Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread John Clark 
On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 6:50 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> Bruce takes the Born probability as the probability that some sequence
>> exists (i.e. 1) instead of the probability it is the observed sequence, (
>> |a|^2 ).
>>
>
> *> That is the source of the disagreement. There are two possible
> questions: 1) In the N repeats of the binary outcome experiment, what is
> the probability that the sequence containing all ones will occur?*
>

If all possible outcomes of N coin flips exist, as in the case in the set
up to your question, then obviously the probability that one of those coin
flips is all ones is 100%. It's the same answer as the answer to the
question "If X exists then what is the probability that X exists?".

> *and 2) what is the probability in this scenario that I will experience
> the sequence of all ones?*
>

And that question has the same answer as "How long is a piece of string?".
It takes more than just the ASCII symbol "?" to make a question.

 John K Clark

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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread John Clark 
On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 2:33 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
> *I am also personally offended that Baggott gives short shrift to
> superdeterminism.*
>

Don't worry about it, nobody ever died from being offended.

> *He either mistakenly or accidentally leaves the reader with the
> impression that these have been ruled out for good, which is most
> definitely not the case.*
>

Nobody will ever be able to prove that superdeterminism is untrue, it's
specifically engineered in such a way to make sure that could never happen,
but it is certainly possible to prove that superdeterminism is silly. It
says that in order for the world to be the way it appears to be now the
initial conditions of the universe 13.8 billion years ago MUST have been in
one and only one SUPER specific starting condition, and in science the more
assumptions you have to make in order for your theory to work the less
valuable it is, and it's impossible to imagine a theory about anything that
needs more assumptions to work than superdeterminism, except perhaps for
the God Theory.

John K Clark

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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread Lawrence Crowell 


The Bell inequality means that if we assume reality, which is there is some 
existential basis for observables prior to a measurement, then we have 
nonlocality. On the other hand, with the Wigner friend and the 
Frauchigger-Renner argument, we can impose locality and have a loss of 
reality. This condition is where one gets superdeterminism. We can look as 
superdeterminism was where hidden variables are nonlocal, where this 
superdeterminism is unobservable and thus effectively nonexistent, or with 
locality, where superdeterminism is in effect unreality. It is a sort of 
nihilism of nonsense. Yet in another setting it can be seen as rather 
illuminating.

LC

On Monday, September 7, 2020 at 6:36:32 AM UTC-5 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 2:33 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>>
> > *I am also personally offended that Baggott gives short shrift to 
>> superdeterminism.*
>>
>
> Don't worry about it, nobody ever died from being offended. 
>
> > *He either mistakenly or accidentally leaves the reader with the 
>> impression that these have been ruled out for good, which is most 
>> definitely not the case.*
>>
>
> Nobody will ever be able to prove that superdeterminism is untrue, it's 
> specifically engineered in such a way to make sure that could never happen, 
> but it is certainly possible to prove that superdeterminism is silly. It 
> says that in order for the world to be the way it appears to be now the 
> initial conditions of the universe 13.8 billion years ago MUST have been in 
> one and only one SUPER specific starting condition, and in science the more 
> assumptions you have to make in order for your theory to work the less 
> valuable it is, and it's impossible to imagine a theory about anything that 
> needs more assumptions to work than superdeterminism, except perhaps for 
> the God Theory.
>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruno Marchal 

> On 6 Sep 2020, at 19:53, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Do you have a paper explaining this?


No. It is a recent finding. But it is almost trivial, the difficulties are in 
the "descriptive set theory". I have thought wrongly that allowing the full 
measure on the sigma_1(a) would make it trivial, but I was wrong. My intuition 
was based on the fact that the determinacy axioms is incompatible with the 
axioms of choice, but that is mitigated by the consistency of the axiom of 
choice and a restricted form of determinacy, called “projective determinacy” in 
set theory. It happens that mechanism seems to require only that restricted 
form of “determinacy”.

My paper:

Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in 
Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.

