On 20 Jul 2016, at 01:31, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​>> ​That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and fractured logic under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug.

​> ​No problem,

​If there really is no problem why does Bruno Marchal refuse to to use Mr. He's name? Because the theory would fall apart that's why.


I did it, and you did not reply.





​> ​ we agree on who "he" is at all times."he" is both copies, as both remember having been in Helsinki.

​Then answer just one question, how many people ​ ​remember being in Helsinki?​

Two. Indeed both confirmed "HW v HM", which is equivalent to H & (W v M)"





​> ​The FPI comes from the fact that alhtough he is both, he (both guy) can only feel to be one of them.

​"THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI duplicating machines ​ ​"THE FPI​" does not exist.

The FPI requires duplicating machines.






​​>>​Two people not one have the experience of seeing only one city​ ​and not the other. So which ONE is "THE"?

​> ​Both in the 3-1 view.​

​What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3 view"? ​


3p view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places.

3-1 view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places and I attribute a genuine first person experience to both guys (and thus I listen to them, or read their personal diary, and both confirmed W v M.





​> One of them with the 1-1 view.

What the hell is the difference between "​THE 1-1 view" and "​THE 1-view"? And which ​ONE of the TWO​ did it turn out ​to have "THE 1-1 view"​, ​w​as it Moscow or Washington?

The 1-1 view is just an expression emphasizing that it is not the 3-1 view. The 1-1-view is equivalent with a 1-view, not attributed to another body, but to the indexical body (or diary/memory) to which the experiencer has some direct access (usually through neurons).





At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when it's all over and the box is opened the state of the cat's health is known,


Which cat? We know all the time that the cat is all the time dead and alive, in the 3-1 view, which here is the universal wave. But yes, in each branch, the cat observer, when he observes the cat with some alive/dead apparatus, will see only the cat being dead, or alive, but this is because he splitted/differentiate, like in the WM-duplication.




​> ​That's why in Helsinki, we got an indeterminacy.

​Nothing as profound as that, ​all that happened is that in Helsinki somebody spouted some gibberish and stuck a question mark at the end of it.

Not at all. Even using pronouns, or not, the question is cristal clear, and the means of verification is very simple. It is just that you seem to infer we get a 3p indeterminacy, but we get "only" a 1p indeterminacy, like in Everett, but in a much larger context, and that explains eventually why physics cannot be the fundamental science, once we bet on Mechanism. Then the math confirms this up to now.






​​>> ​John Clark will say if P=1/2 is correct or not as soon as Bruno Marchal explains exactly what P is supposed to be a probability of.​​ ​Until then is is neither correct nor incorrect, it's just gibberish ​

​> ​The probability of seeing W. Or of seeing M, for the H-guy.

​But before you said "he", The Helsinki guy​,​ ​ ​"​i​s both copies, as both remember having been in Helsinki​.​​"​ .​ ​ So the guy seeing Washington​ ​at 9:01 am Thursday morning remembers being the Helsinki guy ​at 8:59 am on Thursday morning, ​so ​the​​ probability ​of that guy seeing Washington is​ 1 not 1/2​. ​But that guy is not alone, the guy seeing Moscow​ ​at 9:01am ​Thursday morning ​​also ​ remembers being the Helsinki guy at 8:59 am on Thursday morning,​ ​so the​ ​probability of that guy seeing Moscow is​ ​1 not 1/2. ​ Therefore the ​probability of the guy seeing Helsinki at 8:59 am on Thursday morning​ seeing BOTH Washington and Moscow at 9:01 Thursday morning is 100% not 50%.


For the 3-1 view, that is correct, but avoid the question asked. I think you played that trick a lot. Repeating errors does not correct them.






Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means ​"remember having been in Helsinki​" John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this will be "not in the 1-p" forgetting that in a world that has 1-p duplicating machines there is no such thing as "THE 1-p". ​​

Then you die, and computationalism is false, making my point. If computationalism is correct, then there is a "the 1-p" at both places, and that is what we talk about. "a "the" " does not seem english, but that is indeed because english is not well suited to a world with duplicating machine. "the 1p" is the one you will live with certainty, although you cannot know which one in advance. "Which one" makes no sense in the 3p view, but get already clear meaning in the 3-1 view. yet to extracted it, we need to interview the two copies, and see that both refute "W & M", and both confirm "W v M".





​​>> ​"He" just walked into a "he" duplicating machine so there is absolutely no contradiction between:
1)  He will see either Moscow, or Washington and never in both cities
2) John Clark (aka The Helsinki Man) will see both Moscow AND Washington.

​> ​There is a contradiction if we identify the 3p and the 1p view,

​But "he" just walked into a 1p view duplicating machine, therefore there is no such thing as "THE 1p view", therefore there is no contradiction.

yes, there is, or you need to say that both copies are dead.







It's odd certainly, our technology isn't yet good enough to make 1p view duplicating machine​ so it seems very odd indeed, but there is no paradox, ​there is no logical contradiction. It's just odd nothing more.
​>​>>​ ​You forget again to put yourself at the place of both copies
​>> ​​Are you sure you really want me to do that? If so I'd have to conclude that I will see both cities at the same time.​

​> ​But that contradicts the "1)"

​Not if there are 2 I's, and there are because I just walked into a I duplicating machine. ​ ​You told me to take the point of view of both so ​I will, I see Moscow AND I see Washington at the same time;

If you have become the two guys, then you are already me, and this conversation has no more meaning at all. We are in all cities.




the Washington Man doesn't and the Moscow Man doesn't but "I" does if "I" means what Bruno Marchal just said that personal pronoun should mean, but then Bruno changes the fundamental meanings of personal pronouns several times in each post so it's hard to keep up.

It well known that "I" is an indexical. You never become a monster with two bodies. You become a single unique John Clark having a doppelganger in the other cities. Look at what absurdity you are confine to maintain your absurdity. You make my point all the time. And you illustrate the quasi infinite amount of bad faith to deny it.





​​>> ​There is no such thing ​as "THE 1p" in a world with 1p duplicating machines.

​> ​That is contradicted by what copies says.

​If BOTH copies say "mine is THE 1p and there is no other" then THAT is a contradiction and both copies are Imbeciles.

They say "my 1p is in Washington", and "my doppelganger's 1p" is in Moscow, and vice versa. They don't say that ythere is no other, only that they don't live it as the 1p we talked about in Helsinki. Each got one bit of information.




​> ​you will not become a monster with two heads.​ ​You will become one of them,

​And John Clark asks yet again, ​after "you" has been duplicated so that "you" is now TWO and the experiment is now over which ONE did "you" turn out to be? If "you" can't answer that question (and "you" can't) then it's not a experiment.

The W-guy says "I predicted that the 1p will be W v M but not both and I am the one having the 1p W" The M-guy says "I predicted that the 1p will be W v M but not both and I am the one having the 1p M".

Both confirms that the correct prediction was "W v M".





​> ​The question is about the 1p seeing a city,

​I know, it's about "THE 1p" and that is exactly why it's not a question, it's gibberish. ​

Then the notion of 1p is gibberish, and you illustrate very well why materialism leads to person elimination.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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