date:20121029

On 28 Oct 2012, at 18:51, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Predicting the weather is hard, but in principle possible.

Quantum indeterminacy probably comes into play in long range weather
predictions, but even if the world was as deterministic as Newton
thought it was in the long run predicting what chaos will come up
with is not possible even in principle.

OK.

We now know that computing or thinking is physical,

We don't know that. We deduce that in the Aristotelian's theories.

it takes energy to do it and it gives off heat;

Actually computation can be made reversibly, without dissipation of
energy. There are reversible universal machine. This has been
discovered by Wang, a logician, and rediscovered by some physicists
much later. Only erasing information uses energy, and this is not
needed for computation.

to predict what chaos will do you'd have to know the initial
conditions with infinite (not just very good) precision and the
computer would give off so much heat it would disturb the very thing
you were looking at.

It's true that if you slow down any calculation you can perform it
with a arbitrarily small amount of energy (and thus give off a
arbitrarily small amount of heat) but it does no good to make a
prediction about something that happened a billion years ago.
Predicting the future is much more difficult than predicting the past.

> predicting the personal outcome of the self-duplication is easily
show impossible in theory

If I knew that the environment would be Moscow I could say with 100%
certainty that I will be the Moscow man, but for all I know it could
be Duluth Minnesota or Austin Texas.

Not with the protocol given. It can only be Washington or Moscow.

> But if you agree that the self-duplication leads to indeterminacy
[...]

Not any sort of indeterminacy that hasn't been well known for the
better part of a century.

It is new, but this is another topic. If you accept it what is you
opinion on step 4?

Bruno

John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 28 Oct 2012, at 18:23, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 Jason Resch wrote:

> I am not sure if you are being consistent here. Earlier you said
you said you identify yourself with a stream of thoughts

Obviously.

>If you are identified with a stream of thoughts then you can't
simply say one brain is in Moscow and one is in Washington

Three things:

1) Saying that thoughts have a position (like Moscow or Washington)
is not a useful concept.

2) Talking about 2 identical streams of thought is not useful
because in that case there is only one stream of thought.

3) It is useful to say that one stream of thought diverged when one
started to form memories of Moscow and the other started to form
memories of Washington. At that point they were no longer the same
but they were both still Jason Resch. Odd certainly but not
paradoxical.

> you must consider the first person continuum of experience

Yes, and both the Washington and Moscow man have a continuum of
experience going back to Jason Resch's early childhood, that's why
they are both Jason Resch. However the Washington man does not have
a continuum of experience of being in Moscow and the Moscow man does
not have a continuum of experience of being in Washington, and
that's why they are not each other.

> and what they can predict about where their consciousness will
take them.

Nobody can ever do a very good job at predicting where there
consciousness will take them, not even in a predictable environment.

> You agreed if you were instantly halted, taken apart and rebuilt
again (even with different atoms) from your own perspective nothing
would have skipped a beat, your stream of consciousness continues
right where it left off.

Yes.

> But when you are taken apart and two copies are created at two
locations your stream diverges among two paths

Yes because the environments of Washington and Moscow were
different, and as weathermen will tell you it's difficult to predict
what the environment will be. To ask "but which one is really ME?"
presumes that there is only one correct answer but that is not true
because you have been duplicated and it was caused by differences in
the environment.

> which gives rise to true unpredictability in the first person
perspective.

As Godel and Turing proved 80 years ago even in a unchanging
environment there can be unpredictability in the first person
perspective.

Gödel and Turing have never touch on the first and third person issue.
The Turing indeterminacy is pure 3p.
The notion of indeterminacy closer to the comp first person
indeterminacy is the quantum indeterminacy when seen in the Everett
theory (QM without collapse). But it is not the same conceptual notion
as it assumes a universal quantum wave, instead of simply
computationalism.

Bruno

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Re: Code length = probability distribution



On 28 Oct 2012, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/28/2012 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323  
principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie- 
graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you  
can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely  
convinced.


What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually  
infinite.  So to make the argument go through I think it  
implicitly requires a whole 'world';


Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the  
conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if  
you give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323  
principle, so that you attribute a functional role in a  
particular computation to object having no physical activity  
for the actual computation.


But I'm not sure about the 323 principle in a QM world.


Even QM worlds, with QM observers, even having Q brains, are  
emulated in the UD, or in arithmetic. If the 323 principles does  
not hold for them, it might mean that QM is the winning  
computation, but then you have to explain this from arithmetic.


Or you are meaning that you need a *primary* QM world and brain?   
In that case, my consciousness would not be invariant when the Q  
brain is entirely simulated by a classical machine, and comp is  
made false.


The latter.  But why the restriction to "my consciousness"?  Only  
a small fraction of thought is conscious.


Consciousness is what will select the arithmetical or computer- 
science-theoretical branches in the arithmetical reality. It is not  
a fraction of thought which is conscious, it is a person, supported  
by infinities of "unconscious" computations.
If you opt for the latter, you can't accept a digital brain, not  
even a quantum one, per computatio.


That doesn't follow.  My new digital brain will be entangled with  
this QM world, just as my biological one was.  It may not be exactly  
the same consciousness but I think it will be similar; just as I  
think general intelligence will always be accompanied by some kind  
of consciousness. Supposing this entanglement is necessary is why I  
think a simulation must simulate a whole world in order to  
instantiate human like consciousness.


But this does not change the UDA. That simulation is still classicaly  
emulable, and emulated in arithmetic, or by a concrete UD. The 323  
principle is correct at that level. It is just a case of very low  
substitution level.






You negate comp, by putting something magical, needed for your  
consciousness, in the quantum material reality.


Not magical.  As you often point out, QM is computable.  You are  
making an assumption that the substitution can be done at the  
classical level where 'classical' is taken not as an approximation  
but to be fundamental.


But it can, as QM is computable, and classically emulable. So I don't  
see the objection here.


If you assume you need the QM at the basic ontological level, then  
comp is false, as comp, by definition assume that any universal system  
can do the work, if it simulates the right level.






In that non comp reality you are back with all questions unsolved:  
where does that QM reality comes from, how do you singularize  
actual conscious experiences in it, etc.


Good questions, but just because I don't know the answers it doesn't  
follow that I should accept your answer.  Your theory also has  
unanswered questions.


Only math problems, besides what is explained to be absolutely non  
explainable with comp (the 1% of consciousness, as I refer often too).  
That was the goal, transforming the mind-body problem into a math  
problem.


Bruno

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Re: wave function collapse


Hi Richard,

On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno, But it seems that the Gleason Theorem assigns probabilities to
the different universes in the multiverse that are not there in
Everett's MWI in the first place. Richard


?
I don't see that, nor why you say so. can you elaborate? Gleason  
theorem just makes unique the usual Born rule, and justify a literal  
reading of the quantum amplitude as relative (infinite) proportions.
It is quite similar to the Deutsch Hayden justification, in decision  
theoretical terms, of such amplitude reading, in the Heisenberg picture.


Bruno






On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 26 Oct 2012, at 15:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Well Bruno,

If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of
probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not amount  
to

negating it?



Why? I think that it is beautifully solved by Gleason theorem, for  
the

Hilbert space of dim bigger or equal to 3.




I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you
responded to.



I think comp will confirms Everett QM, and this would make our  
sharable

human or animal substitution level very plausibly at the Heisenberg
uncertainty level, this for surviving even a long run, without  
detecting any

difference.

