Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter. Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post, Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more physical but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and computations are too. So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get the job done here on planet Earth. You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless you are interested in the implementation of computer in some physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this means. But this does not mean that physics is primary. As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next, Protein folding? if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult to understand why that is the case. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
LizR skrev 2014-10-01 01:44: On 1 October 2014 04:23, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com mailto:multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Ultrafinitism then: set of all numbers is finite and whatever weird logic they need to have numbers obey some weirder upper limit, and I heard they issue fines and tickets for anybody who states a bigger number. Like the biggest number used by ultra finitists + 1 ... oops. The biggest number + 1 is a number that does not belong to the set of all numbers... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
2014-10-01 9:09 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter. Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post, Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more physical but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and computations are too. So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get the job done here on planet Earth. You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless you are interested in the implementation of computer in some physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this means. But this does not mean that physics is primary. As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next, Protein folding? He uses anyway a bad example, NP-hard problem are computable... they just take exponential time to solve. We were talking about non-computable problems, and nature could use unknown non-computable things for consciousness that would render computationalism false. Quentin if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult to understand why that is the case. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 30 Sep 2014, at 02:19, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 06:45:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2014, at 02:22, Russell Standish wrote:
I introduced the term urstuff as a way of referring to what is
ontologically real. primitive urstuff is a tautology, of course,
as
urstuff is primitive by definition.
Urstuff could be matter, or it could be a platonic system like the
integers. Since we can never know what it is, we should
Wittgensteinly
shut our traps about it, but since we don't seem to be able to do
that, we need a label to talk about it.
But stuff is so much connotated to matter. Matter seems even more
abstract than stuff. Some people makes the error that physics
Only in my grandmother's English.
Grandmothers are often well inspired.
She would say stuff is material - ie
specifically the fabric that you make clothes, or curtains out of. But
already by my generation, stuff is roughly synonymous with
things.
But this is not astonishing, as we are in the aristotlian era, so most
people already believe that reality is made of things and that things
are stuffy. But this is what is needed to be changed in case we are
willing to take computationalism seriously.
Don't mind too much, it is vocabulary and it does not matter (note the
pun).
A thing needn't be material. My son's generation, would
probably use the word junk in the same way.
becomes arithmetic, which is against comp, where physics is a
modality of observation (the FPI bet one obeys the quantum logic
S4Grz1, or Z1*).
Again, this is just vocabulary, but to say that numbers are stuff
seems to me to easily lead to the error of confusing math and
physics (which some people do when using comp naively).
I don't think so. But in any case, I'm using a new word urstuff,
which is definitely not my grandmother's stuff.
But in ZF we call ure-elements what some people add to not working in
pure set theory, where all sets are made only of pure sets, starting
from the empty set { }, and closing this with union, parts, etc.
I think that insisting that number are not physical, not stuffy, not
material, we are closer to your nothing intuition, given this
makes clear that there is nothing physical, except in the internal
self-emerging semantic in arithmetic, on arithmetic.
In English, stuffy refers to a personality type - someone who is
rigid and formal might be called stuffy. You're the only person I
know of using it as an adjective meaning made of matter.
You do have an important point that the ontological number base is not
the same as the empirical world, a distinction captured by Kant's
noumenon-phenomenon dichotomy.
This one is more akin to the 3p / 1p distinction, imo.
With the FPI discovery, you can
demonstrate this quite formally. But to insist that number aren't
physical up front probably doesn't help, as most people don't have a
good idea what physical is to start with.
It is the difference between what is taught in a course of math
(numbers, sets, lines, curves, all sort of spaces, ...)
and a course of physics (energy, particles, physical space, time,
experimental forces, planets, black holes, sound waves, ...).
Math can be argued to be obtained by introspection, and not
necessitating experimental verification, physics, even when deduced
from math + philosophy, like with comp, is always in need of
experimental validation.
With your reversal result,
and insisting that physical means what is observed as phenomena, you
can then conclude that the arithmetical reality is not phenomena.
OK.
Comp does not allow infinity in its basic ontology. All of 0, 1, 2,
3, ... are finite. [0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is already in the mind of some
machines, like ZF. It shorten the proofs, and enlighten the picture
from inside. Comp, as Judson Webb analyse it, is a finitism.
is Norm Wildberger an utltrafinitist in math? He look like a
materialist, and ultrafinitist in physics, but normally that is what
the MGA shows it can't really work (unless adding the magic
needed). That magic is more than non Turing emulable, it is also
not FPI recoverable. I have no idea what that could be except as
something incomprehensible (primitive matter) introduced to make
something else (machine's mind) incomprehensible.
I haven't chatted with Norm personally about this - his views have
evolved considerably in the years since I was regularly in the
department. All I know is what he presented in that seminar, and also
what was written in that New Scientist article.
