date:20191011

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 7:40:42 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/11/2019 6:25 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 7:20:43 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 6:05:23 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/11/2019 2:13 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:50:34 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 

 On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

 On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
>> > fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
>> > components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf. 
>>
>> But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique 
>> representation, 
>> then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of 
>> a 
>> linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because 
>> there 
>> is no unique representation then representations in terms of 
>> components 
>> is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
>> logically equivalent; each one implies the other. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid. What's 
> invalid
> is singling out one representation and asserting the system is 
> simultaneously
> in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG 
>

 I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the latter 
 is what I meant. 
 All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to ascribe 
 ontological status to 
 one particular set of components, when in general there exists an 
 uncountable set, is 
 a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG

 Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms.  In that case the 
 different bases are equally real, but an atom can be in definite spin 
 state, say UP, which is a superposition of LEFT and RIGHT.  This can be 
 confirmed by measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis.  So did the LEFT/RIGHT 
 components exist when the atom was in the UP state?  That sounds like a 
 metaphysical or semantic question about the meaning of  "being in" a 
 state.  But Schroedinger's cat is different because it is impossible to 
 measure in the |LIVE>+|DEAD> and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis.  That was 
 Schroedinger's point that this superposition is absurd.  But why is it 
 absurd?  The best answer seems to be Zurek's einselection, meaning it's* 
 not* because there's an uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD 
 hyperplane, but because only |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable states against 
 environmental interaction.

 Brent

>>>
>>> There may be some exceptions for my claim. I need to study the silver 
>>> atom case and get back to you. But in the case of S's cat, I think the 
>>> problem is with the alleged quantum states of |Live> and |Dead>. What is 
>>> the operator that has those states as eigenstates? If it can't be 
>>> specified, maybe the construct makes no sense. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> Well none, or at least none that anyone could possibly implement as a 
>>> Hermitean projection operator of some instrument.  Schrodinger just chose 
>>> ALIVE/DEAD to emphasize how absurd it was to attribute superpositions to 
>>> macroscopic objects.  But he didn't know *why* it was absurd.  He could 
>>> have stuck to just the radioactive atom decaying or the geiger counter tube 
>>> detecting it, but that wouldn't have been obviously absurd.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> I agree with that! If it shows that superpositions cannot be attributed 
>> to macroscopic objects, then perhaps the idea that everything is quantum is 
>> precarious, if not false. And if he didn't need a cat, just a radioactive 
>> source, what would the consequences have been? AG 
>>
>
> Maybe Schroedinger wanted to show that superposition was inherently 
> absurd, when interpreted as a radioactive source being decayed and 
> undecayed simultaneously -- which is what I have been claiming on other 
> grounds. AG
>
>
> But that's not absurd, because it is possible to have a radioactive atom 
> that is isolated from all environment and other degrees of freedom and so 
> it might exist in a superposition.  
>

But if you amplify the micro superposition and throw in a cat, you get an 
absurdity. Maybe Schroedinger was *also* trying to show that the 
interpretation of *micro* superposition is not correct. AG 

This is how quantum computers gain power compared to classical computers.  
> Qubits exist in superpositions.  But it's hard to keep them cold enough and 
> isolated enough f

Re: Superposition Misinterpreted

2019-10-11 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 10/11/2019 6:25 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 7:20:43 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 6:05:23 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2019 2:13 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:50:34 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan
Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6,
Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I am saying that SINCE there is no unique
representation, it's a
> fallacy to take, say one representation, and
assert that the
> components in one representation,
simultaneously represent the wf.

But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no
unique representation,
then there is more than one representation. 
Some of those consist of a
linear composition of components.  You seem to
infer that because there
is no unique representation then representations
in terms of components
is wrong...but those two things are not only
consistent, they are
logically equivalent; each one implies the other.

Brent

No; on the contrary, I think all the representations
are valid. What's invalid
is singling out one representation and asserting the
system is simultaneously
in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG

I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments,
but the latter is what I meant.
All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But
to ascribe ontological status to
one particular set of components, when in general there
exists an uncountable set, is
a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's
cat. AG

Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms. In that
case the different bases are equally real, but an atom
can be in definite spin state, say UP, which is a
superposition of LEFT and RIGHT.  This can be confirmed
by measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis.  So did the
LEFT/RIGHT components exist when the atom was in the UP
state?  That sounds like a metaphysical or semantic
question about the meaning of  "being in" a state.  But
Schroedinger's cat is different because it is impossible
to measure in the |LIVE>+|DEAD> and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis. 
That was Schroedinger's point that this superposition is
absurd.  But why is it absurd? The best answer seems to
be Zurek's einselection, meaning it's/not/ because
there's an uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD
hyperplane, but because only |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable
states against environmental interaction.

Brent

There may be some exceptions for my claim. I need to study
the silver atom case and get back to you. But in the case of
S's cat, I think the problem is with the alleged quantum
states of |Live> and |Dead>. What is the operator that has
those states as eigenstates? If it can't be specified, maybe
the construct makes no sense. AG

Well none, or at least none that anyone could possibly
implement as a Hermitean projection operator of some
instrument.  Schrodinger just chose ALIVE/DEAD to emphasize
how absurd it was to attribute superpositions to macroscopic
objects.  But he didn't know /why/ it was absurd.  He could
have stuck to just the radioactive atom decaying or the geiger
counter tube detecting it, but that wouldn't have been
obviously absurd.

Brent

I agree with that! If it shows that superpositions cannot be
attributed to macroscopic objects, then perhaps the idea that
everything is quantum is precarious, if not false. And if he
didn't need a cat, just a radioactive source, what would the
consequences have been? AG

Maybe Schroedinger wanted to show that superposition was inherently 
absurd, when interpreted as a radioactive source being decayed and 
undecayed simultaneously -- which is what I have been claiming on 
other grounds. AG

But that's not absurd, because it is possible to have a radioactive atom 
that is isolated from all environment and other degrees of freedom and 
so it might exist in a superposition.  This is how qua

Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 7:20:43 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 6:05:23 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/11/2019 2:13 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:50:34 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 



 On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
> > fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
> > components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf. 
>
> But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique 
> representation, 
> then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of 
> a 
> linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because 
> there 
> is no unique representation then representations in terms of 
> components 
> is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
> logically equivalent; each one implies the other. 
>
> Brent 
>

 No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid. What's 
 invalid
 is singling out one representation and asserting the system is 
 simultaneously
 in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG 

>>>
>>> I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the latter is 
>>> what I meant. 
>>> All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to ascribe 
>>> ontological status to 
>>> one particular set of components, when in general there exists an 
>>> uncountable set, is 
>>> a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms.  In that case the 
>>> different bases are equally real, but an atom can be in definite spin 
>>> state, say UP, which is a superposition of LEFT and RIGHT.  This can be 
>>> confirmed by measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis.  So did the LEFT/RIGHT 
>>> components exist when the atom was in the UP state?  That sounds like a 
>>> metaphysical or semantic question about the meaning of  "being in" a 
>>> state.  But Schroedinger's cat is different because it is impossible to 
>>> measure in the |LIVE>+|DEAD> and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis.  That was 
>>> Schroedinger's point that this superposition is absurd.  But why is it 
>>> absurd?  The best answer seems to be Zurek's einselection, meaning it's* 
>>> not* because there's an uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD 
>>> hyperplane, but because only |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable states against 
>>> environmental interaction.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> There may be some exceptions for my claim. I need to study the silver 
>> atom case and get back to you. But in the case of S's cat, I think the 
>> problem is with the alleged quantum states of |Live> and |Dead>. What is 
>> the operator that has those states as eigenstates? If it can't be 
>> specified, maybe the construct makes no sense. AG
>>
>>
>> Well none, or at least none that anyone could possibly implement as a 
>> Hermitean projection operator of some instrument.  Schrodinger just chose 
>> ALIVE/DEAD to emphasize how absurd it was to attribute superpositions to 
>> macroscopic objects.  But he didn't know *why* it was absurd.  He could 
>> have stuck to just the radioactive atom decaying or the geiger counter tube 
>> detecting it, but that wouldn't have been obviously absurd.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> I agree with that! If it shows that superpositions cannot be attributed to 
> macroscopic objects, then perhaps the idea that everything is quantum is 
> precarious, if not false. And if he didn't need a cat, just a radioactive 
> source, what would the consequences have been? AG 
>

Maybe Schroedinger wanted to show that superposition was inherently absurd, 
when interpreted as a radioactive source being decayed and undecayed 
simultaneously -- which is what I have been claiming on other grounds. AG

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 6:05:23 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/11/2019 2:13 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:50:34 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 



 On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
 > I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
 > fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
 > components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf. 