In that case, the Gleason solution will be the solution for comp.  
For this
the X and Z logics (alreeady extracted) must conforms to some  
desiderata,
already expressed by von Neumann, for a quantum logic, and which is  
that

mainly it defines the searched measure.

I m not sure I can understand string theory or any fundamental QM  
without

Everett.

I agree that the idea that we are multiplied by infinities at each  
instant
is not attractive, but science is not wishful thinking, and  
besides, I don't

take any theory too much seriously (we don't know). I also know that
different theories can happen to be equivalent.

Of course, to be sure, comp has also many attractive features,  
mainly its
conceptual simplicity and naturalness. It really explains almost  
why there
is something instead of nothing, as it assumes only 0 and the  
successor and

the very simple laws, and explain from that how that very explanation
emerges in some collection of stable numbers' dream.

Bruno







Richard

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


Richard,

On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Doesn't the Gleason Theorem negate MWI by assigning probabilities?
Richard




On the contrary. Gleason theorem solves the "measure problem"  
intrinsic

in
the Everett MWI, it makes the probabilities into comp (or  
weakening)

first
person indeterminacies.

Unfortunately, comp necessitates a version of Gleason theorem for  
all

comp
states, not just the quantum one, as the quantum law must be  
derived from

the 1p indeterminacies, occurring in arithmetic.

The advantage is that comp provides the theory of both quanta and  
qualia

(and a whole theology actually).
Unfortunately, it is not yet clear if those quanta behave in a
sufficiently
quantum mechanical way, like making possible quantum computers,  
hydrogen,

strings may be, etc.

Bruno






On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:53, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/24/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb

There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the  
quantum

wave
function
(see below).

1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make
a measurement).


This leads to ... solipsism. See the work of Abner Shimony.




2) In objective or decoherence theories, some physical
event (such as using a probe to make a measurement)
in itself causes decoherence of the wave function. To me,
this is the simplest and most sensible answer (Occam's Razor).


This is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. It forces some  
devices

into
NOT
obeying QM.


No, it's only inconsistent with a reified interpretation of the  
wf.

It's
perfectly consistent with an instrumentalist interpretation.
Decoherence
is
a prediction of QM in any interpretation.  It's the  
einselection that's

a
problem.






But instrumentalism is just an abandon of searching knowledge.  
There is

no
more what, only how.
An instrumentalist will just not try to answer the question of  
betting

if
there is 0, 1, 2, ... omega, ... universes.

And the einselection is not a problem at all, in QM + comp. It is
implied.
And, imo, the QM corresponding measure problem is solved by  
Gleason

theorem
(basically).

And then, keeping that same 'everything' spirit, the whole QM is
explained
by comp. We have just to find the equivalent of "Gleason  
theorem" for

the
"material hypostases".

Bruno








3) There is also the many-worlds interpretation, in which  
collapse

of the wave is avoided by creating an entire universe.
Thi

Re: Code length = probability distribution



On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:


On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8,  
then.

If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think
Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.

Bruno



Indeed I still have problems with step 8, and want to get back to
that. But I want to do it when it when you're not exhausted arguming
other points...


Ah well, that's nice.



Part of the problem, is that I already agree with the
reversal at step 7, so in some sense step 8 is redundant for me.


That is interesting. You are not alone. I have made attempt to make  
that precise, and it leads to some use of stronger form of Occam  
razor.


How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes  
(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that  
this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness, has  
to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it  
maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis).


I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer  
science can make us feeling that this is really an had move, almost  
inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible  
explanation and origin in dreams interferences.


But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to  
the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the  
quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body.


The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a  
move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor 1- 
person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the computation.  
They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor, and so it would  
contradict the "yes doctor" assumption.






There may be an issue with the interpretation of the 323  
principle. I

have no problems with the removal of a register that is never
physically used in the calculation of a consious computation.


OK.





The
nuances arise when we consider Everett's many-minds picture.


Do you mean the Albert-Loewer many-mind theory? I guess you mean it  
in a more general sense.





A
counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my
differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated
minds are essential to my consciousness,


What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction  
would made this senseful?
I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of  
the consciousness of the one in Moscow?


It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In  
that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state, do  
some different task, get some result, and then operate a Fourier  
rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some  
consciousness relevant information.


The brain is a quantum object.  It doesn't do quantum computations  
in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as  
different conscious classical propositions.  But it does quantum  
computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as  
an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with  
the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience


Not the experience, or it just means the level has not been chosen  
correctly.




of being in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is  
constructed to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of  
an experience of being in Moscow.


Only if the level is not right. If not you can't say "yes" to a doctor  
for a digital (classical) brain, as it might easily overlook some  
entanglement.






But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to  
emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum  
brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323  
question at that level.


But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment  
with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical  
character.


As you wish, but the bill of the duplication will be rather salty. No  
conceptual problem here, though.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A mirror of the universe.



On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:11, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/28/2012 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Oct 2012, at 17:02, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/27/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Oct 2012, at 20:30, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/26/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote:


Dear Bruno and Alberto,

   I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a  
"genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that  
anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw  
inertia. It is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that  
it belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the  
collections
of others like it. This is like an error correction or  
compression

mechanism.

--
Onward!

Stephen

ROGER:  For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
mirrors the rest of the universe.



Dear Roger,

 Yes, but the idea is that the mirroring that each monad does of  
each other's "percepts" (not the universe per se!) is not an  
exact isomorphism between the monads. There has to be a  
difference between monads or else there is only One.


Right, and in the arithmetical Indra Net, all universal numbers  
are different.
And the, by the first person indeterminacy it is like there is a  
competition between all of them to bring your most probable next  
"instant of life". It looks that, at least on the sharable part,  
there are big winners, like this or that quantum hamiltonian. But  
we have to explain them through the arithmetical Net structure,  
if we want separate properly the quanta from the qualia.


Bruno



Dear Bruno,

  A slightly technical question. In the arithmetic IndraNet idea,  
what plays the role of the "surface" that is reflective?


reread carefully the UDA. You should understand by yourself that  
the "surface" role is played by the first person experience. This  
is due to the fact that the experience are UD-delay invariant, and  
is a limiting sum on the infinite works of an infinite collection  
of universal numbers.


Dear Bruno,

   My worry is that you seem to assume the equivalent of an absolute  
observer that acts to distinguish the content of the first person  
experience (1p) from each other, as simply an inherent difference  
between "universal numbers".


Not at all. Where?
On the contrary, it is the difference of the inputs receive by  
identical universal numbers which will trigger a branching experience.  
It is exactly like the WM scenario, but with the UD protocol (step  
seven).




Given that one number can be used to code for other numbers, ala  
Godel numbering schemes, how is it that universal numbers can be  
said to have any thing unique that would identify them in a non- 
trivial way?


?
From the first person perspective no intensional number (the i in  
phi_i) can be sure of its relative code, but this is normal in the  
comp theory. No machine can know which machine she is, but this does  
not prevent them of having experiences, and this with the right measure.










How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other?


This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why  
you are using of the word "appear" instead of "are".


   "Are"? To who are they different?


To God, if you insist. The difference between 17 and 2 is 15,  
independently of any observer or universe.




Your idea here seems to depend on a pre-established harmony like  
situation.


