date:20141023

On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:

On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

> Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.

Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure
after the
experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
right of
the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it
would
work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the
right of
the decimal point? I honestly don't know.

I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
But then
I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.

That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model
of the world.

But you left out the "just".

Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a "just a model of the world" viewpoint then
you have to be prepared for the fact that it affects everything else. You're basically
postmodernising the entire scientific enterprise.

No, I'm just pointing out we can't be sure that something that is part of our model of the
world is part of reality; and this is exactly the same as being uncertain that there are
real numbers. In spite of Kronecker, the integers are just as much a human invention as
the reals. We shouldn't take our models to seriously. We may find a better one next week.

Brent

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 10:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

>> Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure
after the
experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
right of the
decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it
would work
just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of
the
decimal point? I honestly don't know.

> I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
But then I
also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.

I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers, particularly the
non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them.

They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited
tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable
too.

Brent

And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles and crystalline
spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model, but I want to know if the
Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but part of our the world .

John K Clark

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Russell Standish

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 01:08:37PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> 
> >> Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
> >> with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
> >> the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
> >> right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
> >> that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
> >> to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.
> >>
> >
> > > I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
> > But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the
> > world.
> >
> 
> I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers,
> particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them.
> And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles  and
> crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model,
> but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but
> part of our the world .
> 
> 
>   John K Clark
> 

Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal
(experienced) world if COMP is true. They needn't be ontological, though.

But then that's exactly the argument you reject!

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-23 Thread Bruce Kellett


Peter Sas wrote:

Hi Richard,

I must stress that this is all new territory for me, but what I gather 
from the things I've read so far is that dark energy is a form of 
positive energy balanced by the negative energy of gravity. So here too 
some kind of polarity seems to hold. The point is that as space expands, 
dark energy increases, so the law of energy conservation is violated, 
unless the negative energy of gravity increases with an equal amount, so 
as to 'balance the books'. Thus it would seem that what happens in 
inflation is precisely this 'splitting' of positive, dark energy 
(repulsion, which drives the inflation) and the negative energy of 
gravity. Dark energy can only increase if the negative energy of gravity 
increases at the same time. Dark energy and gravity seem to be the two 
opposed sidess of one and the same coin, which is also suggested by the 
fact that dark energy is often referred to a repulsive gravity.



The idea that the positive mass-energy of the universe is balanced by 
the negative energy of gravitation is quite common in the popular 
science literature -- the idea is that one can then get zero total 
energy and explain a universe coming from nothing.


The trouble with this idea is that it is flatly contradicted by general 
relativity. There are two main points here. First, in the cosmological 
models of GR, energy is not generally conserved. Energy conservation on 
the large scale depends on the existence of a time-like Killing vector 
field, and no such field exists in the general non-static spacetime, 
such as an expanding universe. The question of the total energy of the 
universe simply has no answer -- no such total energy can be defined so 
it has no value -- zero or anything else.


The second point is that GR is based on the idea that energy, of 
whatever form, is a source term for gravity. The equations of GR have 
the geometry of spacetime depending solely on the stress-energy tensor 
containing all mass, energy, stress, pressure and other physical terms. 
There is no term for negative gravitational energy in this tensor. 
Negative gravitational energy does not affect the geodesics of the 
spacetime, it does not affect the orbits of distant satellites, for 
instance. So, in a very real sense, it does not exist. It can be 
described only by what is commonly called a pseudo-tensor. That is, a 
quantity that does not transform as a tensor under coordinate 
transformations. One can always find a frame in which so-called negative 
gravitational energy vanishes, so it is not physical.


Hope this helps clear up a few confusions.

Bruce





Well, that's what I understand about it (and that's not much)... I have 
to do more reading on this subject to feel really comfortable about 
it... But as far as I can tell right now, this duality of dark energy 
and the negative energy of gravity fits the dialectical picture of 
nothing splitting into opposites quite well.


Peter



Actually Peter I was thinking more about  your basic assumption that 
mass-energy is balanced by gravity, one being the negative of the other, 
which also seems to apply to the dialectic explained in the second blog 
above, which I just read.



Dark energy creates more space and perhaps spacetime. Space or
spacetime does not appear to be the negative of anything. Rather
like a particle and an anti-particle annihilating each other to
produce light, if the dielectic is correct for Dark Energy, then
there must be a balance of positive and negative to create space.
Yet the creation of space just creates more Dark Energy along with it. 


The leading candidate for the explanation of Dark Energy is the
cosmological constant which amounts to a repulsive force. But space
or space time is neutral with respect to force and there is
apparently no evidence that an attractive force like gravity due to
matter creation is happening. Someone on this list like Brent or
John Clark will surely correct my explanation if it is wrong. But in
short, Dark Energy appears to falsify the notion that something is
derived from nothing by a balance of forces.

