain 'other people' and taking only their 
own consciousness as given.  If you're going to assume other people, why not assume 
physics too?


Brent

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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)


On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the 
Nether plane! A "magical act", if real and just part of a story, is 
an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else 
would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would 
introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and 
measures, so they have to be banished. 


Because otherwise things would be screwed up?

Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these 
pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and 
disjoint observers and not just "shared" 1p as such implicitly assume 
an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation 
laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? 
That's an open question. 


You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise 
things wouldn't be regular.


No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? 
If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard 
to get you to consider multiple observers and consider the question as 
to how exactly do they interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen 
so far considers a single observer and abstractions about other people. 
The most I am getting is the word "plurality". Is this difficult? Really?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)


On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A 
"magical act", if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some 
conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry 
Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and 
measures, so they have to be banished. 


Because otherwise things would be screwed up?

Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get 
them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just "shared" 1p as 
such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both 
conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's 
an open question. 


You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things 
wouldn't be regular.

Brent

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Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/12/2012 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Mar 2012, at 05:50, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:52 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:

>> Do they really have to state that they assume existence exists?

> You mean that primary matter exists? Yes that is an hypothesis.

So your complaint is that a biologist like Richard Dawkins doesn't start all his books
with "I assume matter exists". Bruno, that's just nuts.

Yes that would be nuts, but that is not what I am talking about.
I meant that he should assume PRIMARY matter, instead of taking it for granted, in his
book on THEOLOGY, like his "The God Delusion".

>> It would be great if I could explain exactly why there is something
rather
than nothing but unfortunately I don't know how to do that, but a
atheist does
not need to,

> I am not sure anybody needs that

A atheist would need that if a theist could explain why there is something rather than
nothing, I would be in a pew singing hymns next Sunday if they could do that, but of
course no God theory can provide even a hint of a hint of a answer to that.

AUDA is an elementary counter-example. Read my paper on Plotinus. Prerequisites: a good
book in mathematical logic (Mendelson, Epstein-Carnielly, Boolos-Burgess-Jeffrey, ...).

The "correct" theology of a machine is defined by the set of true sentences *about* the
machine. The proper theological part is given by what is true (and might be known) but
can't be justified rationally.

The nice thing with comp, is that you can still justify a part of that truth rationally
at the meta-level from the comp necessarily hypothetical assumption of being an
arithmetically sound machine (= relatively finite digital entity).

> I have no problem with those who say that they are not interested in such
or such
question.

Well, personally I feel that anybody who has not even thought about it a little would
be a bit dull, and somebody who thinks about it a lot is probably wasting time that
could be more productively spent.

Why judge people interest and passion?

A important part of genius is to know what problem to go after, it should be profound
enough to make a big increase in our understanding but not so difficult as to be out of
reach. For example in Darwin's day there was no possibility of figuring out how
chemicals turned into life, but a real first class genius might be able to figure out
how one species can change into another, and that's exactly where Darwin set his
sights. But for Darwin's ideas to come into play you've got to start with a reproducing
entity; so he could explain how bacteria turned into a man but not how chemicals turned
into bacteria, so Darwin explained a hell of a lot but he didn't explain everything nor
did he (or Dawkins) ever claim to.

> Only with those who assert that it is a false problem, a crackpot field

It's not a crackpot field but I think you would have to admit that it does attract more
that its fair share of crackpots.

That is normal given it is very fundamental. That's why fear sellers like to appropriate
them, and of course they injure the field, and the humans, a lot, but they does not
betray everything, and, especially in front of the mind body problem, we have to be
cautious not throwing the best together with the worst.

Physics does not address the theological question, so to oppose physics and the
abrahamic theologies makes physics confused with physicalism/materialism. It makes
physics like taking metaphysically for granted the main point of the abrahamic
theologies, which mainly take the physical reality existing as such. Of course such a
belief is widespread, but the greek platonists created science, including theology, by
taking distance with that idea. By doing so they (re)discovered a mathematical reality
which will inspire the world of intelligible ideas.