No, it depends on elementary arithmetic, like all theories which use  
the number.


If you believe that "17 -2 = 15" is a function of observer, I will ask  
you "in which theory (of number and observer"?". I will ask you for  
describing the functional dependence.
You answer will make sense only in a theory which do no more depend on  
the observer.


If you doubt that 17-2=15" is absolute, I am not sure any theory you  
can give to me will make sense.


I'm afraid your remark might validly demolish the whole of the science  
enterprise.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Hurricane



On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:21, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi everything-list


If things go as expected, meaning that the power goes off,
I may be offline for a couple of days.  Washington DC is
just about to be hit by a hurricane.


Good luck. Take care. Be cautious.

Bruno







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: A mirror of the universe.



On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:31, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out.
I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books.


That's OK, but eventually you have to look inward, and see what you  
think. the solution is in your head, even if Leibniz can help you.






Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies,


Intensional numbers needs some universal numbers around to make sense.  
basically the extensional number is the corporeal bodies. They just  
take the usual shape, when the u number emerges from all computations,  
apparently.






and numbers aren't like that.


They are. You can say that a game of life pattern does not look like a  
number too, but this is just an appearance.





I find the following unsatisfactory,
but since numbers are like ideas, they can be
in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads,
but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me.
Not universakl enough.


I don't get your point. I think you should study the theory of  
universal machine. I explain a bit of this on the FOAR list.







My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly
somehow possesses the numbers.


The supreme monad might be played by the universal number, but is not  
the one (God, arithmetical truth).
Universal numbers are more the Plotinus' man. They are sigma_1  
complete. God, is sigma_i complete for all i.





Hurricane coming.


Be careful,

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote:




Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that
anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It
is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it
belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the  
collections

of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
mechanism.

--  
Onward!


Stephen

ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
mirrors the rest of the universe.


In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal
numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is
already a dynamical Indra Net.

Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers.

Bruno





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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-10-29 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> We now know that computing or thinking is physical,
>>
>
> > We don't know that.
>

We know that as well as we know anything about physics.

> We deduce that in the Aristotelian's theories.
>

I have no idea what if anything that means.

>> it takes energy to do it and it gives off heat;
>>
>
> > Actually computation can be made reversibly, without dissipation of
> energy.
>

With reversible computing you can make the amount of energy used for a
calculation arbitrarily small and thus the heat emitted arbitrarily close
to zero BUT, as I said before, only at the price of slowing down the
computation; we were talking about the theoretical feasibility of making a
prediction and making a forecast of yesterday's weather is not of much use.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-10-29 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > Gödel and Turing have never touch on the first and third person issue.
>

Perhaps because they knew that neither they nor anybody else had anything
interesting to add to the subject and they had better things to do with
their time.

  John K Clark

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Re: wave function collapse

2012-10-29 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno,

I do not find Deutsch's introduction of a rational decision maker convincing
e.g.: http://arxiv.org/ftp/quant-ph/papers/9906/9906015.pdf
nor Wallaces elaboration on that theme
e.g.: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.2718v1.pdf.

My belief is that a rational decision maker, somewhat like a god,
would following Leibniz, always chose the best quantum state in any interaction
to become physical in a single universe. In fact that seems to be exactly what
Wallaces rational decision maker does. I think Deutsch has snookered us all.
Richard

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
> On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno, But it seems that the Gleason Theorem assigns probabilities to
>> the different universes in the multiverse that are not there in
>> Everett's MWI in the first place. Richard
>
>
> ?
> I don't see that, nor why you say so. can you elaborate? Gleason theorem
> just makes unique the usual Born rule, and justify a literal reading of the
> quantum amplitude as relative (infinite) proportions.
> It is quite similar to the Deutsch Hayden justification, in decision
> theoretical terms, of such amplitude reading, in the Heisenberg picture.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Oct 2012, at 15:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
 Well Bruno,

 If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of
 probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not amount to
 negating it?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why? I think that it is beautifully solved by Gleason theorem, for the
>>> Hilbert space of dim bigger or equal to 3.
>>>
>>>
>>>
 I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you
 responded to.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think comp will confirms Everett QM, and this would make our sharable
>>> human or animal substitution level very plausibly at the Heisenberg
>>> uncertainty level, this for surviving even a long run, without detecting
>>> any
>>> difference.
>>>
>>> In that case, the Gleason solution will be the solution for comp. For
>>> this
>>> the X and Z logics (alreeady extracted) must conforms to some desiderata,
>>> already expressed by von Neumann, for a quantum logic, and which is that
>>> mainly it defines the searched measure.
>>>
>>> I m not sure I can understand string theory or any fundamental QM without
>>> Everett.
>>>
>>> I agree that the idea that we are multiplied by infinities at each
>>> instant
>>> is not attractive, but science is not wishful thinking, and besides, I
>>> don't
>>> take any theory too much seriously (we don't know). I also know that
>>> different theories can happen to be equivalent.
>>>
>>> Of course, to be sure, comp has also many attractive features, mainly its
>>> conceptual simplicity and naturalness. It really explains almost why
>>> there
>>> is something instead of nothing, as it assumes only 0 and the successor
>>> and
>>> the very simple laws, and explain from that how that very explanation
>>> emerges in some collection of stable numbers' dream.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 Richard

 On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> Richard,
>
> On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Doesn't the Gleason Theorem negate MWI by assigning probabilities?
>> Richard
>
>
>
>
> On the contrary. Gleason theorem solves the "measure problem" intrinsic
> in
> the Everett MWI, it makes the probabilities into comp (or weakening)
> first
> person indeterminacies.
>
> Unfortunately, comp necessitates a version of Gleason theorem for all
> comp
> states, not just the quantum one, as the quantum law must be derived
> from
> the 1p indeterminacies, occurring in arithmetic.
>
> The advantage is that comp provides the theory of both quanta and
> qualia
> (and a whole theology actually).
> Unfortunately, it is not yet clear if those quanta behave in a
> sufficiently
> quantum mechanical way, like making possible quantum computers,
> hydrogen,
> strings may be, etc.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:53, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 10/24/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi meekerdb
>>>
>>> There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the quantum
>>> wave
>>> function
>>> (see below).
>>>
>>> 1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
>>> to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make
>>> a measurement).
>>>
>>>
>>> This leads to ... solipsism. See the work of Abner Shimony.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2) In obje

Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

Hi Stathis Papaioannou  

Building more complex structures out of simpler ones 
by a simple set of rules (or any set of rules) seems to violate the second law 
of thermodynamics.  Do you have a way around the second law ?

What you are proposing seems to be goal-directed behavior
by the gods of small things.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stathis Papaioannou  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-28, 05:47:58 
Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p 

On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 5:48 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 

>> It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term "consistent 
>> with the laws of physics". It means that when you decide to play tennis the 
>> neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, 
> 
> 
> If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can say 
> that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization of 
> neurons. 

That sounds like eliminative materialism. It is a bit like saying that 
the movement of the car down the road *IS* the combustion of fuel in 
the cylinders, transmission of power to the wheels, and all the other 
lower level phenomena that make up the car. 

> The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to 
> play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every charge 
> and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I am 
> the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, from 
> the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is reflected 
> on every level. 