Get close to those issues, but to explain descriptive set theory require some 
amount of both topology and mathematical logic.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
> On 9/6/2020 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> I think you are helping yourself to probabilities by implicitly assuming a 
>>> measure.
>> 
>> It is not obvious, but there is a measure for the first person views, plural 
>> ([]p & <>t) and singular ([]p & p, []p & <>t & p).
>> I have realised more or less recently that the measure is inherited from a 
>> measure on the sigma_1 set + arbitrary oracles, that is the union of all 
>> sigma_1(a) for a being a real (or complex number). This requires a bit of 
>> Descriptive Set theory. 
>> 
>> So, there is a measure, even a Lebesgue Measure. There is an integral, 
>> normally Feynman’s one, if both Mechanism, and Quantum Mechanics are correct.
>> 
>> It took me some time to admit that the invariance of the first person for 
>> the Universal-Dovetailer-steps “delays” enforces the presence of all 
>> oracular computations. It is a continuum, with a complicated structure 
>> determined by the modes of self-reference (which are 8, although there are 
>> more like 4 + 4 * infinity).
>> 
>> Bruno
> 
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruno Marchal 

> On 6 Sep 2020, at 19:58, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> This is a reasonable account of teleporation.

I agree too, … except for minor technical details (already discussed with 
Bruce, and I guess Bruce will not be convinced by Vaidman, nor by my slight 
corrections, which is mainly that a quantum state always refer to infinity of 
worlds/histories/relative-states).

Bruno


> 
> LC
> 
> On Sunday, September 6, 2020 at 12:03:30 PM UTC-5 sce...@libero.it wrote:
> BTW I've found that quote by Vaidman.
> 
> 'In the framework of the MWI, the teleportation procedure does not move the 
> quantum state: the state was, in some sense, in the remote location from the 
> beginning. The correlated pair, which is the necessary item for 
> teleportation, incorporates all possible quantum states of the remote 
> particle, and, in particular, the state which has to be teleported. The local 
> measurement of the teleportation procedure splits the world in such a manner 
> that in each of the worlds the state of the remote particle differs form the 
> state by some known transformation. The number of such worlds is relatively 
> small. This explains why the information which has to be transmitted for 
> teleportation of a quantum state—the information which world we need to split 
> into, i.e., what transformation has to be applied—is much smaller than the 
> information which is needed for the creation of such a state. For example, 
> for the case of a spin-1/2 particle there are only 4 different worlds, so in 
> order to teleport the state we have to transmit just 2 bits.' – Lev Vaidman 
> in https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9810089 
> 
> 
> 
>> Il 06/09/2020 12:47 Bruce Kellett > > ha scritto:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 6:55 PM 'scerir' via Everything List < 
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com 
>> > wrote: 
>> Bruce: "The idea of a large ensemble of pre-existing worlds that just get 
>> distinguished by results has never been taken seriously by anyone outside of 
>> this list. It has never been worked through in detail, and it is doubtful if 
>> it even makes sense. It certainly has nothing to do with the Schrodinger 
>> equation."
>> 
>> Vaidman, speaking of quantum teleportation, 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_teleportation 
>>  , pointed out that 
>> when Bob receives the message from Alice, he will know which of the four 
>> states his particle is in, and using this information he performs a unitary 
>> operation on his particle to transform it to the desired state. But (as 
>> Vaidman pointed out) before Bob receives the message from Alice there are 
>> four pre-existing equiprobable states, one of them (Bob doesn't know which 
>> one) is already the right one. 
>> 
>> 
>> Serafino,
>>  I am sorry to have to say this, but Lev Vaidman is something of an idiot 
>> about these things. Don't take anything he says seriously, even though he 
>> has been around for many years. This quote is irrelevant to my point. MWI is 
>> incompatible with the Born rule. The Born rule makes sense only in single 
>> world settings.
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> 
> 
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>> .
>>  
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruno Marchal 

> On 6 Sep 2020, at 20:40, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a 
> >> possible subjectivity”.
> 
> > I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100 
> > different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room 
> > differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay 
> > in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the 
> > room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the 
> > probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.
> 
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk out, 
> look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% chance he 
> will not see a prime number.

You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the 
alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them. But 
if we do the experience, those who see that the number is prime, or that it is 
not prime, can understand that the prediction asked, (which is a prediction on 
possible subjective experiences, and not on body localisation) cannot be 100% 
for prime. Indeed the John Clark of room 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, … admits that their 
prediction (on their subjective experiences) are wrong, and that is what makes 
those probabilities on subjective experiences objective. That are personally 
refutable, and unless you negate the conscious experience, they make sense.