> and this by letting believe that science has solve or dissolve the
question, when
it is hardly the case.

But Dawkins has never done that, never, and being a biologist most of his books concern
how the laws of chemistry (which is already something as he would be the first to
admit) produced life, including advanced life like you and me. And Dawkins does not
claim he has a complete explanation for even this much more limited (although still
very profound) problem. Science in general and Dawkins in particular can't explain
everything, but they can explain a lot. Religion can explain nothing, absolutely nothing.

Science can't explain everything, but after Gödel 1931, and using comp, science can
explain why, for machine, science cannot explain the "whole truth", nor even give it a name.

Dawkins is correct in denunicating that particular "God delusion", but he fall in that
exactly same trap by opposing science and religion.

I believe only in scientific attitude, and that is nor field dep

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)


On 3/12/2012 4:21 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/11/2012 11:47 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:

On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about 
the whole

point of the exercise.

I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future 
content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might 
seem to entail

100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the 
perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.


However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not 
only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could 
be anything
at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we 
conclude that

comp is false?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I 
used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering 
it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with 
some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly 
determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you 
allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its 
behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, 
as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If 
the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the 
lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one 
world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable 
experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise 
experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white 
noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does 
not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in 
laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced 
(such as the current statistically winning machines no longer 
being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of 
view of others).


This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the 
regularity of physics.  I'm not sure you can show that, but if 
it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, 
even if physics can be explained by the UD.  Only worlds with 
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which 
seems unlikely to me).


Brent

Hi Brent,

I do not understand how you think that "only worlds with 
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness" is 
unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of 
consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist 
multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with 
each other (in the sense that they can "understand" each other) 
then the physics of their common world will necessarily be 
maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry 
Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of 
their experience. 


I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their 
experience'. 

Hi Brent,

Oh, let's see. If we could upload ourselves into artificial 
hardware then we are by definition "arbitrarily extending our 
experiences"... If we go with the "reincarnation" theories we get 
arbitrary extensions as well...



How would magical events prevent anything.


An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the 
Nether plane! A "magical act", if real and just part of a story, is 
an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else 
would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would 
introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and 
measures, so they have to be banished. 


"Have to be"?  To satisfy you...or what?


To satisfy the requirements of arbitrarily long extensions. My 
point is that Harry Potterisms are pathological because they can 
introduce arbitrary cul-de-sacs, therefore, they are a serious problem.




Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these 
pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and 
disjoint observers and not just "shared" 1p as such implicitly assume 
an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation 
laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? 
That's an open question.


We  have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific 
places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything.  We tend 
to not believe them because they violate the physics which we 
suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke 
that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious 
circularity.


That is my point. We do not see such violations, not ever!



Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to 
have conservation laws. 


But the symmetry principles that result in

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)


On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/11/2012 11:47 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:

On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:

This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole
point of the exercise.

I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail
100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of 
those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.


However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything
at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that
comp is false?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I used to wonder if 
that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: 
your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly 
determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to 
what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution 
level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented 
correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines 
implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one 
world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some 
MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we 
don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this 
does not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in 
laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the 
current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 
3p death from the point of view of others).


This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics.  
I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental 
to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD.  Only worlds with 
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me).


Brent

Hi Brent,

I do not understand how you think that "only worlds with extremely consistent 
physics can support consciousness" is unlikely. Are you only considering a single 
momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist 
multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the 
sense that they can "understand" each other) then the physics of their common world 
will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry 
Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. 


I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. 

Hi Brent,

Oh, let's see. If we could upload ourselves into artificial hardware then we are by 
definition "arbitrarily extending our experiences"... If we go with the "reincarnation" 
theories we get arbitrary extensions as well...



How would magical events prevent anything.


An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A 
"magical act", if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some 
conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry 
Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and 
measures, so they have to be banished. 


"Have to be"?  To satisfy you...or what?

Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get 
them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just "shared" 1p as 
such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both 
conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's 
an open question.


We  have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and 
they don't seem to prevent anything.  We tend to not believe them because they violate 
the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke 
that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity.


That is my point. We do not see such violations, not ever!



Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. 


But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are arguably human 
selections.  We pay attention to and build 'laws' on what does not depend on particular 
time/place/orientation; so may conservation of momentum and energy are (at least 
approximately) inevitable.


How so? It is one thing to have

Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/11/2012 11:38 PM, acw wrote:
Some of those beliefs can be greatly justified by evidence, while others are
unjustified. All of them are provably unprovable, even given the right evidence. Some of
them can be believed with high confidence given the right evidence, others match certain
heuristics which indicate a likely to be true theory (such as Occam's Razor), while
others fail such heuristics and yet are still believed by less rational means
(authority, indoctrination, etc).

I think you got to far when you refer to things supported by lots of evidence as
"assumptions" and "provably unprovable". Are you applying mathematical standards of proof
to empirical facts? Of course they are unprovable in that sense. But mathematical proof
is only relative to axioms and rules of inference anyway.

If you're on a jury in a criminal trial you don't look for, and would not accept, an
axiomatic proof of guilt. You look for a proof beyond reasonable doubt based on evidence
- and there are plenty of "assumptions" that meet that standard. The standard for science
is somewhat higher, because it requires that you test your assumptions to see if they can
be made to fail and it never reaches a fixed conclusion, as a jury must. But to dismiss
scienctific knowledge as "provably unprovable" and "assumptions" on the same level as
religious myths is silly.

As to why religious myths are widely believed and (unlike math and science) culturally
dependent I highly recommend Craig A. James book "The Religion Virus" and the similarly
named but different "The God Virus" by David W. Ray.

Brent Meeker
Religion has the exact same job assignment as science, to make sense of the world, that's
why science and religion can never co exist peacefully Science changes its stories based
on better evidence, religion writes its stories on stone tablets.

--- Bob Zannelli

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)



On 12 Mar 2012, at 04:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:

On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about  
the whole

point of the exercise.

I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future  
content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might  
seem to entail

100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the  
perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.


However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not  
only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could  
be anything
at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we  
conclude that

comp is false?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I  
used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering  
it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with  
some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly  
determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you  
allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its  
behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change,  
as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If  
the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the  
lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one  
world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable  
experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise  
experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white  
noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does  
not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in  
laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced  
(such as the current statistically winning machines no longer  
being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of  
view of others).


This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the  
regularity of physics.  I'm not sure you can show that, but if  
it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence,  
even if physics can be explained by the UD.  Only worlds with  
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which  
seems unlikely to me).


Brent

Hi Brent,

   I do not understand how you think that "only worlds with  
extremely consistent physics can support consciousness" is  
unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of  
consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist  
multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with  
each other (in the sense that they can "understand" each other)  
then the physics of their common world will necessarily be  
maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry  
Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of  
their experience.


I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their  
experience'.  How would magical events prevent anything.  We  have  
reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and  
times and they don't seem to prevent anything.  We tend to not  
believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be  
consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence  
that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity.


Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to  
have conservation laws.


But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are  
arguably human selections.  We pay attention to and build 'laws' on  
what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may  
conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately)  
inevitable.


There is also the problem that according to current theories are  
many possible kinds of physics even if you limit them to just those  
consistent with string theory, much less Classical physics.


But my main point was conditional.  IF consciousness is strongly  
dependent on physics then Bruno's program of replacing physics with  
arithmetic isn't going anywhere because arithmetic will produce too  
many kinds of worlds and only by studying physics will we be able to  
learn about our world.


OK, but my logical point here is that in such a case comp has to be  
wrong. It is not so much a program than an logical obligation for  
staying rational *and* betting on comp, whatever the level is, if it  
exists.






It is because of this line of reasoning that I resist the Platonic  
interpretation of COMP as it puts pathological universes on the  
same level of likelihood as non-pathological ones.