ISTM that that the MGA presents choices:
1) COMP is false
2) Physical supervenience is false (that's hard to square with
evidence)
3) We live in a robust reality (such as AR)
4) Some recordings are conscious
4) - 1) in the sense that if some recordings are conscious, we have
to admit that consciousness is not necessarily the result of a
computation, and we can no more sure that we survive the digital brain
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 30 Sep 2014, at 04:05, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 2:19 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 06:45:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Sep 2014, at 02:22, Russell Standish wrote: I introduced the term urstuff as a way of referring to what is ontologically real. primitive urstuff is a tautology, of course, as urstuff is primitive by definition. I have already patent on platonically malleable urstuff. So don't go introducing my stuff any further. Urstuff could be matter, or it could be a platonic system like the integers. Since we can never know what it is, we should Wittgensteinly shut our traps about it, but since we don't seem to be able to do that, we need a label to talk about it. What's wrong with the usual primitive objects/entities in some theory/ontology etc? But stuff is so much connotated to matter. Matter seems even more abstract than stuff. Some people makes the error that physics Only in my grandmother's English. She would say stuff is material - ie specifically the fabric that you make clothes, or curtains out of. But already by my generation, stuff is roughly synonymous with things. A thing needn't be material. My son's generation, would probably use the word junk in the same way. ...and in some rather particular other ways as well. becomes arithmetic, which is against comp, where physics is a modality of observation (the FPI bet one obeys the quantum logic S4Grz1, or Z1*). Again, this is just vocabulary, but to say that numbers are stuff seems to me to easily lead to the error of confusing math and physics (which some people do when using comp naively). I don't think so. But in any case, I'm using a new word urstuff, which is definitely not my grandmother's stuff. Yes, it's my stuff. I think that insisting that number are not physical, not stuffy, not material, we are closer to your nothing intuition, given this makes clear that there is nothing physical, except in the internal self-emerging semantic in arithmetic, on arithmetic. In English, stuffy refers to a personality type - someone who is rigid and formal might be called stuffy. You're the only person I know of using it as an adjective meaning made of matter. Mass, heaviness. A stuffy person isn't erm... light or easy. You do have an important point that the ontological number base is not the same as the empirical world, a distinction captured by Kant's noumenon-phenomenon dichotomy. Here you speak in absolute terms... But I can see how in comp numbers and the like become stuff/entity by definition and rules of the game, in similar way as matter in appropriate contexts. With the FPI discovery, you can demonstrate this quite formally. But to insist that number aren't physical up front probably doesn't help, as most people don't have a good idea what physical is to start with. With your reversal result, and insisting that physical means what is observed as phenomena, you can then conclude that the arithmetical reality is not phenomena. It demonstrates an inconsistency between physical supervenience and computational supervenience, notably that physical supervenience entails that certain very simple computations, such as the replaying of a recording, will be conscious. This only works in a non-robust universe, however, a point that is often overlooked in treatments of this. It seems to me that the MGA makes the robust/non-robustness irrelevant. It is enough that elementary arithmetic, or the combinators, is a robust reality. I agree. The whole non-robust universe move is a rejection of your AR postulate. But it does seem reasonable to ask what might happen if not all possible programs could exist, ie that the Turing model of computation is constrained in some way. I guess essential if you really want to tackle Aristotelianism in its home ground. I mention the sub-universal more often called sub-creative) set of computable function. That might be interesting indeed. But if we assume the usual computationalist assumption, for theology and physics, introuicing such a restriction would already be like doing terachery. If such a restriction plays a role (as I am sure it does), that has to be extracted from self-reference to exploit the G/G* distinction, and get both qualia and quanta. The ultrafinitist physicalism has still to endow his existing matter with magical non-Turing emulable to make its reality doing the selection it seems to me. I agree it is non-Turing, but magical might be a bit too strong an epithet. The argument, presumably, is that some computations require too great a resource in order to be instantiated. (By analogy with Norm Wildberger's main argument against infinity). Comp does not allow infinity in its basic ontology. All of 0, 1, 2, 3, ... are finite. That's weird because of ... as pointer to
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter. Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post, Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more physical but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and computations are too. So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make computers out of matter? This does not follow from what I said. To use a computer in our physical reality, we need to implement it in that physical reality. but to get the result that the physical reality emerges from computations, you need to invoke the immaterial computations which exist in arithmetic. I don't think so. Maybe computers really do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get the job done here on planet Earth. Correct. You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless you are interested in the implementation of computer in some physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this means. But this does not mean that physics is primary. As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature must solve a NP-hard problem To solve it exactly? Perhaps, we can't be sure. But swarm of ants solves efficaciously NP complete problem, like the traveling salesman problem. I think some soap film solves some NP problem too, but I have no reference at hands. But I am sure of the relevance of your remark in our topic. Bruno to figure out what to do next, if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult to understand why that is the case. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 01 Oct 2014, at 09:09, Telmo Menezes wrote: On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter. Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post, Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more physical but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and computations are too. So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get the job done here on planet Earth. You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless you are interested in the implementation of computer in some physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this means. But this does not mean that physics is primary. As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next, Protein folding? This would mean that we can reduce the protein folding problem to the traveling salesman problem, and that makes sense, as we can reduce protein folding to minimization of energy is the space of the protein configuration, and this does not seem to be a long way from the salesman problem; but I heard that idea for the first time. But I have stopped to follow that folding problem since some time. Is it your idea/feeling or have you heard about the existence of such a reduction. Maybe it is trivial? I have no idea. Bruno if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult to understand why that is the case. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 01 Oct 2014, at 09:23, Torgny Tholerus wrote: LizR skrev 2014-10-01 01:44: On 1 October 2014 04:23, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Ultrafinitism then: set of all numbers is finite and whatever weird logic they need to have numbers obey some weirder upper limit, and I heard they issue fines and tickets for anybody who states a bigger number. Like the biggest number used by ultra finitists + 1 ... oops. The biggest number + 1 is a number that does not belong to the set of all numbers... I think you were quoting Liz, who was quoting the Cowboy. Now, your answer make sense, but it shows that an ultrafinitist capable of vindicating explicitly his ultrafinitist position, needs to be non- ultrafinitiste at the meta-level. That can make sense for physicalist ultrafinitism. Fair enough. But comp is false in that case, and the mind is made even more mysterious. Why not of course. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 01 Oct 2014, at 12:35, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-10-01 9:09 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter. Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post, Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more physical but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and computations are too. So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get the job done here on planet Earth. You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless you are interested in the implementation of computer in some physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this means. But this does not mean that physics is primary. As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next, Protein folding? He uses anyway a bad example, We can agree on this. NP-hard problem are computable... Yes. they just take exponential time to solve. Assuming that P ≠ NP, which is indeed judged very plausible by all experts (but not all) in the field, but remains still unproved today. It is as you know a famous open problem. Bruno We were talking about non-computable problems, and nature could use unknown non-computable things for consciousness that would render computationalism false. Quentin if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult to understand why that is the case. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 3:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Oct 2014, at 12:35, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-10-01 9:09 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter. Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post, Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more physical but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and computations are too. So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get the job done here on planet Earth. You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless you are interested in the implementation of computer in some physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this means. But this does not mean that physics is primary. As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next, Protein folding? He uses anyway a bad example, We can agree on this. Indeed. NP-hard problem are computable... Yes. they just take exponential time to solve. Assuming that P ≠ NP, which is indeed judged very plausible by all experts (but not all) in the field, but remains still unproved today. It is as you know a famous open problem. This is why I find protein folding intriguing. I see the following possibilities: - Molecular interactions entail an immense computational power; - P = NP; - We are constantly winning at quantum suicide. Am I missing something? Telmo. Bruno We were talking about non-computable problems, and nature could use unknown non-computable things for consciousness that would render computationalism false. Quentin if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult to understand why that is the case. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Gut bacteria are protected by host during illness
Interesting evidence that not only do animals rely on symbiotic microbiota for their health they actively assist their community of helpful microorganisms by feeding them special sugars they make during periods of illness to keep their beneficial flora and fauna from dying off. No life (form) is an island! Gut bacteria are protected by host during illness Gut bacteria are protected by host during illness To protect their gut microbes during illness, sick mice produce specialized sugars in the gut that feed their microbiota and maintain a healthy microbial balance. T... View on medicalxpress.com Preview by Yahoo -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
This is why I find protein folding intriguing. I see the following possibilities: - Molecular interactions entail an immense computational power; - P = NP; - We are constantly winning at quantum suicide. Am I missing something? P=/=NP doesn't mean that NP problems require immense computational power beyond what could biochemistry can provide. Being NP is just a statement about how a problem scales with size of the input. But for some given finite size it might be quickly solved. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Non-Genetic Reproduction (telegony)