You change your mind because all the components of your brain change 
configuration. If this did not happen, your mind could not change. The 
mind is the higher level phenomenon. The analogy is as above with the 
car: it drives down the road because of all the mechanics functioning 
in a particular way, and you could say that driving down the road is 
equivalent to the mechanics functioning in a particular way. 

>> the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion 
>> channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and 
>> many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result 
>> in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your 
>> tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes 
>> neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your 
>> brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or 
>> neurotransmitter change, and so on. 
> 
> 
> No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious 
> intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity in 
> many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the footprint 
> of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are the 
> leader of these brain processes, not the follower. 

You completely misunderstand these experiments. Please read about 
excitable cells before commenting further. The following online 
articles seem quite good. The third is about spontaneous neuronal 
activity. 

http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/E/ExcitableCells.html 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Membrane_potential 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_oscillation 

>> Cells don't defy entropy and planes don't defy gravity. Their respective 
>> behaviour is consistent with our theories about entropy and gravity. 
> 
> 
> Cells defy entropy locally. Planes allow us to get around some constraints 
> of gravity. If your definition of any law is so broad that it includes all 
> possible technological violations of it, then how does it really give us any 
> insight? 

The laws of nature are broad enough to determine everything everywhere 
that has happened and will happen. 

>> How the computer was made would have no effect on its behaviour or 
>> consciousness. 
> 
> Yes, it would. If I make a refrigerator, I can assume that it is a box with 
> cooling mechanism. If I find an organism which has evolved to cool parts of 
> itself to store food, then that is a completely different thing. 

The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, 
the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving 
about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or 
consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? 

>> >> If a biological 
>> >> human were put together from raw materials by advanced aliens would 
>> >> that make any difference to his consciousness or intelligence? 
>> > 
>> > It would if we were automaton servants of their agendas. 
>> 
>> If the created human had a similar structure to a naturally developed 
>> human he would have similar behaviour and similar experiences. How could it 
>> possibly be otherwise? 
> 
> Because conscious

Re: mega-consciousness,created by bio-electrical circuitry?

Hi meekerdb 

How about social justice for zombies ? 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: meekerdb  
Receiver: EveryThing  
Time: 2012-10-27, 15:59:03 
Subject: mega-consciousness,created by bio-electrical circuitry? 


UH OH! We may have to consider the ethics of our treatment of bacteria next. 

Brent 



The seafloor is home to a vast electrical network created by bacteria 
Annalee Newitz 

It sounds a little bit like one of the subplots in Avatar, where we 
discover that the moon Pandora possesses a kind of mega-consciousness 
created by bio-electrical circuitry. But this is actually real. Two 
years ago, researchers discovered a strange electro-chemical signature 
in the sludge at the bottom of Aarhus Bay in Denmark. Now, they've 
discovered what was causing it: a vast network of bacteria that form 
electrical connections with each other, almost like nerve cells in the 
brain. 

Above, you can see what you might call tiny electrical wires that 
connect each bacterial cell, under an electron microscope. The wires 
are blue, and they are running through a piece of sediment, or sand 
from the seafloor. 

Over at Wired Science, Brandon Keim explains: 

 The bacteria were first detected in 2010 by researchers perplexed 
at chemical fluctuations in sediments from the bottom of Aarhus Bay . 
. . Almost instantaneously linking changing oxygen levels in water 
with reactions in mud nearly an inch below, the fluctuations occurred 
too fast to be explained by chemistry. 

 Only an electrical signal made sense ? but no known bacteria could 
transmit electricity across such comparatively vast distances. Were 
bacteria the size of humans, the signals would be making a journey 12 
miles long. 

 Now the mysterious bacteria have been identified. They belong to a 
microbial family called Desulfobulbaceae, though they share just 92 
percent of their genes with any previously known member of that 
family. They deserve to be considered a new genus, the study of which 
could open a new scientific frontier for understanding the interface 
of biology, geology and chemistry across the undersea world. 

Even more incredible, it turns out these bacteria are found all over 
the world, their tiny electrical cables woven deeply into the mud of 
the ocean bottom. Keim writes that the scientists found "a full 
half-mile of Desulfobulbacea cable" in one teaspoonful of mud. 

The seafloor is home to a vast electrical network created by bacteria 
In other words, the entire ocean bed may be electrified in the same 
way our nervous systems are. They're networks of individual cells 
connected by electro-chemical signals ? essentially they are an 
enormous multi-cellular organism. These bacteria "breathe" by 
absorbing oxygen and hydrogen sulfide, emitting water as a byproduct. 
They might be serving as a vast water purification system on the ocean 
bottom, or they might be part of a geological process that's a lot 
more complex. We also have no way of knowing how other sea creatures 
are interacting with this giant electrical grid organism. 

What matters here is that we've just discovered a new kind of life 
that is not only ubiquitous, but also engaging in electro-chemical 
processes throughout the oceans. There's no evidence that this life 
form is "thinking" in any way that we'd recognize, but it certainly 
sounds like the perfect opening to a science fiction story. 

Read more about this bacterial network, and see more amazing pictures, 
in Wired. Read the scientists' paper in Nature. Images via Nils 
Risgaard-Petersen; schematic via Nature 

http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/10/bacteria-electric-wires 


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Re: Numbers in Leibniz



On 29 Oct 2012, at 06:15, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno

Still waiting for the storm to shut things down.


Take care.





Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet,
in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that
they are simply numbers, with no ontological status.
Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere.


I can be OK. I think that numbers are not even 'inextended' as  
extension does not apply to them. Then, of course variant of  
extension, like length in base 10, or number of Kb, can of course be  
defined.






Numbers are definitely not monads, because no
corporeal  body is attached.


For me, numbers, body, language, machine, etc. are basically  
synonymous. There are nuances, be they are not useful before they play  
a (usually relative) rôle.






Although they can
whenever thought of appear in the minds of
particular men in the intellects of their monads.

Leibniz does refer to a proposed "universal"
language, which is simply everywhere
as well as possibly in each head.


I think Leibniz got the intuition of universal number (machine,  
language, program, etc.).





Numbers would
no doubt be the same, both everywhere and
in individual minds at times.



OK.




So numbers are universal and can be treated
mathematically as always.


They are universal in that sense. But some numbers are universal in  
the Turing sense, and, as language, might be closer to Leibniz  
intuition. Such universal numbers can emulate the behavior of all  
other number. typical incarnation: the brain, the computer, the three  
bodies problem, the quantum zero body problem, game of life, fortran,  
lisp, algol, c++, combinators, arithmetic, etc. They all faithfully  
mirrors each other.


They are like the golem. You can instruct them by using words, or  
numbers, so that they become slave, like your PC or MAC. Like the  
golem, the math explain it is risky and that you can loose control.  
With comp, you can make them becoming yourself, and an infinitely of  
them already are.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-28, 18:31:25
Subject: Re: Re: A mirror of the universe.


Hi Bruno Marchal

I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out.
I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books.

Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies,
and numbers aren't like that. I find the following unsatisfactory,
but since numbers are like ideas, they can be
in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads,
but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me.
Not universakl enough.

My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly
somehow possesses the numbers.

Hurricane coming.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote:




Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that
anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It
is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it
belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the  
collections

of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
mechanism.

--  
Onward!


Stephen

ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
mirrors the rest of the universe.


In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal
numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is
already a dynamical Indra Net.

Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers.

Bruno





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Re: Re: A mirror of the universe.