That's the question.  Is there some canonical measure that makes the  
non-pathological ones overwhelmingly likely?


It exists or comp is false. There are evidences that it exists, like  
the v

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)



On 11 Mar 2012, at 21:44, R AM wrote:

This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the  
whole point of the exercise.


To explain that if we are machine then the mind-bpdy problem reduces  
partially into a justification of the laws of physics from computer  
science/arithmetic.




I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of  
subjective experience is indeterminated?


It depends of the protocols, but eventually if comp is true then some  
first plural indeterminacy exists and can be shared, like QM  
illustrates. But if comp is correct QM has to be a theorem of  
arithmetic concerning the relations between a machine and its possible  
universal neighbors.





Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the  
contrary is the case. Is that correct?


I guess acw have answered all this. Comp entails third person  
determinacy (cf the working of a computer) and some local and global  
indeterminacy due to self-duplication. You have to do the thought  
experiments by yourself to grasp the meaning of this.




However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only  
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be  
anything at all.



Prove this, and you refute comp.
The UD Argument might leads to that, but actually it leads more to QM  
than to a contradiction.



But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp  
is false?


That would be rather premature. There is a measure problem, but it is  
an interesting one. It put light on a possible origin of both  
consciousness and the appearance of matter and laws. We discuss that  
measure problem since the beginning of this list. All "everything- 
type" of theories have a measure problem. It is akin to the modal  
inflation in logical realism.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

Hi John,

On 11 Mar 2012, at 20:36, John Mikes wrote:

John,
'te bartender cuts in...' - I believe David indeed has no idea what
the "real point in issue" may be - he would have been addressing it.
There is NO real point.
In those "thought experiments" (euphemism for phantasm to justify
points of non-existence) certain prerequisites are also needed
(additional phantasms) and justification for them, too. Then there
are 'conclusions' imaginary and the consequences of such - built in.
I admire the patience of Bruno replying to all those (circular?
fantasy-related?) posts (I am not relating to your posts) - I lost
the endurance to follow all of them lately. I read a lot of David's
posts and think your expressed "...belie(f)ve your (i.e. David's)
thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace." is wrong.

Can't agree more.

It is a shame, because you seem to be a well-thinking and well-
educated guy who works with well-crafted logical argumentation.
I cannot raise my voice for/against indeterminacy because of my
agnostic worldview that postulates lots of unknown/unknowable
factors influencing our decisions - together with factors we know of
and acknowledge - so uncertainty may be ignorance-based, not only
haphazardous. A 'deterministic' totality, however, is a matter of
belief for me - unjustified as well - because of the partial 'order'
we detect in the so far knowable nature (negating 'random'
occurrences that would screw-up any order, even the limited local
ones).

My worldview is my 'faith' - not subject to discussion.

Best,

Bruno

On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 1:00 PM, John Clark
wrote:

On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 David Nyman wrote:

> John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're
expending a

great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of
straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but
would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the
real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past
it.

If your thinking were clear and you understood what " the real point
at issue" was and you knew of a key question I have not answered you
would have certainly asked it somewhere in the above; but you did
not I think because you could not, and that fact makes me believe
your thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. Prove me wrong.

John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

On 12 Mar 2012, at 05:50, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:52 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>>  Do they really have to state that they assume existence exists?

> You mean that primary matter exists? Yes that is an hypothesis.

So your complaint is that a biologist like Richard Dawkins doesn't  
start all his books with "I assume matter exists". Bruno, that's  
just nuts.

Yes that would be nuts, but that is not what I am talking about.
I meant that he should assume PRIMARY matter, instead of taking it for  
granted, in his book on THEOLOGY, like his "The God Delusion".

>>  It would be great if I could explain exactly why there is  
something rather than nothing but unfortunately I don't know how to  
do that, but a atheist does not need to,

> I am not sure anybody needs that

A atheist would need that if a theist could explain why there is  
something rather than nothing, I would be in a pew singing hymns  
next Sunday if they could do that, but of course no God theory can  
provide even a hint of a hint of a answer to that.