 But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique representation, 
 then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of a 
 linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because there 
 is no unique representation then representations in terms of components 
 is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
 logically equivalent; each one implies the other. 

 Brent 

>>>
>>> No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid. What's 
>>> invalid
>>> is singling out one representation and asserting the system is 
>>> simultaneously
>>> in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG 
>>>
>>
>> I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the latter is 
>> what I meant. 
>> All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to ascribe 
>> ontological status to 
>> one particular set of components, when in general there exists an 
>> uncountable set, is 
>> a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG
>>
>>
>> Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms.  In that case the 
>> different bases are equally real, but an atom can be in definite spin 
>> state, say UP, which is a superposition of LEFT and RIGHT.  This can be 
>> confirmed by measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis.  So did the LEFT/RIGHT 
>> components exist when the atom was in the UP state?  That sounds like a 
>> metaphysical or semantic question about the meaning of  "being in" a 
>> state.  But Schroedinger's cat is different because it is impossible to 
>> measure in the |LIVE>+|DEAD> and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis.  That was 
>> Schroedinger's point that this superposition is absurd.  But why is it 
>> absurd?  The best answer seems to be Zurek's einselection, meaning it's* 
>> not* because there's an uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD 
>> hyperplane, but because only |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable states against 
>> environmental interaction.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> There may be some exceptions for my claim. I need to study the silver atom 
> case and get back to you. But in the case of S's cat, I think the problem 
> is with the alleged quantum states of |Live> and |Dead>. What is the 
> operator that has those states as eigenstates? If it can't be specified, 
> maybe the construct makes no sense. AG
>
>
> Well none, or at least none that anyone could possibly implement as a 
> Hermitean projection operator of some instrument.  Schrodinger just chose 
> ALIVE/DEAD to emphasize how absurd it was to attribute superpositions to 
> macroscopic objects.  But he didn't know *why* it was absurd.  He could 
> have stuck to just the radioactive atom decaying or the geiger counter tube 
> detecting it, but that wouldn't have been obviously absurd.
>
> Brent
>

I agree with that! If it shows that superpositions cannot be attributed to 
macroscopic objects, then perhaps the idea that everything is quantum is 
precarious, if not false. And if he didn't need a cat, just a radioactive 
source, what would the consequences have been? AG 

-- 
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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted

2019-10-11 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 10/11/2019 2:13 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:50:34 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I am saying that SINCE there is no unique
representation, it's a
> fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert
that the
> components in one representation, simultaneously
represent the wf.

But that's an invalid inference. If there is no unique
representation,
then there is more than one representation. Some of
those consist of a
linear composition of components. You seem to infer that
because there
is no unique representation then representations in terms
of components
is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent,
they are
logically equivalent; each one implies the other.

Brent

No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are
valid. What's invalid
is singling out one representation and asserting the system
is simultaneously
in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG

I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the
latter is what I meant.
All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to
ascribe ontological status to
one particular set of components, when in general there exists an
uncountable set, is
a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG

Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms. In that case the
different bases are equally real, but an atom can be in definite
spin state, say UP, which is a superposition of LEFT and RIGHT.
This can be confirmed by measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis. So
did the LEFT/RIGHT components exist when the atom was in the UP
state? That sounds like a metaphysical or semantic question about
the meaning of "being in" a state. But Schroedinger's cat is
different because it is impossible to measure in the |LIVE>+|DEAD>
and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis. That was Schroedinger's point that this
superposition is absurd. But why is it absurd? The best answer
seems to be Zurek's einselection, meaning it's/not/ because
there's an uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD hyperplane,
but because only |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable states against
environmental interaction.

Brent

There may be some exceptions for my claim. I need to study the silver
atom case and get back to you. But in the case of S's cat, I think the
problem is with the alleged quantum states of |Live> and |Dead>. What
is the operator that has those states as eigenstates? If it can't be
specified, maybe the construct makes no sense. AG

Well none, or at least none that anyone could possibly implement as a
Hermitean projection operator of some instrument. Schrodinger just
chose ALIVE/DEAD to emphasize how absurd it was to attribute
superpositions to macroscopic objects. But he didn't know /why/ it was
absurd. He could have stuck to just the radioactive atom decaying or
the geiger counter tube detecting it, but that wouldn't have been
obviously absurd.

Brent

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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 2:55:09 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 3:12 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> I'll bet you Adrian Kent's paper* (did you read it?) is netter than 
>> Shut Up And Read Sean Carroll's Book On Many Worlds.*
>
>
> I won't even ask you if you read it because I know you didn't, I didn't 
> either but at least I skimmed it and found it said:
>
> "*This motivates exploring ways to go beyond standard quantum theory, for 
> example by adding extra mathematical structure (as in de Broglie-Bohm 
> theory  or new dynamical laws (as in GRWP models)*."
>
> And Carroll talks in detail about both Broglie-Bohm theory and GRWP models 
> in his book, so what is this "curious omission" you accuse Carroll of 
> making? And the above is entirely consistent with Carroll saying that Hugh 
> Everett did not add anything new to quantum mechanics, instead he just 
> stripped out a lot of extraneous stuff because Many Worlds does not need to 
> "add extra mathematical structure" to make it fit observation. The only 
> purpose of that extra mathematical stuff is to get rid of many worlds, it 
> does nothing else. And
> William of Ockham must be spinning in his grave.
>
>  John K Clark
>



In any case, Kent dismisses Many Worlds. One World is enough:

*One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution, 
probability, and scientific confirmation*
Adrian Kent
https://arxiv.org/abs/0905.0624

*Against Many-Worlds Interpretations*
Adrian Kent
https://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9703089


@philipthrift

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:50:34 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>> > I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
>>> > fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
>>> > components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf. 
>>>
>>> But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique representation, 
>>> then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of a 
>>> linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because there 
>>> is no unique representation then representations in terms of components 
>>> is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
>>> logically equivalent; each one implies the other. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>
>> No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid. What's 
>> invalid
>> is singling out one representation and asserting the system is 
>> simultaneously
>> in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG 
>>
>
> I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the latter is 
> what I meant. 
> All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to ascribe 
> ontological status to 
> one particular set of components, when in general there exists an 
> uncountable set, is 
> a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG
>
>
> Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms.  In that case the different 
> bases are equally real, but an atom can be in definite spin state, say UP, 
> which is a superposition of LEFT and RIGHT.  This can be confirmed by 
> measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis.  So did the LEFT/RIGHT components exist 
> when the atom was in the UP state?  That sounds like a metaphysical or 
> semantic question about the meaning of  "being in" a state.  But 
> Schroedinger's cat is different because it is impossible to measure in the 
> |LIVE>+|DEAD> and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis.  That was Schroedinger's point that 
> this superposition is absurd.  But why is it absurd?  The best answer seems 
> to be Zurek's einselection, meaning it's* not* because there's an 
> uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD hyperplane, but because only 
> |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable states against environmental interaction.
>
> Brent
>

There may be some exceptions for my claim. I need to study the silver atom 
case and get back to you. But in the case of S's cat, I think the problem 
is with the alleged quantum states of |Live> and |Dead>. What is the 
operator that has those states as eigenstates? If it can't be specified, 
maybe the construct makes no sense. AG

-- 
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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science

On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 3:12 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*> I'll bet you Adrian Kent's paper* (did you read it?) is netter than Shut
> Up And Read Sean Carroll's Book On Many Worlds.*


I won't even ask you if you read it because I know you didn't, I didn't
either but at least I skimmed it and found it said:

"*This motivates exploring ways to go beyond standard quantum theory, for
example by adding extra mathematical structure (as in de Broglie-Bohm
theory  or new dynamical laws (as in GRWP models)*."