BTW there some preliminary evidence that the cosmological constant
explanation is not
correct: 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dark-energy-cosmological-constant/


Richard


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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?


On 10/23/2014 12:50 AM, Peter Sas wrote:
Well, I'm not a physicists but a philosopher, so I cannot give a physicist's answer. My 
approach is to start with the most fundamental question (Why is there anything at all?) 
and then see how far we can get with pure logic alone. It is of course very, very tricky 
to try to derive fundamental laws of nature in this way. But I think that we can 
actually get quite far with such an a priori method. Now with respect to your question, 
I understand that dark energy is a basically repulsive force driving inflation. I don't 
want to say I can derive dark energy from a priori principles (that would be absurd). 
But I think I can derive a duality of attraction and repulsion in that way. The 
reasoning I emply, however, is very abstract, using ideas taken from philosophers like 
Hegel and Heidegger, although on the whole I feel more attracted to the rationality of 
Anglo-American philosophy (and science) than to postmodern philosophy (which I think is 
basically a fraud). Perhaps my reasoning is closest to German idealists like Hegel and 
Schelling who still feld they could derive the basic principles of natural science from 
philosophical principles. So here is how my argument goes in nuce, I hope you can make 
sense of it:


First I argue that nothing is self-negating (for logical arguments see the blog piece). 
Simply put: nothing is nothing to such a degree that it isn't even itself! Thus, as 
nothing negates itself, it produces being, it becomes something.


I like that.  It' just what my friend Norm Levitt used to say, paraphrasing 
Quine:

"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"


Now, since nothing is different from itself, being (as the negation of nothing) must be 
different from something else. This then is how I define being: as difference from 
something else. Now it is easy to see that this difference must take two forms. First, 
being is being because it differs from non-being or nothing (let's call this ontological 
difference, following Heidegger). Second, being must also be internally differentiated, 
that is to say: there must be multiple beings differing from each other (let's call this 
ontic difference). Then we can say: a being is what it is because of its ontic 
difference from other beings. (Ultimately, I think, this imlies that beings are 
mathematical, for lacking intrinsic qualities of their own,


Why must they lack intrinsic qualities?  It seems you are assuming that ontological 
difference implies multiplicity and the integers. But what if the something is the 
universal wave function (as it is in some theories) which is defined over a complex 
Hilbert space? Parts are differentiated by their relation to other parts, but there is no 
definitive way to divide it up.  Rovelli characterizes it as relations without relata.


they canly be distinguished in quantitative ways, such that it is their position in a 
quantitative structure which determines what they are.) Now we can say: the source (or 
cause) of what beings are is (ontic) difference. This difference, then, must precede 
them, just as any origin must precede the originated (at least logically, if not 
temporally). But what is this difference that precedes the different beings? It's like a 
relation that generates its own relata. Thus we must postulate something like a pure 
difference or a pure negativity underlying the mutual non-identity of beings. But what 
is this pure negativity? It seems clear to me that we are now back with our starting 
point, the concept of nothing as differing from itself. And this is not surprising if 
the self-negating nothing generates all beings, for then it must also act as the pure 
negativity that differentiates beings. But now comes the rub: there is a contradiction 
between ontological and ontic difference. Recall: ontological difference requires that 
beings differ from nothing (i.e. pure negativity), whereas ontic difference requires 
that there is pure negativity between them. Hence: to have existence (i.e. ontological 
difference) beings must stand in a negative relation to the negativity between them, 
they must differ from their mutual difference. But to differ from their mutual 
difference, beings must become the same and loose their separate identities.


I don't see how that follows.  You and I both differ from Bruno, but that doesn't entail 
that you can I are the same person.


Hence there is a contradiction between identity and existence, i.e. between the 
determinacy of beings (ontic difference) and their existence (ontological difference): 
in short, existence is unifying, determinacy is separating. Now given the fact that 
being must be logically consistent, we must interpret this contradiction not as logical 
but as an opposition of forces.


"Forces" opposing one another (are we to assume metaphysical equilibrium) seems more 
metaphorical than logical.


Brent

Thus existence becomes a unifying force, determinac

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think
>> that every integer has a successor.  It's just a convenient assumption for
>> doing proofs and calculations.
>>
>>   So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how
> might one determine what it is?
>
>
> I think we invented the integers, so it's up to us whether we want there
> to be a largest integer.  It is certainly is more convenient to reason
> about some things by assuming there is not, but that's true of real numbers
> too.
>
>
I don't know what you mean by "invented the integers. And whenever I've
asked I get a vague handwavey answer, and then you say you have no
viewpoint so it isn't worth arguing with you.

So, OK, whatever.

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>  On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb 
>>
>>  > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.
>>
>>
>>  Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
>> with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
>> the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
>> right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
>> that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
>> to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.
>>
>>  I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
>> But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the
>> world.
>>
>
>  That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a
> model of the world.
>
>
> But you left out the "just".
>
>
Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a "just a model of the world"
viewpoint then you have to be prepared for the fact that it affects
everything else. You're basically postmodernising the entire scientific
enterprise.