> And the question "What is the probability I will see a prime number?" has no 
> answer because in this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous. 

It is not ambiguous, or it is ambiguous in Everett too. The point is that it is 
the same “ambiguity”, i.e. indeterminacy of personal outcomes.



> 
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of those 
> rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a prime 
> number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a legitimate 
> unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there are 25 prime 
> numbers less than 100.


In this case, there were no explicit duplication, as in the start they are all 
identical brain in the rooms, and you have agree that there is only one, non 
ambiguous person/consciousness.

Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty that I 
will be indeterminate about what I will see after opening the door of the 
reconstitution box, then, I am unambiguously already indeterminate on that 
outcome? If yes, you can no mire say that there is a unique person, when two 
brains run identically. If not, you get the point.





> But that probability would just be a subjective probability because he is 
> either in a prime numbered room or he is not, So that probability figure must 
> just be a measure of that John Clark's ignorance.


Which is the same as the one before the multiplication, as we have accepted 
that all copies are continuation of the candidate (we use the non transitive 
notion of personal identity on which we have always agreed on).

In your sense of “subjective probability” here, Mechanism makes all probability 
subjective, even the frequentist notion, despite it is also an observable 
(after Graham-Hartle-Omnes-Griffith type of treatment).  I have no problem with 
that. By objective, we can mean here 3p, or 1p-plural. That does not change the 
probability calculus.

Bruno


> 
> John K Clark
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruno Marchal 

> On 7 Sep 2020, at 00:49, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:34 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> It's because Bruce takes the Born probability as the probability that some 
> sequence exists (i.e. 1) instead of the probability it is the observed 
> sequence, ( |a|^2 ).
> 
> 
> That is the source of the disagreement. There are two possible questions: 1) 
> In the N repeats of the binary outcome experiment, what is the probability 
> that the sequence containing all ones will occur?; and 2) what is the 
> probability in this scenario that I will experience the sequence of all ones?
> 
> If we are using the theory to calculate probabilities, the first question is 
> the relevant one,

?


> and the theory gives two different answers , so the theory is inconsistent.

No, the theory is inconsistent here, only if you negate the distinction between 
3p and 1p. 



> If our concern is only about ourselves, and not about what the theory says, 
> then the second question is the appropriate one. Then there is no 
> inconsistency, because we know that we will only see one sequence —

Good!



> which one we do see can only be determined post hoc, and that is not a 
> probabilistic matter. The 1p/3p confusion here is all yours, not mine. What 
> gives you the right to maintain that the Born rule is only about what you 
> will experience? And not about objective probabilities?

Define “objective probabilities”. It is clearly in a stronger sense than the 
one I have given and used  in this thread, and I am not sure what you are 
talking about. I am not sure your “objective probability” makes sense. I would 
say that the Boin rules, and their constant verification, is what makes those 
probabilities objective, because, like with Mechanism, no machine can know 
which fine-grained histories she is living, among an infinity (realised in 
arithmetic, notably).

Bruno



> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruno Marchal 

> On 7 Sep 2020, at 13:06, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 6:50 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> >> Bruce takes the Born probability as the probability that some sequence 
> >> exists (i.e. 1) instead of the probability it is the observed sequence, ( 
> >> |a|^2 ).
> 
> > That is the source of the disagreement. There are two possible questions: 
> > 1) In the N repeats of the binary outcome experiment, what is the 
> > probability that the sequence containing all ones will occur?
> 
> If all possible outcomes of N coin flips exist, as in the case in the set up 
> to your question, then obviously the probability that one of those coin flips 
> is all ones is 100%. It's the same answer as the answer to the question "If X 
> exists then what is the probability that X exists?”.





Except that when you look at the outcome, you are yourself multiplied, and so, 
in the 3p description, you experience all sequences. Yet, you will never 
experience all sequences, but only one of them, from your personal subjective 
pov, so, once you understand that the question is about those pov, the 
objective probability, on the subjective experience, is logically unavoidable.
> 
> > and 2) what is the probability in this scenario that I will experience the 
> > sequence of all ones?
> 
> And that question has the same answer as "How long is a piece of string?".  
> It takes more than just the ASCII symbol "?" to make a question.