AUDA is an elementary counter-example. Read my paper on Plotinus.  
Prerequisites: a good book in mathematical logic (Mendelson, Epstein- 
Carnielly, Boolos-Burgess-Jeffrey, ...).

The "correct" theology of a machine is defined by the set of true  
sentences *about* the machine. The proper theological part is given by  
what is true (and might be known) but can't be justified rationally.

The nice thing with comp, is that you can still justify a part of that  
truth rationally at the meta-level from the comp necessarily  
hypothetical assumption of being an arithmetically sound machine (=  
relatively finite digital entity).

> I have no problem with those who say that they are not interested  
in such or such question.

Well, personally I feel that anybody who has not even thought about  
it a little would be a bit dull, and somebody who thinks about it a  
lot is probably wasting time that could be more productively spent.

Why judge people interest and passion?

A important part of genius is to know what problem to go after, it  
should be profound enough to make a big increase in our  
understanding but not so difficult as to be out of reach. For  
example in Darwin's day there was no possibility of figuring out how  
chemicals turned into life, but a real first class genius might be  
able to figure out how one species can change into another, and  
that's exactly where Darwin set his sights. But for Darwin's ideas  
to come into play you've got to start with a reproducing entity; so  
he could explain how bacteria turned into a man but not how  
chemicals turned into bacteria, so Darwin explained a hell of a lot  
but he didn't explain everything nor did he (or Dawkins) ever claim  
to.

> Only with those who assert that it is a false problem, a crackpot  
field

It's not a crackpot field but I think you would have to admit that  
it does attract more that its fair share of crackpots.

That is normal given it is very fundamental. That's why fear sellers  
like to appropriate them, and of course they injure the field, and the  
humans, a lot, but they does not betray everything, and, especially in  
front of the mind body problem, we have to be cautious not throwing  
the best together with the worst.

Physics does not address the theological question, so to oppose  
physics and the abrahamic theologies makes physics confused with  
physicalism/materialism. It makes physics like taking metaphysically  
for granted the main point of the abrahamic theologies, which mainly  
take the physical reality existing as such. Of course such a belief is  
widespread, but the greek platonists created science, including  
theology, by taking distance with that idea. By doing so they  
(re)discovered a mathematical reality which will inspire the world of  
intelligible ideas.

> and this by letting believe that science has solve or dissolve the  
question, when it is hardly the case.

But Dawkins has never done that, never, and being a biologist most  
of his books concern how the laws of chemistry (which is already  
something as he would be the first to admit) produced life,  
including advanced life like you and me. And Dawkins does not claim  
he has a complete explanation for even this much more limited  
(although still very profound) problem. Science in general and  
Dawkins in particular can't explain everything, but they can explain  
a lot. Religion can explain nothing, absolutely nothing.

Science can't explain everything, but after Gödel 1931, and using  
comp, science can explain why, for machine, science cannot explain the  
"whole truth", nor even give it a name.

Dawkins is correct in denunicating that particular "God delusion", but  
he fall in that exactly same trap by opposing science and religion.

I believe only in scientific attitude, and that is nor field  
dependent. And basically it is an attitude of modesty, and of putt

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

2012-03-12 Thread R AM

On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 10:43 PM, acw  wrote:

> On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
>
>>
>> However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only
>> indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything
>> at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that
>> comp is false?
>>
> You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I used to
> wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it
> doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract
> machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or
> quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona
> identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can
> change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently.


Not sure if I understand you ... I was thinking of something like this: if
comp is true, then we can upload the mind into a computer and simulate the
environment. The simulator could be constructed so that the stimuli given
to the mind is a sequence of arbitrary "white rabbits". Is there somehing
in comp that makes the existence of such "evil" simulators unlikely?

Ricardo.