Hi Bruno Marchal  

OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas
in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which
is the monad for the universe. Then the universe 
would be the corporeal body. Or something like that.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-29, 11:54:20 
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. 


On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:31, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out. 
> I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books. 

That's OK, but eventually you have to look inward, and see what you  
think. the solution is in your head, even if Leibniz can help you. 



> 
> Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies, 

Intensional numbers needs some universal numbers around to make sense.  
basically the extensional number is the corporeal bodies. They just  
take the usual shape, when the u number emerges from all computations,  
apparently. 




> and numbers aren't like that. 

They are. You can say that a game of life pattern does not look like a  
number too, but this is just an appearance. 



> I find the following unsatisfactory, 
> but since numbers are like ideas, they can be 
> in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads, 
> but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me. 
> Not universakl enough. 

I don't get your point. I think you should study the theory of  
universal machine. I explain a bit of this on the FOAR list. 




> 
> My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly 
> somehow possesses the numbers. 

The supreme monad might be played by the universal number, but is not  
the one (God, arithmetical truth). 
Universal numbers are more the Plotinus' man. They are sigma_1  
complete. God, is sigma_i complete for all i. 


> 
> Hurricane coming. 

Be careful, 

Bruno 


> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/28/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59 
> Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. 
> 
> 
> On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
>>> 
>> Dear Bruno and Alberto, 
>> 
>> I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic 
>> algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that 
>> anticipation 
>> is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It 
>> is 
>> a relation between any one and the class of computations that it 
>> belongs 
>> to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the  
>> collections 
>> of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression 
>> mechanism. 
>> 
>> --  
>> Onward! 
>> 
>> Stephen 
>> 
>> ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad 
>> mirrors the rest of the universe. 
> 
> In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal 
> numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is 
> already a dynamical Indra Net. 
> 
> Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
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>> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
> 
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ht

Re: Numbers in Leibniz



On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:

So numbers are universal and can be treated
mathematically as always.




I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the  
existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is  
equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false  
even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.



I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.

And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is  
that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining  
some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and  
the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands  
(unless philosophers?).


Bruno

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never  
succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am  
afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental  
and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability  
issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the  
arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics)  
issue, etc.

When you say:

<<
Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued  
before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that  
the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible  
world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God)  
prior to the availability of resources with which to actually  
perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content  
of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!

>>

I don't find any sense. I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't  
say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and  
formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in  
the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the  
link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:03, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> We now know that computing or thinking is physical,

> We don't know that.

We know that as well as we know anything about physics.

This is not valid. A priori we can be dreaming in some world based on  
a different physics. Or, as with comp we might belong only to  
sophisticated computations, which are entirely emulated already by  
degree four diophantine polynomials.

And computation is a the start a purely mathematical, indeed  
arithmetical, concept. All physical computations are defined by the  
physical incarnation of the corresponding mathematical computation.

> We deduce that in the Aristotelian's theories.

I have no idea what if anything that means.

There are two main rational conception of reality.

1) the Aristotelian one, in which the ultimate reality is a physical  
world, and the erst emerges from it.

2) the Platonist one, in which the physical reality is the border, or  
the shadow of a vaster invisible reality.

The idea that today science has solved the question of deciding  
between those two conception is a crackpot idea of sunday type  
philosophers.

The UDA illustrates this, by showing that if we take computationalism  
seriously enough, the Platonist conception of reality is about  
unavoidable, and that the physical reality is no more a primitive  
notion, but a derivative of an ability owned by complex relation  
between some numbers. This makes also comp testable, as the derivation  
is constructive (albeit technically difficult).

>> it takes energy to do it and it gives off heat;

> Actually computation can be made reversibly, without dissipation  
of energy.

With reversible computing you can make the amount of energy used for  
a calculation arbitrarily small and thus the heat emitted  
arbitrarily close to zero BUT, as I said before, only at the price  
of slowing down the computation;

I give a good energy at the start, and I can sped the non dissipating  
process at the speed limited by light.

we were talking about the theoretical feasibility of making a  
prediction and making a forecast of yesterday's weather is not of  
much use.

No. We were talking on something else.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

2012-10-29 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of 
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.


p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter of 
logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of what is 
modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have perfection 
reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the conviction that 
perfect modeling is possible in principle - what Paul Teller calls the 
"perfect model model" - does not have an a priori justification either!"


p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively 
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this 
is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so. Then still, 
before we can go on to use that model, to make predictions and build 
bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect to that model. So 
apparently we need to have something in addition to what science has 
given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of location."


p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as 
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a 
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably doomed 
to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is something 
irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit to 
objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."


Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

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Re: Against Mechanism



On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:10, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Gödel and Turing have never touch on the first and third person  
issue.


Perhaps because they knew that neither they nor anybody else had  
anything interesting to add to the subject and they had better  
things to do with their time.


What is that for an argument?

Proceed in the UDA before judging. Or study computer science and use  
AUDA, which I wrote for the mathematicians, who asked for a version  
without philosophy of mind, other than what the machine can already  
prove. Thanks to a result of Solovay, this is given by a tiny bunch of  
modal logics, and everything is 3p there (but in UDA too, as the 1p  
notion used admit a simple 3p description (access to personal diary)).


UDA and AUDA just formulate the comp mind-body problem. If you are not  
interested in that problem, then just say nothing, but you talk  
sometimes like if there were no problem, or that other problem are  
more interesting (and that's is about you and never in the scope of  
the topic).


And yes, that modest formulation is enough to se that Plato win the  
Mind-Body match against Aristotle, but I have never asserted that this  
is the final match, especially that comp was close to be refuted or  
seriously doubted, if physics was not quantum-like.


Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: mega-consciousness,created by bio-electrical circuitry?


On 10/29/2012 9:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb

How about social justice for zombies ?


We already have it, since philosophical zombies are indistinguishable from 
other people.

Brent

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Re: A mirror of the universe.



On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas
in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which
is the monad for the universe. Then the universe
would be the corporeal body. Or something like that.


Hmm... I don't think this can work. The supreme monads can only dream,  
the physical universe is when many universal numbers shared their  
dreams, in some manner. There is no ultimate corporeal body, at least  
not in the 'usual' sense, as some collection of dreams might point on  
something very similar.
It is complex to explain the picture from scratch. It is simpler to  
get it by oneself by doing the reasoning. We will see. The supreme  
monad, as you define it, is just the 'man', or the Löbian universal  
machine (man is used in a very large but precise sense, it includes  
plausibly the jumping spiders). You have 8 hypostases:


  God
 Man   Divine-Man
  Soul

Intelligible matter  Divine intelligible Matter
Sensible Matter Divine Sensible Matter

You supreme monad might be played by the Man or the Divine-Man, or  
Divine-Intellect (it is Plato's Noùs).
Read some of my papers perhaps, but you might need to study a bit of  
logic and computer science for this.


Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-29, 11:54:20
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:31, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out.
I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books.


That's OK, but eventually you have to look inward, and see what you
think. the solution is in your head, even if Leibniz can help you.





Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies,


Intensional numbers needs some universal numbers around to make sense.
basically the extensional number is the corporeal bodies. They just
take the usual shape, when the u number emerges from all computations,
apparently.





and numbers aren't like that.


They are. You can say that a game of life pattern does not look like a
number too, but this is just an appearance.