And Carroll talks in detail about both Broglie-Bohm theory and GRWP models
in his book, so what is this "curious omission" you accuse Carroll of
making? And the above is entirely consistent with Carroll saying that Hugh
Everett did not add anything new to quantum mechanics, instead he just
stripped out a lot of extraneous stuff because Many Worlds does not need to
"add extra mathematical structure" to make it fit observation. The only
purpose of that extra mathematical stuff is to get rid of many worlds, it
does nothing else. And
William of Ockham must be spinning in his grave.

 John K Clark

-- 
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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted

2019-10-11 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 10/11/2019 11:35 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation,
it's a
> fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the
> components in one representation, simultaneously represent
the wf.

But that's an invalid inference. If there is no unique
representation,
then there is more than one representation. Some of those
consist of a
linear composition of components. You seem to infer that
because there
is no unique representation then representations in terms of
components
is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are
logically equivalent; each one implies the other.

Brent

No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid.
What's invalid
is singling out one representation and asserting the system is
simultaneously
in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG

I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the latter
is what I meant.
All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to ascribe
ontological status to
one particular set of components, when in general there exists an
uncountable set, is

a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG

Contrast the SG experiments with silver atoms. In that case the
different bases are equally real, but an atom can be in definite spin
state, say UP, which is a superposition of LEFT and RIGHT. This can be
confirmed by measuring in the LEFT/RIGHT basis. So did the LEFT/RIGHT
components exist when the atom was in the UP state? That sounds like a
metaphysical or semantic question about the meaning of "being in" a
state. But Schroedinger's cat is different because it is impossible to
measure in the |LIVE>+|DEAD> and |LIVE>-|DEAD> basis. That was
Schroedinger's point that this superposition is absurd. But why is it
absurd? The best answer seems to be Zurek's einselection, meaning
it's/not/ because there's an uncountable set of bases in the LIVE/DEAD
hyperplane, but because only |LIVE> and |DEAD> are stable states against
environmental interaction.

Brent

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Fwd: Octopuses

2019-10-11 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

So the government of the UK agrees that consciousness is implied by 
intelligent behavior.


Brent


 Forwarded Message 

From Daniel C. Dennett:  In the United Kingdom, the law regarding 
cruelty to animals draws an important moral line at whether the animal 
is a vertebrate: as far as the law is concerned, you may do what you 
like to a live worm or fly or shrimp, but not to a bird or frog or 
mouse. It's a pretty good place to draw the line but laws can be 
amended, and this one was, Cephalopods, were made honorary vertebrates, 
in effect because they, unlike their close mollusk cousins the clams and 
oysters, have such strikingly sophisticated nervous systems.


MJB

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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:59:04 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 2:43 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> Path Integrals and Reality*
>> Adrian Kent
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.6565.pdf 
>> 
>>
>> *> We define the idea of real path quantum theory, a realist 
>> generalization of quantum theory in which it is postulated that the 
>> configuration space path actually followed by a closed quantum system is 
>> probabilistically chosen. ... The ultimate vision of those who take path 
>> integral quantum theory as fundamental to all of physics is a path integral 
>> formulation of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology.*
>>
>
> And how does that differ from the Shut Up And Calculate quantum 
> interpretation?
>
>

I'll bet you Adrian Kent's paper* (did you read it?) is netter than Shut Up 
And Read Sean Carroll's Book On Many Worlds.

* "It gives a clear physical meaning to the paths and to probabilities 
associated with them. It also suggests a clear and conceptually 
unproblematic way of justifying from first principles the appearance of 
quasiclassical trajectories."

@philipthrift 

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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science

On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 2:43 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*> Path Integrals and Reality*
> Adrian Kent
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.6565.pdf
>
> *> We define the idea of real path quantum theory, a realist
> generalization of quantum theory in which it is postulated that the
> configuration space path actually followed by a closed quantum system is
> probabilistically chosen. ... The ultimate vision of those who take path
> integral quantum theory as fundamental to all of physics is a path integral
> formulation of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology.*
>

And how does that differ from the Shut Up And Calculate quantum
interpretation?

>> do you think GRW theory is also a danger to science just as Many Worlds
>> is? Should everybody just stick with Shut Up And Calculate and stop asking
>> difficult questions?
>>
>
> *> Beats me.*
>

It doesn't beat me, I find those questions to be remarkably easy. And the
answers to both is a big fat *NO!*

John K Clark

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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:14:20 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

 Path integrals are a method of calculation not a quantum interpretation ...
>

*Path Integrals and Reality*
Adrian Kent
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.6565.pdf

*We define the idea of real path quantum theory, a realist generalization 
of quantum theory in which it is postulated that the configuration space 
path actually followed by a closed quantum system is probabilistically 
chosen. ... The ultimate vision of those who take path integral quantum 
theory as fundamental to all of physics is a path integral formulation of 
quantum gravity and quantum cosmology.*

>
>
> And do you think GRW theory is also a danger to science just as Many 
> Worlds is? Should everybody just stick with Shut Up And Calculate and stop 
> asking difficult questions?
>
>  John K Clark 
>

Beats me.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book

2019-10-11 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 10/11/2019 5:48 AM, smitra wrote:


Indeed. The opposition to the MWI is not really motivated by the 
technical details, people tend to oppose it because they don't like 
the idea of "many words". Technical details are invoked but these 
apply just as well to QM in general not just to MWI. The MWI could 
indeed be wrong in a technical sense but that's then unlikely to  
strip the "many worlds" aspect of it away.


Sez people who like the idea of multiple worlds.  Of course everyone 
uses their intuition about what ideas to pursue.  But only advocates 
perceive it as opposition.  Scientists perceive it as questioning.


Brent

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:27:19 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
>> > fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
>> > components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf. 
>>
>> But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique representation, 
>> then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of a 
>> linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because there 
>> is no unique representation then representations in terms of components 
>> is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
>> logically equivalent; each one implies the other. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid. What's 
> invalid
> is singling out one representation and asserting the system is 
> simultaneously
> in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG 
>

I wasn't clear in one or more of my previous comments, but the latter is 
what I meant. 
All representations are valid; basic linear algebra. But to ascribe 
ontological status to 
one particular set of components, when in general there exists an 
uncountable set, is 
a fallacy. I thought I illustrated that point with S's cat. AG

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:10:27 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
> > fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
> > components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf. 
>
> But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique representation, 
> then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of a 
> linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because there 
> is no unique representation then representations in terms of components 
> is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
> logically equivalent; each one implies the other. 
>
> Brent 
>

No; on the contrary, I think all the representations are valid. What's 
invalid
is singling out one representation and asserting the system is 
simultaneously
in ALL the components of THAT representation. AG 

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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science

On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 1:35 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> I did a search of his book [
> https://books.google.com/books?id=f16IDwAAQBAJ ] and though he does write
> about *Feynman diagrams* I don't see anything about *path integrals*.
> That would be a curious omission.
>

Huh? I don't see what you're driving at. Path integrals are a method of
calculation not a quantum interpretation, even the very inventor of the
path integral approach admitted it, that's why he was never entirely
satisfied with what he had created, and that why he never stopped saying
"nobody understands quantum mechanics".