> If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower
> layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as
> ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws
> of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't
> experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this
> does not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in
> laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as
> the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to
> implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others).
>
> Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such stable
> implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious to me. A
> more practical concern would be to consider the case of what would happen
> if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too high - would it
> lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the SIM(Substrate Independent
> Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level machines implement it (there's
> another thought experiment which shows how this could be done, if a machine
> can find one of its own Godel-number).
>
>>
>> Ricardo.
>>
>>
>
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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

2012-03-12 Thread acw


On 3/12/2012 09:41, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi,

Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is
such that there always exists a standard what is the "Real"
version? If
it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or
virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow
possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably "real"
version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of
experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available
resources) then it is "real", as a better or "more real" simulation of
it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply
because there does not exist a better simulation of it.


Sure, given a mathematical ontology, "real" is just the structure you
exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for
example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)-
a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it
and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work
without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of.

I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean
a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire
body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level,
think of "Second Life" or "Blocks World" or some other similar
simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational
resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that
one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as
matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent
mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which
prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain
surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real
world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a
higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real
structure is completely self-contained.


Hi!

I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by "indexical".

Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are
indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless
you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is
possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter
hypothesis).



As to brain
surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that
control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures.

Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience
changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to
the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a
bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your
brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented,
but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics
simulation (at a different layer, for example, "brain" program is ran
separately from "physics" simulation program) . There's some subtle
details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's
physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics
simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something
existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation
depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the
VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a
difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from
a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have
the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and
thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may
assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's
physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain)
reality.


Hi,

Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a situation
where your P.o.V. os "stuck" 'in one's head" and a P.o.V. where it is
free to move about.
The difference that I'm trying to illustrate is about how the brain is 
implemented and with what it's entangled with, or what is required for 
its implementation. In the "reality" implementation case, a real brain 
is implemented by random machines below the substitution level. The 
experiences are also given by those machines if the brain/body are one 
and the same. The problem with VRs is that the physics, thus the 
generated sensory input (and output from "player") is separated from 
actual mind's implementation - they run at different layers, thus we 
cannot use experienced sensory information to predict much about our 
mind's implementation (or what would happen next) without a specially 
designed VR which is made to facilitate just that (a special case VR

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

2012-03-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/3/12 Stephen P. King 

> On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote:
>
>> On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>> On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:
>>>
 On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

> Hi,
>
> Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is
> such that there always exists a standard what is the "Real" version? If
> it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or
> virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow
> possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably "real"
> version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of
> experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available
> resources) then it is "real", as a better or "more real" simulation of
> it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply
> because there does not exist a better simulation of it.
>
>  Sure, given a mathematical ontology, "real" is just the structure you
 exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for
 example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)-
 a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it
 and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work
 without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of.

 I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean
 a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire
 body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level,
 think of "Second Life" or "Blocks World" or some other similar
 simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational
 resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that
 one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as
 matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent
 mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which
 prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain
 surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real
 world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a
 higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real
 structure is completely self-contained.

>>>
>>> Hi!
>>>
>>> I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by "indexical".
>>>
>> Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are
>> indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless you
>> can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is possible
>> or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter hypothesis).
>>
>>
>>  As to brain
>>> surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that
>>> control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures.
>>>
>> Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience
>> changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the VR,
>> if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit different
>> (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain within the VR
>> if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the brain's
>> computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation (at a
>> different layer, for example, "brain" program is ran separately from
>> "physics" simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - if the
>> brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would apply and
>> you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a
>> simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the
>> brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper
>> layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but
>> there would be a difference in measure and experience between simulating
>> the brain from a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our
>> world, we have the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of
>> matter and thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we
>> may assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics
>> - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality.
>>
>
> Hi,
>
>Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a situation
> where your P.o.V. os "stuck" 'in one's head" and a P.o.V. where it is free
> to move about. Have you ever played a MMORPG game? These two situations are
> just a matter of the programs parameters... Again, what makes the virtual
> reality "virtual"? I claim that it is only because there is some other
> point of view or stance that is taken as "real" such that the virtual
> version is has fewer detail and degrees of freedom. If a sufficiently
> powerful computer can generate a simulation of a physical world, why can it
> not simulate brains in it a

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)


On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi,

Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is
such that there always exists a standard what is the "Real" 
version? If

it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or
virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow
possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably "real"
version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of
experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available
resources) then it is "real", as a better or "more real" simulation of
it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply
because there does not exist a better simulation of it.