Only because you mix the 1p description (about which we are asking), and the 3p 
global description, in which indeed there is no probabilities at all.

Bruno



> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread John Clark 
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 8:02 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > *The Bell inequality means that if we assume reality, which is there is
> some existential basis for observables prior to a measurement, then we have
> nonlocality.*
>
You could still have locality if things were SUPER-deterministic, but
that's the only way you could have Reality, Locality and Determinism. And
regular determinism won't work because that just means the present state Is
determined by the previous one, you need SUPER-determinism which means the
universe had to start out in one and only one SUPER specific state 13.8
billion years ago. I think it would be nice to have Reality, Locality and
Determinism but SUPER-determinism is far far too high a price to pay for having
all 3. I'll have to settle for Reality.

John K Clark

>
>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread John Clark 
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 9:29 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
>> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
>> there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
>> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
>> 100% chance he will not see a prime number.
>
>
> *> You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the
> alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them.*
>

And you make the exact same error over and over and over and over again!
If I made a mistake in the above it certainly wasn't that one because I
said absolutely nothing about what Mr.You would or would not do or say or
think, and could not even if I wanted to because due to the circumstances
of the thought experiment the personal pronoun "you" has no referent, so
any "question" using that word has no answer because it is not a question, i
t's just some words and a question mark.

>> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
>> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
>> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
>> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
>> are 25 prime numbers less than 100.
>
>
> *> In this case, there were no explicit duplication,*
>

Exactly, and therefore the personal pronoun "you" would not be ambiguous.so
a question that started as "*what would you*" would not automatically be an
ambiguous question.

*> Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty
> that I will be* [...]
>

I don't need to read another word. No I do not agree, and I don't disagree
either because gibberish is not the sort of thing one can agree or disagree
with, it's just gibberish.

John K Clark

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Re: Ex Machina, the film, about the Turing Test

2020-09-07 Thread Tomasz Rola 
On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote:
> If you haven't viewed it, please do so. It's about the Turing Test, science 
> fiction, but the "special effects" aren't primarily photographic bells and 
> whistles, but the dialogue. the text, the logic of the script. Recently, we 
> have argued about consciousness, what it is, and how we can test for it in 
> the context of AI. I claimed that we could do some superficial surgery to 
> determine whether the subject of the test was a robot or a conscious 
> entity. But this is completely mistaken. All that that would reveal is 
> whether the subject was artificial, not whether it was "conscious". The 
> subject could have been a black box, and still showing signs of what we 
> can't really define; consciousness. I think Ex Machina provides an answer 
> of what we need to look for. Please view it and report back. But do NOT 
> read the plot, say in Wiki. It's a spoiler. AG

My loose thoughts, in no specific order:

1. The ultimate test of AI is when it does not play your
game. Actually, very same can be said about humans.

2. Are there any readers of Stanislaw Lem here (besides me)? I
consider Lem a philosopher, and a very conscious and contemporary one
(he was more interested in a world around him and the future path of
humanity rather than in subjects like whether the world or humanity
exists), whereas I am afraid majority of public will have opinions
based on poorly done cinematisation of some books he wrote. In his
works, he gives, among other things, a gallery of automatons, whose
actions are erratic in various ways. A protagonist usually shrugs it
off as "requires repair or replacement", but sometimes he is not so
sure. The errors become quite specific, suggesting underlying will and
goal. There is a thin border line, a level of complication of electric
brain, after which doubts start to appear.

The appearance of real AI is burried in a whirl of human activity,
always hurring somewhere, get home early, go to sleep, go to work, go
see fiancee, drive children to school... Nobody will realize when such
moment happens. Only in retrospect there may be speculation - "it
happened during project M going on in skunk basement under the X-1
building... probably". Or during night watch of some lonesome
programmer at his home/villa/castle.

The movie "Ex machina" has more of Lem in itself than half of the
movies "based on him" that I watched (the other half was great, but
none of it were done on big budget, thus probably unknown beyound a
circle of enthusiasts).