And do you think GRW theory is also a danger to science just as Many Worlds
is? Should everybody just stick with Shut Up And Calculate and stop asking
difficult questions?

 John K Clark

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted

2019-10-11 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 10/11/2019 12:18 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
I am saying that SINCE there is no unique representation, it's a 
fallacy to take, say one representation, and assert that the 
components in one representation, simultaneously represent the wf.


But that's an invalid inference.  If there is no unique representation, 
then there is more than one representation.  Some of those consist of a 
linear composition of components.  You seem to infer that because there 
is no unique representation then representations in terms of components 
is wrong...but those two things are not only consistent, they are 
logically equivalent; each one implies the other.


Brent

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 12:41:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 9:40:10 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:51:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 10:53:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



 On 10/10/2019 6:55 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:37:13 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:27:58 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/10/2019 8:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 4:21:50 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/9/2019 3:52 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 12:28:38 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 



 On 10/8/2019 9:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
 > I've argued this before, but it's worth stating again. It's a 
 > misintepretation of superposition to claim that a system 
 described by 
 > it, is in all the component states simultaneously. As is easily 
 seen 
 > in ordinary vector space, an arbitrary vector has an uncountable 
 > number of different representations. Thus, to claim it is in some 
 > specific set of component states simultaneously, makes no sense. 
 Thus 
 > evaporates a key "mystery" of quantum theory, inclusive of S's 
 cat and 
 > Everett's many worlds. AG 

 No.  It changes the problem to the question of why there are 
 preferred 
 bases. 

 Brent 

>>>
>>> Who chose Alive and Dead, or Awake and Sleeping for the S. cat? 
>>> Wasn't it the observer? 
>>>
>>>
>>> Could the observer have chosen |alive>+|dead> and |alive>-|dead> as 
>>> a basis?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *That's a great question and the answer is No, because, as you would 
>> say, the pair (|Alive>, |Dead>), forms a "preferred" basis. We can only 
>> measure Alive or Dead. However, the other pair you have above is a 
>> perfectly valid state of the S cat system, a vector in the Hilbert Space 
>> of 
>> the system, and presumably there is an uncountable set of other valid 
>> states in Hilbert Space. This means that the interpretation of a 
>> superposition of the first pair is just as valid as the interpretation 
>> of 
>> any other pair; namely, that the system is in both components 
>> simultanously. But this is obvious nonsense given the plethora of valid 
>> bases, so the interpretation fails. THIS is my point. Am I mistaken? AG*
>>
>>
>> The way I read what you posted above is that it would "make no sense" 
>> to say a ship on a heading of 345deg is simultaneously moving on a 
>> 270deg 
>> and 90deg heading.  I think that does make sense.   The interesting 
>> question is could it be moving on some other heading?  The answer might 
>> be 
>> no, it's in the Panama Canal.  In other words there may be something 
>> else 
>> in physics that determines  perferred basis, even thought he bare 
>> Schrodinger equation doesn't seem to.
>>
>> brent
>>
>
> No, not what I meant. Rather, a ship with a heading of 345 deg, could 
> be represented as moving on a 270deg and 90deg heading, *as well as 
> an uncountable combination of other headings.*  I think this 
> fundamental misinterpretation of superposition of states leads to the MWI 
> and a host of other "mysteries" alleged in QM. AG 
>

 IOW, you can think of the wf representing a heading of 345deg, and 
 since the basis in Hilbert Space is *not* unique, you can imagine that 
 very *same* wf composed of *different* components. Thus, if it's 
 claimed that one set of basis components simultaneously represents the wf, 
 one can also find another, *different* set of basis components to 
 simultaneously represent the wf. It therefore makes no sense to claim that 
 any set of basis components simultaneously represents the wf. 
 Specifically, 
 the quantum claim that a system can be in several component states 
 simultaneously, is bogus, since the components are *not unique*. AG


 But my example of the ship shows that it's a commonplace that a vector 
 can be represented as a sum of components in infinitely many ways...it's a 
 trivial result of being a vector space.  It's just your prejudice that 
 there has to be a unique "really, really real" representation.

 Brent


>>>
>>> I suppose if a ship was sent through double straits (A,B) to a linear 
>>> array of docks D(x), then some angle pairs (A,D(x)), (B,D(x)) would 
>>> interfere with each other and some would

Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 9:40:10 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:51:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 10:53:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/10/2019 6:55 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:37:13 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 



 On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:27:58 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 10/10/2019 8:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 4:21:50 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/9/2019 3:52 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 12:28:38 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/8/2019 9:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>> > I've argued this before, but it's worth stating again. It's a 
>>> > misintepretation of superposition to claim that a system described 
>>> by 
>>> > it, is in all the component states simultaneously. As is easily 
>>> seen 
>>> > in ordinary vector space, an arbitrary vector has an uncountable 
>>> > number of different representations. Thus, to claim it is in some 
>>> > specific set of component states simultaneously, makes no sense. 
>>> Thus 
>>> > evaporates a key "mystery" of quantum theory, inclusive of S's cat 
>>> and 
>>> > Everett's many worlds. AG 
>>>
>>> No.  It changes the problem to the question of why there are 
>>> preferred 
>>> bases. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>
>> Who chose Alive and Dead, or Awake and Sleeping for the S. cat? 
>> Wasn't it the observer? 
>>
>>
>> Could the observer have chosen |alive>+|dead> and |alive>-|dead> as a 
>> basis?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *That's a great question and the answer is No, because, as you would 
> say, the pair (|Alive>, |Dead>), forms a "preferred" basis. We can only 
> measure Alive or Dead. However, the other pair you have above is a 
> perfectly valid state of the S cat system, a vector in the Hilbert Space 
> of 
> the system, and presumably there is an uncountable set of other valid 
> states in Hilbert Space. This means that the interpretation of a 
> superposition of the first pair is just as valid as the interpretation of 
> any other pair; namely, that the system is in both components 
> simultanously. But this is obvious nonsense given the plethora of valid 
> bases, so the interpretation fails. THIS is my point. Am I mistaken? AG*
>
>
> The way I read what you posted above is that it would "make no sense" 
> to say a ship on a heading of 345deg is simultaneously moving on a 270deg 
> and 90deg heading.  I think that does make sense.   The interesting 
> question is could it be moving on some other heading?  The answer might 
> be 
> no, it's in the Panama Canal.  In other words there may be something else 
> in physics that determines  perferred basis, even thought he bare 
> Schrodinger equation doesn't seem to.
>
> brent
>

 No, not what I meant. Rather, a ship with a heading of 345 deg, could 
 be represented as moving on a 270deg and 90deg heading, *as well as an 
 uncountable combination of other headings.*  I think this fundamental 
 misinterpretation of superposition of states leads to the MWI and a host 
 of 
 other "mysteries" alleged in QM. AG 

>>>
>>> IOW, you can think of the wf representing a heading of 345deg, and since 
>>> the basis in Hilbert Space is *not* unique, you can imagine that very 
>>> *same* wf composed of *different* components. Thus, if it's claimed 
>>> that one set of basis components simultaneously represents the wf, one can 
>>> also find another, *different* set of basis components to 
>>> simultaneously represent the wf. It therefore makes no sense to claim that 
>>> any set of basis components simultaneously represents the wf. Specifically, 
>>> the quantum claim that a system can be in several component states 
>>> simultaneously, is bogus, since the components are *not unique*. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> But my example of the ship shows that it's a commonplace that a vector 
>>> can be represented as a sum of components in infinitely many ways...it's a 
>>> trivial result of being a vector space.  It's just your prejudice that 
>>> there has to be a unique "really, really real" representation.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I suppose if a ship was sent through double straits (A,B) to a linear 
>> array of docks D(x), then some angle pairs (A,D(x)), (B,D(x)) would 
>> interfere with each other and some would reinforce.
>>
>> :) 
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> I'm trying to make an important claim, so I don't appreciate jokes on this 
> thread. AG 
>



It wasn't a joke.