Sure, given a mathematical ontology, "real" is just the structure you
exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for
example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)-
a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it
and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work
without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of.

I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean
a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire
body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level,
think of "Second Life" or "Blocks World" or some other similar
simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational
resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that
one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as
matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent
mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which
prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain
surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real
world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a
higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real
structure is completely self-contained.


Hi!

I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by "indexical".
Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are 
indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless 
you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is 
possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter 
hypothesis).




As to brain
surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that
control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures.
Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience 
changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to 
the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a 
bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your 
brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, 
but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics 
simulation (at a different layer, for example, "brain" program is ran 
separately from "physics" simulation program) . There's some subtle 
details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's 
physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics 
simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something 
existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation 
depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the 
VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a 
difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from 
a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have 
the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and 
thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may 
assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's 
physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) 
reality.


Hi,

Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a 
situation where your P.o.V. os "stuck" 'in one's head" and a P.o.V. 
where it is free to move about. Have you ever played a MMORPG game? 
These two situations are just a matter of the programs parameters... 
Again, what makes the virtual reality "virtual"? I claim that it is only 
because there is some other point of view or stance that is taken as 
"real" such that the virtual version is has fewer detail and degrees of 
freedom. If a sufficiently powerful computer can generate a simulation 
of a physical world, why can it not simulate brains in it as well? Some 
people think that minds are just "something that the brain does", so why 
not have a single program generating all of it - brains and minds included?
My problem is that I fail to see how the UD and indeterminacy given 
copy and paste operations is involved in this question.



The point is that if we are consid

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

2012-03-12 Thread acw


On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi,

Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is
such that there always exists a standard what is the "Real" version? If
it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or
virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow
possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably "real"
version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of
experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available
resources) then it is "real", as a better or "more real" simulation of
it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply
because there does not exist a better simulation of it.


Sure, given a mathematical ontology, "real" is just the structure you
exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for
example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)-
a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it
and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work
without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of.

I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean
a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire
body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level,
think of "Second Life" or "Blocks World" or some other similar
simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational
resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that
one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as
matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent
mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which
prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain
surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real
world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a
higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real
structure is completely self-contained.


Hi!

I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by "indexical".
Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are 
indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless 
you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is 
possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter 
hypothesis).




As to brain
surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that
control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures.
Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience 
changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the 
VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit 
different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain 
within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the 
brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation 
(at a different layer, for example, "brain" program is ran separately 
from "physics" simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - 
if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would 
apply and you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no 
longer a simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), 
otherwise, the brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy 
present at the upper layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This 
is a subtle point, but there would be a difference in measure and 
experience between simulating the brain from a digital physics 
simulation and external to it. In our world, we have the very high 
confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and thus 
implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may assume the 
implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics - 
experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality.

The point is that if we are considering brains-in-vasts problems we need
to also consider the "other minds" problems. We should not be analyzing
this from a strict one person situation. You and I have different
experiences up to and including the "something that is like being
Stephen" as different from "something that is like to being ACW". If we
where internally identical minds then why would be even be having this
conversation? We would literally "know" each others thought by merely
having them. This is why I argue that plural shared 1p is a weakness in
COMP. We have to have disjointness at least.
We have different mind-states thus we have different experiences. I'm 
not entirely sure why would we share a mind if we didn't share a brain - 
it doesn't make much sense to me.


Onward!

Stephen




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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)