I find the following unsatisfactory,
but since numbers are like ideas, they can be
in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads,
but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me.
Not universakl enough.


I don't get your point. I think you should study the theory of
universal machine. I explain a bit of this on the FOAR list.






My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly
somehow possesses the numbers.


The supreme monad might be played by the universal number, but is not
the one (God, arithmetical truth).
Universal numbers are more the Plotinus' man. They are sigma_1
complete. God, is sigma_i complete for all i.




Hurricane coming.


Be careful,

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote:




Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that
anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It
is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it
belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the
collections
of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
mechanism.

--  
Onward!


Stephen

ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
mirrors the rest of the universe.


In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal
numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is
already a dynamical Indra Net.

Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers.

Bruno





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http

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-10-29 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> >> We know that as well as we know anything about physics
>
> > This is not valid.
>


NOT A VALID POINT?!

> A priori we can be dreaming in some world based on a different physics.
> Or, as with comp we might belong only to sophisticated computations,
>

Are you seriously suggesting that we trash our physics textbooks and it
doesn't bother you if one of your statements does not correspond to
physical experiments??


2) the Platonist one, in which the physical reality is the border, or the
> shadow of a vaster invisible reality.
>

If it's in shadow then it can't be seen so there is nothing to be gained by
talking about it.


>> we were talking about the theoretical feasibility of making a prediction
>> and making a forecast of yesterday's weather is not of much use.
>>
>
> > No. We were talking on something else.
>


I was talking about it, I don't know what you were talking about.

  John K Clark

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Re: wave function collapse


Richard,


Bruno,

I do not find Deutsch's introduction of a rational decision maker  
convincing

e.g.: http://arxiv.org/ftp/quant-ph/papers/9906/9906015.pdf
nor Wallaces elaboration on that theme
e.g.: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.2718v1.pdf.

My belief is that a rational decision maker, somewhat like a god,
would following Leibniz, always chose the best quantum state in any  
interaction
to become physical in a single universe. In fact that seems to be  
exactly what
Wallaces rational decision maker does. I think Deutsch has snookered  
us all.

Richard


I don't want to be technical about this, as I "believe" in the many  
dreams at the start. By comp they are just the search of existing or  
non existing solution to diophantine equation, or arithmetical problem.


But technically, from some of its paper at least, Wallace seems to me  
the closer to comp Everettian, i.e. closer to the kind of physics  
which has to emerge from the distribution of the possible dreams/ 
persons in arithmetic, as implied by the comp assumption.


The comp mind-body problem forces us to mega-generalizes Everett, on  
the whole of the arithmetical truth, and physics is "reduced" to  
arithmetic, like the carbon-based biology can be said to be be reduced  
to chemistry today.


Bruno





On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

Hi Richard,

On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno, But it seems that the Gleason Theorem assigns probabilities  
to

the different universes in the multiverse that are not there in
Everett's MWI in the first place. Richard



?
I don't see that, nor why you say so. can you elaborate? Gleason  
theorem
just makes unique the usual Born rule, and justify a literal  
reading of the

quantum amplitude as relative (infinite) proportions.
It is quite similar to the Deutsch Hayden justification, in decision
theoretical terms, of such amplitude reading, in the Heisenberg  
picture.


Bruno






On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 26 Oct 2012, at 15:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Well Bruno,

If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of
probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not  
amount to

negating it?




Why? I think that it is beautifully solved by Gleason theorem,  
for the

Hilbert space of dim bigger or equal to 3.




I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you
responded to.




I think comp will confirms Everett QM, and this would make our  
sharable

human or animal substitution level very plausibly at the Heisenberg
uncertainty level, this for surviving even a long run, without  
detecting

any
difference.

In that case, the Gleason solution will be the solution for comp.  
For

this
the X and Z logics (alreeady extracted) must conforms to some  
desiderata,
already expressed by von Neumann, for a quantum logic, and which  
is that

mainly it defines the searched measure.

I m not sure I can understand string theory or any fundamental QM  
without

Everett.

I agree that the idea that we are multiplied by infinities at each
instant
is not attractive, but science is not wishful thinking, and  
besides, I

don't
take any theory too much seriously (we don't know). I also know  
that

different theories can happen to be equivalent.

Of course, to be sure, comp has also many attractive features,  
mainly its
conceptual simplicity and naturalness. It really explains almost  
why

there
is something instead of nothing, as it assumes only 0 and the  
successor

and
the very simple laws, and explain from that how that very  
explanation

emerges in some collection of stable numbers' dream.

Bruno







Richard

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:



Richard,

On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Doesn't the Gleason Theorem negate MWI by assigning  
probabilities?

Richard





On the contrary. Gleason theorem solves the "measure problem"  
intrinsic

in
the Everett MWI, it makes the probabilities into comp (or  
weakening)

first
person indeterminacies.

Unfortunately, comp necessitates a version of Gleason theorem  
for all

comp
states, not just the quantum one, as the quantum law must be  
derived

from
the 1p indeterminacies, occurring in arithmetic.

The advantage is that comp provides the theory of both quanta and
qualia
(and a whole theology actually).
Unfortunately, it is not yet clear if those quanta behave in a
sufficiently
quantum mechanical way, like making possible quantum computers,
hydrogen,
strings may be, etc.

Bruno






On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal >

wrote:





On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:53, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/24/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb

There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the  
quantum

wave
function
(see below).

1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to ma

Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective by Bas C
Van Fraassen.

p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter of logic,
mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of what is modeled, although
models actually constructed cannot have perfection reachable in principle. But on the
other hand, the conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what Paul
Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a priori justification either!"

p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively represents the world
in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as
knowing that it is so. Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect to that model.

If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what we will think about
it and do with it. But then this will run into Godelian incompleteness. If it is true it
will be unprovable within the model.

Brent

So apparently we need to have something in addition to what science has given us here.
The extra is the self-ascription of location."

p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as paradigmatically
objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a simple, objective statement of fact,
then science is inevitably doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit to objectivity, we
have let subjectivity into science."

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

2012-10-29 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 29.10.2012 19:21 meekerdb said the following:

On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
 Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
priori justification either!"

p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.
Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
respect to that model.


If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what
we will think about it and do with it.  But then this will run into
Godelian incompleteness.  If it is true it will be unprovable within
the model.


The question would be how it should be done practically. Say let us 
imagine that such a model is the M-theory (I am still impressed by Grand 
Design by Hawking). How do I find myself in the M-theory?


Evgenii


Brent


So apparently we need to have something in addition to what science
 has given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of location."

p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
 simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a
limit to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."

Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen





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Re: Re: A mirror of the universe.

Hi Bruno Marchal  

I think you're right. Anyway, I've since decided that the numbers
have to be simply a priori. Like the pre-established (a priori) Harmony.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-29, 13:49:33 
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. 


On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas 
> in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which 
> is the monad for the universe. Then the universe 
> would be the corporeal body. Or something like that. 