Fly offspring can resemble their mothers' previous partner. Just rarely, a newspaper throws up something gobsmacking. From today's Sydney Morning Herald. Quoted here with absolutely no permission whatsoever. I'm sure this holds for humans as well. Flies and humans are both Turing emulable. This introduces a quasi-nondeterministic feature into human reproduction. I'm sure Bruno and JK will be pleased that the ancient Greeks were already speculating on this. Kim What if that sexual partner you'd rather forget remained forever a part of your life? Sydney scientists have shown for the first time that offspring can resemble their mother's previous sexual partner – in flies, at least. The research team, led by evolutionary ecologist Angela Crean, propose that sperm from a previous partner can penetrate a developing egg, influencing its growth despite being sired by another male. Dr Crean said her team were shocked when their experiments revealed they had discovered a new form of non-genetic inheritance. We did a lot of follow-up studies to check our results, she said. First proposed in ancient Greece, the idea that offspring can inherit characteristics from their mother's previous mate – known as telegony – was discredited when scientists established more than a century ago that genes were the dominant way traits passed from parent to offspring. Before we discovered genetics it was widely believed that [telegony] occurred, and it was even spoken about by Darwin in The Origin of Species, Dr Crean, from the University of NSW, said. But once we figured out genetics, it didn't make sense under than mechanism, so it was just dismissed. But more recently other forms of non-genetic inheritance have been observed, including work by Dr Crean which found a father's environment could influence the size of their offspring. For instance, flies fed a nutrient-rich diet as maggots grew into bigger insects and then passed this condition onto their offspring. Maggots fed a poor diet become smaller adults, as did their offspring. That's why we know it was not a genetic effect, because we manipulated the condition of the flies ourselves, she said. To uncover how these traits were being passed between parent and offspring, Dr Crean and her collaborator Russell Bonduriansky took the research a step further, mating the small and large male flies with females and then studying their young. They found that the size of the young was determined by the size of the first male the mother mated with, rather than the second male that sired the offspring. Their results are published in the journal Ecology Letters. Now we have to go down the very difficult path of trying to figure out how this happens, she said. Dr Crean said it was likely something in the semen was influencing the growth of fly offspring. But there are hundreds of different molecules in the semen, [so] it could be quite challenging to figure that out. Dr Crean said this type of non-genetic inheritance had not been observed in other species, but there were clues from rodent studies that the phenomenon may be more widespread. Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au kmjco...@icloud.com Mobile: 0450 963 719 Phone: 02 93894239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Fwd: FW: generalizations_of_islam
The following link might be of interest. It addresses some of the questions raised on this forum about Islam. Samiya -- Forwarded message -- Subject: generalizations_of_islam Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 22:23:35 -0400 Good segment http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/09/30/reza_aslan_mahers_facile_generalizations_of_islam_the_definition_of_bigotry.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FW: generalizations_of_islam
Thank you, that's interesting (of course, it should be obvious to anyone with a few brain cells that facile generalisations are bad... but they creep in all too easily...) On 2 October 2014 15:56, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: The following link might be of interest. It addresses some of the questions raised on this forum about Islam. Samiya -- Forwarded message -- Subject: generalizations_of_islam Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 22:23:35 -0400 Good segment http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/09/30/reza_aslan_mahers_facile_generalizations_of_islam_the_definition_of_bigotry.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FW: generalizations_of_islam
On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 5:31 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Thank you, that's interesting (of course, it should be obvious to anyone with a few brain cells that facile generalisations are bad... but they creep in all too easily...) Which is of course another generalization :-) Sorry, couldn't help myself. Bloody winds of recursion. PGC On 2 October 2014 15:56, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: The following link might be of interest. It addresses some of the questions raised on this forum about Islam. Samiya -- Forwarded message -- Subject: generalizations_of_islam Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 22:23:35 -0400 Good segment http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/09/30/reza_aslan_mahers_facile_generalizations_of_islam_the_definition_of_bigotry.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FW: generalizations_of_islam
On 10/1/2014 8:31 PM, LizR wrote: Thank you, that's interesting (of course, it should be obvious to anyone with a few brain cells that facile generalisations are bad... but they creep in all too easily...) But also facile distinctions are made: /ASLAN: Stoning and mutilation and those barbaric practices should be condemned and criticized by everyone. The actions of individuals and societies and countries like Iran, like Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia must be condemned, because they don't belong in the 21st century.// // //But to say Muslim countries, as though Pakistan and Turkey are the same, as though Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are the same, as though somehow what is happening in the most extreme forms of these repressive countries, these autocratic countries, is representative of what's happening in every other Muslim country, is, frankly -- and I use this word seriously -- stupid. So let's stop doing that. / Turkey is different precisely because Kemal Ataturk made separation of church and state a foundation of Turkey - something directly contrary to the Quran which mandates theocracy. So it is not as though the differences are between Pakistan and Turkey or Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are unrelated to religion. The difference are that the more barabaric nations are the more religious. Brent On 2 October 2014 15:56, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com mailto:samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote: The following link might be of interest. It addresses some of the questions raised on this forum about Islam. Samiya -- Forwarded message -- Subject: generalizations_of_islam Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 22:23:35 -0400 Good segment http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/09/30/reza_aslan_mahers_facile_generalizations_of_islam_the_definition_of_bigotry.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