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Re: generalizations_of_islam - God Matter

2014-10-23 Thread John Mikes

Liz: I should object to the subject. How can Islm be GENERALIZED with their
differences among their own shades?
IS happily chops off Islamic heads if their sentiments diverge. Shia-s
Sunnis are warring for 15 centuries and I would not
volunteer counting the diverse shade-differences ('shady'?)
JM

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 6:06 PM, LizR  wrote:

>
>
> On 22 October 2014 02:01, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 21 Oct 2014, at 00:24, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 21 October 2014 04:06, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Oct 2014, at 01:20, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Richard
>>>
>>> I'm only on page 2 of your paper, but already confused. You appear to be
>>> positing that a mathematical universe might have a physical underpinning.
>>> If so, this rather defangs the MUH,
>>>
>>> OK.
>>>
>>> which obtains its importance from being logically prior to (the
>>> appearance of) a material universe. Without that assumption
>>>
>>> Which assumption?
>>>
>>
>> The assumption that the MUH makes mathematics logically prior to a
>> material universe.
>>
>>
>> is that not part of the MUH?
>>
>
> Yes, which was my point. Deriving the MUH from a primitively physical
> universe appears like a pointless exercise.
>
>  --
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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience


On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

> Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.


Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with 
experiment
the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment 
have only
had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. 
Are
we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if 
there
were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point?  I 
honestly
don't know.

I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.  But 
then I
also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.


That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of 
the world.


But you left out the "just".

Brent

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that
every
integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs
and
calculations.

So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine what
it is?

I think we invented the integers, so it's up to us whether we want there to be a largest
integer. It is certainly is more convenient to reason about some things by assuming there
is not, but that's true of real numbers too.

Brent

Obviously it's larger than Graham's Number (It could become known as Brent's
Number!)

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014-10-23 21:21 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR  wrote:
>
> > There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
>> you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.
>>
>
> I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal
> pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble, it strikes at the very core
> of his ideas. The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and accompanied thought
> experiments is to make words like "I" and "you" and "he" crystal clear. In
> our normal everyday world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world
> where matter duplication machines exist ( and the only reason we don't have
> such machines already is engineering difficulties  not scientific
> difficulties) such words have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the
> very beginning Bruno  assumes that even after the duplication everything
> has already been cleared up and so he says stuff like "you will see this"
> and "he will predict that". It is not allowed to assume what you're trying
> to prove.
>
>
No, the only one giving ambiguity is you... It has always been clear that
*you should follow the diary and what's written on them*... But I don't
expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an asshole and a
troll for years... which you are of course.


>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable,
>

Yes.

> but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this
>

I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness
not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask "what city will you be
in?", all that can be said is that the brain that receives information
about Moscow will think about Moscow and the brain that receives
information about Washington will think about Washington, and the question
"which one is you" can not be answered because in these circumstances the
word "you" has no unique referent .

  John K Clark

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR  wrote:

> There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one
> you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble.
>

I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal
pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble, it strikes at the very core
of his ideas. The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and accompanied thought
experiments is to make words like "I" and "you" and "he" crystal clear. In
our normal everyday world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world
where matter duplication machines exist ( and the only reason we don't have
such machines already is engineering difficulties  not scientific
difficulties) such words have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the
very beginning Bruno  assumes that even after the duplication everything
has already been cleared up and so he says stuff like "you will see this"
and "he will predict that". It is not allowed to assume what you're trying
to prove.

  John K Clark

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-23 Thread Peter Sas

Hi Richard,

I must stress that this is all new territory for me, but what I gather from 
the things I've read so far is that dark energy is a form of positive 
energy balanced by the negative energy of gravity. So here too some kind of 
polarity seems to hold. The point is that as space expands, dark energy 
increases, so the law of energy conservation is violated, unless the 
negative energy of gravity increases with an equal amount, so as to 
'balance the books'. Thus it would seem that what happens in inflation is 
precisely this 'splitting' of positive, dark energy (repulsion, which 
drives the inflation) and the negative energy of gravity. Dark energy can 
only increase if the negative energy of gravity increases at the same time. 
Dark energy and gravity seem to be the two opposed sidess of one and the 
same coin, which is also suggested by the fact that dark energy is often 
referred to a repulsive gravity. 

Well, that's what I understand about it (and that's not much)... I have to 
do more reading on this subject to feel really comfortable about it... But 
as far as I can tell right now, this duality of dark energy and the 
negative energy of gravity fits the dialectical picture of nothing 
splitting into opposites quite well.

Peter



Actually Peter I was thinking more about  your basic assumption that 
mass-energy is balanced by gravity, one being the negative of the other, 
which also seems to apply to the dialectic explained in the second blog 
above, which I just read.