Hmm... I don't think this can work. The supreme monads can only dream,  
the physical universe is when many universal numbers shared their  
dreams, in some manner. There is no ultimate corporeal body, at least  
not in the 'usual' sense, as some collection of dreams might point on  
something very similar. 
It is complex to explain the picture from scratch. It is simpler to  
get it by oneself by doing the reasoning. We will see. The supreme  
monad, as you define it, is just the 'man', or the L?ian universal  
machine (man is used in a very large but precise sense, it includes  
plausibly the jumping spiders). You have 8 hypostases: 

   God 
  Man Divine-Man 
   Soul 

Intelligible matter Divine intelligible Matter 
Sensible Matter Divine Sensible Matter 

You supreme monad might be played by the Man or the Divine-Man, or  
Divine-Intellect (it is Plato's No?). 
Read some of my papers perhaps, but you might need to study a bit of  
logic and computer science for this. 

Bruno 

> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/29/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-29, 11:54:20 
> Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. 
> 
> 
> On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:31, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
>> Hi Bruno Marchal 
>> 
>> I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out. 
>> I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books. 
> 
> That's OK, but eventually you have to look inward, and see what you 
> think. the solution is in your head, even if Leibniz can help you. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies, 
> 
> Intensional numbers needs some universal numbers around to make sense. 
> basically the extensional number is the corporeal bodies. They just 
> take the usual shape, when the u number emerges from all computations, 
> apparently. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> and numbers aren't like that. 
> 
> They are. You can say that a game of life pattern does not look like a 
> number too, but this is just an appearance. 
> 
> 
> 
>> I find the following unsatisfactory, 
>> but since numbers are like ideas, they can be 
>> in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads, 
>> but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me. 
>> Not universakl enough. 
> 
> I don't get your point. I think you should study the theory of 
> universal machine. I explain a bit of this on the FOAR list. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly 
>> somehow possesses the numbers. 
> 
> The supreme monad might be played by the universal number, but is not 
> the one (God, arithmetical truth). 
> Universal numbers are more the Plotinus' man. They are sigma_1 
> complete. God, is sigma_i complete for all i. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Hurricane coming. 
> 
> Be careful, 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>> 10/28/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> - Receiving the following content - 
>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59 
>> Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. 
>> 
>> 
>> On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> 
 
>>> Dear Bruno and Alberto, 
>>> 
>>> I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic 
>>> algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that 
>>> anticipation 
>>> is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It 
>>> is 
>>> a relation between any one and the class of computations that it 
>>> belongs 
>>> to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the 
>>> collections 
>>> of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression 
>>> mechanism. 
>>> 
>>> --  
>>> Onward! 
>>> 
>>> Stephen 
>>> 
>>> ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad 
>>> mirrors the rest of the universe. 
>> 
>> In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal 
>> numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is 
>> already a dynamical Indra Net. 
>> 
>> Your monad really looks like the (u

Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi  

Science cannot give us the absolute truth because 
the foundation on which science rests is contingent.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Evgenii Rudnyi  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-29, 13:21:39 
Subject: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model" 


Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of  
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen. 

p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter of  
logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of what is  
modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have perfection  
reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the conviction that  
perfect modeling is possible in principle - what Paul Teller calls the  
"perfect model model" - does not have an a priori justification either!" 

p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively  
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this  
is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so. Then still,  
before we can go on to use that model, to make predictions and build  
bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect to that model. So  
apparently we need to have something in addition to what science has  
given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of location." 

p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as  
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a  
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably doomed  
to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is something  
irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit to  
objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science." 

Evgenii 
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Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

On 10/29/2012 11:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 29.10.2012 19:21 meekerdb said the following:

On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
priori justification either!"

p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.
Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
respect to that model.

If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what
we will think about it and do with it. But then this will run into
Godelian incompleteness. If it is true it will be unprovable within
the model.

The question would be how it should be done practically. Say let us imagine that such a
model is the M-theory (I am still impressed by Grand Design by Hawking). How do I find
myself in the M-theory?

In practice, which I'm sure you're familiar with, we don't 'locate ourselves in the
model'. The model is in the objective world that we share with others who are also not in
the model. An engineer designing an airliner considers the airliner carrying other
people, but he doesn't model them completely - only their weight, size, use of the
restrooms, entertainment, etc. He doesn't try to model their inner thoughts unrelated to
the airliner. So a model, to be useful, cannot be complete because part of its usefulness
is that it can be communicated and must be 3p, as Bruno would say. That's not to say that
someone's inner thoughts cannot be in some model (the often are in novels), but only that
they can't be in that same person's model; just like a Godel sentence unprovable in one
system can be provable in some other axiom system.

Brent

Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

2012-10-29 Thread John Mikes

Brent, I think if a 'model' is *complete*, it is not a model, it is the
real thing.
Consequently it (as the real thing) is not provable from within - Godel, or
not. (dON'T ASK ME ABOUT "real", please )
JM

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 2:21 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>> Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
>> Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
>> ..(quot4s deleted)
>
> If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what we
> will think about it and do with it.  But then this will run into Godelian
> incompleteness.  If it is true it will be unprovable within the model.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  So apparently we need to have something in addition to what science has
>> given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of location."
>>
>> p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
>> paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a simple,
>> objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably doomed to be
>> objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is something irreducibly
>> subjective, then we have also admitted a limit to objectivity, we have let
>> subjectivity into science."
>>
>> Evgenii
>> --
>> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-**c-van-fraassen
>>
>>
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Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

Right.  And even less than complete models can run afoul of Godel, e.g. if I created a 
model of myself.  It might be an accurate model, but I couldn't know that it was.  On the 
other hand, John Mikes could know that it was.


Brent

On 10/29/2012 12:53 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent, I think if a 'model' is *complete*, it is not a model, it is the real 
thing.
Consequently it (as the real thing) is not provable from within - Godel, or not. (dON'T 
ASK ME ABOUT "real", please )

JM

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 2:21 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of 
Perspective
by Bas C Van Fraassen.
..(quot4s deleted)

If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what we 
will think
about it and do with it.  But then this will run into Godelian 
incompleteness.  If
it is true it will be unprovable within the model.

Brent



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Re: Solipsism = 1p

2012-10-29 Thread John Mikes

*Bruno*, I cannot keep up with argumentation that includes opposites to ALL
tenets previously stated. Who knows what kind of *'hardwire"* does a brain
have (I mean: not the physiological tissue-construct, but the complex brain*
function* also called 'brain). Anatomists, physiologists, neurologists and
other conservative scientists know only peripheral characteristics and
details.
 The "hard problem" functionality (mentality etc.) is still in our dreams.
We (I at least) have not cracked (yet?) YOUR  *'universal machine'*thinking.

If* Stathis* guesses that Lucy used only ~0,1% of her (available?) mental
capabilities (=hardware) in HER lifestyle, I don't think 99.9% of her
brain-hardware was unused and was a mere filling to her skull. That would
not click with nature's so far observed economy. That also would not jibe
with the development of new species with increased capabilities from the
simpler ones in their ancestors.
Development seems to work in concerted steps - one requirement brings about
another one that helps - and so on. And this - IMO - is  *B O T H
*hardware and software, the discerned two components which I consider our
human artifacts - borrowed from our primitive, embryonic binary kraxlwerk
computer - rather than being original distinctions (terms?) of the infinite
natural complexity.

*Question to Bruno*: can *YOU* 'reprogram' a universal computer? does it
have a closed (though maybe immense) finite hardware and a changeable
software?

