On 01 Oct 2014, at 12:35, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-10-01 9:09 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>:
On 30 Sep 2014, at 19:32, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Sep 28, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> Computationalism is the theory that the human brain is a
computer, a type information processing machine, and it postulates
that thinking is a form of computing. But you can't have a brain
or a computer or a machine of any sort without matter.
> Computer have been discovered in arithmetic. Gödel was close in
his 1931 paper, but missed it, but then it is clear in Post,
Church, Turing paper. Turing made his machine looking more
"physical" but it is still a purely mathematical objects, and
computations are too.
So over the last few decades was it a big waste of time and money
to spend trillions of dollars and millions of man-hours to make
computers out of matter? I don't think so. Maybe computers really
do exist in some sort of ethereal Platonic abstract plane, maybe
they're real but apparently they're not quite real enough to get
the job done here on planet Earth.
> You don't need the notion of matter in computer science, unless
you are interested in the implementation of computer in some
physical reality. Then you need some physics to define what this
means. But this does not mean that physics is primary.
As I've said no natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature
must solve a NP-hard problem to figure out what to do next,
Protein folding?
He uses anyway a bad example,
We can agree on this.
NP-hard problem are computable...
Yes.
they just take exponential time to solve.
Assuming that P ≠ NP, which is indeed judged very plausible by all
experts (but not all) in the field, but remains still unproved today.
It is as you know a famous open problem.
Bruno
We were talking about non-computable problems, and nature could use
unknown non-computable things for consciousness that would render
computationalism false.
Quentin
if the so called real numbers are really real I find it difficult
to understand why that is the case.
John K Clark
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