> Dark energy creates more space and perhaps spacetime. Space or spacetime 
> does not appear to be the negative of anything. Rather like a particle and 
> an anti-particle annihilating each other to produce light, if the dielectic 
> is correct for Dark Energy, then there must be a balance of positive and 
> negative to create space. Yet the creation of space just creates more Dark 
> Energy along with it. 
>
> The leading candidate for the explanation of Dark Energy is the 
> cosmological constant which amounts to a repulsive force. But space or 
> space time is neutral with respect to force and there is apparently no 
> evidence that an attractive force like gravity due to matter creation is 
> happening. Someone on this list like Brent or John Clark will surely 
> correct my explanation if it is wrong. But in short, Dark Energy appears to 
> falsify the notion that something is derived from nothing by a balance of 
> forces.
>
> BTW there some preliminary evidence that the cosmological constant 
> explanation is not correct: 
> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dark-energy-cosmological-constant/
> Richard
>
>
>>
>>

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR  wrote:

>> No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's "proof"
>> and stopped reading when I made the  determination that he didn't know what
>> he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I
>> made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage
>> capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and
>> Bruno's "proof" didn't make the cut.
>>
>
> > Nevertheless, a lot of highly intelligent people (like Brent and
> Russell) have followed Bruno's proof all the way through, and although they
> may have issues with it, they don't rail constantly against step 3. You're
> the only person who does this.
>

As I said I no longer remember what any of the steps were and see no reason
to refresh my memory, but if I was the only one to catch a blunder in step
3 then good for me. I do remember that Bruno made a big deal about
something he called first person indeterminacy that on first reading seemed
utterly ridiculous to me and when questioned extensively about it over a
period of many months  (I hope never to see Helsinki or Moscow) proved
incapable of defending it.  He also maintained that the chain of personal
identity depends on how accurately your predictions about the future were
are rather than remembering who you were yesterday, and that  is even more
ridiculous.

> Maybe you would like to consider the possibility that these clever people
> have noticed something that - despite, no doubt, being equally clever -
> you've missed.
>

Neither Bruno nor Brent nor Russell nor anybody else has come even close to
answering the objections I have to my satisfaction, if fact the defense was
so inept it only reinforced my opinion that Bruno didn't know what he was
talking about. And I refuse to accept anybody's idea on faith.

  John K Clark

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>> Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
>> with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
>> the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
>> right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
>> that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
>> to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.
>>
>
> > I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.
> But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the
> world.
>

I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers,
particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them.
And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles  and
crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model,
but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but
part of our the world .


  John K Clark

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 23 Oct 2014, at 02:23, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR  wrote:

I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could  
no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2  were or if it was in  
step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it  
was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently  
makes me think it deserves a second look.


In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at  
something you don't actually know anything about.


No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's  
"proof" and stopped reading when I made the  determination that he  
didn't know what he was talking about.
Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I made the wrong  
decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage capacity  
I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and  
Bruno's "proof" didn't make the cut.



No. You have pretended that something did not follow, but when asked  
what you have offered until now, as Liz just said, are semantical  
quibbles. +  hand wavings, mockeries of the entire field, and many ad  
hominem unfair allusions.


In the original thesis, as I was told that I might have some jury  
member allergic to thought experiences, I manage to use them only to  
motivate the technical definitions of the modal "probability  
one" (with S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*). AUDA (the arithmetical UDA), technically  
does not need UDA. It makes the reasoning embedded in computer  
science, indeed even in arithmetic.


But you are providing evidence that some people propagate rumors like  
if there was something controversial about what you call "my proof",  
which is only the formulation of a problem, and the attempt of  
solution is AUDA.


To negate the step three, you have to build a robot able to predict  
its first person diary continuation in a WM-like duplication. As Kim  
remarked, the impossibility of this can be understood by kids. Then  
AUDA exploits the fact that we can even explain this to "enough rich"  
machine, using the recursion theoretic tools, and defined in  
mathematics, indeed in arithmetic, what we mean by  
"understand" (indeed using Gödel's provability predicate or variants).


Do the work John.  If not,  try at least to be more cautious with the  
words. Only idiots pronounce judgement  on what they do not  
understand. Want to play that role? Be my guess.


The problem for you, is that the very tone that you are using will not  
help you to change your mind. I do suspect you have had the aha! more  
than one time, but then you prefer to stop the thinking and come back  
with your attitude of "nobody can doubt physics is the fundamental  
science". That dogmatic attitude will just prevent your ability to  
conceive other fundamental theories. Many physicists are open to the  
idea that physics might eventually be explained mathematically, with  
or without comp, like on the other side number theorists flirt with  
fundamental physics, almost for their pure number theoretical  
motivation.