John M

On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> John,
>
> A fixed universal machine (some hardwired one, like a brain or a laptop)
> can emulate a self-modifying universal machine, even one which modifies
> itself "completely".
>
> Bruno
>
>
> On 26 Oct 2012, at 23:08, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Stathis:
>
> IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the
> programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while
> (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts
> 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) -
> accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given
> "hardware" content.
>
> John M
>
> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would
>> all
>> > be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer
>> itself
>> > rather than the programming, that would be a good sign.
>>
>> A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy
>> its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic
>> level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware
>> can then only move into future physical states consistent with that
>> configuration. "Defying its programming" would mean doing something
>> *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics.
>> That's not possible for  - and you have explicitly agreed with this,
>> saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a
>> computer or a human.
>>
>>
>> --
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>>
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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

2012-10-29 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:
[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated 
mathematically as always.





I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the 
existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is 
equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false 
even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.




Dear Bruno



I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.


No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of 
conscious beings. If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom 
numbers are concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers 
in such worlds. My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of 
theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, 
not to numbers themselves.




And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is 
that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining 
some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and 
the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands 
(unless philosophers?).


I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 
'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept 
of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My 
claim is that truth valuations supervene on the ability of consciousness 
to form concepts of numbers. I question the entire idea of numbers 
existing as separate Platonic entities. In the absence of consciousness, 
there is no such thing as a concept!




Bruno

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never 
succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am 
afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental 
and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability 
issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the 
arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) 
issue, etc.


It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument as 
what Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. 
 In 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world we read:


"There is a close relation between propositions and possible 
worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any 
given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is 
understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in 
which it is false."


Solutions to equations or computations are not available until 
after they are actually solved. My solution to this is to not go so far 
as you do in Step 8. Let me try to be more explicit:


From your paper 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf :


"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine 
state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at space-time  
(x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia which  
is  accepted  as  existing

independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism). "

I am pointing out that the idea of computations "existing 
independently of our selves" is wrong in that it conflates *the meaning 
and truth valuation of numbers* with *t**he existence of numbers as 
Platonic objects*. It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of 
"17  is prime" depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that 
the truth of "17 is prime" is knowable by any person is not absurd. If 
we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow prior to that 
which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd. The content of 
knowledge and the ability of knowledge occur simultaneously or not at all.
Absent the "concept" of numbers there is no such thing as 
valuations of numbers because the notion of Platonic objects considers 
objects as existing independently as some singular "perfect" version 
that is then plurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we 
see in the Allegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a 
one-to-one mapping.
How exactly is a "type" or "sheaf" a singular and "perfect" version 
of each and every computation and yet be something that has individuated 
valuations? Individual valuations of computations are only those that 
occur as physical instantiations of computations and thus they do not 
"exist" in Platonia. The Many exist in the physical worlds, no?
I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the 1p 
qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras) that 
is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphically equivalent 
space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is a restatement of the Stone 
duality into COMP-like terms. ;-)

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-10-29 Thread Jason Resch

John,

Are you on this list to learn or to argue?

Jason

On Oct 29, 2012, at 12:58 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

>> We know that as well as we know anything about physics

> This is not valid.

NOT A VALID POINT?!

> A priori we can be dreaming in some world based on a different
physics. Or, as with comp we might belong only to sophisticated
computations,

Are you seriously suggesting that we trash our physics textbooks and
it doesn't bother you if one of your statements does not correspond
to physical experiments??

2) the Platonist one, in which the physical reality is the border,
or the shadow of a vaster invisible reality.

If it's in shadow then it can't be seen so there is nothing to be
gained by talking about it.

>> we were talking about the theoretical feasibility of making a
prediction and making a forecast of yesterday's weather is not of
much use.

> No. We were talking on something else.

I was talking about it, I don't know what you were talking about.

John K Clark

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Re: wave function collapse

2012-10-29 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno,

Here is the snooker- from wiki MWI: ' Deutsch's derivation is a
two-stage proof: first he shows that the number of orthonormal
Everett-worlds after a branching is proportional to the conventional
probability density. "

Who cares what the density of branching is- each branch is independent
of all other branches and therefore all branches are equal. No way can
probability enter into a single branch. Dreams are a result of many
minds, not many worlds.
Richard

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 12:18 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
> Bruno,
>
> I do not find Deutsch's introduction of a rational decision maker convincing
> e.g.: http://arxiv.org/ftp/quant-ph/papers/9906/9906015.pdf
> nor Wallaces elaboration on that theme
> e.g.: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.2718v1.pdf.
>
> My belief is that a rational decision maker, somewhat like a god,
> would following Leibniz, always chose the best quantum state in any 
> interaction
> to become physical in a single universe. In fact that seems to be exactly what
> Wallaces rational decision maker does. I think Deutsch has snookered us all.
> Richard
>
> On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> Hi Richard,
>>
>> On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno, But it seems that the Gleason Theorem assigns probabilities to
>>> the different universes in the multiverse that are not there in
>>> Everett's MWI in the first place. Richard
>>
>>
>> ?
>> I don't see that, nor why you say so. can you elaborate? Gleason theorem
>> just makes unique the usual Born rule, and justify a literal reading of the
>> quantum amplitude as relative (infinite) proportions.
>> It is quite similar to the Deutsch Hayden justification, in decision
>> theoretical terms, of such amplitude reading, in the Heisenberg picture.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 On 26 Oct 2012, at 15:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:

> Well Bruno,
>
> If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of
> probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not amount to
> negating it?

 Why? I think that it is beautifully solved by Gleason theorem, for the
 Hilbert space of dim bigger or equal to 3.

> I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you
> responded to.

 I think comp will confirms Everett QM, and this would make our sharable
 human or animal substitution level very plausibly at the Heisenberg
 uncertainty level, this for surviving even a long run, without detecting
 any
 difference.

 In that case, the Gleason solution will be the solution for comp. For
 this
 the X and Z logics (alreeady extracted) must conforms to some desiderata,
 already expressed by von Neumann, for a quantum logic, and which is that
 mainly it defines the searched measure.

 I m not sure I can understand string theory or any fundamental QM without
 Everett.

 I agree that the idea that we are multiplied by infinities at each
 instant
 is not attractive, but science is not wishful thinking, and besides, I
 don't
 take any theory too much seriously (we don't know). I also know that
 different theories can happen to be equivalent.

 Of course, to be sure, comp has also many attractive features, mainly its
 conceptual simplicity and naturalness. It really explains almost why
 there
 is something instead of nothing, as it assumes only 0 and the successor
 and
 the very simple laws, and explain from that how that very explanation
 emerges in some collection of stable numbers' dream.

 Bruno

> Richard
>
> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Richard,
>>
>> On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> Doesn't the Gleason Theorem negate MWI by assigning probabilities?
>>> Richard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On the contrary. Gleason theorem solves the "measure problem" intrinsic
>> in
>> the Everett MWI, it makes the probabilities into comp (or weakening)
>> first
>> person indeterminacies.
>>
>> Unfortunately, comp necessitates a version of Gleason theorem for all
>> comp
>> states, not just the quantum one, as the quantum law must be derived
>> from
>> the 1p indeterminacies, occurring in arithmetic.
>>
>> The advantage is that comp provides the theory of both quanta and
>> qualia
>> (and a whole theology actually).
>> Unfortunately, it is not yet clear if those quanta behave in a
>> sufficiently
>> quantum mechanical way, like making possible quantum computers,
>> hydrogen,
>> strings may be, etc.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>

Scott Aronson on free will