On 19 Jul 2016, at 18:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the
original and, because of the phenomenon of first person
experience, feels that he is the one true copy persisting through
time
<snip>
This is why I think Bruno's argument that you can instantiate
consciousness without a physical world fails. The physical and
mental are inextricably entwined.
Computationalism guaranties that the physical and the mental are
deeply entwined. The physical becomes the border of the universal mind
(the mind of the universal machine/number), so to speak.
The point is just that once you bet on computationalism, you can no
more invoke some physical reality to explain consciousness, you have
to explain the physical by local/global relative measure on the
computations, which are already all realized, in infinitely many
relative representations, in arithmetic.
Invoking the physical, having understood the notion of computation, is
exactly introducing the kind of magic in matter which would prevent
the computationalist to say "yes" to the doctor.
And also, why not add the need of a God with a white beard sitting on
a cloud? You can't reify a metaphysical notion to hide a genuine
problem, which is also an interesting problem as it leads to the
testability of a rather precise version of the cognitive digital
thesis (CT + YD).
With computationalism, physics becomes machine-independent, or theory
independent. The physics is the same in all the phi_i bases. That is a
very powerful invariant principle, for both physics and psychology/bio/
theology.
Bruno
Brent
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Stathis Papaioannou
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