You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, but it seems  
that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this for having a  
theory unifying what we can observe and shared, what we can live and  
experience, what we can conceive, and what we can hope + the minimal  
amount of the inconceivable (here limited to 0, s(0), s(s(0)) ... with  
their addition laws and their multiplication laws). Here "we" is for  
the ideally arithmetically sound machines.


Bruno










  John K Clark




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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 Oct 2014, at 03:41, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014   Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> Wait? How long should I wait?
> Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or  
not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for  
the search of a proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a  
bit long more. You can bound the running time of the programs with  
the Busy Beaver function (BB). The answer to your question is : no  
more than BB(k) seconds where k is the number of bit used to  
describe the program you ask if it stops or not. I assume a machine  
doing computational step in one second.

If the program is to find the smallest even integer greater than 2  
that is not the sum of two primes and then stop, and if there are no  
even integers greater than 2 that are not the sum of two primes then  
I will be waiting forever for it to stop and forever be uncertain if  
Goldbach is true or not.

Maybe someday it will find such a number and stop or maybe there is  
no such number and it will never stop; but the Busy Beaver function  
is only defined for the class of Turing Machines that eventually  
stop, and nobody knows if the the Goldbach Turing Machine is of that  
class or not. And even if it is and  Busy Beaver has a meaning for  
it nobody knows what number BB(k) is and nobody has anyway of  
calculating it so it does me no good whatsoever.

 >> Do you think real numbers exist or do you not?

> What I think is of no concern to you.

Sorry for asking such a personal question.

I work in a theory (computationalism + an infinitesimal use of Occam  
Razor, and the classical theory of knowledge). In that theory, the  
real numbers do not exist, as what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)),  
etc.
But the real numbers still exists at the machine epistemological  
level.

So at the human epistemological level Harry Potter exists.

I don't see your point, nor if there is a point.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience



On 23 Oct 2014, at 04:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Brent,

That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
but is it also true for matrix theory?
Re: real and complex numbers.


Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM,
the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus
couple of real numbers), same for momentum.

In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't
find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems
to be refuted on this point.

Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it
does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what
we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I
think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in
arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers
with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume
computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a
primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ...


To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx
do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some  
finite
precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the  
needle of

an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next.

Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and  
eigenvectors

drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as
an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And  
even then,

countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's
ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to.


But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to  
think that every integer has a successor.  It's just a convenient  
assumption for doing proofs and calculations.


All depends on what you assume.

The idea is: let us start from simple, and if we need something more,  
we can add more.


Once we assume the brain is turing emulable, then it is emulated  
infinitely often in arithmetic, and the question is more: does this  
define a unique universe, a unique multiverse, ... or not?


Arithmetic needs its "Gleason theorem", and the intensional variant of  
provability shows that the "machine dreams" might be enough linear and  
symmetrical for that. Does all physical realities have to exploit  
Unitary = e^i * (self-adjointness)?


Bruno





Brent



Cheers


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Re: generalizations_of_islam - God Matter

On 23 Oct 2014, at 04:52, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> I can accept that it is rational to disbelieve in fairy-tale  
notion of god,

There are 2 choices, you can have:

1) A fairy-tale notion of god that is entertaining but silly.

2) A notion for God that lets you preserve the word "God" but is so  
bland and uncontroversial as to be useless

The meaning of "zero" is also bland and uncontroversial, but is useless.

The advantage of using god, is that we can reason abstractly, and many  
points will be true for all rational theologies.

By Gödel's completeness theorem: a machine's set of beliefs  is  
consistent iff it exists a model (a mathematical structures)  
satisfying those beliefs. A machine betting on its consistency is  
equivalent (from outside) to a machine netting on a reality (a  
structure satisfying its beliefs). By Gödels INcompleteness, a machine  
believing in a reality should be inconsistent, unless she add the  
interrogation mark, and use cautious inference rule on such marked  
propositions. That is what I will call the machine's theology. By a  
theorem of Solovay, we get the proper theological part of the rational  
possible beliefs of ideally correct machines axiomatized by the modal  
logics G* \ G, including their intensional variants. One of which  
should be a quanum logic, for the FPI making mathematical sense, and  
up to now, it is shown to be the case.

>  I have hundreds of book on theology

Wow , you could make a lot of good wood pulp with all that.

>> According to theology how does consciousness work?

> Which one?

Hey I'm not picky, find me any theology that can give a good answer  
to that question and I'll become the most religious person you ever  
saw.

I suggest taking the theology of any simple ideally correct, or  
arithmetically sound, machine. It contains physics, and this makes it  
testable.

> Read Plotinus,

No.

OK, but then stop confusing theology in general and christian  
theology. You really act like you want to ignore that theology has  
been a science before a political brainwashing tools, in some  
countries at some times.

You know something, if I never see another word about the ancient  
Greeks on this list I will not in any way feel deprived.

That is because you are not interested in the fundamental questions,

It's because I have nothing but contempt for the idea that my time  
could be better spent reading Plotinus than reading a modern book  
about cosmology.