3. Who is going to judge consciousness of the black box? Humans are
not equal. Not everybody is great athlete. In my opinion, not
everybody is conscious to the same degree. Some folks I hear about
(maybe meet with) are on the level of legendary talking animals. I am
willing to believe that with some effort, they could upend themselves
a bit, just like everybody could become better athlete with some
patience (as long as he can steer a single muscle).

So who is going to judge AI? How do we choose the judge(s)? From my
observations, a good number of potential choices will still be naive
and unable to overcome their biases.

Who is going to judge consciousness of a tenured professor? Or a
politician? Should we test voters? If yes, how exactly? What to do
with those who fail? I guess, give them more blockbusters and
entertainment... 

-- 
Regards,
Tomasz Rola

--
** A C programmer asked whether computer had Buddha's nature.  **
** As the answer, master did "rm -rif" on the programmer's home**
** directory. And then the C programmer became enlightened...  **
** **
** Tomasz Rola  mailto:tomasz_r...@bigfoot.com **

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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 



On 9/7/2020 4:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 2:33 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:


>///I am also personally offended that Baggott gives short shrift
to superdeterminism./


Don't worry about it, nobody ever died from being offended.

>/He either mistakenly or accidentally leaves the reader with the
impression that these have been ruled out for good, which is most
definitely not the case./


Nobody will ever be able to prove that superdeterminism is untrue, 
it's specifically engineered in such a way to make sure that could 
never happen, but it is certainly possible to prove that 
superdeterminism is silly. It says that in order for the world to be 
the way it appears to be now the initial conditions of the universe 
13.8 billion years ago MUST have been in one and only one SUPER 
specific starting condition, and in science the more assumptions you 
have to make in order for your theory to work the less valuable it is, 
and it's impossible to imagine a theory about anything that needs more 
assumptions to work than superdeterminism, except perhaps for the God 
Theory.


It's not an assumption.  It's an inference.  Determinism is the 
assumption.  And just as for Laplace, determinism entails that the 
universe began in a state which dynamics maps one-to-one into our 
current state.


If you instead assume indeterminism then that entails a SUPER SPECIFIC 
sequence of random events to arrive at our current state.


Brent

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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou 
On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 21:36, John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 2:33 AM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
> > *I am also personally offended that Baggott gives short shrift to
>> superdeterminism.*
>>
>
> Don't worry about it, nobody ever died from being offended.
>
> > *He either mistakenly or accidentally leaves the reader with the
>> impression that these have been ruled out for good, which is most
>> definitely not the case.*
>>
>
> Nobody will ever be able to prove that superdeterminism is untrue, it's
> specifically engineered in such a way to make sure that could never happen,
> but it is certainly possible to prove that superdeterminism is silly. It
> says that in order for the world to be the way it appears to be now the
> initial conditions of the universe 13.8 billion years ago MUST have been in
> one and only one SUPER specific starting condition,
>

Isn’t that just determinism?

and in science the more assumptions you have to make in order for your
> theory to work the less valuable it is, and it's impossible to imagine a
> theory about anything that needs more assumptions to work than
> superdeterminism, except perhaps for the God Theory.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
>
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> 
> .
>
>
> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread Lawrence Crowell 
On Monday, September 7, 2020 at 9:06:21 AM UTC-5 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 8:02 AM Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
>
>> > *The Bell inequality means that if we assume reality, which is there 
>> is some existential basis for observables prior to a measurement, then we 
>> have nonlocality.*
>>
> You could still have locality if things were SUPER-deterministic, but 
> that's the only way you could have Reality, Locality and Determinism. And 
> regular determinism won't work because that just means the present state Is 
> determined by the previous one, you need SUPER-determinism which means 
> the universe had to start out in one and only one SUPER specific state 
> 13.8 billion years ago. I think it would be nice to have Reality, Locality 
> and Determinism but SUPER-determinism is far far too high a price to pay 
> for having all 3. I'll have to settle for Reality. 
>
> John K Clark
>

Much of this issue of superdeterminism is an interest in having local 
hidden variables. In the Wigner set up, observers and their friends,, it is 
natural to assume there is a joint probability for all four measurements of 
Alice-Bob and Charlie-Debbie. Following reasoning with local hidden 
variables correlations must obey Bell inequalities. One of the Bell 
inequalities, two measurement settings per party and binary outcomes, is 
violated in a six-photon experiment [Proietti, M. et al. Sci. Adv. 5, 9832 
(2019]. This supports the conclusion no joint probability exists, which 
means superobserver's and the friend's data are fundamentally inconsistent. 