What I call a "ship" above can be done with a *2000-atom molecule*

Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science

On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 9:32:04 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 2:49 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>
>> https://aeon.co/essays/post-empirical-science-is-an-oxymoron-and-it-is-dangerous
>>
>
> *> the so-called Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, there 
>> are universes containing our parallel selves, identical to us but for their 
>> different experiences of quantum physics. These theories are attractive to 
>> some few theoretical physicists and philosophers, but there is absolutely 
>> no empirical evidence for them.*
>
>
> I would maintain that the 2 slit experiment is, not proof, but evidence 
> that Many Worlds is right because if it is right then the odd results from 
> that experiment is exactly what you should expect to see; and if it's not 
> right and those other worlds do not exist then, to be compatible with 
> observation, new physics must be postulated, such as in 
> Ghirardi-Rimini–Weber theory (GRW).  GRW modifies the Schrodinger equation 
> so it's no longer completely deterministic (Einstein would not have liked 
> that) and as a result on very rare random occasions, about once every 
> hundred million years, the wave function of a particle spontaneously 
> collapses for no reason at all. Despite claims, made by those who haven't 
> read it, that Carroll's book doesn't talk about alternatives to Many Worlds 
> he goes into much more detail about GRW than I have here, but please note 
> that the bottom line fact is *there is absolutely no empirical evidence 
> that GRW theory is true*. So is GRW also a danger to science?
>
>  John K Clark
>

I did a search of his book [ https://books.google.com/books?id=f16IDwAAQBAJ ] 
and though he does write about *Feynman diagrams* I don't see anything 
about *path integrals*. 

That would be a curious omission.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.04178

Path integrals, spontaneous localisation, and the classical limit
Bhavya Bhatt 
, Manish 
Ram Chander 
, Raj 
Patil 
, Ruchira Mishra 
, Shlok 
Nahar 
, Tejinder P. Singh 

(Submitted on 13 Aug 2018 (v1 ), last 
revised 31 Jan 2019 (this version, v3))

We recall that in order to obtain the classical limit of quantum mechanics 
one needs to take the ℏ→0 limit. In addition, one also needs an explanation 
for the absence of macroscopic quantum superposition of position states. 
One possible explanation for the latter is the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) 
model of spontaneous localisation. Here we describe how spontaneous 
localisation modifies the path integral formulation of density matrix 
evolution in quantum mechanics. (Such a formulation has been derived 
earlier by Pearle and Soucek; we provide two new derivations of their 
result). We then show how the von Neumann equation and the Liouville 
equation for the density matrix arise in the quantum and classical limit, 
respectively, from the GRW path integral. Thus we provide a rigorous 
demonstration of the quantum to classical transition.

@philipthrift

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Friday, October 11, 2019 at 1:51:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 10:53:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/10/2019 6:55 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:37:13 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:27:58 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 



 On 10/10/2019 8:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 4:21:50 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 10/9/2019 3:52 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 12:28:38 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/8/2019 9:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I've argued this before, but it's worth stating again. It's a 
>> > misintepretation of superposition to claim that a system described 
>> by 
>> > it, is in all the component states simultaneously. As is easily 
>> seen 
>> > in ordinary vector space, an arbitrary vector has an uncountable 
>> > number of different representations. Thus, to claim it is in some 
>> > specific set of component states simultaneously, makes no sense. 
>> Thus 
>> > evaporates a key "mystery" of quantum theory, inclusive of S's cat 
>> and 
>> > Everett's many worlds. AG 
>>
>> No.  It changes the problem to the question of why there are 
>> preferred 
>> bases. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> Who chose Alive and Dead, or Awake and Sleeping for the S. cat? Wasn't 
> it the observer? 
>
>
> Could the observer have chosen |alive>+|dead> and |alive>-|dead> as a 
> basis?
>
> Brent
>

 *That's a great question and the answer is No, because, as you would 
 say, the pair (|Alive>, |Dead>), forms a "preferred" basis. We can only 
 measure Alive or Dead. However, the other pair you have above is a 
 perfectly valid state of the S cat system, a vector in the Hilbert Space 
 of 
 the system, and presumably there is an uncountable set of other valid 
 states in Hilbert Space. This means that the interpretation of a 
 superposition of the first pair is just as valid as the interpretation of 
 any other pair; namely, that the system is in both components 
 simultanously. But this is obvious nonsense given the plethora of valid 
 bases, so the interpretation fails. THIS is my point. Am I mistaken? AG*


 The way I read what you posted above is that it would "make no sense" 
 to say a ship on a heading of 345deg is simultaneously moving on a 270deg 
 and 90deg heading.  I think that does make sense.   The interesting 
 question is could it be moving on some other heading?  The answer might be 
 no, it's in the Panama Canal.  In other words there may be something else 
 in physics that determines  perferred basis, even thought he bare 
 Schrodinger equation doesn't seem to.

 brent

>>>
>>> No, not what I meant. Rather, a ship with a heading of 345 deg, could be 
>>> represented as moving on a 270deg and 90deg heading, *as well as an 
>>> uncountable combination of other headings.*  I think this fundamental 
>>> misinterpretation of superposition of states leads to the MWI and a host of 
>>> other "mysteries" alleged in QM. AG 
>>>
>>
>> IOW, you can think of the wf representing a heading of 345deg, and since 
>> the basis in Hilbert Space is *not* unique, you can imagine that very 
>> *same* wf composed of *different* components. Thus, if it's claimed that 
>> one set of basis components simultaneously represents the wf, one can also 
>> find another, *different* set of basis components to simultaneously 
>> represent the wf. It therefore makes no sense to claim that any set of 
>> basis components simultaneously represents the wf. Specifically, the 
>> quantum claim that a system can be in several component states 
>> simultaneously, is bogus, since the components are *not unique*. AG
>>
>>
>> But my example of the ship shows that it's a commonplace that a vector 
>> can be represented as a sum of components in infinitely many ways...it's a 
>> trivial result of being a vector space.  It's just your prejudice that 
>> there has to be a unique "really, really real" representation.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>
> I suppose if a ship was sent through double straits (A,B) to a linear 
> array of docks D(x), then some angle pairs (A,D(x)), (B,D(x)) would 
> interfere with each other and some would reinforce.
>
> :) 
>
> @philipthrift
>

I'm trying to make an important claim, so I don't appreciate jokes on this 
thread. AG 

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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science

On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 2:49 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

https://aeon.co/essays/post-empirical-science-is-an-oxymoron-and-it-is-dangerous
>

*> the so-called Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, there are
> universes containing our parallel selves, identical to us but for their
> different experiences of quantum physics. These theories are attractive to
> some few theoretical physicists and philosophers, but there is absolutely
> no empirical evidence for them.*

I would maintain that the 2 slit experiment is, not proof, but evidence
that Many Worlds is right because if it is right then the odd results from
that experiment is exactly what you should expect to see; and if it's not
right and those other worlds do not exist then, to be compatible with
observation, new physics must be postulated, such as in
Ghirardi-Rimini–Weber theory (GRW).  GRW modifies the Schrodinger equation
so it's no longer completely deterministic (Einstein would not have liked
that) and as a result on very rare random occasions, about once every
hundred million years, the wave function of a particle spontaneously
collapses for no reason at all. Despite claims, made by those who haven't
read it, that Carroll's book doesn't talk about alternatives to Many Worlds
he goes into much more detail about GRW than I have here, but please note
that the bottom line fact is *there is absolutely no empirical evidence
that GRW theory is true*. So is GRW also a danger to science?

 John K Clark

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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book

2019-10-11 Thread smitra

On 10-10-2019 23:42, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2019 at 5:16 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
wrote:

And of course nobody but me has bothered to read his book, but

everybody has an opinion about it.

_You keep posting that, but I've already posted that I have read

Carroll's book, _

Sorry, I missed that.

_I don't think QM is the last word,_

Neither do I and neither does Carroll.

_so it's not a good idea to draw a lot of far fetched

conclusions...like infinitely many universes in which everything
happens. _

The trouble is to avoid that far fetched conclusion you must make some
far fetched assumptions as I'm sure you know having read Carroll's
book. Many Worlds is stripped down quantum mechanics devoid of all
extraneous bells and whistles.

_ __it leaves open questions like whether the split "propagates" at

less than light speed or is instantaneous because it happens in
Hilbert space. Carroll cops out by saying either one works...which
is what Bohr would have said. _

True, and the exact same thought occurred to me when I read that in
Carroll's book, well,... Bohr was the second greatest physicist of
the 20th century so I guess it's not surprising if sometimes he makes
a good point.

Indeed. The opposition to the MWI is not really motivated by the
technical details, people tend to oppose it because they don't like the
idea of "many words". Technical details are invoked but these apply just
as well to QM in general not just to MWI. The MWI could indeed be wrong
in a technical sense but that's then unlikely to strip the "many
worlds" aspect of it away.

This is similar to how Fred Hoyle vigorously argued against the Big Bang
theory. He didn't like it and as far as he was concerned it was all
baloney. He attacked the theory on the issue of the synthesis of the
elements. As originally proposed, all elements were supposed to have
been formed during the Big Bang. Hoyle realized that this couldn't have
been the case and he successfully developed the theory of stellar
nucleosynthesis. So, he did prove wrong the original version of the Big
Bang theory, but that didn't disprove the general idea of the Big Bang.

Saibal

Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science


> On 8 Oct 2019, at 21:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 8, 2019 at 11:17:35 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 8, 2019 at 8:22:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Oct 2019, at 20:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/post-empirical-science-is-an-oxymoron-and-it-is-dangerous
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Theoretical physicists who say the multiverse exists set a dangerous 
>> precedent: science based on zero empirical evidence
> 
> 
> Any one saying that even one universe exist say something with zero physical 
> evidence. The very expression “physical evidence” is begging the question in 
> metaphysics.
> 
> Mechanist metaphysics implies that the physical reality emerges from 
> arithmetic, in a precise way, and nature gives the east same physics, as far 
> as we can judge today, and this without hiding consciousness and the first 
> person under the rug. So, I would say that the empirical evidences today is 
> for 0 universes, but many dreams (computations seen from inside, or moralised 
> through the universal machine theory of self-reference.
> 
> Physical evidences are dream-able. They cannot be direct evidence for 
> anything ontological. Einstein, at least, was ware of the mystery of the 
> existence of the physical universe, and took it as a religion, which is the 
> correct attitude if one believe in such a thing. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> x emerges from arithmetic is not grounded, because arithmetic is not 
> grounded. Whatever syntactic specification of arithmetic one starts with 
> (that is at least as expressive as Peano Axioms) has an unfixed semantics 
> ("nonstandard models"). There are other arithmetics for hyperarithmetical  
> theory.
> 
> Where Jim Baggott gets it wrong; All theories have nonempirical premises 
> encoded in their language. Even though EFE (Einstein Field Equations) may be 
> a useful tool for predictions of data collected in instruments, their 
> expression in terms of a continuous space+time is not empirical.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> It could just be a useful approximation in order for calculus to be applied. 
> However, experiments have been done, and so far no deviation from spatial 
> continuity has been detected. Not sure about time continuity. AG 

Me neither. Digital Mechanism makes one observable at least ranging on the 
continuum, but it is possible that it concerns only the frequency operator. 
There is a continuum of computational extensions, as the universal dovetailer 
dovetails also on the input, including the elements of any possible field like 
R, C, H or O. (H = the quaternion, O = the octonion).

My body is locally a machine entails that we are confronted to many non 
mechanical entities, just by the first person indeterminacy. But now, many of 
them can be equivalent with respect to the prediction, so “counting” the worlds 
is beyond the mathematics available today, and it is not clear if such counting 
makes sense.

I got recent clues that the high cardinals might play a role in the origin of 
space, which is a “quantum” (in the arithmetical sense) phenomenon.

Bruno



> 
>  
> 
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Re: The multiverse is dangerous to science


> On 8 Oct 2019, at 19:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 8, 2019 at 8:22:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Oct 2019, at 20:49, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/post-empirical-science-is-an-oxymoron-and-it-is-dangerous
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Theoretical physicists who say the multiverse exists set a dangerous 
>> precedent: science based on zero empirical evidence
> 
> 
> Any one saying that even one universe exist say something with zero physical 
> evidence. The very expression “physical evidence” is begging the question in 
> metaphysics.
> 
> Mechanist metaphysics implies that the physical reality emerges from 
> arithmetic, in a precise way, and nature gives the east same physics, as far 
> as we can judge today, and this without hiding consciousness and the first 
> person under the rug. So, I would say that the empirical evidences today is 
> for 0 universes, but many dreams (computations seen from inside, or moralised 
> through the universal machine theory of self-reference.
> 
> Physical evidences are dream-able. They cannot be direct evidence for 
> anything ontological. Einstein, at least, was ware of the mystery of the 
> existence of the physical universe, and took it as a religion, which is the 
> correct attitude if one believe in such a thing. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> x emerges from arithmetic is not grounded, because arithmetic is not 
> grounded. Whatever syntactic specification of arithmetic one starts with 
> (that is at least as expressive as Peano Axioms) has an unfixed semantics 
> ("nonstandard models”).

That is true for any theory in which you can prove that there is a universal 
machine (in the mathematical sense of Post, Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.

A fortiori that remains true for any physics in which we can build a universal 
machine, that is, a computer.




> There are other arithmetics for hyperarithmetical  theory.

With generalised Church-turing thesis. Yes, that exists and plays some role 
concerning the “analytical truth”, which plays some fundamental role for all 
the self-referential modes. But those are not new arithmetic, hyper 
arithmetical concerns the base of the analytical, and belongs to the 
phenomenology of the arithmetical.


> 
> Where Jim Baggott gets it wrong; All theories have nonempirical premises 
> encoded in their language. Even though EFE (Einstein Field Equations) may be 
> a useful tool for predictions of data collected in instruments, their 
> expression in terms of a continuous space+time is not empirical.


OK.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is


> On 10 Oct 2019, at 23:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 2:16 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> After all the ducking and weaving below, Bruno, I must reluctantly come to 
> the conclusion that you are not actually interested in engaging with the 
> issues that I have raised. I suspect that, like Wallace in his book, you have 
> done so in private and realise that no simple account is going to work, so 
> you obfuscate.

I will wait for an argument. I think you have an inconsistent interpretation of 
QM without collapse.

In case you really sucked in bringing a proof of FTL action in your 
QM-without-collapse theory, I would suggest to correct it until this do no more 
happen. Maybe that could require a quantum treatment of what is space 
(space-time) which does not really exist. By the way I proceed, non FTL are 
guarantied to not occur.

To make ad hominem remark like “you obfuscate” show some lack of seriousness, 
only.

Bruno



> 
> Sad.
> 
> Bruce
> 
>> On 8 Oct 2019, at 14:18, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 10:25 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 6 Oct 2019, at 10:39, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Oct 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > On 6 Oct 2019, at 02:50, Russell Standish >> > > wrote:
>>> > 
>>> > What I do get is Bruno's point that a single world assumption turns a
>>> > nonlocal state into FTL "influence", the mechanism of which is quite
>>> > unimaginable as you point out. An argument by incredulity, as it were,
>>> > for the MWI.
>>> 
>>> Exactly.
>>> 
>>> It is not an indirect argument for MWI because MWI has not provided an 
>>> alternative explanation.
>> 
>> I don’t believe in MW “I”. MW is just quantum mechanics without collapse. 
>> There is just one unitary evolution, which computable, even linear, and 
>> always local in the Hilbert space.
>> 
>> Local or non-local applies to physical 3-space, or space-time -- using the 
>> word for Hilbert space is just a confusion. There are no space-time 
>> intervals in Hilbert space -- the metric is all wrong.
> 
> 
> But the interpretation of the wave is made by the entities supported by the 
> waves. The wave described only the relative accessible histories.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>  
>> The violation of Bell’s inequality shows the inseparability, or 
>> non-locality, but there is no FTL influence. It is up in the believer in FTL 
>> influence to shows them, but as you told me that you don’t believe in FTL 
>> influences, I am not sure what we are discussing. Now, I do believe that 
>> QM-with-collapse does introduce FTL influence, even in the case of looking 
>> to one particle just “diffusing”. If there is a physical collapse of the 
>> position of the particle, it has to be instaneous.
>> 
>> I don't know what you are talking about. All I am asking of you is that if 
>> you believe that Aspect's results can be explained by local actions in many 
>> worlds, then give me the derivation of the local mechanism.
> 
> The simulation of the universal wave by a computer, to give the simplest. Or 
> its simulation in the sigma_1 arithmetic.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>   
>>> We might all reject FTL as implausible. But what are you proposing to 
>>> replace it? Magic??
>> 
>> OK. We reject all FTL. You might think that some FTL remains in the MWI, but 
>> just the argument given by Price (although not as general as it could be) 
>> shows why such FTL are just local apparence in the branches where all 
>> resulting Bobs and Alices find themselves into.
>> 
>> The trouble is that Price's argument is just the standard non-local argument 
>> from quantum mechanics. He does not make any use of the absence of collapse, 
>> or of 'many worlds'. If you do not agree with this, reproduce the argument 
>> and show how it differs from  the standard quantum argument.
>> 
>> 
>> We might interpret the wave differently. Of course, from what I have proven 
>> about “digital mechanism”, I expect physics describing only the physical 
>> reality we access to. The wave is epistemic, not ontic. I think that your 
>> problem is that you take the notion of “world” too much seriously.
>> 
>> No, I take the evidence of my experience of the world around me seriously.
> 
> But you said it is quasi-classical, which is not an obvious notion at all.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> And physics is the science of trying to understand this.
> 
> 
> No physics try to find the bet way to make prediction, by simplifying the 
> picture in using an indemnity thesis between Mind and Reality, but in 
> metaphysics, the notion of “physical universe” does not when we assume 
> Mechanism. 
> 
> Digital Mechanism (+ computer science, arithmetic) explains, perhaps wrongly, 
> but in testable way how the laws of physics originate and develop (somehow), 
> so let us see.
> 
> 
> 
>

Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is



> On 8 Oct 2019, at 20:19, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/8/2019 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 6 Oct 2019, at 19:33, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/6/2019 1:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 When Alice and Bob are separated, and measure their particles state, the 
 MWI only ask that whatever they found will be correlated. In the world 
 where Alice finds “up", Bob will find "down", and in the world where Alice 
 finds “down”Bob will find “up”. But without any FTL action at a distance.
>>> But being a world is a non-local variable.
>> I am not sure what this means, but if it means that FTL influences occur 
>> “physically”,
> If you don't know what "world" means, then you can't know what "physically" 
> means either.
> 
> I just mean that if you say Alice is in the UP world then that entails that 
> Alice and Bob are in the |UP DOWN> world which is a non-local thing.

Which Bob? Only those related to Alice Up, which has been determined locally. 
There is still a non-locality, intrinsic to the singlet state, but that Alice 
mettes the right Bobs, and vice versa does not entail any physical FTL actions, 
or at least none that I see, or have find a proof of their existence. The FTL 
actions are not required in the MW. Once Alice and Bob are separated, 
Relatively to Alice, before she makes her measurement, there are many Bobs, and 
vice versa. The term Bob is no more univocally defining one person.

Bruno 



> 
> Brent
> 
>> that is one reason more to abandon the concept of “world” or “universe”, and 
>> QM get closer to what we can expect from digital Mechanism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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> 
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Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is

> On 8 Oct 2019, at 20:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/8/2019 4:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> We might interpret the wave differently. Of course, from what I have proven 
>> about “digital mechanism”, I expect physics describing only the physical 
>> reality we access to. The wave is epistemic, not ontic. I think that your 
>> problem is that you take the notion of “world” too much seriously.
> 
> You tend to think only what is fundamental should be taken "seriously”. 

Why do you say that?. The physical reality is not primitive, yet remain the 
base for confirming or refuting theology, which is indeed the fundamental 
science (and by theology I mean the mathematics of G* and its intensional 
variants).

No, I search only a theory coherent with mechanism. Physics as usually conceive 
is not. Physics fits with the (conscious) observation by using an brai-mind 
identity thesis which is violated by mechanism.

> But my view is that science's job is to understand the world we experience

Absolutely. 

> and in general this may be quite different from the ontology of some theory 
> explaining it. 

Yes. Physics is the best science to make precise prediction, but it still 
require a non mechanist theory of mind.

With mechanism, we have “just” to extract physics from all computations, so 
that the physical-empirical  predictions corresponds to the 
arithmetical-physical-prdeictions of the entities emulated (in infinitely many 
occurrences) in arithmetic.

> So from my standpoint the problem is explaining "worlds" and given current 
> physical theories that implies connecting quantum mechanics to experience. If 
> we accept that experience is brain process and is therefore (c.f. Tegmark) 
> classical this just means connecting QM to the classical. So what is the QM 
> representation of a classical "world".  In CI it's just a projection onto 
> some result subspace, where the subspace is already a classical world.  So CI 
> just assumes there's an answer. In Everett's QM that "world" needs an 
> explanation/definition/construction.

That go in the right Mechanist direction, starting from empiry. That happens 
already, for theoretical reason,  with Digital Mechanism in cognitive science. 

Bruno

> 
> Brent
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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book

> On 10 Oct 2019, at 09:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 3:59:50 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 9, 2019 at 4:55 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> > Other interpretations (but not MWI, as far as I can see) are used in 
> > writing programs for computational QM.
> 
> Like what?
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> Multiple Histories.

Then if you define a world by a set of events close for interaction, many 
histories implies the “usual many world”, but some called it one world, by 
equivocating the many-Histories with the One multiverse. It remains that if you 
look at the cat, your history will still differentiate.

Many-worlds and many-histories are slight variants of the same idea, and they 
are not even defined so precisely that we can differentiate them from the 
internal many-histories that we have in arithmetic or any Turing. Complete 
theory.

It is true that Mechanism makes the approach by Gelman and Hartle, or Griffith 
and Omnes more senseful, as with mechanism, there is no world” in the 
Aristotelian sense of “world” or “universe”. The states are epistemic, first 
person plural, notions.

Bruno

> 
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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book


> On 9 Oct 2019, at 22:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 2:41:19 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 4:54 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> > I haven't seen yet where MWI serves any useful purpose.
> 
> If you're only interested in making a better widget then the MWI has no 
> useful purpose and you should just stick with the Shut Up And Calculate 
> Interpretation, but if you have any interest at all in understanding reality 
> at a somewhat deeper level you may not find that interpretation to be 
> entirely satisfactory.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
>  MWI is not the one and only  alternative to SUACI (Shut Up And Calculate 
> Interpretation).
> 
> Other interpretations (but not MWI, as far as I can see) are used in writing 
> programs for computational QM.

If they use programs, they need an ontology in which all computations are 
realised, so the MWI is not an option, and QM-without collapse, that is Many 
“worlds” confirms that aspect which is unavoidable when we use any theory in 
which the notion of programs can be defined.

Bruno


> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book


> On 9 Oct 2019, at 11:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 8, 2019 at 6:24:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/8/2019 2:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, October 8, 2019 at 2:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> That MWI entails other, unobservable "worlds" is neither a bug or a feature, 
>> it's just one answer to the measurement problem.  If you have a better 
>> answer, feel free to state it.
>> 
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> MWI, according to Sabine Hossenfelder, is not an answer - in the final 
>> analysis - to the measurement problem
>> 
>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/09/the-trouble-with-many-worlds.html 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The many world interpretation, now, supposedly does away with the problem of 
>> the quantum measurement and it does this by just saying there isn’t such a 
>> thing as wavefunction collapse. Instead, many worlds people say, every time 
>> you make a measurement, the universe splits into several parallel worlds, 
>> one for each possible measurement outcome. This universe splitting is also 
>> sometimes called branching.
>> 
>> Some people have a problem with the branching because it’s not clear just 
>> exactly when or where it should take place, but I do not think this is a 
>> serious problem, it’s just a matter of definition. No, the real problem is 
>> that after throwing out the measurement postulate, the many worlds 
>> interpretation needs another assumption, that brings the measurement problem 
>> back.
>> 
>> The reason is this. In the many worlds interpretation, if you set up a 
>> detector for a measurement, then the detector will also split into several 
>> universes. Therefore, if you just ask “what will the detector measure”, then 
>> the answer is “The detector will measure anything that’s possible with 
>> probability 1.”
>> 
>> This, of course, is not what we observe. We observe only one measurement 
>> outcome.
> 
> The implication is that the above two sentences are contrasting.  But nobody 
> asks "what will the detector measure".  The question asked by the 
> experimenter is "which measurement outcome will the detector detect", which 
> is perfectly consistent with "we observe only one measurement outcome"
> 
>> The many worlds people explain this as follows. Of course you are not 
>> supposed to calculate the probability for each branch of the detector. 
>> Because when we say detector, we don’t mean all detector branches together. 
>> You should only evaluate the probability relative to the detector in one 
>> specific branch at a time.
> 
> I can't even parse that.  You are supposed to calculate the probability of 
> each possible measurement outcome and those characterize the branch.  It is 
> NOT calculating "each branch of the detector" unless you are defining those 
> "branches" by what the measurement outcome is.
> 
>> 
>> That sounds reasonable. Indeed, it is reasonable. It is just as reasonable 
>> as the measurement postulate. In fact, it is logically entirely equivalent 
>> to the measurement postulate.
> 
> It's not clear here what "logically" equivalent means.  It is instrumentally 
> equivalent...which is why it's an interpretation and not a different theory 
> (as GRW is).  It's different from the measurement postulate in that the 
> measurement postulate says the wave function instantaneously changes to match 
> the observed measured value.  MWI says those other measured values obtain in 
> other orthogonal subspaces of the Hilbert space and you are only observing 
> one.  Those are not "logically" the same.
> 
>> The measurement postulate says: Update probability at measurement to 100%. 
>> The detector definition in many worlds says: The “Detector” is by definition 
>> only the thing in one branch.
> 
> What does "only the thing in one branch mean". In MWI there are projections 
> of the detector in subspaces which differ only by the value detected.
> 
>> Now evaluate probabilities relative to this, which gives you 100% in each 
>> branch. Same thing.
>> 
>> And because it’s the same thing you already know that you cannot derive this 
>> detector definition from the Schrödinger equation.
> 
> ?? You can't derive the definition of any physical object from the 
> Schroedinger equation.  You put in the Hamiltonian of the object and whatever 
> it interacts with and the initial ray in Hilbert space and the Schroedinger 
> equation tells you how it evolves
> 
>> It’s not possible. What the many worlds people are now trying instead is to 
>> derive this postulate from rational choice theory. But of course that brings 
>> back in macroscopic terms, like actors who make decisions and so on. In 
>> other words, this reference to knowledge is equally in conflict with 
>> reductionism as is the Copenhagen interpretation.
> 
> I agree with that point.  But once you suppose a probabilistic interpretation 
> of the Hilbert space, then

Re: Superposition Misinterpreted



On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 10:53:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/10/2019 6:55 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:37:13 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 3:27:58 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/10/2019 8:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 4:21:50 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 



 On 10/9/2019 3:52 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 12:28:38 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 10/8/2019 9:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I've argued this before, but it's worth stating again. It's a 
> > misintepretation of superposition to claim that a system described 
> by 
> > it, is in all the component states simultaneously. As is easily seen 
> > in ordinary vector space, an arbitrary vector has an uncountable 
> > number of different representations. Thus, to claim it is in some 
> > specific set of component states simultaneously, makes no sense. 
> Thus 
> > evaporates a key "mystery" of quantum theory, inclusive of S's cat 
> and 
> > Everett's many worlds. AG 
>
> No.  It changes the problem to the question of why there are preferred 
> bases. 
>
> Brent 
>

 Who chose Alive and Dead, or Awake and Sleeping for the S. cat? Wasn't 
 it the observer? 


 Could the observer have chosen |alive>+|dead> and |alive>-|dead> as a 
 basis?

 Brent

>>>
>>> *That's a great question and the answer is No, because, as you would 
>>> say, the pair (|Alive>, |Dead>), forms a "preferred" basis. We can only 
>>> measure Alive or Dead. However, the other pair you have above is a 
>>> perfectly valid state of the S cat system, a vector in the Hilbert Space of 
>>> the system, and presumably there is an uncountable set of other valid 
>>> states in Hilbert Space. This means that the interpretation of a 
>>> superposition of the first pair is just as valid as the interpretation of 
>>> any other pair; namely, that the system is in both components 
>>> simultanously. But this is obvious nonsense given the plethora of valid 
>>> bases, so the interpretation fails. THIS is my point. Am I mistaken? AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> The way I read what you posted above is that it would "make no sense" to 
>>> say a ship on a heading of 345deg is simultaneously moving on a 270deg and 
>>> 90deg heading.  I think that does make sense.   The interesting question is 
>>> could it be moving on some other heading?  The answer might be no, it's in 
>>> the Panama Canal.  In other words there may be something else in physics 
>>> that determines  perferred basis, even thought he bare Schrodinger equation 
>>> doesn't seem to.
>>>
>>> brent
>>>
>>
>> No, not what I meant. Rather, a ship with a heading of 345 deg, could be 
>> represented as moving on a 270deg and 90deg heading, *as well as an 
>> uncountable combination of other headings.*  I think this fundamental 
>> misinterpretation of superposition of states leads to the MWI and a host of 
>> other "mysteries" alleged in QM. AG 
>>
>
> IOW, you can think of the wf representing a heading of 345deg, and since 
> the basis in Hilbert Space is *not* unique, you can imagine that very 
> *same* wf composed of *different* components. Thus, if it's claimed that 
> one set of basis components simultaneously represents the wf, one can also 
> find another, *different* set of basis components to simultaneously 
> represent the wf. It therefore makes no sense to claim that any set of 
> basis components simultaneously represents the wf. Specifically, the 
> quantum claim that a system can be in several component states 
> simultaneously, is bogus, since the components are *not unique*. AG
>
>
> But my example of the ship shows that it's a commonplace that a vector can 
> be represented as a sum of components in infinitely many ways...it's a 
> trivial result of being a vector space.  It's just your prejudice that 
> there has to be a unique "really, really real" representation.
>
> Brent
>
>

I suppose if a ship was sent through double straits (A,B) to a linear array 
of docks D(x), then some angle pairs (A,D(x)), (B,D(x)) would interfere 
with each other and some would reinforce.

:) 

@philipthrift

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Re: Superposition Misinterpreted