But cosmology does not address the problem of consciousness, and if  
you read the posts you should understand that post people here are  
aware of that problem.

If you tell me that cosmology has solved the problem, then show the  
references. Only Aristotle and some theologian have believed that the  
solution could be found by cosmology or physics, but this fails  
provably so when we ssume computationalism. It is not clear if it is  
more solvable with non-comp theories.

 > As you say above, you seem glad with the "I don't know" theory.

That theory has one virtue, it is obviously correct, and thus it is  
vastly superior to a theory that is obviously wrong.

Obviously wrong?

Bruno

 John K Clark

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?



On 23 Oct 2014, at 05:34, LizR wrote:

IMHO this slightly understates the problem of an infinite causal  
chain:
The idea of an eternally existing universe - for example in the form  
of an eternal cycle of Big Bangs - might turn out to be a  
scientifically legitimate hypothesis. It might even turn out to be  
true. But it still doesn't answer the question why there is anything  
at all. It doesn't answer the question why there is this infinite  
series to begin with. It might be objected that this question makes  
no sense because in an infinite series of causes there simply is no  
first cause. But this objection assumes that the ultimate cause of  
the universe must be temporal, existing in time, like the universe  
itself. But why can't the ultimate cause be non-temporal? This,  
indeed, is what contemporary physics suggests about the cause of the  
Big Bang: since not only space and matter but also time itself only  
came into existence with the Big Bang, the cause of the Big Bang  
must be timeless. This notion of a non-temporal cause is also  
inescapable for the infinitist solution. A temporally infinite  
series of causes has no first cause in time, but it must have an  
ultimate cause outside of time, a non-temporal cause.
Assuming the laws of physics allow such an infinite chain to exist,  
I think a more important question is where do those laws originate?


That is, the "something" that we're wondering about includes  
whatever makes what physically exists the way it is.





Do you agree that computationalism provides an answer, in the sense  
that it explains why


1) there is no primitive universe  (so no origin problem),
2) universal machine cannot avoid the discovery of a physical universe  
and easily take it as primitive,
3) that such physical reality has a first person plural (locally it  
looks like third person physical) and pure first person non sharable  
aspects (so this explains, in some sense, the existence of the qualia,  
and the quanta appears to be sharable one among groups of universal  
machines).
4) all this in a testable way. In particular, the physics would not be  
quantum like, computationalism would be no more plausible. Both  
Gödel's incompleteness theorem and QM saves computationalism and its  
solution of the mind body problem.


I m not sure at all such a naïve classical theory is true, but the  
point is that it is testable, and it gives the most we can hope,  
because of


5) Logicians can already explains why we cannot explains where the  
numbers (or the base universal machine you prefer) comes from. We have  
to assume it to even address the question. Almost by definition,  
anything capable of explaining the existence of a universal machine,  
is Turing universal itself.


This reduces the mind-body problem to our belief in elementary  
arithmetic, together with an explanation why the question "where  
elementary arithmetic comes from?" provably unanswerable.


This seems to me to explain why here is something (theological,  
physical, psychological, biological) from what we accept in high  
school algebra, up to the possible refutation by nature.


Arithmetic (not logic per se) can be seen then as an atemporal  
"cause", but from inside, machine needs to bet on larger and larger  
part of the arithmetical and the analytical truth. The view from  
"inside" is inexhaustible, and refutes all effective theories.


Hmm.. To get all this needs some amount of computer science and  
mathematical logic, and "philosophy of mind".


Bruno

Bruno




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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-23 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Peter Sas  wrote:

> Well, I'm not a physicists but a philosopher, so I cannot give a
> physicist's answer. My approach is to start with the most fundamental
> question (Why is there anything at all?) and then see how far we can get
> with pure logic alone. It is of course very, very tricky to try to derive
> fundamental laws of nature in this way. But I think that we can actually
> get quite far with such an a priori method. Now with respect to your
> question, I understand that dark energy is a basically repulsive force
> driving inflation. I don't want to say I can derive dark energy from a
> priori principles (that would be absurd). But I think I can derive a
> duality of attraction and repulsion in that way. The reasoning I emply,
> however, is very abstract, using ideas taken from philosophers like Hegel
> and Heidegger, although on the whole I feel more attracted to the
> rationality of Anglo-American philosophy (and science) than to postmodern
> philosophy (which I think is basically a fraud). Perhaps my reasoning is
> closest to German idealists like Hegel and Schelling who still feld they
> could derive the basic principles of natural science from philosophical
> principles. So here is how my argument goes in nuce, I hope you can make
> sense of it:
>
> First I argue that nothing is self-negating (for logical arguments see the
> blog piece). Simply put: nothing is nothing to such a degree that it isn't
> even itself! Thus, as nothing negates itself, it produces being, it becomes
> something. Now, since nothing is different from itself, being (as the
> negation of nothing) must be different from something else. This then is
> how I define being: as difference from something else. Now it is easy to
> see that this difference must take two forms. First, being is being because
> it differs from non-being or nothing (let's call this ontological
> difference, following Heidegger). Second, being must also be internally
> differentiated, that is to say: there must be multiple beings differing
> from each other (let's call this ontic difference). Then we can say: a
> being is what it is because of its ontic difference from other beings.
> (Ultimately, I think, this imlies that beings are mathematical, for lacking
> intrinsic qualities of their own, they canly be distinguished in
> quantitative ways, such that it is their position in a quantitative
> structure which determines what they are.) Now we can say: the source (or
> cause) of what beings are is (ontic) difference. This difference, then,
> must precede them, just as any origin must precede the originated (at least
> logically, if not temporally). But what is this difference that precedes
> the different beings? It's like a relation that generates its own relata.
> Thus we must postulate something like a pure difference or a pure
> negativity underlying the mutual non-identity of beings. But what is this
> pure negativity? It seems clear to me that we are now back with our
> starting point, the concept of nothing as differing from itself. And this
> is not surprising if the self-negating nothing generates all beings, for
> then it must also act as the pure negativity that differentiates beings.
> But now comes the rub: there is a contradiction between ontological and
> ontic difference. Recall: ontological difference requires that beings
> differ from nothing (i.e. pure negativity), whereas ontic difference
> requires that there is pure negativity between them. Hence: to have
> existence (i.e. ontological difference) beings must stand in a negative
> relation to the negativity between them, they must differ from their mutual
> difference. But to differ from their mutual difference, beings must become
> the same and loose their separate identities. Hence there is a
> contradiction between identity and existence, i.e. between the determinacy
> of beings (ontic difference) and their existence (ontological difference):
> in short, existence is unifying, determinacy is separating. Now given the
> fact that being must be logically consistent, we must interpret this
> contradiction not as logical but as an opposition of forces. Thus existence
> becomes a unifying force, determinacy (ontic difference) becomes a
> separating force. The separating force must manifest itself as repulsion,
> i.e. as resistance against unification. The unifying force must manifest
> itself as resistance against repulsion, i.e. as attraction. Hence repulsion
> and attraction are the basic forces that govern being.
>
> I spelled out this argument in more detail on another blog piece I wrote:
>
> So if you want more detail, please check this piece. I have to emphasize,
> however, that I am still working on these ideas and that I hope to publish
> a fuller account on my blog in the near future.
>   http://critique-of-pure
> 
> -interest.blogspot.nl/201

Re: philosophy tech support

On 23 October 2014 21:47, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

>
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:57 AM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 23 October 2014 01:22, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>>
>>> I suspect "Everything List Tech Support" would be quite similar!
>>>
>>> http://existentialcomics.com/comic/51
>>>
>>
>> Reminds me of Monty Python's philosophers' football match.
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2gJamguN04
>>
>
> A great classic. Leibniz is a terrible goal keeper!
>
> Yes, he shouldn't have let that one in ... but maybe it was the best of
all possible goals.

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Re: philosophy tech support

2014-10-23 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:57 AM, LizR  wrote:

> On 23 October 2014 01:22, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
>> I suspect "Everything List Tech Support" would be quite similar!
>>
>> http://existentialcomics.com/comic/51
>>
>
> Reminds me of Monty Python's philosophers' football match.
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2gJamguN04
>

A great classic. Leibniz is a terrible goal keeper!


>
>
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Re: philosophy tech support

On 23 October 2014 21:43, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> On 10/22/2014 5:22 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> I suspect "Everything List Tech Support" would be quite similar!
>>>
>>> http://existentialcomics.com/comic/51
>>>
>>
>> Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a 30,000 page menu and no
>> food.
>>
>
> Unless you're on a diet, when it's the other way around.

>
> Normal life feels like that when you're depressed. Which helps explains
> perhaps a certain connection between dark moods and existential questions...
>
> Yeah, I get the dark moods and existential questions. Normally when I
catch a bug.

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Re: philosophy tech support

2014-10-23 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 10/22/2014 5:22 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> I suspect "Everything List Tech Support" would be quite similar!
>>
>> http://existentialcomics.com/comic/51
>>
>
> Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a 30,000 page menu and no
> food.
>

Normal life feels like that when you're depressed. Which helps explains
perhaps a certain connection between dark moods and existential questions...