In this setting we can have a superdeterminism, but nobody can agree on 
anything. Superdeterminism just means there is a causal set that is unitary 
for such local variables, but the locality requirement means there is no 
consistency between the data observers report. This is of course not a way 
we would ordinarily choose to actually measure things, so we loosen the 
locality requirement and the Bell inequality violations are consistent with 
nonlocality. 

Superdeterminism is not that super; if to compare to superheroes it is less 
superman and maybe more antman. 

LC

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou 
On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
>>> possible subjectivity”.
>>
>>
>> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
>> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
>> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
>> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the
>> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
>> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>>
>
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John
> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there
> is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk
> out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100%
> chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is the
> probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in this
> hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
> Clark's ignorance.
>

The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
some gambler will buy the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the
tickets are sold.

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruce Kellett 
On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
 possible subjectivity”.
>>>
>>>
>>> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
>>> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
>>> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
>>> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the
>>> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
>>> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>>>
>>
>> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
>> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
>> there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
>> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
>> 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
>> the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
>> this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>>
>> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
>> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
>> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
>> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
>> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
>> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
>> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
>> Clark's ignorance.
>>
>
> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
> prime number,
>


How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?

Bruce

not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler who buys a
> lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one particular gambler
> will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that some gambler will buy
> the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the tickets are sold.
>

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Re: QM gets personal

2020-09-07 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 



On 9/7/2020 7:05 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 8:02 AM Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


> /The Bell inequality means that if we assume reality, which is
there is some existential basis for observables prior to a
measurement, then we have nonlocality./

You could still have locality if things were SUPER-deterministic, but 
that's the only way you could have Reality, Locality and Determinism. 
And regular determinism won't work because that just means the present 
state Is determined by the previous one, you need SUPER-determinism 
which means the universe had to start out in one and only one SUPER 
specific state 13.8 billion years ago.


But that's true of any deterministic theory whose dynamics are time 
reversible. Such a theory, like Newton's clockwork universe has 
one-to-one time evolution mapping.  You seem think a merely 
deterministic, but non-reversible theory is unremarkable and easy to 
accept.  But such a theory implies that time reversal maps one-to-many 
and so many possible pasts converged to today.  That seems as least as 
preposterous and super-determinism.


Brent

I think it would be nice to have Reality, Locality and Determinism but 
SUPER-determinism is far far too high a price to pay for having all 
3. I'll have to settle for Reality.


John K Clark


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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou 
On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
> possible subjectivity”.


 *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
 different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
 differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
 in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the
 room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
 probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*

>>>
>>> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
>>> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
>>> there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
>>> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
>>> 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
>>> the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
>>> this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>>>
>>> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
>>> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
>>> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
>>> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
>>> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
>>> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
>>> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
>>> Clark's ignorance.
>>>
>>
>> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
>> prime number,
>>
>
>
> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>

Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruce Kellett 
On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:44 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
>> possible subjectivity”.
>
>
> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open 
> the
> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>

 In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
 John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
 there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
 will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
 the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
 this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.

 However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
 those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
 prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
 legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
 are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
 subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
 is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
 Clark's ignorance.

>>>
>>> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
>>> prime number,
>>>
>>
>>
>> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
>> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>>
>
> Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
> question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
> see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
> that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
> question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?
>


The question of dualism arises more acutely from the 1p perspective: "if I
am duplicated in the 100 rooms, what is the probability that I will see a
prime number?" Take a random selection from the 100: will that one be me?
If, for any possible selection, the answer is "yes, that will be me" (all
the copies are "me"), then the probability that "I" will see a prime is
one, since 25 of the "mes" will see primes. If only one selection will give
me, then you have dualism, and a 25% chance that I will see a prime. In
your account above, the selection is equivalent to just asking "if I select
a room at random, what is the probability that the door will have a prime
number?" The fact that there is a copy of JC in the room becomes irrelevant
to the probability, which is simply determined by the ratio of the number
of primes to the number of doors.

Bruce

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