Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On 20 Jul 2016, at 01:31, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and fractured logic under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug. > No problem, If there really is no problem why does Bruno Marchal refuse to to use Mr. He's name? Because the theory would fall apart that's why. I did it, and you did not reply. > we agree on who "he" is at all times."he" is both copies, as both remember having been in Helsinki. Then answer just one question, how many people remember being in Helsinki? Two. Indeed both confirmed "HW v HM", which is equivalent to H & (W v M)" > The FPI comes from the fact that alhtough he is both, he (both guy) can only feel to be one of them. "THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI duplicating machines "THE FPI" does not exist. The FPI requires duplicating machines. >>Two people not one have the experience of seeing only one city and not the other. So which ONE is "THE"? > Both in the 3-1 view. What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3 view"? 3p view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places. 3-1 view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places and I attribute a genuine first person experience to both guys (and thus I listen to them, or read their personal diary, and both confirmed W v M. > One of them with the 1-1 view. What the hell is the difference between "THE 1-1 view" and "THE 1-view"? And which ONE of the TWO did it turn out to have "THE 1-1 view", was it Moscow or Washington? The 1-1 view is just an expression emphasizing that it is not the 3-1 view. The 1-1-view is equivalent with a 1-view, not attributed to another body, but to the indexical body (or diary/memory) to which the experiencer has some direct access (usually through neurons). At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when it's all over and the box is opened the state of the cat's health is known, Which cat? We know all the time that the cat is all the time dead and alive, in the 3-1 view, which here is the universal wave. But yes, in each branch, the cat observer, when he observes the cat with some alive/dead apparatus, will see only the cat being dead, or alive, but this is because he splitted/differentiate, like in the WM-duplication. > That's why in Helsinki, we got an indeterminacy. Nothing as profound as that, all that happened is that in Helsinki somebody spouted some gibberish and stuck a question mark at the end of it. Not at all. Even using pronouns, or not, the question is cristal clear, and the means of verification is very simple. It is just that you seem to infer we get a 3p indeterminacy, but we get "only" a 1p indeterminacy, like in Everett, but in a much larger context, and that explains eventually why physics cannot be the fundamental science, once we bet on Mechanism. Then the math confirms this up to now. >> John Clark will say if P=1/2 is correct or not as soon as Bruno Marchal explains exactly what P is supposed to be a probability of. Until then is is neither correct nor incorrect, it's just gibberish > The probability of seeing W. Or of seeing M, for the H-guy. But before you said "he", The Helsinki guy, "is both copies, as both remember having been in Helsinki." . So the guy seeing Washington at 9:01 am Thursday morning remembers being the Helsinki guy at 8:59 am on Thursday morning, so the probability of that guy seeing Washington is 1 not 1/2. But that guy is not alone, the guy seeing Moscow at 9:01am Thursday morning also remembers being the Helsinki guy at 8:59 am on Thursday morning, so the probability of that guy seeing Moscow is 1 not 1/2. Therefore the probability of the guy seeing Helsinki at 8:59 am on Thursday morning seeing BOTH Washington and Moscow at 9:01 Thursday morning is 100% not 50%. For the 3-1 view, that is correct, but avoid the question asked. I think you played that trick a lot. Repeating errors does not correct them. Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means "remember having been in Helsinki" John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this will be "not in the 1-p" forgetting that in a world that has 1-p duplicating machines there is no such thing as "THE 1-p". Then you die, and computationalism is false, making my point. If computationalism is correct, then there is a "the 1-p" at both places, and that is what we talk about. "a "the" " does not seem english, but that is indeed because english is not well suited to a world with duplicating machine. "the 1p" is the one you will live with certainty, although you cannot know which one in advance. "Which one" makes no sense in the 3p view, but get already clear
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 20 Jul 2016, at 23:44, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 9:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote There would be a discontinuity if you go into the teleporter in one city and get out in another, but there is also a discontinuity if you fall asleep on the train. Except at death conscious is always continuous, With computationalism, it can be shown (in different ways) that conscious is continuous even at death, although it is here that we have to take the 1-3 distinction the most into account. That is almost trivial. Your first person is associated with infinitely many computations, making conscious continues, and this with some intuitionistic semantic topology (as provided through the mathematical 1p: S4Grz1 and X1*) There is an inflation of type of immortality, and some depends on what you identify yourself with. Now, nobody can know for sure that computationalism is true, nor can know for sure its own substitution level. But everyone can bet, as you already did. We don't need to believe in the theology of numbers, and we can consider it as a "toy theology", but it is interesting that it can be tested, and that what is weird and shocking in QM becomes trivial, and I guess as much shocking, when we assume explicitly the digital mechanist thesis. This happens at the intuitive level (step 7), and in arithmetic (from theoretical computer science). I am aware this is step 7 level advanced computationalism (grin), and it requires a good understanding of the extensional and intensional Church-Turing-Post thesis (non grin), and some knowledge on how recursive functions and predicate can be represented in (very weak) arithmetical theories, like RA. I insist anyone interested (having studied a bit the Mendelson book, or Boolos & Jeffrey) take a look on the three papers of Tarski, including the important --Mostowski, Robinson, Tarski paper, where RA is born and shown essentially undecidable (undecidable and so for *all* its consistent extensions and theories in which they can be interpreted). People should understand well that the notion of computation is not just a well defined mathematical concept, but that it is also an arithmetical concept, indeed a Sigma_1 complete one, like, notably Gödel's beweisbar predicate []p, or [0]p, which is axiomatized by G (at the machine justifiable level) and G* (at the truth level). although the outside world may not be. With mind-digitalism (the mechanist hypothesis in the *cognitive* science) there are infinitely many universal numbers which compete for making you believe in an sensible and stable world. What does that give? We can only do the math. Bruno In your example it's the train that behaves discontinuously, instantaneously it jumps many miles ahead. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 19 Jul 2016, at 18:29, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the original and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels that he is the one true copy persisting through time This is why I think Bruno's argument that you can instantiate consciousness without a physical world fails. The physical and mental are inextricably entwined. Computationalism guaranties that the physical and the mental are deeply entwined. The physical becomes the border of the universal mind (the mind of the universal machine/number), so to speak. The point is just that once you bet on computationalism, you can no more invoke some physical reality to explain consciousness, you have to explain the physical by local/global relative measure on the computations, which are already all realized, in infinitely many relative representations, in arithmetic. Invoking the physical, having understood the notion of computation, is exactly introducing the kind of magic in matter which would prevent the computationalist to say "yes" to the doctor. And also, why not add the need of a God with a white beard sitting on a cloud? You can't reify a metaphysical notion to hide a genuine problem, which is also an interesting problem as it leads to the testability of a rather precise version of the cognitive digital thesis (CT + YD). With computationalism, physics becomes machine-independent, or theory independent. The physics is the same in all the phi_i bases. That is a very powerful invariant principle, for both physics and psychology/bio/ theology. Bruno Brent -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> "THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI duplicating >> machines >> "THE FPI" does not exist. >> > > > > The FPI requires duplicating machines. > We haven't invented duplicating machines yet, does that mean FPI doesn't exist in our world? >> >> >> What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3 view"? > > > > > 3p view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places. > > 3-1 view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places and I > attribute a genuine first person experience to both > In other words the Helsinki man's " genuine first person experience " would be experienced by both . So "What one and only one experience will The Helsinki Man experience?" is not a question with a indeterminate answer, it's just an asinine question. > > The 1-1 view is just an expression emphasizing that it is not the 3-1 view. > > Then it's just a case of jargon inflation to impress the rubes, but I'm not a rube and I am not impressed. I had already figured out that if 1 view were the same as 3 view you wouldn't have given them different names. > > The 1-1-view is equivalent with a 1-view Then the best way to emphasize that is to never say 1-1-view again. >> >> At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when it's all over >> and the box is opened the state of the cat's health is known, > > > > > Which cat? > The only cat in the box that we can see in the observable universe, that cat. > > > We know all the time that the cat is all the time dead and alive, in the > 3-1 view, > Sorry, I've lost track of what the 3-1 view is, but I do know that in no view in the observable universe "the cat is all the time dead and alive". > > > Then the math confirms this up to now. > Math alone can't confirm anything, it can just tell us that certain results follow from certain assumptions. But you're assumptions are worse than wrong, they're gibberish. >> >> Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means "remember having been in >> Helsinki >> >> " John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this will be "not in the 1-p" >> forgetting that in a world that has 1-p duplicating machines there is no >> such thing as "THE 1-p". > > > > > Then you die, Maybe, that depends entirely on what the hell "he" means, and the meaning seems to shift even within a single sentence, but whatever the hell that god damned personal pronoun means what's important is that if at least one thing (and the more the merrier) tomorrow remembers being John Clark today then John Clark will live for at least another 24 hours. > > > If computationalism is correct, then there is a "the 1-p" at both places, > No there would be "a 1p" at both places, and that would be true even if computationalism was false. > > > "the 1p" is the one you will live with certainty > And the one " you " will live with certainty is "the 1p". And round and round we go. > > although you cannot know which one in advance. > Not only that, "you" cannot know which one even after the experiment is over because it's not a question, it's just words with a question mark at the end. > > > "Which one" makes no sense in the 3p view, but get already clear meaning > in the 3-1 view. > There is no such thing as THE 3-1 view. John K Clark > > > > > > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 21 July 2016 at 07:29, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 7/20/2016 6:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, 20 July 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> >> On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett >>> wrote: >>> On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the >> original and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels >> that he is the one true copy persisting through time >> > > How would it feel any different if he weren't? He doesn't know and > neither does anyone else. So it's really meaningless to say he feels he's > the one true copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that he > was > unique. > Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I can be radically sceptical about the existence of the world and other minds, but still go about life as if it matters. But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been said about Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot conclude that he is thinking, he can only conclude that thinking is going on. >>> >>> From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a thought at >>> this moment, not that there is an entity that has a stream of thoughts. >>> >>> >>> Thoughts are not "at a moment". They have temporal extent and hence can >>> have continuity. >>> >> >> It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is more easily >> shown by considering a digital computer. A computation can be paused, >> saved, and restarted, and if there are observers in the computed >> environment there is no way for them to know that this has happened. >> >> >> First, that assumes single computer running on a clock that keeps all the >> changes synchronized so there is a each clock cycle "the state". No at all >> like a brain in which there is a distributed process. Second, it's not >> even clear that it's possible for a single clocked computer. When you stop >> a computation there are registers to be saved and cleared; and when you >> restart it these have to be reinitialized. On theory that awareness is a >> kind of computation, how do we know that a computer instantiated AI would >> not be aware of this in some sense. When you have a concussion you don't >> have memory of what went just before the event, although there's no reason >> to suppose you weren't aware of it at the time. You are aware that you >> have a gap in memory, that you have been unconscious. >> > > It would be very strange if a computer instantiated AI would be aware of a > pause in the computation, since that would imply a decoupling between the > AI's consciousness and the computation - like a dualist version of > computationalism. > > > If I programmed an AI, say for a Mars rover, I would certainly make sure > that it recorded every power loss and reboot. > That would be extra data inserted into the computation. The fact that the computer had stopped and started again would not, on its own, be noticed. > Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up >> arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an experience the >> computation could branch at the 200 ms point giving two different >> experiences, or there could be two overlapping experiences from 0 ms to 500 >> ms and from 100 ms to 600 ms. If you don't allow such overlap, and there >> are only discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still possible to replace talk >> of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with observer-half-seconds. >> >> >> I not only allow overlap, I think it is essential to how a brain >> operates, and that's why there are no discrete thoughts. Thoughts can form >> a continuum because they overlap. >> >> The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of related >>> thoughts. >>> >>> >>> That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not >>> fundamental. It depends on whether you look for something that is >>> epistemologically primary or something that is ontologically primary. >>> >> >> The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of brains. >> >>> These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a physical >>> substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient method of producing >>> thoughts with the right sort of relationship to each other, >>> >>> >>> "Producing" is a funny word to use. Are you assuming there is a >>> "someone" who produces the thoughts - even though the "someone" is emergent >>> from the thoughts? The physical world is partly an inference and partly a
Re: Holiday Exercise
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 02:22:07PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 11:01 AM, Russell Standish > wrote: > > > I am not convinced that they are the only two possible > > outcomes. Remember my skepticism of the Parfit Napoleon thought > > experiment. > > > > > There may be other theories of personal identity that are consistent. I > only mention that there are two I am aware of that are. What was your > skepticism regarding Parfit's thought experiment? Parfit's thought experiment imagined that you could smoothly interpolate between your own consciousness, and that of Napoleons, by replacing neurons one at a time. My criticism was that I could not see that this is obviously possible. At some point during the transformation, a percolation threshold is reached, and you'll lapse into unconsciousness, way before you'll start thinking you are Napoleon. Another way of expressing this phenomenon is "the straw that broke the camel's back". So whilst it is likely that Parfits process can apply between, say W and M in Bruno's teleporter example, it is far from obvious that it will work between W and Napoleon as Parfit imagines. In such a world, there will definitely be multiple persons, who are more than single observer moments. ... > > > If B and C both remember being A, then they can claim > > to being the same person as A, in spite of the fact that B and C are > > different people. > > > > What is the problem with that point of view? > > > > Identity relations, by definition, are transitive. If A is identical to B, > and A is identical to C, then B is identical to C. Then maybe "personal identity" is not an "identity relation" so defined. The teleporter example leads us to conclude that W is H and M is H, but W is not M. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 08:00:36PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > > What if Eve White can only remember being Chris Sizemore, but Eve > Black can remembers everything Eve White remembers, but doesn't > remember */being/* Eve white. And Jane can remember being Jane and > Eve White and Eve Black (c.f. "All About Eve"). > > Brent ISTM that in that case, Eve White is actually Chris Sizemore, and so is Eve Black, and Jane is both Jane and Chris Sizemore. It might help to prime the labels to avoid terminological confusion, ie "if Eve White' can only remember being Chris Sizemore, but Eve Black' can remembers everything Eve White' remembers, but doesn't remember */being/* Eve white. And Jane' can remember being Jane and Eve White and Eve Black" then Eve White' is actually Chris Sizemore, and so is Eve Black', and Jane' is both Jane and Chris Sizemore Am I missing something in the above? I haven't read the story you refer to. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