> --- Robert Pirsig
>
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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-23 Thread Peter Sas

Well, I'm not a physicists but a philosopher, so I cannot give a 
physicist's answer. My approach is to start with the most fundamental 
question (Why is there anything at all?) and then see how far we can get 
with pure logic alone. It is of course very, very tricky to try to derive 
fundamental laws of nature in this way. But I think that we can actually 
get quite far with such an a priori method. Now with respect to your 
question, I understand that dark energy is a basically repulsive force 
driving inflation. I don't want to say I can derive dark energy from a 
priori principles (that would be absurd). But I think I can derive a 
duality of attraction and repulsion in that way. The reasoning I emply, 
however, is very abstract, using ideas taken from philosophers like Hegel 
and Heidegger, although on the whole I feel more attracted to the 
rationality of Anglo-American philosophy (and science) than to postmodern 
philosophy (which I think is basically a fraud). Perhaps my reasoning is 
closest to German idealists like Hegel and Schelling who still feld they 
could derive the basic principles of natural science from philosophical 
principles. So here is how my argument goes in nuce, I hope you can make 
sense of it:

First I argue that nothing is self-negating (for logical arguments see the 
blog piece). Simply put: nothing is nothing to such a degree that it isn't 
even itself! Thus, as nothing negates itself, it produces being, it becomes 
something. Now, since nothing is different from itself, being (as the 
negation of nothing) must be different from something else. This then is 
how I define being: as difference from something else. Now it is easy to 
see that this difference must take two forms. First, being is being because 
it differs from non-being or nothing (let's call this ontological 
difference, following Heidegger). Second, being must also be internally 
differentiated, that is to say: there must be multiple beings differing 
from each other (let's call this ontic difference). Then we can say: a 
being is what it is because of its ontic difference from other beings. 
(Ultimately, I think, this imlies that beings are mathematical, for lacking 
intrinsic qualities of their own, they canly be distinguished in 
quantitative ways, such that it is their position in a quantitative 
structure which determines what they are.) Now we can say: the source (or 
cause) of what beings are is (ontic) difference. This difference, then, 
must precede them, just as any origin must precede the originated (at least 
logically, if not temporally). But what is this difference that precedes 
the different beings? It's like a relation that generates its own relata. 
Thus we must postulate something like a pure difference or a pure 
negativity underlying the mutual non-identity of beings. But what is this 
pure negativity? It seems clear to me that we are now back with our 
starting point, the concept of nothing as differing from itself. And this 
is not surprising if the self-negating nothing generates all beings, for 
then it must also act as the pure negativity that differentiates beings. 
But now comes the rub: there is a contradiction between ontological and 
ontic difference. Recall: ontological difference requires that beings 
differ from nothing (i.e. pure negativity), whereas ontic difference 
requires that there is pure negativity between them. Hence: to have 
existence (i.e. ontological difference) beings must stand in a negative 
relation to the negativity between them, they must differ from their mutual 
difference. But to differ from their mutual difference, beings must become 
the same and loose their separate identities. Hence there is a 
contradiction between identity and existence, i.e. between the determinacy 
of beings (ontic difference) and their existence (ontological difference): 
in short, existence is unifying, determinacy is separating. Now given the 
fact that being must be logically consistent, we must interpret this 
contradiction not as logical but as an opposition of forces. Thus existence 
becomes a unifying force, determinacy (ontic difference) becomes a 
separating force. The separating force must manifest itself as repulsion, 
i.e. as resistance against unification. The unifying force must manifest 
itself as resistance against repulsion, i.e. as attraction. Hence repulsion 
and attraction are the basic forces that govern being. 

I spelled out this argument in more detail on another blog piece I wrote: 
http://critique-of-pure-interest.blogspot.nl/2014/06/theses-towards-dialectical-ontology_8246.html
So if you want more detail, please check this piece. I have to emphasize, 
however, that I am still working on these ideas and that I hope to publish 
a fuller account on my blog in the near future.

.  

Op woensdag 22 oktober 2014 15:46:16 UTC+2 schreef yanniru:
>
> Peter,
>
> Could you elaborate on how Dark Energy fits into your thesis?
> Richard
>
> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
>  On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb 
>
>  > Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers.
>
>
>  Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it
> with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after
> the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the
> right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that
> that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits
> to the right of the decimal point?  I honestly don't know.
>
> I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers.  But
> then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world.
>

That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model
of the world.

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb  wrote:

> But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think
> that every integer has a successor.  It's just a convenient assumption for
> doing proofs and calculations.
>
> So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine
what it is? Obviously it's larger than Graham's Number (It could become
known as Brent's Number!)

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 23 October 2014 13:35, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> >
> > >Brent,
> > >
> > >That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations,
> > >but is it also true for matrix theory?
> > >Re: real and complex numbers.
> >
> >
> > Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM,
> > the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus
> > couple of real numbers), same for momentum.
> >
> > In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't
> > find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems
> > to be refuted on this point.
> >
> > Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it
> > does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what
> > we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I
> > think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in
> > arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers
> > with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume
> > computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a
> > primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ...
> >
>
> To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx
> do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some finite
> precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the needle of
> an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next.
>
> Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and eigenvectors
> drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as
> an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And even then,
> countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the
> Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's
> ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to.
>
> Um, does that mean you agree with me? :-)

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Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience